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Allan Lavell, Cassidy Johnson and Garima Jain
The problem
In cities of the global South, low- income populations suffer dispropor-
tionately the impacts of climatic and other hazard events, as well as being 
exposed to everyday risks to health, life, livelihood and human security. 
Within these populations, women, the elderly, disabled people and those 
belonging to particular ethnic or social groups may be especially vulner-
able. The COVID- 19 pandemic is reconfirming the nature of who is most 
exposed and vulnerable to the different hazards society faces on a recur-
rent or long- term basis. The growing inequality faced by society and its 
repercussions on many livelihoods and lifestyle conditions are of major 
concern in terms of understanding this relationship.
As one way of reducing existing disaster risk, national and local 
governments, often supported by international funding agencies, engage 
in resettlement and relocation processes. While this may reduce people’s 
exposure to hazard, it can lead to numerous other problems, which can 
leave people more vulnerable or worse off than they were before. This vol-
ume seeks to understand better the challenges and associated outcomes 
of such interventions on people and cities, and to examine ways forward 
for avoiding the need for resettlement or undertaking this endeavour in 
more holistic and integrated ways.
There are many examples and studies of the resettlement of popu-
lations, its causes and motivations, and the search to reconstitute their 
livelihoods and their infrastructural, economic, social, cultural and psy-
chological foundations (Ferris 2012; de Sherbinin, Castro and Gemenne 
2010; Mathur 1995; Mathur and Marsden 1998; Satiroglu and Choi 
2015). These include the demand for land for the development of large- 
scale infrastructure projects or for urban renovation, or the need to settle 
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and resettlement due to the incidence or potential incidence of damaging 
climatic and other natural hazards are becoming increasingly common, 
especially in urban areas (Correa 2011). Climate change and its impact 
on hydro- meteorological hazards will probably increase this need in the 
future.
These movements and processes (unless completely spontaneous) 
require legal or normative frameworks in which to operate, institutional 
and organisational set- ups for achieving set goals, mechanisms for financ-
ing and systems for monitoring (Ferris 2014). Experience has shown that 
many such processes incite social conflict, competing demands and dis-
satisfaction with (or suspicion of) government and its ability to provide 
solutions. Many have not been carried out in planned, participatory, sus-
tainable and sustained manners (Menon- Sen and Bhan 2008; Cabannes, 
Guimarães Yafai and Johnson 2010; Cernea and Mathur 2007).
When relocation or resettlement are related to the presence or 
potential presence and impact of damaging physical events of climatic 
and meteorological, geological, geomorphological or oceanographic ori-
gin, such practice is often conceived as part of what is now commonly 
known as disaster risk management (DRM). It then constitutes one of 
the many methods available for ‘reducing’ (corrective management) 
or ‘anticipating or preventing’ (prospective management) disaster risk. 
The latter may increasingly be related to climate change hazards (de 
Sherbinin et al. 2011).
Disaster risk- related relocation and resettlement may take one of 
many forms and be inspired and implemented according to many insti-
tutional and organisational, legal and normative, planning and partici-
patory schemes. When decision and implementation are led by different 
organisations and institutions, varying rationales and processes may pre-
vail. Thus, for example, resettlement and relocation are often related to 
land use planning processes as well as to disaster risk reduction goals. 
In fact, independent of the disaster risk link, resettlement may be seen 
as a concern that essentially derives from land use planning needs. In 
this case, the criteria for decision- making could differ substantially from 
those where disaster risk management concerns and practices are preva-
lent and the starting point for the process.
In general, similar conditions and processes play out in different 
time periods and help explain the permanently growing populations in 
areas exposed to hazards, and to hydro- meteorological hazards in par-
ticular. Little has been studied or written based on empirical evidence 
about the future impacts of climate change on the insecurity of such 




hazards and eventually the risk conditions that are a prelude to disasters 
(Revi et al. 2014). A consideration of the data and the facts presented 
allows us to identify a number of challenges and defining factors for risk 
reduction among urban populations and how resettlement interven-
tions address regional- level systemic issues and the impact of large- scale 
investments in resettlement programmes on climate change.
Firstly, the number of persons living in highly hazard- prone areas is 
large and is growing. Here it should be noted that the notion of ‘unmiti-
gable’ risk is specific to a particular population group. What is unmitiga-
ble for the urban poor is not necessarily unmitigable for the urban rich 
and economic and commercial interests as a whole. Beyond the prevail-
ing economic processes and the concentration of income in cities, the 
continued migration of poorer populations is the main cause of location 
in unsafe areas, and climate change is expected to impact rural popula-
tions in such ways that rural- to- urban migration continues. The sum of 
these processes and their accumulative results means that countries face 
an almost impossible task in promoting pre- impact resettlement of even 
the most ‘at-risk’ populations. The numbers are simply too great and the 
resources too scarce. Also, the administrative process leading to state- 
incentivised resettlement is still nascent. This suggests that resettlement 
can most appropriately be seen as a means of last resort, once all other 
options for risk reduction have been considered and discarded (Ferris 
2012). This is relevant not only when we consider the social and eco-
nomic disruption resettlement can and has caused, but also because it is 
impossible to think of resettlement for all those in such need, even less so 
if one thinks of future population growth in unsafe areas.
A second question and challenge relate to the ability to offer alter-
natives to continued location in highly risk- prone areas, thus avoid-
ing, from the outset, the need for future resettlement. Resettlement is 
mostly a palliative for disaster risk: a needed option due to prior failure 
to control location in already hazard- prone areas. Only in cases where 
the physical hazard has developed in post- location periods, as can be the 
case with changed conditions due to environmental degradation and 
climate change, for example, can we think of resettlement as a needed 
solution for changed conditions. It is, however, a need principally dic-
tated by humanitarian, social and political considerations in post- impact 
situations. The search for greater prospective control over settlement in 
hazard- prone areas is present but still latent. This means that now, and 
in the future, resettlement will probably only be a real option in most 
cases for post- impact populations, those that have suffered disaster and 
where decision- making as to need and priority is dictated by the pressure 
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of circumstances, political considerations and short- term needs. This of 
course does not exonerate us or government from searching for mecha-
nisms for the prospective control of location in insecure sites.
On population movement and resettlement
A consideration of the extensive literature on voluntary and involuntary 
population movements, relocation and resettlement reveals that we are 
dealing with a complex topic with common roots but also clear differ-
ences in context and circumstance (Ferris 2012, 2014; Oliver- Smith 
2012). Thus, understanding what is what and recognising the diversity 
of different circumstances and conditions is essential. This diversity also 
indicates that we are perhaps not dealing with a single integrated, eas-
ily identified problem, but rather with a series of different circumstances 
which, if examined jointly, show common features but also a sum of sig-
nificant differences. When this diversity of circumstances is applied to 
the problem of classifying, constructing typologies or systematising the 
different conditions under which movement takes place or is induced, 
this must be accompanied by a heterogeneous understanding of the pro-
posed or possible solutions to the problems identified.
Here we will provide a view from the inside that derives from a 
consideration of prior terminologies and ideas, but which is coloured by 
the experience of the research project this book is predicated on (Ferris 
2012, 2014; Correa 2011; Oliver- Smith and de Sherbinin 2014). Neither 
here nor later are we postulating a conceptual frame for the research as 
such (although this is implicit in what is said and analysed), but rather 
we are offering an advance on conclusions derived from the research 
itself. It is not our intention to review existing terminologies and notions, 
but instead to derive a conclusion about the most appropriate terms to be 
used in understanding and constructing typologies that lead to an under-
standing of causal factors, conditions for and solutions to the problem of 
hazard- prone urban populations.
The starting point for any discussion on terminology is the notion 
of the spatial movement, mobility or displacement of population. Such 
movement may be voluntary – planned as a collective response, or spon-
taneously undertaken at an individual family level, normally stimulated 
by the search for betterment or security. Or it may be involuntary or 
obligatory – dictated by a hierarchically more pervasive social institu-
tion or force, normally some level of government, which applies the law 




of repression. Repression and force may and have been used by private- 
sector interests in the search to increase land rent for economic gain. This 
is a form of usurpation which constitutes theft unless undertaken with 
the complicity of the state, which may give it some appearance or status 
of legality. For example, land grabbing is now a major problem in the 
developing world, and can be couched in terms related to risk and natu-
ral hazards.
Voluntary or involuntary movements in response to climate- 
related hazards may occur under a series of different circumstances or 
contexts: firstly, and most dominantly, as a response to a disaster event 
which seriously impacts the existing population or community, leading 
to wide- scale loss of housing and site security. Secondly, in response to a 
series of smaller sequenced events that accumulatively have led to dam-
age and loss, insecurity and fear of the future and which stimulate pre-
ventive thought and maybe action by population or authorities. Thirdly, 
as a preventive measure where it can be shown through scientific analysis 
or it is perceived that a serious event could and will occur in the near to 
medium- term future. Fourthly, where processes of environmental degra-
dation have led to a changed physical environment for a community with 
the possibility of hazard event occurrence in the future (socio- natural 
events such as land sliding and flooding due to deforestation on site 
and upstream). And lastly, where the average climate conditions have 
changed to such a degree that livelihoods as practised are no longer via-
ble at the present location (this situation can be increasingly expected in 
areas severely affected by climate change and where there is dependency 
on agricultural or natural resource- based initiatives).
Under any of these conditions the voluntary or obligatory move-
ment and relocation of persons may be justified in terms of reduced dis-
aster risk. At the same time, obligatory movement may also at times be 
explained by ulterior motives such as the potential revalorisation of the 
abandoned site, development needs and redevelopment of city centres 
by private- sector and government actors. Nothing undermines the cred-
ibility of government or the private sector more than the development 
of abandoned land for private or public gain where this was not explicit 
when the resettlement was proposed. In the case of preventative (as 
opposed to post- disaster) movements, the onus of responsibility for justi-
fying the move, the complexity this involves and the technical arguments 
favouring it are seriously increased due to uncertainty and the fact that 
resettlement will seriously interrupt accepted ongoing livelihood pro-
cesses and patterns and service provision on- site.
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Considering the population that moves under conditions of cli-
mate and hydrological stress, we may identify two different contexts. 
Firstly, entire communities or zones of a city (including at times multi- 
community zones, contiguous in geographical terms). These may be of 
varied sizes from small – let us say 15– 30 families – to very large, up to 
or above a population size of fifteen thousand. At times whole towns 
have been relocated or the functions of cities reassigned to new loca-
tions, even though the original city persists with changed or modified 
functions (for example the resiting of the capital of Belize from Belize 
City to Belmopan due to hurricane threats to the functioning of govern-
ment and society).
Secondly, individual families or small groups of families from 
diverse hazard- prone communities in the same urban centre who are 
selected at the same time or in the frame of the same relocation/ reset-
tlement process or political decision. Such a process normally follows the 
occurrence of hazard events that seriously affect various parts of a town 
or city contemporaneously and which have affected some but not all of 
the community. The impacts of such ‘splitting’ of communities or families 
can be considerable, reducing access to social networks and livelihood 
options. Resettlement, particularly of this sort, can also occasion consid-
erable emotional stress and sentiments of loss and alienation that can 
affect the adaptive process to the new environment (Quinn et al. 2018).
On options and solutions to voluntary and involuntary 
movement and the idea of typologies
In any attempt to provide a conceptual basis for understanding the 
 processes of planned human movement under hazard stress it is necessary 
to also consider the range of options that exist as regards a solution to the 
problem of hazardous location. Here, evidence (including that from the 
present research) suggests various generic types of solution. Firstly, the 
movement all together of a community, small or large, to a single alterna-
tive location, where access to an adequate site is critical in the decision 
(adequate in the multiple sense of cost efficient, security of tenure, safe 
from hazard, well located as regards employment opportunities, services 
and communications, non- invasive of protected ecological zones, etc.).
Secondly, the movement all together of more than one community 
from different or the same parts of a town or city to a single new site and 
where access to adequate land and considerations of intercommunity 




Thirdly, the creation of new communities in safer locations made 
up of individual families from different hazard- prone locations from the 
same or different cities or towns.
Fourthly, the movement of families or individuals from an exist-
ing community to diverse and different parts of a town or city according 
to their own choices and options for purchase or renting of alternative 
accommodation. This may include such schemes as those where persons 
offered relocation to a common site may reject this but are given the 
option of finding a family from a non- hazard- prone area that does want 
to occupy the new location and where the original beneficiary occupies 
their house. This demands that the house is certified as being in a safe 
and adequate location. This implies that people will be integrated into 
existing communities, which in itself may occasion a series of problems 
and challenges with respect to competition with the host community for 
resources as well as a potential for conflict on ethnic or class bases.
Clearly, in terms of populations in movement and the creation of 
new living habitats and spaces, if we consider the different conditions that 
stimulate movement and the characteristics of the moving populations, 
any typology (or double typology) would be very large. If we assume that 
defined types of population situations or contexts determine the need for 
specific and identifiable optimums in terms of types of solution, such a 
crossing of typologies could be a basis for the evaluation of real cases 
and the factors governing their success or not. Refer to Appendix A for a 
summary of typology of resettlement and relocation interventions from 
the research project.
On terminology
The case studies in this volume, together with past experience, lead us 
to a reflection on terminology in the search to differentiate between con-
texts or situations which are of importance when considering process and 
success and failure vis- à- vis the social and economic impacts of change.
A basic difference in types of movement, and their spatial and social 
aspects, requires a consideration of the relationship between livelihoods 
and the social structure of the original and the new location. Although 
the physical distance between these is important in any distinction, the 
notion of social and functional distance is more important. Thus, popu-
lation that is moved or moves but can, without additional cost or major 
effort, maintain its current livelihood schemes, its access to services 
and determined levels of social relation and cohesion can be considered 
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under one category of movement. This category we can refer to as ‘relo-
cation’.1 This category may include whole communities, large and small, 
single or composite, or individual families and persons from different or 
the same locations that are dispersed in the city or located together in a 
new habitat.
On the other hand, where movement clearly interrupts or seriously 
modifies the existing livelihood options and the types of access to exist-
ing services, and involves a need for consideration of past, or the develop-
ment of new social relations and patterns of coexistence, we will refer to 
this as ‘resettlement’.2 This derives from a consideration of the term ‘set-
tlement’ itself, which constitutes a condition characterised and defined 
by the creation of habitat and the generation and consolidation of liveli-
hood options and social relations between members of a new community, 
made up of extended families, friends and others.
An alternative to this form of definition, and more in line with 
ongoing developments in international work on the topic, would be to 
consider all movements as planned (or administered or supervised) relo-
cation and then distinguish between the two contexts discussed above 
using some other terminology. However, from our perspective the key 
distinction between relocation and resettlement derives from the fact 
that the notion of settlement implies a complex development of multiple 
dimensions of human existence, whereas relocation does not necessarily 
mean this, as structures, relations, behaviour patterns and goals may stay 
the same despite a change of location (relocation). A distinction should 
be made between forms of resettlement that bring a resource bundle 
with it, however meagre or inadequate, and outright displacement with 
no assistance of any sort.
The relevance of the details we provide in the examination of the 
multiple factors that change and condition the population movement 
scenario can be found in its relevance for an understanding of decision- 
making and implementation. Clearly, given the array of different cir-
cumstances under which movement takes place and for which solutions 
are sought, there can be no single theory or materialisation of decision- 
making and implementation procedures. Certain key factors and circum-
stances can be seen to come into play in general, but beyond these generic 
aspects, many cases show sui generis and idiosyncratic characteristics, and 
the notion of standard processes and procedures or set policy briefs and 
recommendations becomes difficult to achieve (there is now a plethora of 
guidelines developed internationally regarding relocation, forced move-
ment and resettlement related to climate, often based on knowledge 





developed for this (for example see Leckie 2013). Relocation and reset-
tlement are dynamic, context- related processes that show an enormous 
range of options, decisions and implementation challenges. This does not 
of course mean that lessons cannot be learned from a comparative study 
of different cases, nor that such a study cannot serve to identify a series 
of key elements which, if not taken into consideration, will lead to severe 
implementation and outcome problems. In pointing out the idiosyncratic 
character of many schemes, we are merely indicating the need for caution 
when decisions are taken and implementation is made effective.
Scope of the book
This book draws on the empirical findings of the ‘Reducing Relocation 
Risk in Urban Areas’ project, with contributions from the project team, 
as well as contributions from authors not directly part of the project but 
in line with its areas of enquiry. The book aims to reflect widely on the 
problem of resettlement and relocation from areas exposed to climate 
and non- climatic risks. It sees this problem firmly within the context of 
several strands of literature, including that on preventative resettlement 
and development displacement, on disaster risk management, and on 
planning, development and resilience in urban areas of the global South.
About the research project ‘reducing relocation risk 
in urban Areas’
The project ‘Reducing Relocation Risk in Urban Areas’ ran from 2015 to 
2017. Funded by the Climate and Development Knowledge Network, it 
was conducted by the researchers at four partner organisations from the 
global South and North, including the Bartlett Development Planning 
Unit at UCL, the Indian Institute for Human Settlements, the Secretariat 
General’s Office of the Latin American Social Science Faculty (Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales – FLACSO) and Makerere 
University, Uganda.
Through empirical analysis, the project looked across  several 
case studies3 from India, Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Uganda to 
 understand 1) the political, economic and institutional contexts in which 
relocation and resettlement from disaster risk areas takes place; 2) the 
costs and benefits of relocation and resettlement from both governments’ 
and individuals’ perspectives; and 3) how relocation and resettlement 
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aim was not to be comparative, but to understand the realities in each of 
the country contexts in order to build an empirical and theoretical basis 
for understanding the problem.
The research took place in four phases. For the first, diagnostic, 
phase of the research, each of the country studies began in 2015 with 
a documentary review to look for experiences of resettlement in the 
country and to create an inventory of case studies, as is evidenced in 
Appendix A, which outlines the typologies of interventions. The sec-
ond phase of the research was fieldwork in each country, focused on 
the selected case studies. The selection of case studies was dependent 
on addressing the relevant typologies in the country, and the scale of 
the research endeavour was dependent on the resources available to 
teams, which differed by country. The objective of the fieldwork was 
to find out the experiences of resettlement from the perspectives of 
individuals, communities, governments and other stakeholders. These 
took the form of interviews, focus groups and surveys with households 
and stakeholders, conducted in local languages. The third phase of the 
research was to draw upon the fieldwork in each country to develop a 
method for cost– benefit analysis for each country, trying to understand 
from the government, individuals’ and collective perspectives how 
relocation and resettlement impacts people’s wellbeing and resilience 
over different timeframes. The fourth phase of the research was a cross- 
regional analysis, of which this book forms an element, in addition to 
the policy brief in Appendix B. All of these reports can be found on the 
project website.4
In India, the field study included nine sites in the state of Odisha 
and seven in the state of Andhra Pradesh. The study also included five 
rural sites to present a counterpoint to urban resettlement practices, 
highlighting the distinct issues and challenges faced in the urban area. 
These sites represented a mix of resettlement, relocation, in situ hous-
ing and infrastructure upgrading interventions (see Table 3.1 for more 
detail). Decision- making and implementation processes were under-
stood through 26 interviews with key officials and policymakers and two 
consultations each with 45 policymakers. Community- level information, 
for example on infrastructure conditions and cultural norms, was gath-
ered through 10 group discussions. To understand more household- level 
risks, 158 primary household- level surveys were conducted to assess 
changes in various indicators before and after the intervention. Some 
individuals, especially those with special needs such as the disabled, 
elderly, minorities and women, were identified and 15 were interviewed 




interventions. The methods and sample design used in the India study 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of the book, and references to 
the original reports are included there.
In Colombia, the fieldwork was not specifically done for the pro-
ject, but rather was based on fieldwork and research carried out by the 
Colombian team in Manizales over some years, using interviews and 
documentary sources.
In Mexico, the research was carried out in the municipality of 
Celestún, and the fieldwork methodology consisted of visits to selected 
projects in the municipality of Celestún: Las Charcas and Colonia 
FONDEN, and included meetings with focus groups in both resettlements 
and free- form interviews with residents and government authorities of 
federal, state (Yucatán) and municipality (Celestún) levels. The case 
study is elaborated in Chapter 13.
In Peru, the research focused on the Amazonian city of Belén, and 
was based on interviews and focus groups in high- risk zones and in the 
area of the resettlement, interviews with government authorities and 
employees at a national, regional and local level, and interviews with the 
Lower Belén population that had moved spontaneously to other resettle-
ment sites. The case study, and more details about the sample sizes, are 
presented in Chapter 8.
In Uganda, the fieldwork was focused in Kampala, and particularly 
on two settlements in the central part of the city (Bwaise III and Natete) 
that are located in low- lying, often flooded neighbourhoods and have 
been subject to relocation from a drainage channel expansion. The field-
work consisted of interviews with residents living in both settlements, 
as well as families that had relocated out of the settlements; in total 70 
interviews were conducted. This was complemented by interviews with 
nine stakeholders including municipal officials. The case study is detailed 
in Chapters 4, 9 and 15.
The key findings from across the countries are generalised and 
have been published as a policy brief, which is included in Appendix B. 
However, it is worthwhile to indicate, in a succinct way, the key findings 
here in the introduction. They set up a framework or a starting point for 
our analysis in this book.
1. Resettlement and relocation may reduce people’s exposure to haz-
ards – but experience shows that in most cases, it leaves people worse 
off overall in social and economic terms than they were before.
2. In some cases, hazard exposure also continues despite the resettle-
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safer locations for new green- site settlements, in order to avoid future 
needs for resettlement due to poor location in hazard- prone areas.
3. Resettlement should always be considered a last resort after all 
options for on- site mitigation or upgrading have been exhausted. 
Decision- making authorities may, and often do, understand risks 
differently from the communities living in environments that they 
know and understand, and alternative actions to resettlement may be 
possible.
4. Policies and procedures must ensure people’s rights are protected; 
legal frameworks may need to be strengthened; and international 
covenants on resettlement must be honoured.
Organisation of the book
The book is organised into five parts in addition to this introduction and 
a concluding chapter. Each part addresses a particular issue of disaster 
risk- related resettlement and relocation. It should be mentioned that 
most chapters touch on more than one issue and thus many of the themes 
explored cross the boundaries of the parts described below.
Part 1 provides a critical framing of the related concepts, plac-
ing resettlement and relocation in context within the development and 
planning discourses in urban areas of the global South. Contributors 
discuss the meanings we place on important terms in the discourse, 
such as ‘settlement’ and ‘habitat’: notions that influence how we see the 
problem of resettlement and relocation. The chapters frame resettle-
ment as a last- resort approach for disaster risk management, and as an 
unfortunate outcome of development failures. The contributions point 
to current deficiencies in the implementation of resettlement schemes 
and provide a critical examination of the elements that need to go into 
decision- making.
Part 2 scrutinises the understanding and interpretation of the sub-
jective concept of ‘risk’: how risk is understood, calculated and employed 
to decide who is at risk and to what extent it is possible to mitigate these 
risks. The interpretation of risk is a crucial element in whether resettle-
ment is an appropriate course of action. The contributions shed light on 
how residents and communities tolerate disaster risks as a trade- off for 
other benefits and aspects they value about a particular location. This 




see disaster risk as a more classic calculation of possible losses associated 
with calculations of hazard, vulnerability and exposure.
Following that, Part 3 looks particularly at how urban communities 
are resisting and protesting against being resettled. The contributions 
in this section examine how power and politics often undermine con-
fidence that communities have in a proposed resettlement. Resistance 
takes many forms, and the chapters look at how resistance activities have 
impacted on decision- making for resettlement.
How land is held and transacted is an important puzzle piece in 
understanding patterns of disaster risk- related resettlement and relocation. 
This theme is examined in Part 4. The contributions look at how land rights 
and land tenure patterns influence decisions about resettlement and on- site 
upgrading. Evictions and dispossession are key themes across the chapters, 
highlighting that what is termed disaster risk- related ‘resettlement’ is often 
akin to eviction, as people may be displaced without adequate compensa-
tion that allows them to resettle, and may have little voice in the process.
Part 5 contains contributions that examine the issues of resettle-
ment or relocation to or from ecologically sensitive areas of the city. They 
explore the contradiction between desired development and required 
conservation, which leads to a clear paradox in natural protected areas. 
Occupation of wetland or riverside areas means people are more exposed 
(so they may want to relocate if given the option), but these occupations 
can also impact on the functioning of the wider city, if, for example, 
water resources are affected for the population as a whole. The contri-
butions explore how enhanced management of these resources may be 
better than resettlement.
Part 1: framing the issues
In Chapter 1, Allan Lavell seeks to deconstruct the hypothesis that reset-
tlement is beset by decision- making and implementation procedures that 
lack understanding of the structural and contextual reasons for risk exist-
ing in the first place. The chapter therefore delves into visions, concepts, 
mindsets and notions that are used in the practice of resettlement. It 
also critically analyses the failures in disaster risk management policy in 
general, recognising that resettlement is most likely to be used as a last- 
resort mechanism for disaster risk reduction.
Anne-Catherine Chardon, in Chapter 2, critiques the current 
approaches of resettlement for their focus on physical or natural spaces 
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in place of understanding the fundamental factors of ‘habitat’ and ‘inhab-
itation’ that relate to social, cultural, economic or financial vulnerability. 
She bases her arguments on an examination of resettlement projects in 
Manizales, Colombia. She argues that while in theory there is reason to 
focus on ‘inhabiting’ and all that entails, in praxis there is an incomplete 
institutional vision that does not allow for these qualitative factors.
Chapter 3 by Garima Jain uses case studies from both rural and 
urban contexts in India to understand to what extent disaster and 
everyday risks are really reduced by a resettlement and relocation 
intervention. Through detailed empirical data collected as part of the 
‘Reducing Relocation Risk’ project, this chapter examines the decision- 
making processes and implementation procedures that went into the 
resettlement and relocation, and links this to the outcomes of the pro-
jects. This yields several important observations about urban resettle-
ment projects, including that post- disaster housing developments focus 
narrowly on reducing hazard exposure, and in the process create other 
socio- economic risks.
Part 2: understanding and interpreting risk
In Chapter 4, Cassidy Johnson, Garima Jain, Vineetha Nalla and José 
Delfín Cáceres- Martínez look at how policy actors measure and interpret 
risks, and how this affects decisions that are made about resettlement. 
The authors consider national policies, including those related to ‘non- 
mitigable risk’ in Peru and ‘non- tenable slums’ in India. Also drawing on 
Uganda as a case study, they consider how risk, as understood in those 
policies, is quite different from residents’ risk tolerance and their tipping 
points for relocation.
How to weigh up the costs and benefits of resettlement is the topic 
of Chapter 5 by Shuaib Lwasa, Amir Bazaz and Garima Jain. This chapter 
draws on empirical data from research undertaken in India and Uganda, 
as part of the ‘Reducing Relocation Risk’ project, to illustrate how the 
narrow economic valuation of risk can be enhanced with an extended 
value list to inform decisions at various levels of actors.
Emily Wilkinson, in Chapter 6, draws on research in Montserrat 
after the 1995– 9 volcanic eruption, which destroyed the capital Plymouth 
and led to the resettlement in the north of all those remaining on the 
island. Looking at aligning attitudes to risk tolerance, she argues that the 
resettlement policy ‘worked’ when local and central levels of risk toler-






analyses why attitudes towards risk tolerance have changed and what are 
the impacts of these changes.
Part 3: protest and power: resistance to resettlement
Focusing specifically on the urban question of disaster- and climate 
change- induced resettlements, in Chapter 7 Anthony Oliver- Smith 
explores the reasons why residents in urban areas resist resettlement. 
He argues that rights, governance regimes and policies can be driv-
ers of resistance. He pinpoints the aspects of a community that make 
resistance to resettlement possible and offers a typology of tactics for 
resistance.
Chapter 8, by Angel Wilson Chávez Eslava, looks in depth at the 
resistances to the New City of Belén resettlement project in Iquitos, 
Peru. Drawing on research conducted during the ‘Reducing Relocation 
Risk’ project, he presents an analysis of the conflicts and power relations 
among the different actors and reflects on what this means for resilience 
and local culture.
Part 4: land issues in resettlement
Based on the study of Kampala, Uganda, in Chapter 9 Colin Marx looks at 
how property rights influence who is accountable for risk, and for reset-
tlement and compensation. The tangle of property rights in Kampala 
means that local authorities have little prospect in enforcing people to 
stay away from settling in flood- prone areas, and it also means that when 
residents were evicted due to risk- reducing infrastructure investments, 
complex land tenure arrangements isolated residents from receiving 
assistance for their losses.
Chapter 10, by Yves Cabannes, looks at forced evictions in order 
to place risk- induced resettlement and relocation within the context of 
drivers of forced evictions in urban areas. He uses David Harvey’s model 
of ‘accumulation through dispossession’ to explain the breadth, depth 
and variety of evictions taking place worldwide, primarily those that 
are climate change or disaster induced. The end of the chapter offers 
some glimpses of innovative programmes of emerging anti- hegemonic 
practices.
Giovanna Astolfo navigates the history and current urban trans-
formation trajectory of Phnom Penh, Cambodia in Chapter 11. Using a 
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unprecedented scale of dispossession that made relocation and resettle-
ment a lawful exercise of violence. She reflects that the production and 
sharing of knowledge is a central issue to be addressed in risk- related 
resettlement.
Chapter 12, by Bill Flinn and Holly Schofield, focuses on the con-
cept of self- recovery, which has been adopted by humanitarian practi-
tioners as a method of supporting people’s agency and choices about how 
and where to rebuild after a disaster. This chapter examines recovery in 
an urban and a rural area after the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, which devas-
tated the Visayas region of the Philippines and illustrates how land ten-
ure security influences people’s choices to rebuild on-site or relocate.
Part 5: natural resource and human occupation issues
Chapter 13 draws on research Elizabeth Mansilla undertook as part of 
the ‘Reducing Relocation Risk’ project about resettlement in the Ría 
Celestún Biosphere Reserve in Yucatán, Mexico. She questions the logic 
that a conventional approach to wholesale resettlement of the popula-
tion is the answer, and instead proposes that a more imaginative idea 
of development, based on a comprehensive management of the environ-
mental, social and urban challenges prevailing in the area, could be a 
better alternative.
In Chapter 14 Garima Jain, Chandni Singh and Teja Malladi offer 
a case study of Chennai, India to exemplify how post- disaster resettle-
ment can further aggravate risks for the settlers and for the city if the 
resettlement locations are also exposed to hazards. They show how the 
direct socio- economic implications of first the disaster, and then the pro-
cess of resettlement and the degraded conditions of living in risk- exposed 
resettlements, further exacerbate vulnerabilities. In effect, new socio- 
economic and ecological risks are created for the people as well as the 
city at large as a consequence of poorly planned interventions.
In the final chapter of the book (Chapter 15), Teddy Kisembo looks 
at household- level decision- making about relocation in Kampala. Based 
on empirical data from two neighbourhoods in environmentally sensitive 
wetland areas, she analyses the reasons why people tolerate risks and 
stay in the neighbourhood, and what are the tipping points that promote 
people to move. Although some people are drawn to staying in the neigh-





to move generally inhibits people from relocating to safer locations – as 
most would prefer to do, if they could.
Conclusion
The concluding chapter of the book synthesises and integrates the issues 
raised in the preceding chapters. The lessons learned about relocation 
and resettlement from multiple perspectives and geographical contexts 
are discussed, outlining the way forward through a series of recommen-
dations. These suggestions are aimed at helping practitioners to develop 
better processes for implementation and decision- making for disaster 
risk reduction and resettlement.
Notes
 1. Equivalent to relocalización or reubicación in Spanish.
 2. Reasentamiento in Spanish.
 3. See Appendix A for a mapping of the case studies across the relocation and resettlement typol-
ogy described earlier.
 4. https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ bartlett/ development/ reducing- relocation- risk- urban- areas.
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The overall problem and definition of relocation, resettlement and 
 rehabilitation, notions guiding such processes and possible alternatives, 
success and failure defined according to outcomes and the challenges of 
decision- making and implementation are common in different balances 
in the following three chapters. Allan Lavell’s contribution is generic and 
general, seeking to highlight the major dilemmas and contexts that have 
led to mostly unsuccessful resettlement and the combination of structur-
ally determined circumstances and conjunctural, context- based causes. 
Anne- Catherine Chardon, following an initial definition of habitat and 
habitat development as the basis for successful resettlement, examines 
the outcome of three interventions in Manizales City, Colombia over a 
25- year period; and Garima Jain, drawing from the Indian cases of reset-
tlement and relocation, analyses the combination of decision-making 
and implementation processes that led either to failure or at times to suc-
cesses in resettlement. All three recognise that resettlement or relocation 
is far more likely post- hazard impact and that pre-emptive,  prospective 
schemes are rarely undertaken.
The greater complexity and need for integrated, holistic approaches 
with resettlement as opposed to relocation is highlighted in all three 
contributions. Resettlement, seen as human habitat development by 
Chardon, as is implicit in the contributions of Lavell and Jain, emphasises 
the frequent lack of achievement of processes that go beyond merely 
building a house in a location that is safer from physical hazards.
Failures are analysed by Chardon, who examines the outcome 
side and the dissatisfaction or satisfaction of beneficiaries as expressed 
through interviews and on- site observation, including the size and 
design of housing and options and needs for modification and redesign, 
the integration of built and natural environments, the options for move-
ment to and from employment options, difficulties in payment of rent or 
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loans, conflicts between neighbours due to proximity and incompatible 
lifestyles. The ‘why’ of these contradictions is implicit but not the subject 
of explicit reasoning, except in the case of the one successful scheme of 
Yarumales.
Jain concentrates on the decision- making and implementation pro-
cesses and the ways these lead to different positive and negative outcomes 
across the cases under study. These include the lack of consideration of 
on- site upgrading as opposed to resettlement, discrimination against 
the marginalised in selection processes for beneficiaries, transit housing 
provision, resettlement distances from original locations, indebtedness 
of persons prohibiting lack of access to new credit, housing style, lack of 
concern for caste and disability and grievance redressal, social support 
networks and financial security measures and trade- offs between differ-
ent risk contexts – chronic and disaster related.
The overall institutional set- ups for resettlement are examined and 
referred to particularly by Lavell and Jain, and the lack of integrality 
in these is highlighted. Two dominant themes arise. First, disaster risk 
management as a basis for resettlement often lacks a development basis 
and is more likely to concentrate on straightforward hazard reduction 
as opposed to integrated human development in a habitat mode. And 
second, while development projects as such rarely consider hazard risk, 
resettlement projects rarely consider development needs and parame-
ters. Only when multi- institutional, multi- criteria schemes are developed 
can there be hope for more consistently successful resettlement, but this 
is limited by the mindsets, visions and objectives of different institutions 
in a mode of working not sufficiently informed by contextual analysis and 
the needs and wishes of the so- called beneficiary population.
Questions raised by Jain in her conclusions are backed by the 
debate and findings in the other two chapters: the need for more consid-
eration of on- site upgrading; how to avoid the exclusion of the already 
marginal from beneficiary processes; greater sensitivity to context; and 
how to promote more prospective and pre-emptive resettlement under 




Resettlement and relocation:  
an approach to understanding failure 
and guiding success
Allan Lavell
Characterising and evaluating past climate- related resettlement at the 
urban or other territorial scales tends to lead to a number of pervasive 
overriding conclusions. One is the generally low level of success achieved 
with resettlement, when this is judged in terms of the satisfaction of 
the overall livelihood, economic, social and physical security needs of 
the resettled population (de Sherbinin et al. 2011; Oliver- Smith 1991, 
2013). Empirical analysis in many different places, at many times, on 
schemes of different size and complexity, enacted in different time peri-
ods, has revealed many of the common and sui generis reasons for failure 
or inadequate implementation of schemes. Shortfalls on finance, sector- 
based decisions and processes that fail to consider the satisfaction of 
livelihood needs, failure to consider social integration and employment 
creation, lack of access to transport, and poor house and urban planning 
are among the failings that appear with surprising regularity (Cernea 
2000; Jha and Duyne 2010). Thus, understanding failure in an immedi-
ate causal sense is not difficult, as the same factors or reasons come up 
repeatedly, although with different weights, balances and formats.
When the same problems appear repeatedly and are rarely dealt with 
adequately, despite ample knowledge of their importance and impact, we 
must assume that the type and content of questioning required to under-
stand failure probably needs modifying. Repetition of the same or similar 
problems time after time in the same or in different countries and the 
occasional appearance of a successful case, the exception that proves 
the rule, undoubtedly indicates a mistaken mindset, vision, concept or 
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structural interpretation of ends and means by decision- makers and 
implementers. That is to say, the processes and decisions are flawed due 
to an inadequate framing and contextualising of the problem.
The cross- continental, comparative research project whose results 
are presented in the present collection of essays sought to understand the 
decision- making, implementation and cost– benefit processes involved in 
urban hazard- induced ‘resettlement’ or ‘relocation’. This was achieved 
through discussion and thought on conceptual and theoretical matters, 
backed up with the use of selected case studies in six countries of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America (India, Uganda, Tanzania, Colombia, Mexico 
and Peru).
A basic starting hypothesis for research was that the results, ben-
efits or negative aspects of resettlement were defined by the nature and 
content of decision- making and implementation procedures and that 
this was structurally and contextually determined (see Figure 1.1 for a 
synthesis of the causal chain hypothesised). Implicit in this hypothesis, 
and increasingly explicit as the project proceeded, was the fact that deci-
sion and implementation are based on stakeholder visions, concepts, 
mindsets, ideas and notions on the why and what of the process referred 
to as ‘resettlement’. Framed as a research question, this means examin-
































Figure 1.1 From need to outcome: process and context. An illustration 
of the structurally and contextually determined causal chain for the 
process of resettlement. © Allan Lavell.
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concepts best explain outcomes (see Chapter 3 by Jain in this book). This 
can be typified in terms of segregated or partial knowledge and interest 
domains. The contrasting views and needs of stakeholders come much 
into play in conditioning the result of such processes. Of course, this does 
not discount the influence of such aspects as bureaucracy, inefficiency 
and inefficacy of government structures and organisations, the lack of 
collaboration and harmony among beneficiaries and other such contex-
tual aspects. However, the critical analytical framework for understand-
ing success and failure, gains and losses, has, from our perspective, to be 
found in the goals, visions and mindsets present as resettlement is con-
sidered and planned.
While the aspect of mindsets and visions and sector- defined goals 
and procedures may be used to analyse the process of resettlement, a sec-
ond analytical strand must, we postulate, be taken up in deliberating on 
successful or failed resettlement. This relates to the social context and 
origins of the settlement, for which resettlement is seen to be a solution. 
Here it is clear that the resettlement of poorer, more disadvantaged and 
excluded persons and families is vastly different to that of more well- off 
populations, even where the prime stimulus for resettlement is similar – 
in our case, security from physical hazard. Whereas in the second case, 
government intervention is limited and the population can account for 
the livelihood security that needs to accompany the decision on a safer 
location, this is not the case with poorer populations (Jain et al. 2017). In 
this latter case, a safe location will always be seen in the light of and will 
often conflict with a location that offers sufficient livelihood opportuni-
ties and adequate income, employment and social relationships.
The objective of the present chapter is to deconstruct the former 
hypotheses or frames of reference and examine the factors that explain 
a mindset and social context interpretation of failure or inadequacy, as 
well as considering the minimum requirements for good resettlement 
policy and practice. At the same time, the arguments put forward exam-
ine evolving critical thought on the failures in disaster risk management 
(DRM) policy in general, recognising that resettlement is most likely to 
be seen and used as a mechanism for disaster risk reduction.
This chapter is structured as follows. A first substantive section con-
siders the notions of settlement and resettlement, location and relocation. 
A second considers the ways settlement is induced among predominantly 
poor populations and the limitations and satisfiers of this, as well as the 
type of demands that lead to the need for resettlement. A third section 
considers the ways DRM is practised and the disassociation that often 
exists between place and livelihood security. A last section highlights 
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needed changes in mindsets and attention to context in order to make 
resettlement correspond far more truly to social needs and demands.
Resettlement and relocation as notions
‘Resettlement’ derives, as a term and concept, from the notion of ‘settle-
ment’, as ‘relocation’ derives from ‘location’. The derivative should thus 
reflect the original in sense and purpose.
Settlement, when used in the context of persons, families, groups 
or communities laying down roots in any particular place, can be 
defined intuitively and in experiential terms. In its simplest sense, it is 
the act of settling which in itself is the act of establishing oneself (indi-
vidually or collectively) in a place. Experientially, it signifies creating 
the basis for a secure work and livelihood scheme (security includes 
life opportunities and security of place – from outside attack or from 
floods, from eviction or landslides, etc.). Historically, it has signified, in 
different places and at different times, a process of occupation and con-
quest of territory, the expansion of population and production frontiers 
and the creation of hamlets, towns and cities. It has also signified the 
creation of new modes of life, the challenge of newness, the develop-
ment of community and common ties and values, a sense of being and 
the developing of cultural and emotional ties to land and place. The 
notions of settlement and community, settlement and commonality in 
goals, settlement and collaboration, tend to go hand in hand. Most early 
settlement was typified by a movement of persons bonded by familial, 
ethnic, racial, religious or other ties. To settle (successfully), whether 
physically or emotionally, involves a process and product defined by an 
integrated and holistic relationship between the social unit that settles 
(be it an individual, family or community) and the local environment 
that provides the resources or opportunities for livelihood and welfare 
(Ferris 2012). It also involves the construction of habitat, a built envi-
ronment that provides shelter, services and options for communication 
and movement (see Chapter 2 by Chardon in this book). It signifies the 
construction of social meaning and relationships in a place. To success-
fully settle means the establishment of the bases for a productive, fruit-
ful and successful human existence on an individual and social level. 
It inevitably signifies a relative level of harmony and collaboration 
with neighbours in what may be defined variously as a community or 
neighbourhood.
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Location is a far easier and less committed or compromised term. 
Settlement involves location, but location does not require settlement in 
order to be defined. To locate signifies simply to place (permanently or 
in transitory fashion) something or someone (or identify their position-
ing in a particular place), in order to satisfy a permanent or transitory 
function – production, consumption, communication, residence, etc. It 
assumes that by locating, a function is achieved, but this is not a defining 
part of the notion or concept as such. Any value judgement about objec-
tives or function would be achieved by qualifying the idea of location as 
such – location searching for proximity to work or resources; an ideal 
location for climate; etc. To settle, settling or settlement encapsulates, we 
would suggest, a wider definition of welfare and wellbeing than do the 
ideas of location or locating (see Chapter 5 by Lwasa, Bazaz and Jain in 
this book).
Resettlement and relocation are of course derivatives of settlement 
and location, and their significance can be recognised by referring to the 
original definition, concept or state of settlement and location. To be reset-
tled or relocated, one has to have been located or settled in the first place.
This in itself, although obvious, leads to a consideration of how new set-
tlement as opposed to resettlement of population is processed at a govern-
ment and social level. For example, when new housing areas or estates are 
constructed, following urban planning regulations, this is done considering 
factors such as the need for proximity to work, play and schools, service 
provision and recreational facilities of potential buyers. This original con-
text and its structure are, or should be, critical factors in considering and 
understanding the pros and cons, gains and losses achieved through move-
ment and relocation. But many times, this is not the case.
Translating these arguments into definitions of use in urban reset-
tlement studies, relocation may be used to depict a movement in space, 
a placing of a social unit, whether family or community, where the wider 
concerns associated with resettlement do not necessarily have to be 
taken up – new livelihood sustenance, new service provision, new social 
relations, etc. This is due to the fact that where movement is induced by 
government in a planned fashion, and relates to poorer disadvantaged 
groups, the distance of relocation is relatively short and allows prior rela-
tions to be maintained, while providing a safer place with new housing 
and internal community links but not a whole new social and economic, 
physical and environmental infrastructure, as is the case with resettle-
ment. Alternatively, relocation takes place over a greater distance where 
knowledge of opportunity and the wish to relocate exists and motives are 
explicit (Ferris 2012).
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Resettlement and existing social conditions  
and demands
In order for hazard exposure- inspired resettlement to be successful, it 
must at least reduce disaster risk and maintain the overall balance of 
social or economic goods or advantages of the original location. This is 
particularly true where poorer populations are concerned, and the gov-
ernment is the promoter of movement. The only other alternative is that 
reduction of disaster risk sufficiently compensates for loss of livelihood 
and lifestyle benefits accumulated over time at the original location due 
to the imperative of impeding future loss (particularly of life) and a high 
perception of the opportunities for reconstruction of livelihoods over 
the short and medium terms at the new site (Cernea 2008). This exists 
for example in the Peruvian case recorded in this volume (see Chapter 8 
by Chávez Eslava), where mothers took the decision to resettle to the 
new area offered by government in order to avoid the threat of death by 
drowning of their children every rainy season, despite opposition from 
their husbands, who felt they would lose their livelihood base.
The basis for any effective approach which considers needs and 
wants and satisfaction of livelihood demands must be rooted in an inte-
grated understanding of the root causes of the disaster risk suffered by 
the at- risk population. This is normally a direct result of the vulnerabil-
ity and exposure which result from the very condition of poverty, lack of 
resources and ability to determine and gain access to an adequate site for 
home and house, community and relations suffered by the population 
(Gaillard 2008). That is to say, disaster risk is a result, an outcome, of the 
precarious life conditions of the population and the basis of their original 
location decision. This is an obvious but easily forgotten or ignored fact 
in our sector- based, specialised world.
Any approach to resettlement of the poor or destitute that ignores 
this basic premise and considers disaster risk due to hazard exposure in 
isolation of other contextual and historical factors is likely to fail. The 
bases or drivers of disaster risk and the conditions that the population 
need to overcome are to be found in livelihood, lifestyle, existential and 
everyday risk concerns, and not directly in exposure to hazards and disas-
ter risk. If disaster risk reduction propounded as a goal does not account 
for and integrate a search to resolve the principal problem for the popu-
lation, which is poverty and livelihood security, service access and edu-
cational and health opportunity for children, difficulties will inevitably 
be encountered. This is even more the case where disaster risk is not 
associated with large- scale death and destruction and where affected 
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populations have traditionally received government support during cri-
sis in the form of food, roofing and building materials, blankets etc. The 
opportunity for good resettlement rests on the satisfaction of everyday, 
chronic risk reduction needs, and only secondarily on reduction of dis-
aster risk as such. This points to the fact that only development- based, 
holistic approaches to resettlement can hope to be successful.
A second attendant consideration is that society and communities 
are often dynamic, creative and resilient, especially where social capi-
tal is strong and functional in bonding, linking and integrational modes. 
Society creates and recreates itself and turns adversity into accepted real-
ity. This in itself becomes a permanent feature of a social environment 
which is not easily torn apart or replaced. The reading of what change 
means by a resettlement decision- maker or implementer is many times 
vastly different to that of the population itself (see Chapter 4 by Johnson 
et al. in this book). The objective/ subjective dimensions play out differ-
ently. What is unacceptable or untenable or non- mitigable from one angle 
or institutional perspective is not so from the perspective of population. 
Personal and family life histories are forged, created and recreated in 
the process of satisfying basic needs. These needs and their satisfaction, 
even though meagre, become the basis for constancy and permanence. 
Disaster risk becomes a technocratic concern under many circumstances, 
whereas everyday risk mitigation, where basic needs and the means 
of achieving them are satisfied, is a central and permanent concern of 
affected people. Disaster risk and the conditions that explain it in any one 
location become a dimension of opportunity, not disadvantage. This is 
expressed through location- based access to diverse resources that are an 
integral part of ‘livelihood security’ – these may be physical- locational, 
integrational, relational, systemic or occupational.
Disaster risk management: current sector  
as opposed to integral mindsets
Structural conditions link to the ways the resettlement problem is con-
structed socially and politically, and this in itself reflects how hazard 
proneness and disaster risk are conceived and built into mindsets on 
development and human security in general. This is determined by the 
type of resettlement identifiable from a typology of approaches and 
causes. This includes post- disaster impact movements that are often 
more part of recovery and reconstruction in their logic and governance 
than preventative resettlement; pre- impact preventative schemes seeking 
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to anticipate and avoid future impacts; and on- site improvements and 
risk reduction. Each of these when enacted may derive from a different 
mindset and vision, from a different process of social and political con-
struction. Thus, although they seem to be types of something, which is 
essentially generically the same, they are in fact at times very different 
things with very different origins, arguments in favour, decision- making 
and implementation limitations and processes.
It is our contention that much resettlement planning (if that is what 
much experience can be called) when faced with hydro- meteorological 
hazards has been unilateral, partial, sectoral and exclusive. It has been 
determined by immediate pressures of disaster and humanitarian sup-
port or simply underestimated in its complexity due to partial views 
originating in different implementing sectors or thematic areas – disas-
ter risk, territorial organisation and land use planning, housing, envi-
ronment, social integration, health, etc. Here we recognise from the 
outset that resettlement can be an instrument for dealing with hydro- 
meteorological hazards that is of unilateral or combined concern for all 
these sectors or areas of concern and can be used to help advance each of 
their different aims (see Chapter 13 by Mansilla in this book). However, 
the dominant concern that directs action is that of getting people out of 
harm’s way  (reducing or eliminating disaster risk as such; see Chapter 14 
by Jain, Singh and Malladi in this book). Little due consideration is given 
to the ‘how’ and content of this action when seen from the angle of live-
lihood security and social welfare in a wider sense. Rarely has social 
 development or development as a whole been the guiding light and cen-
tral stated objective for action.
Much of the partiality and lack of integrated approaches with liveli-
hood sustainability as the centre of concerns may be explained by a series 
of contexts that require change if an advance is to be made.
Firstly, disaster risk, the primary motivation and justification for 
resettlement intervention (that is to say, the action would not be promoted 
unless a decision had been taken that the existing location is untenable 
due to the level of hazard suffered by the population), is considered as a 
standalone context. It is seen as a sector of concern independent of other 
considerations and where cause and context are essentially governed or 
delimited by exposure to hazard, as opposed to a consideration of more 
integral underlying causes, drivers and contexts of risk. In many ways, 
the resettlement scene has been typified by a dependence on physical-
ist interpretations of risk with little real consideration of complex social 
causation and the origins of such contexts in social practice and position. 
Rather than being seen as a dependent variable, disaster risk is seen as 
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a situation in itself, self- generated or exogenously caused. The hazard is 
the primary problem and getting people out of harm’s way at whatever 
cost is the prime objective. This does not of course mean that hazard is 
not, at times, used as an excuse for achieving other implicit goals, such 
as redevelopment of the recovered areas for the urban rent gains it will 
signify. Where this is present, the chances of good resettlement being 
enacted are even less likely.
Secondly, and related to the prior context, the roots of disaster 
risk and the contradictions or trade- offs that come into play are not 
adequately taken into consideration in an understanding of the situation 
and context of affected populations (see Chapter 4 by Johnson et al. in 
this book). Due to this, solutions are based on single- factor approaches 
that deny or ignore the underlying causes of risk and the conditions and 
demands this creates for the affected populations. A livelihood approach 
based on an understanding of want and lack, struggle and resilience, and 
competing risk demands, among other things, would lead to more inte-
grated and realistic approaches that could even include the rejection of 
resettlement as an option or effective solution.
From a pragmatic and programmatic perspective, the resettlement 
problem may most easily be seen from the partial but basic perspective of 
access to alternative safe land and to adequate housing and service provi-
sion. Although apparently simple, dealing with these three aspects can be 
extremely complicated. From a conceptual and process level it involves 
an understanding of i) land use and land rent patterns and problems, 
including the role of speculation and excess speculative urban earnings 
(see Chapter 9 by Marx in this book); ii) the problem of community and 
housing design and the use of vernacular, culturally acceptable versus 
standardised, industrial approaches to construction en masse; and iii) 
density of service provision according to location with the cost consid-
erations involved. Resolving the sum of these three interacting contexts 
and needs adequately can be daunting in itself, without even starting 
to consider the other imperious needs present in a holistic, integrated, 
development- based view of resettlement.
It is in this second set of requirements for good resettlement that 
problems are often found which are rarely taken up in comprehensive 
fashion. As we have pointed out in our definition of resettlement as 
opposed to relocation, this process is far more than physical and infra-
structural and relates to the reconstruction or construction of integrated 
livelihood and lifestyle options that replace or reconstitute those previ-
ously existing. Such a process requires careful consideration and reso-
lution of demands associated with employment and income, including 
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functional access and distance considerations. It requires respect for the 
environment and its resources and maintenance of ecosystem values and 
services. Due consideration for existing populations in resettled areas is 
needed. The maintenance and strengthening of social relations and net-
works and the consolidation of social capital in bonded, linked and inte-
grative forms must be achieved. In addition, relationships to the wider 
urban environment and structure and a role of urban planning and struc-
turing in the location of resettlement schemes should be considered.
As can be appreciated, satisfying the sum of the demands that arise 
with regard to each of these different elements requires a comprehen-
sive, interrelated conceptual scheme and the participation of multiple 
organisations and institutions from local and regional/ national govern-
ment, along with private- sector and NGO participation. But this is often 
required in environments where governance is weak, decentralisation 
almost non- existent, severe problems in inter- sector coordination exist, 
competing interests and approaches are found, lack of permanence of 
government officials and lack of training in implementation and con-
ception are prevalent, and budgetary allocations and timeframes are 
inadequate.
Resettlement can be seen to be the prerogative of many different 
institutions that have different central goals (safety from hazard, reorder-
ing the city, saving ecological resources, reducing poverty and increasing 
social integration, increasing employment and income opportunities). 
However, few or none is really in a position, resource- or knowledge- wise, 
to adequately comply. And DRM has had as yet little success in bring-
ing multiple development- based organisations and institutions together 
in an endeavour that must promote social advance at the same time as 
reducing or controlling disaster risk.
The way forward
A reading of the literature and a consideration of the bases of many haz-
ard resettlement initiatives allows us to reach the conclusion that this is 
in fact a severely under- conceptualised and under- theorised topic, domi-
nated by empirical approaches, dictated by circumstances, that are more 
descriptive and prescriptive than prospective. One possible reply to the 
overall question of why little is done to change this and improve imple-
mentation may well lie not only in the sporadic and passing nature of 
concern for the problem once need arises, but also in the severe lack of 
an adequate reading and conceptualisation of the problem. The mindsets 
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with which resettlement is approached and the institutions that domi-
nate in its execution are deficient.
Given this, what are the major factors that should be brought 
together in constructing an adequate conceptual frame for thinking about 
resettlement, which can adequately guide decision- making and imple-
mentation processes and that are the result of our collective research 
effort and prior conceptual debates and search for precision?
A primary factor or starting point is the mindset with which reset-
tlement is approached and the role it is designated in terms of human 
and societal advancement and security. The options vary from restricted 
sector and thematic concerns, with the inevitable dominance of those 
related to disaster risk reduction, through to holistic concerns whereby 
integrated human development is central and particular objectives such 
as disaster risk reduction are collateral and supportive, if important.
From our perspective, the starting point for conceptual develop-
ment is the affirmation that disaster risk is essentially a social construc-
tion (IPCC 2012), closely related to the workings of economic growth 
and proposed development processes, the result of a series of risk drivers 
or dynamic processes and an indicator of failed development processes, 
marked by exclusion and marginalisation. This is in tune with increas-
ingly mainstream thought on the disaster risk problem. Thus, the extent 
to which it may be reduced or controlled should be seen as a derivative 
of collateral development processes, and any attempt to reduce or con-
trol its growth must be formulated in a development framework where 
the integration between different drivers and processes is considered at a 
sector and territorial level and confronted in an integrated manner.
When considered from a resettlement policy and practice angle, 
this means that although a central and necessary objective is the elimina-
tion, reduction or prospective control of disaster risk for a set group of 
population or community, this must be achieved in ways that tackle and 
confront the major drivers of the original disaster risk.
This conclusion is confirmed by a second context. Disaster risk as suf-
fered by exposed hazard populations is the result in great part of poverty, 
lack of choice and exclusion, as we have affirmed previously. Therefore, 
such disaster risk is only one of many contexts of adversity that commu-
nities face. However, all these contexts are in one way or another related. 
Chronic risk contexts such as poverty, unemployment, bad health, drug 
addiction, and social and family violence increase vulnerability to physi-
cal hazards or their effects and after- effects and reduce resilience. At the 
same time disaster, whether recurrent small- scale or singular large- scale, 
adds to the chronic risk context. In times of non- manifest disaster risk 
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and disaster itself, populations survive and exist by eking a living out 
of the local resources available and the opportunities that exist. Social 
capital is built up among and between groups and in relation to exter-
nal agents from government and civil society. Life goes on, even under 
conditions not considered acceptable for many external agents. Everyday 
life is certain and its challenges sure. Disaster risk is ephemeral, sporadic 
and uncertain in its consequences, time- and space- wise. Therefore, at- 
risk populations constantly play off one set of risks against another and 
search for the maximum overall livelihood security possible. In view of 
this, the planning for the reduction of disaster risk can only effectively 
be achieved where due and serious consideration is paid to reducing and 
controlling everyday chronic risk. Negation of the satisfaction of every-
day needs and demands in lieu of increased disaster risk security is a non- 
viable option. A total, integrated livelihood approach must be followed, 
whereby creation and consolidation of economic and social assets, liveli-
hood satisfiers and balanced overall security are considered.
The prior considerations relate to the position of the individual, 
family and community affected by disaster risk and the concatenated 
processes of everyday and disaster risk, poverty, exclusion and confron-
tation that demand integrated, holistic concepts and processes.
However, the resettlement process and the need for it can also be 
seen from a wider societal angle and the role it can and should play in 
achieving greater social, economic and environmental efficiency and 
efficacy, justice and equity. Resettlement, beyond being a mechanism for 
increases in social welfare and security of affected populations, is also a 
mechanism for resolving created problems of ecological downgrading, 
spatial inefficiency, territorial organisation, social integration and trans-
port planning.
Each of these aims has its own conceptual framework, and the 
search to integrate ideas and aims will always be difficult not only prag-
matically, but also institutionally. This then pushes us to consider what is 
the most appropriate institutional and organisational set- up to promote 
and implement resettlement and which can guarantee consistency, inte-
gration, multiple objectives, social efficacy and societal gains, planning 
and livelihood goals, among others. This includes the vertical integration 
of different spatial scales from community to nation and beyond. The 
answer will depend on the country dealt with, but we can be sure that 
only an institution or organisational mode that provides for integrated 
thought and action, and strategic planning that brings multiple goals and 
ends together at a local level, will be successful.
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Resettling, re- enabling: the challenge 
of reconstructing a human habitat
Anne- Catherine Chardon
During the last few decades Latin America has been one of the most 
affected and most studied regions as regards urban vulnerability to 
natural phenomena. Studies have been produced to better analyse, 
understand and intervene in not only the physical threats but also the 
vulnerability that generates fragility and instability in urban settle-
ments. The aim has been to mitigate risks and build resilient human 
habitats. Indeed, the vulnerable city is primarily a habitat, when this 
is considered in its broader meaning, and needs to be dealt with using 
holistic and cross- cutting approaches. This is required in order to deal 
with the problem as a whole and to intervene in all its shortcomings 
and weaknesses, taking advantage of the strengths that characterise a 
community and its environment.
In the Colombian Andes region, urban areas are subject to high seis-
micity, mudslides and mass movements. The latter are the more frequent 
and significant, leading to the greatest amount of accumulated losses. 
These are in good part borne by the inhabitants of such settlements 
themselves. In today’s context where things may get worse, as an effect of 
climate change, one of the measures to reduce risk in a preventive way or 
to respond to the situation of affected households is population resettle-
ment. This is enacted in different ways. Many attempts are unsuccessful. 
In the present chapter, following some conceptual reflections, various 
cases of resettlement in Manizales, Colombia, developed since the mid- 
1980s, will be discussed.
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Vulnerable habitats: a needed reflection
When analysing mitigation policies for natural hazards in Latin American 
urban areas, significant orientation and intervention failings can be 
found. Policies have been directed almost exclusively towards the 
physical- natural or physical- spatial fields, leaving aside fundamental fac-
tors relating to social, cultural, economic and financial vulnerability.
Vulnerability, a complex concept
In a resettlement context, it is important to consider the vulnerable 
object as a habitat. Habitat is proposed as an ‘articulating’ concept used 
to address the proposed theme of resettlement. Indeed, when we talk 
about the vulnerability of a community and resettlement as a possible 
solution, what is really at stake is the multidimensional habitat built by 
this community. Therefore, the resettlement process cannot be limited 
only to the group of persons involved. It needs to contemplate the reset-
tlement of the habitat in its totality.
inhabit, habitat, habits
Logically, the habitat should allow for the notion of ‘inhabitation’, the 
complex expression of being and remaining on the land. This is the cen-
tral topic covered in the present chapter.
The act of inhabiting goes far beyond using and occupying a space, 
since the dynamic process of inhabiting derives from the confluence of 
different worlds: the natural, social, economic, cultural, emotional and 
physical- spatial. In ‘dwelling’, the human being materialises the build-
ing of place, territory and a life system, in order not only to relate to and 
own something but also to belong to, develop roots and grow. Inhabiting 
is multidimensional, because the settler establishes connections with 
all the elements of their environment, by using and transforming them. 
Buchot (2012) also indicates that to inhabit means to be mobile: that 
is to say, to be able to move physically and mentally in time, space and 
towards others. Such an understanding means that to inhabit is, in fact, 
a process marked by an evolution and individual or community transfor-
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This singularity in the ways of living, coexisting and relating to the 
environment leads to the concept of human habitat, that is to say, the 
object or space that is inhabited. Different to the use of the term in 
the environmental field, the concept of human habitat has increasingly 
evolved considering the leading role of the settlers themselves. This 
allows us to speak of human territory and territoriality, which refers to 
the dynamic acts of appropriation, transformation, ‘culturisation’ and 
‘anthropomorphisation’ of space. This signifies a territory, a space with 
actors, owners, defenders and mourners with a sense of belonging and 
where they are recognised because they participate in its construction 
and development.
These reflections and definitions are fundamental since in the pro-
cess of resettlement, actions of territorialisation, the expression of cul-
ture and identity, must be allowed in order to prevent traumas. This must 
also be applied to the habitat which is left behind, the original habitat.
For the reasons argued above, habitat does not exist on its own, 
but rather, is built around the life space of human beings, around their 
possessions, and is characterised by an exclusively anthropomorphic 
dimension (González- Escobar 2002). Of course, when we introduce the 
concept of belonging, one approximates the notion of housing. This tends 
to be seen as a container for material goods and intangibles, without 
completely implying that habitat is limited to the living space of a house. 
However, the house is a principal component of habitat. It is important 
here to recognise that it is not limited to the space between the walls (the 
house), but also includes the space from the walls outward, the proxi-
mate environment, generally of public use, and necessary for acceptable 
daily life (Hurtado Isaza and Chardon 2012).
In praxis, it can be asserted that the institutional vision of habitat 
cannot be limited to the house, the form. It is important to be able to 
inhabit, that is, to choose to live in the place and out of the place, beyond 
its structure. Policies should allow for the design of productive housing 
models and habitats should provide acceptable living conditions, achiev-
ing, among other things, economic sustainability.
Elsewhere (Chardon 2010, 30) I have considered the urban habitat 
to be ‘a bio- physical- eco- space- system. A system whose components are 
the urban space itself, its inhabitants (characterised by a context, social, 
economic and cultural processes, routes and means of communication), 
the natural, physical- spatial environment, the political and institutional 
context and the relationships that link these elements.’ Also, habitat is 
the expression of the dynamics, nexus and networks human beings estab-
lish with their environment (Ramírez Hernández 2014). This means 
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occupying a meaningful territory where, beyond the notion of being in a 
physical sense, one can ‘be’. This recognises that habitat is loaded with a 
strong dose of subjectivity, the product of affection, perception, dreams, 
yearnings and symbols. It is an intimate social way of representing terri-
tory, of appropriating it. This multidimensional view of habitat allows us 
to understand that at the moment resettlement processes are promoted, 
the focus of the action needs to be comprehensive.
Resettlement: a challenge
In practice, as we will demonstrate with case study analysis, the concept 
of resettlement, seen first as a mitigation of hazard exposure, is often 
developed and implemented with little consideration of aspects that 
go beyond such mitigation. This has implications that require careful 
analysis. As Lavell explains in Chapter 1, the term resettlement is often 
confused in common institutional languages with concepts such as relo-
cation, which, if considered closely, refers to a different situation, even if 
both terms are motivated by changes in the life of the inhabitants, espe-
cially in spatial terms (see Lavell’s chapter in this book for arguments that 
support the critical notions developed here and below).
In order to consider human resettlement, it is important to reflect 
on the meaning of the verb ‘to settle’. This refers to the act of establish-
ment at a site, but with a particular connotation of security, decisiveness, 
permanence and durability over time. This permanence means settling is 
not sudden but rather the result of a process, spatial or physical, as well 
as social, cultural, political and economic. Settling derives from identity. 
It corresponds to the establishment of a place, of a community and finally 
of a habitat with a sense of roots. The term ‘locate’, and its derived term, 
relocation, is not associated with durability and a sense of belonging. 
Rather, it supposes the act of putting in a place, but not in an intentional 
or definitive way. As to the concept of resettlement, there are approaches 
guided by the ‘simple’ search for security of life and property (Duque- 
Botero 2006). This is a view many local authorities hold.
Resettlement programmes should signify habitat recreation. This 
cannot, of course, be achieved without some unpleasant experiences. If 
it is not carried out with a multisector approach, there is a risk that one 
type of marginality is transformed into another type at the new site, due 
to poor management by the authorities.
A conceptualisation of resettlement inspired by my earlier article 
(Chardon 2010) is proposed for the analysis in this chapter. This concept 
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suggests that resettlement is the construction of a new territory or real 
habitat, framed within a policy for city reorganisation. This is seen to 
be the only valid option since it demonstrates a systemic view of the 
situation. Effectively, the resettlement process is primarily human and, 
through changes and transformations in multiple aspects, the process 
should lead to optimal individual and collective habitat conditions, sus-
tained over time. Its purpose is at least to restore and at best to achieve 
a general improvement in the daily lives, the environment and the qual-
ity of life of the targeted population. Initially, one has to think about the 
physical context, looking for safe spatial conditions. But implementation 
also has to be carried out in structural and non- structural areas, internal 
or external to the community, i.e. in social, cultural, economic, financial 
and physical- spatial aspects. Here, community participation in sustain-
able development is fundamental.
Resettling populations signifies building for them and with them 
(through community participation and reflection, planning, design 
and execution) a new living space in order that they feel they have a 
life  territory – that is to say, a comfortable, friendly space, where this 
is  recognised and felt, where the inhabitant has appropriated place, is 
rooted in it and has become a recognised, legitimate actor.
Resettlement projects have to respond in a holistic and definitive 
way to complex individual and collective situations, and therefore have 
to go far beyond the simple search for a safe roof. The processes involve 
a high social, economic, cultural and political cost as well as important 
physical- territorial impacts both in the home habitat and in the destina-
tion area. Due to this it is important to operate in such a way that the 
result is the observance of a continuous development of the resettled 
community.
Resettlement: reality may be far from the theory
In Colombia, resettlement is a risk mitigation option used in situations 
where it is deemed impossible to provide in situ vulnerability reduction 
due to the high hazard- proneness of place. Because of this the settler can 
opt for a social housing programme providing housing in safe sectors 
or choose to buy a used home. The Colombian state does not currently 
have specific regulations to formulate and implement resettlement plans. 
Such plans are considered to be similar to simple projects for housing of 
social or priority interest (‘VIS’ and ‘VIP’, in Spanish).
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Through a comparative analysis of three resettlement processes 
developed in Manizales in the last 20 years, we will observe the distance 
between theory and imposed practice.
resettlement praxis in manizales: from one habitat to another
Manizales is an intermediate- sized Andean city (400,000 inhabitants). 
It is located in an area of very rugged topography, with lowly compacted 
volcanic soils and high levels of seismicity. The area is characterised by 
a bimodal equatorial mountain climate (between 2,500 and 3,000 mm 
of rain per year, of torrential characteristics and with strong erosive 
power). This situation partially explains the frequent occurrence of ero-
sive processes in the city and constant mass movements of large destruc-
tive power. In this context, the municipality proposes solutions for the 
mitigation of vulnerability through resettlement processes. These consist 
in the acquisition of new or ‘used’ housing by the vulnerable community 
members, in a supposedly safe place when seen from the physical- natural 
angle. The primary objective is to effectively protect the population’s 
life and goods. The projects are mostly designed as VIP projects (maxi-
mum value of 70 monthly minimum wages, equalling US$17,300 as of 
March 2017) or less frequently as VIS (maximum value of 135 monthly 
minimum wages). According to income levels, the beneficiaries can 
receive a subsidy from the state of up to 22 monthly minimum wages 
and 14 monthly minimum wages from the municipality. The remaining 
amount is financed through the banking system.
Before commenting on different modalities of resettlement, it is 
important to briefly present the initial living conditions of the settlers in 
order to apprehend the situation.
the habitat of origin
In Manizales, the population subject to resettlement processes lived previ-
ously on very steep slopes near the city centre (see Figure 2.1). The fami-
lies, generally numerous (more than six members), with low and irregular 
incomes, lived in precarious dwellings, seen in terms of materials and con-
struction systems, and suffered very low hygiene and health conditions. 
The built area often did not meet optimum needs. However, the space 
people occupied was much larger than that later given to them as a sup-
posed solution to their vulnerability. The residents occupied the site as 
owners, as de facto owners or by paying a moderate rent. The physical and 
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spatial environment was characterised by an organic morphology where, 
despite the evident overcrowding, there were green areas, generally culti-
vated, and people walked to and from their homes. There was access to all 
required urban services and piracy of public services was very common. 
Extended nuclear families lived in the same neighbourhood or the same 
house, thus increasing family interrelationships. Neighbourhood rela-
tions encouraged solidarity in the human environment.
The prior living conditions of settlers help us understand why 
becoming a homeowner in a safe place is a very attractive proposal, with-
out settlers really worrying about the multidimensional conditions of 
the process. Three resettlement projects are discussed below. The pro-
grammes were developed in different modalities and at various times. 
By considering three cases, we may analyse benefits and reprehensible 
aspects, from an integrated vision of habitat.
destination habitats
The three projects respond to local and national conditions and poli-
cies: Yarumales (1995), Altos de Santa Ana (2005) and Bosques de 
Bengala (2013).
Figure 2.1 San José district, on the northern hillside of the city. Self- 
built bamboo housing forms organic neighbourhoods where a united 
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Yarumales (see Figure 2.2) was holistically designed and could be 
described as a visionary, integrated model to follow. In 1993 and over 
a two- year period, the local government’s Popular Housing Fund along 
with El Minuto de Dios, a local organisation, carried out a resettlement 
project for 36 families that previously lived in very different vulner-
able parts of the city. The project consisted not only in relocating the 
settlers but also in constructing a sustainable socio- eco- cultural com-
munity, aspects that were developed in workshops organised with the 
mandatory participation of all family members. Also, it was important 
to build community with future neighbours, given that each actor was 
seen as someone committed to and responsible for the project. Among 
other activities, training in the fields of dressmaking, shoemaking and 
baking were offered, so that families could earn the necessary income 
for their support and to pay for the new house. A building was equipped 
in the neighbourhood with the necessary machinery for the develop-
ment of these trades so that the newly qualified people could work there. 
Families had to be able to sustain themselves and their new life project in 
the short, medium and long terms. In addition, households, as a way of 
Figure 2.2 Yarumales, an integrated resettlement programme built 
according to the modality of the individual house, in a consolidated 
neighbourhood with all services and equipment. © A.C. Chardon.
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participating in the project and reducing costs of acquiring housing, had 
to contribute 700 hours of work on the site.
In effect, the project was not subsidised. Families had to fully finance 
the acquisition of their new homes, including the initial deposit and a 
credit in the bank. This was essential. Full participation, especially finan-
cial, was deemed essential if the project was to work. This generates a 
sense of belonging and respect for the project, and allows it to be appreci-
ated in all its dimensions. In resettlement programmes (as with housing 
programmes), paternalism and clientelism distort the objectives of pro-
grammes. That is to say, it is an opportunity for participatory development 
and not a gift or a bargaining block between different interest groups.
As regards the physical- natural and physical- spatial dimensions, 
the project also sought to improve the quality of life of the settlers and 
it considered them worthy of a dignified and pleasant life. The lot was 
located near a main road in an already consolidated traditional sector 
of the city that had access to all needed urban services and equipment. 
From the urbanistic point of view, the public areas were composed of 
front yards, walkways, a small playground, a sports court and parking, 
all of which are currently in excellent condition. This is proof of the sense 
of belonging in the community.
Finally, the architectural design of the project was undertaken by 
a group of students and professors from the School of Architecture and 
Urbanism at the National University of Colombia in Manizales. Design 
provided for areas of around 55 m2 distributed on two levels and with 
a back yard. In 1995, the families moved to Yarumales and after more 
than 20 years, we can observe that only 30 per cent of the buildings have 
undergone remodelling or enlargement, which shows that the dwellers 
have felt at ease with the initial project.
Overall, the project was conceived of in integrated terms. 
Vulnerability was not only seen to be due to physical factors but also to 
the negative social, cultural and economic context at a family and com-
munity level. Intervention using a correct vision of habitat was needed in 
order to favour development among the families. The project has been 
sustainable ever since, in all its dimensions. To date, in Manizales, the 
Yarumales project is unique (in part, possibly because of the limited num-
ber of resettled households). During the twenty- first century, processes 
have unfortunately been promoted that have a very limited and errone-
ous vision and approach to the concept of human habitat.
The Santa Ana resettlement project (finished in 2005) was devel-
oped by the municipality for the benefit of families affected by the night 
of 18 March 2003, when in three hours 144 mm of rain fell, causing 82 
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large landslides in several unstable sectors of the city. Deciding on and 
executing the project took a little more than two years. This is a short 
period when compared to the range of tasks that had to be undertaken, 
including financing, finding and purchasing adequate land (given the low 
income levels of the recipient population), tendering and building. No 
social dimension was considered and the project was run like any social 
housing project, with the right to a 50 per cent financial subsidy from 
the state and municipality. This obliged the families to obtain a loan to 
pay the other 50 per cent of building costs. Although it is important that 
the recipient population assume some financial responsibility for their 
homes, the lack of employment and income- generating training options 
led to immense difficulties as regards paying for bank loans and public 
utility services. This led on many occasions to owners selling or renting 
their homes against the rules of the game, and returning to less costly 
areas, which are often unstable, insecure and dangerous in general. 
Homes have also been sold off by the bank to recover unpaid loans. Such 
results completely eliminate the objectives of a resettlement programme.
The Santa Ana housing development is located on peripheral forest 
lands and consists of 11 blocks that group 392 houses, each with an area 
of 29 m2, on 35 m2 lots. Families moved to live there in October 2005. 
Urban development is oriented in the direction of the slope, with roads 
and laddered buildings and difficult access to public spaces, which also 
lack services (see Figure 2.3).
Architecturally, each house of 29 m2 is distributed between a social 
space, a bedroom, a patio and a bathroom, which a family group, always 
numerous, ‘enjoys’. Critical overcrowding does not allow the separation 
of social, private and intimate areas. Curtains are used to separate spaces. 
Social or service space is private, and decks or terraces become a place 
where children play, clothes are dried, vegetables are grown or domestic 
animals are kept, thus revealing the rural customs of the settlers. The 
lack of space, as in many similar situations, forces the occupation of pub-
lic spaces. This is the case of the use given to front yards.
In this type of settlement, it is very common to observe that the 
living space is also a source of income. Lack of training and of formal 
employment opportunities means that people create their own employ-
ment opportunities that allow, among other things, them to cover the 
financial responsibilities entailed in purchasing the house (payment of 
loans, public services, transport etc.).
As Torres- Tovar and Robles- Joya (2014) underline, in the processes 
of resettlement, the economic aspects are rarely considered. They are 
assumed to be already solved. This is how, in the same 29 m2, in addition 
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to the confusion and overlap of domestic uses, small- scale commercial 
activities such as a shop, a stall or a hairdresser are developed. Limited 
habitability is not restricted to the built area as such, but also applies as 
regards light (a single span), acoustics (a thin wall is shared with the 
neighbouring house), ventilation and humidity (the deck- terrace gener-
ates water filtration). Because they were not taken into account during 
the design process, families had to expand or transform their home to 
take economic advantage of it, demonstrating that the desire is to have 
a home as opposed to a house. And soon after occupation, second and 
third storeys, windows, balconies and personalised colours appear, and 
the patio gets covered. These modifications are not always undertaken 
using adequate building standards, thus endangering the structure and 
its habitants.
The peripheral location of the project requires public transport in 
order to be able to connect to the rest of the city, mainly the centre. This 
situation generates an additional expense for families who used to live 
previously in very central areas. Moreover, the absence of social actors, 
the high unemployment rate among young people and the reduced living 
spaces and service provision lead to conditions that foment delinquency. 
Since the keys to houses were handed over in 2005, local authorities have 
Figure 2.3 The basic deliverable unit in Altos de Santa Ana. The 
terrace allows for a doubling of the available area. © A.C. Chardon.
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had no further contact with settlers and no official process of follow- up 
has occurred.
The Bosques de Bengala urban development project is one of the 
housing schemes totalling one hundred thousand houses to be built 
as part of the free- of- charge home policy the Colombian government 
launched in 2012, mainly for families displaced by armed conflict and 
by disasters. In Manizales, a total of 1,420 housing units will be built, all 
using the multifamily mode. This programme is an unfortunate example 
of where by receiving a new house a family has its immediate physical 
needs satisfied but little consciousness exists as to the fact that the what, 
the where and the how of things are highly significant social variables.
By the end of 2013, 240 families had ‘benefited’ from the project. 
It consists of six blocks of five storeys with eight fully subsidised apart-
ments each. Additionally, the housing complex is provided with a court, 
green areas, playgrounds and parking (see Figure 2.4). Families came 
from rural areas, fleeing armed conflict. They were employed mostly in 
agricultural pursuits. A move to the city created a complete change in 
work environments, with no support given in this context of forced urban 
adaptation and acculturation.
While the new living conditions allow some degree of stabil-
ity and access to basic services which the inhabitants did not have as 
displaced or affected persons, the smallness of apartments (scarcely 
42 m2, with three rooms but no opportunity for enlargement as in the 
case of Santa Ana), the non- resolution of their economic situation and 
the new rules of coexistence considerably affect their daily lives. The 
hallways become an extension of the apartments, to dry clothes and 
store bicycles. People also linger on the outside railings as if it was their 
balcony because inside, not everything fits. In the same way, the apart-
ment becomes an economic unit and the windows of the apartment that 
border with the outside corridor are turned into windows to serve the 
customers of the businesses that many families set up. Some of these 
use hazardous equipment such as industrial bakery ovens! Thus, as in 
Santa Ana, shops, bakeries, manicure salons and hairdressing salons 
are opened, with their own advertisements on the facades. In the park-
ing lot, arepas (a typical Colombian food) are also made and sold at 
certain times of the day.
Even though the houses were given away by the state (a policy that 
also generated employment in the construction sector), families find it 
difficult to pay public services, or costs of the administration of the com-
plex, and other essential daily obligations. Due to this, housing has to 
become productive, even if it was not designed for this, and the situation 
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often leads to conflicts. What seems to be inexpensive as a solution turns 
out to be expensive. Owners can neither rent nor sell for 10 years accord-
ing to the rules. But the lack of economic solvency has led to many sell-
ing their apartment or renting them out. Severe economic difficulties are 
recurrent in these projects, as they almost inevitably generate an increase 
in household expenses.
Figure 2.4 Bosques de Bengala, 40 apartments per block. 
Appropriation of the exterior corridors. © A.C. Chardon.
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The first stage of the San Sebastián de Betania project (close to 
Bosques de Bengala and where the construction of almost all the free 
housing of the city is carried out) was in part subsidised. More than 80 per 
cent of households have not been able to keep up with their debts or pay 
for public services. This has led to a crisis that has required much negotia-
tion, a search for sponsors to pay off the debts, the suspension of services 
(with illegal connection then being made to neighbours’ services), and 
even auction of goods (Toro 2014; Arango- Arango 2015). Resettlement, 
when legally constituted, has a cost and generates new expenses, which 
not all families can assume. It requires the development of educational 
policies, training opportunities and the creation of employment to enable 
income generation at the household level. But such policies are not put 
into action.
Numerous problems of coexistence exist in the housing projects, 
even leading to homicide. These are caused by the lack of respect and 
tolerance of some residents towards their neighbours. They are also pos-
sibly, in part, the responsibility of the architectural and urban design 
(Sánchez 2014). The narrowness of place leads to forced existence under 
high- density conditions. Guayacundo- Chaves (2015) points out that the 
problem is recurrent in this modality of multifamily units. It is obvious 
that a process of resettlement, as well as urban renewal, cannot be suc-
cessful and contribute to the quality of life of the settlers, without taking 
into account socio- economic and cultural conditions and their implica-
tions for the development and management of projects at the financial, 
socio- cultural, architectural and urbanistic level. A project must be, to 
some degree, personalised with regard to the community to be resettled 
and, of course, designed to offer an integrated, comfortable life context, 
i.e. as a habitat.
Conclusion
In light of the examples analysed above, evidence exists that resettlement 
praxis is still far from the theory that the author considers valid. This situ-
ation is largely due to an incomplete institutional vision of the conditions 
required for the acceptable development of a vulnerable population. This 
view seems to assume that quality of life is merely having a safe roof over 
one’s head and few qualitative factors are taken into account. The ‘house’ 
as an object also appears in the foreground of the families’ imaginary. 
But they later become aware that other social, economic, cultural and 
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the large- scale, very detailed survey I developed (Chardon 2010) among 
families resettled in Manizales, which showed how families accept the 
housing programmes because they allow them to abandon a risk zone 
and become low- cost owners. At first, they consider that their new situa-
tion offers new opportunities. But then their vision usually changes, and 
they feel nostalgic about their original habitat. This occurs when they 
realise that at both the housing level and with regard to the quality of life 
in general, the project does not satisfy their needs and expectations. Over 
time, they become resigned to their situation and accommodate to it. So, 
in most respects, people exist more in line with the habits and needs that 
existed before the transfer. This scenario generally leads to them adapt-
ing to their new place of ‘life’ and gradually trying to build a sustainable, 
manageable habitat.
The Yarumales project demonstrated that comprehensive and 
transdisciplinary management – including participation (financial as 
well), training and integration into the labour market and the dynam-
ics of the city – propitiates a process of successful resettlement. This has 
allowed people to ‘re- inhabit’, while facing all aspects of vulnerability, 
articulating the interests of the various actors and allowing a real dialec-
tic between the different levels of intervention (housing unit, neighbour-
hood, city), thus achieving the construction of a habitable city, from the 
perspective of the city and the polis.
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How do relocation decisions 
and implementation impact risk 
outcomes? Raising questions after 
learning from India
Garima Jain
India has experienced many disasters, both climatic and non- climatic, 
but it was only after the 1999 super cyclone, 2001 Latur earthquake and 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that the National Disaster Management Act 
was passed in 2005 and institutional action began to be taken for long- 
term disaster risk reduction.1 Before the 1990s, efforts were limited to 
relief and response, with some exceptions involving investments in early 
warning systems, but once the State Disaster Management Authorities 
were set up (first in Odisha in 1999 and then Gujarat in 2001), sys-
tematic action was initiated for mitigation and preparedness in certain 
states. Large investments began to be made to improve early warning 
systems for hydro- meteorological hazards. Many international devel-
opment lenders such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank 
also increased investments in India, with a view to strengthening disas-
ter risk management and building resilience (Jain 2016b, 37). Affected 
states learned from their past experiences of disasters that providing 
early warning and investing in evacuation response systems greatly 
reduced the numbers of lives lost. However, what remained a chal-
lenge was when people returned to their broken homes and disrupted 
livelihoods. Thus, many states – such as Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, 
Uttarakhand, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh – began investing in reha-
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with the objective that future events would have the least possible 
impact on their lives.
Some of these housing rehabilitation projects also involved mov-
ing people (post- disasters or pre- emptively) by relocating or resettling 
them in new locations. It is well known within development literature 
that housing has far- reaching social, environmental, economic and 
political implications, well beyond its function as a shelter (Bhan, Anand 
and Harish 2014; Mathur 2006, UN- Habitat 2014). Despite this, deliv-
ery of housing for ‘risk reduction’3 continues to fail to address many of 
these needs (see Chapter 14 by Jain, Singh and Malladi in this book). 
Undoubtedly, there has been a great deal of learning in the last decade 
for post- disaster rehabilitation, but the long- term monitoring and impact 
evaluation is still in its nascent stages and the timeframe of such evalu-
ations is short. Further, the knowledge from these experiences is still 
limited to certain states and regions, and all long- term implications for 
people’s lives are not understood well (Jain et al. 2017).
In this chapter, I use cases of rehabilitation undertaken in the con-
text of risk reduction in the city of Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh 
and Ganjam district in Odisha in order to understand the differential out-
comes from varying interventions made by different actors, within the 
context of their decision- making and implementation processes. In the 
cases discussed, where people were resettled in Jawaharlal Nehru Urban 
Renewal Mission (JnNURM), Rajiv Awas Yojna (RAY) and Indira Awas 
Yojna (IAY) housing schemes, the housing was built under development 
schemes prior to the occurrence of the disaster and affected people were 
moved there later, whereas the Odisha Disaster Recovery Project (ODRP) 
sites were designed and implemented after the cyclonic event in 2013. 
Some cases referred to in this chapter are discussed in more detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this book.
I use a governance framework of decision- making and implemen-
tation processes in each of these intervention options and argue that in 
both post- impact and pre- emptive action scenarios, the specific pathways 
taken are leading to differential outcomes, and creating further risks 
for the communities and the cities at large. With this review of cases, 
I attempt to lay out a variety of options for processes to consider that 
could improve the rehabilitation processes undertaken by various state 
and non- state actors. The options presented here are by no means com-
prehensive, but are a means to question the current practices and offer 
alternative ways to think.
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Structure
The key question of enquiry was set out as, ‘How, whose, what and to 
what extent are the risks reduced (or intended to be reduced) through 
forms of rehabilitation?’ This was understood by conceptualising a reha-
bilitation intervention in three phases: decision- making processes, an 
implementation phase, and their effect on the outcomes of these inter-
ventions. See Figure 3.1 for the structure of the analysis.
The project team and I set out to understand the various decision- 
making processes that lead to rehabilitation interventions in the context 
of disaster risk reduction (DRR). We aimed to understand the various 
triggers that instigate these processes and what alternatives for achieving 
DRR are proposed before arriving at the decision to rehabilitate and the 
form of rehabilitation. These triggers could be corrective, pre- emptive 
or compensatory (UN Secretary- General 2016) in nature and the vari-
ous alternatives of rehabilitation could be relocation, resettlement, in 
situ housing or infrastructure upgrading. These decisions further lead to 
beneficiary identification where some are included and others are not. 
Another important aspect of rehabilitation is related to land in terms of 
location decisions and alternate uses of the vacated land and how they 
may affect the outcomes for the people. The institutional design of these 
interventions is envisioned in multiple ways, particularly differentiating 
between urban and rural contexts. In this process, we asked how and 
when participation is enabled and imagined, and how various incentives 
and disincentives are built into the intervention design.
To study the implementation phase better, we set out to understand 
the various operational challenges faced during the implementation of 
rehabilitation, in urban versus rural areas. These may be standard proce-
dures, but might also involve context- specific flexibilities. There could be 
innovative ways to scale these methods up. Reflecting on the relationship 
between various decision- making aspects, such as timing and sequencing, 










Decision-making Resettlement outcomesfor the people and places
Figure 3.1 Research framework. The study focused on decision- 
making and implementation processes in these resettlements to 
understand their impact on outcomes for the people. © Garima Jain.
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Various combinations of decisions and the processes of implemen-
tation affect the trajectory and experiences of rehabilitation outcomes. 
This chapter aims at outlining some of the emerging connections between 
the phases of decision- making and implementation, and how they could 
be reimagined for better risk reduction and development outcomes for 
households and the city.
Methods and sample design
Based on a preliminary secondary review and initial interviews with 
housing and DRR experts in the region, 16 rehabilitation sites were 
identified across urban and rural areas of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh 
covering a variety of resettlement, relocation, in situ housing and infra-
structure upgrading interventions (see Table 3.1) to find patterns in 
decision- making and implementation processes leading to long- term 
outcomes. Unlike developmental projects, detailed socio- economic sur-
veys or environmental assessments are not available for post- disaster 
projects. Therefore, the team relied more on rapid needs assessments 
and other secondary studies, apart from using site observations and sur-
veys as instruments of research and analysis (Government of Odisha, 
Asian Development Bank and World Bank 2013).
Decision- making and implementation processes were understood 
through interviews with key officials and policymakers (n=26), and con-
sultations (n=2 with 45 stakeholders) (Jain 2016a; Malladi et al. 2016). 
Community- level information on experiences, e.g. on infrastructure con-
ditions and cultural norms, was gathered through 10 group discussions. 
To understand more household- level risks, primary household- level 
surveys (n=158) were conducted to assess changes in various indica-
tors before and after the intervention. Some individuals, especially those 
with special needs such as the disabled, elderly, minorities and women, 
were identified and interviewed to get a better sense of the risks faced by 
them during such rehabilitation interventions (n=15).
Six different kinds of respondents were identified and inter-
viewed: (1) Non- beneficiaries who were cyclone- affected but excluded 
from the housing intervention (n=31); (2) In situ housing upgrad-
ing beneficiaries (n=8); (3) Beneficiaries in the process of rehabilita-
tion (n=20); (4) Relocated or resettled (R&R) beneficiaries (n=44); 
(5) Beneficiaries identified for infrastructure upgrading (n=20); and 
(6) Beneficiaries identified for R&R in the future (n=35).
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Table 3.1 Selected sites in urban and rural Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, sample 
description and type of resettlements studied through the project. © Garima 
Jain based on data sources BeMC (2014a), BeMC (2014b), Census of India 2011, 
GVMC (2015a), GVMC (2015b), Sarma 2015, and key stakeholder interviews.
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Triggers and rehabilitation alternatives
Disaster risk reduction projects are undertaken with a high sense of urgency. 
Following disaster incidences, states feel the need to respond quickly and 
‘visibly’ to showcase their effectiveness and action (Scott 1998). Housing, 
being one of the most visible types of damage, attracts their attention 
(Few et al. 2021). Similar to post- disaster compensation amounts that 
are seen as the state’s moral responsibility or ex gratia, the state also pro-
vides post- disaster housing from a moral high ground and sees people as 
‘beneficiaries’ irrespective of whether the provision is in fact beneficial to 
them (Jain et al. 2017).
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Funding and actions taken in the context of disasters are often 
response- centric one- time efforts, lacking a long- term view. In devel-
opment programmes, systems for assessments, implementation design, 
beneficiary identification, pre- defined compensatory mechanisms and 
long- term monitoring and impact evaluation are standard, whereas, in 
a disaster context, action is required to be taken soon after an extreme 
event, when affected families require immediate support, and there is 
little time to conduct any detailed socio- economic, risk or environmen-
tal assessments. Effectively, post- disaster recovery remains considerably 
divergent from other development objectives (Chandrasekhar, Zhang 
and Xiao 2014; Olshansky and Chang 2009); at best it is seen as urban 
development activities compressed in time and space (Olshansky and 
Johnson 2017).
Normatively, the objectives of both DRR and development inter-




































Figure 3.2 Elements of decision- making processes. Triggers and 
alternatives considered, institutional design, and incentive structures 
were identified as key decision- making elements that had implications 
for resettlement outcomes. © Garima Jain.
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people. However, owing to the fundamental differences between the two 
contexts in which they operate, the approaches may be different. Post- 
disaster interventions focus on reducing long- term vulnerabilities to 
recurring events, but there is a need for them to adopt processes from 
development projects such that the overall outcomes are more sustain-
able, while development projects need to become more risk- informed.
Alternatives to R&R are not assessed fully. Particularly in urban areas, 
where inner- city land is priced very highly, alternatives to R&R are not 
considered as such, especially when the land is occupied by people living 
in slums or those who do not have land rights. In many cases, ‘unten-
ability’ is used as a pretext for moving people to peripheral areas (e.g. 
Sevanagar in Visakhapatnam, where people were evicted from a ‘haz-
ardous’ inner- city location to several miles away from the city), without 
sufficient assessments of social, economic and environmental costs and 
benefits to the households in question or the city at large (see Chapter 5 
in this volume on risk tolerance). Alternatives to moving people far, such 
as not moving them at all, and instead investing in in-situ upgrading, are 
not considered at the time of decision- making. The ‘value’ of land in pro-
viding in situ housing needs to be reconsidered in the larger development 
frame (see Chapter 5 by Lwasa, Bazaz and Jain in this book), alongside 
the discussion on the alternative use of land argument discussed later in 
the chapter.
When the vacated land is put to alternate uses other than environmen-
tal recovery, the costs of resettlement and upgrading the site for this new 
use seem unjustifiable vis- à- vis in situ upgrading. While people are being 
relocated to new sites replacing the existing environmental or other func-
tions, the original settlement sites often also undergo land use changes. 
In New Golabanda in Odisha and Sevanagar in Visakhapatnam, the 
entire neighbourhoods were resettled and the land was traded in the first 
case with a military base and in the second case used by the railways as 
a stadium.
In the case of the ODRP in Ganjam district of Odisha, people were 
allowed to keep their original lands and houses which they owned, and 
in many cases family members continued living there to retain a con-
nection. While the relocated residents were required to live in the new 
sites for a minimum of seven years to get patta (legal tenure), they could 
not rent out their lands and houses in either location. In cases such as 
Lakshmipur, the distance between the old and new sites was so large 
that many continued to live in the old sites, with one of the family mem-
bers going to the new site only to sleep. This approach may be accept-
able to residents as it likely supports their accumulation strategy (Bazaz 
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et al. 2016), but it is yet to be seen if these older sites continue to remain 
exposed to hazard risk. Thus, the risk reduction outcome in these cases 
may not be completely achieved despite the provision of new and safe 
houses.
Institutional design
Multi- scalar institutional delivery designs and sequencing of processes 
significantly affect the levels of participation and thereby the outcomes of 
the intervention. ODRP pursued a unique institutional design. Odisha 
State Government asked the World Bank to fund the recovery project, 
and Odisha State Disaster Management Authority (OSDMA) anchored 
the delivery of housing. OSDMA is part of the Department of Revenue, 
which in turn controls rural land for the state, making the otherwise con-
tested task of land allocation easier for the R&R programme. In addition, 
Gram Vikas, a local NGO, was brought in as a key socio- technical part-
ner. Well- documented experiences from the World Bank’s past DRR and 
development projects (Jain 2016b, 37) as well as ground experiences of 
Gram Vikas and OSDMA, were effectively employed in the programme 
design. District authorities first identified the affected people and vil-
lages, following which suitable land was found in agreement with the vil-
lage development committees through the Department of Revenue. The 
resulting R&R was largely acceptable to the rehabilitated communities.
In contrast, in Visakhapatnam, the development agencies took the 
lead on delivering ‘disaster- resilient’ housing. The State Housing Board 
raised public and private humanitarian funds to build housing on the 
land that was allotted by the State Department of Revenue. Housing was 
constructed well before the district authorities started their beneficiary 
identification. This resulted in a situation where the beneficiaries could 
not participate in the decision- making process, and eventually resisted 
moving (Sarma 2015). Institutional design, sequencing of processes that 
involve participation, and learning from past experiences are critical for 
more sustainable outcomes.
Participation can enable a sense of ownership that can have longer- 
term benefits for the development. One clear distinction observed between 
the cases of Paradesipallyam and Sevanagar in Visakhapatnam, which 
were both resettled at Madhurvada at a distance of 20- plus km from their 
original locations in the city, was the willingness of people to move. Both 
were moved to housing sites that were built under the centrally sponsored 
JnNURM housing programme, and therefore the provisions of social and 
physical infrastructure, distance from the original site, timing, etc. were 
equally deficient. While Paradesipallyam was inhabited mostly by people 
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who were renters in the city who ‘chose’ these sites from among three 
location choices through an application process, Sevanagar inhabitants 
were evicted from railway lands on the grounds of ‘untenability’ and 
were left with no choice but to move.
Eventually, people in Paradesipallyam formed a management com-
mittee to take care of open drains and waste management and made 
a collective effort to get bus access improved, whereas the people of 
Sevanagar took no ownership over maintaining the place, and, with 
time, increasing health hazards, accidental deaths, the crime rate, edu-
cation dropouts and other issues became rampant. While there may be 
other reasons for these differential outcomes, the level and sense of own-
ership evidently had direct implications which need to be considered in 
such resettlement scenarios.
Incentive structures
‘Inclusion’ criteria exclude many and can exacerbate inequalities within 
the existing social structures. Most housing schemes are selective in 
their ‘beneficiary identification’. Usually, the criteria are set during pro-
gramme design, based on which the assessments are conducted by dif-
ferent teams comprising various government officials with differing skills 
and expertise. To avoid discrepancies across assessment teams and to 
keep the assessments ‘objective’, the criteria are based on tangible indi-
cators, such as:
• Level of house damage (e.g. fully, severely or partially). It is taken 
as a proxy for all damages and does not include other losses, such as 
damaged productive or non- productive assets or loss to working days, 
thereby excluding many affected people.
• Proof of residence in the state and land title/ ownership. Not everyone 
has these documents to prove residence, or they may have lost them 
during the disaster itself. Furthermore, renters may have been living 
in a place for a long time without having any proof of residence, and 
may not have an alternative place to stay.
• Proof of identity (including a below poverty line card). People, espe-
cially those in rural areas, migrants or those with limited education, do 
not have sufficient proof of identity, and therefore risk being excluded.
• Non- participation in other housing schemes.
One proof of identity that is often made mandatory is the below 
poverty line (BPL) card. While the poverty line itself is a contentious 
statistic across the country, there are several other challenges in getting 
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a card even for those who are BPL. This played out in Markandi village 
in Odisha. Predominantly consisting of thatched roof houses, the vil-
lage caught fire in 1997. Many people took loans at that time to rebuild 
their houses using asbestos sheets, but again lost what they had rebuilt 
in the 1999 super cyclone, and were thus burdened by more loans. Those 
who had not taken out loans earlier took them this time, to rebuild parts 
of their houses (usually one room) using concrete slabs to avoid such 
shocks in the future. Since then, however, their names have been taken 
off the BPL list, because roof quality is a criterion in BPL selection. Thus, 
when the 2013 cyclone struck, even though they were still repaying high- 
interest 10- year- old loans and were affected by the cyclone, they were 
not entitled to get new houses since they were not BPL any more. There 
are many such cases where self- investment becomes a disincentive for 
building resilience.
These ‘objective’ criteria often lead to the exclusion of others 
despite them being equally or even more affected. Consider the simpli-
fied illustration (Figure 3.3) of how this might manifest. Assume that 
before the intervention takes place, there are four kinds of people in 
a neighbourhood: the poorest of the poor, with no residence proof, no 
land and no identity proof; the poor, with inadequate housing; long- 
term renters to informal landowners, with no proof of residence; and 
the affluent. But since the beneficiary identification criteria are such 
that only the poor with damaged housing and proof of residence are 
allotted new housing, the poorest of the poor and the renters are left 
out. Despite large investments made in housing provision, opportunity 










but with land and
identity
Renters (means to pay rent, but no
housing/proof of residence)
Renters (means to
pay rent, but no
housing/proof of
residence)
Poorest of the poor with no house, land or
sufficient proof of identity
AFTER INTERVENTIONBEFORE INTERVENTION
Poor with inadequate housing and
living in exposed locations
Poorest of the poor with no house, land or
sufficient proof of identity
Figure 3.3 Beneficiary inclusion and exclusion criteria can have a 
pervasive impact on social inequities. © Garima Jain.
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Universal housing allocation is neither a solution nor implementable. 
It is worthwhile examining if a rights-based universal provision could be 
considered as an approach for such programmes, as opposed to target-
ing. This has been a matter of debate in the public distribution system 
of food in India, where universal access is seen to reduce the errors of 
excluding the ones in need (type 1 error) and the costs of targeting are 
found to be more than the costs of including ones not in need (type 2 
error). This approach also worked during the Odisha relief distribution 
after Cyclone Phailin, when 500 rupees and 50 kg of rice were given to 
everyone, irrespective of whether they were affected or not. Every house-
hold we spoke to received this one- time relief, although in many cases 
people opted out, based on their needs, and the value of their time and 
convenience.
But the provision of rice or compensation is very different from 
housing. With limited funds and other resources (such as land), it is 
impossible to make such commitments. Even notionally, if all the peo-
ple in one neighbourhood were to be resettled together, it might have a 
positive impact vis- à- vis the social continuity of these settlements, but 
this is easier said than done. Even in one neighbourhood not everyone is 
equally able – economically, politically and socially – and not everyone 
would want these provisions. Five of the 35 type 1 respondents (non- 
beneficiaries) in our surveys who owned houses but suffered little dam-
ages did not want the housing provision. They may still be at risk in the 
future due to the increasing intensity and frequency of climatic hazards, 
but they do not perceive those risks. This is a form of residual risk post- 
intervention. Some upgrading interventions may be considered so that 
even the non- beneficiaries could get some risk reduction benefits for 
safeguarding their future as a preventive approach to risk reduction.
Meanwhile, states have largely focused on dealing with type 2 leak-
ages within such housing schemes, to ensure that people who do not 
need such allocations are unable to get them through unfair means or 
by using incorrect identities. A Collector from Andhra Pradesh described 
a new system under development for a holistic application process for 
housing schemes. This would involve linking the Adhaar card (national 
identity card), ration cards, property tax information and BPL status of 
people, making it easy to monitor anyone who is not eligible for a house 
(i.e. if they have received a house before, if they already own a house, or 
if their family member owns a house, etc.). While this system may reduce 
type 2 error, type 1 error continues to plague the process and to create 
inequality.
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Proximity or provision of public transport is not the same as access. 
The outcomes of R&R varied greatly based on the distance of the original 
settlement from the new sites: beyond 2 km in rural areas and 5 km in 
urban areas. Further investigation shows that outcomes are based on the 
connections people have with the original location – for their workplaces, 
schools, health facilities, temples, etc. – and as long as they were able 
to reproduce these connections, R&R was more acceptable to them. The 
literature calls it the ‘place attachment’ (Lewicka 2011) (see Chapter 4 
by Johnson et al. in this book). In rural areas, people are dependent on 
walking, and some men use bicycles. They would pay for a bus commute 
for long distances, but are not used to paying for their everyday local 
commute. Even if such transport options were provided, it would still be 
an additional burden that they may be unable or unwilling to take on. 
People in rural areas indicated that relocation within walking distance of 
1– 2 km would be acceptable.
In urban areas, however, people were used to travelling on buses 
and public transport over short distances. When asked how far they 
would be willing to go, most people said they would be fine with relo-
cating within 3– 5 km. But it is also in the urban areas that resettlement 
sites (in Visakhapatnam particularly) were located 20+ km from original 
sites, largely owing to price- based land allocations made for affordable 
housing. So even if a bus service were provided, which is not often the 
case, it may be too expensive for the poor, or not accessible due to their 
age, physical abilities, gender or cultural or safety concerns. The ques-
tion then is whether the provision of transportation services is enough 
to address the problem of access. In many cases, despite having schools 
across the main highway from the resettlement, it was still difficult for 
families and children to cross over and access the school. Safety is a big 
concern, and proximity does not confirm access.
Different per- unit investments for ongoing housing schemes are 
seen as disincentives in participating in one over the other. There have 
been many housing schemes in the last few years, often running 
simultaneously within the same geographies, but the spend per house 
on each varies widely. While IAY provides 75,000 rupees, JnNURM 
offers 125,000– 175,000 rupees per house. ODRP offered houses 
worth 300,000 rupees, in order to provide ‘dignified housing’ to eve-
ryone, and in Visakhapatnam cyclone- resilient housing was worth 
225,000 rupees per unit. The stated reason for the last two being higher 
than those built under development programmes is the inclusion of 
disaster- resilient construction technologies and specifications that 
increased costs. People are often excluded from one scheme because of 
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their participation in another scheme earlier, even though the support 
received in the past might not have been sufficient to build a house. In 
ODRP in Odisha, people agreed to return the money they had received 
previously (under IAY) in order to become part of the new housing 
scheme (they could not use the plinths built earlier as they did not 
align with the new programme’s house designs). Does the lower cost 
of regular affordable housing indicate that it is not disaster resilient? In 
one case (see Chapter 5 by Lwasa, Bazaz and Jain in this book for more 
details on the case), using relief aid money, more expensive ‘disaster- 
resilient’ housing was built adjacent to regular framed structures for 
JnNURM housing in Madhurvada in Visakhapatnam. Both were far 
from the city and remained vacant for a long time after construction, 
indicating that the construction techniques or quality were not suffi-
cient to attract residents (GVMC 2015a).
One size does not fit all. Even within one programme, the budget 
needs may not be same for all. In ODRP, 300,000 rupees have been dis-
bursed in six tranches based on the signing of the agreement, completion 
of plinth, lintel, roof, removal of centring, and full completion. Another 
12,500 rupees are disbursed before roof casting for the toilet construc-
tion, as part of the National Clean India Mission. While people at the 
completed sites said that this sum was sufficient, most of the houses were 
contractor- built, where the sum to be paid was fixed and built houses 
were delivered en masse. In many such instances, quality was seen to 
have been compromised. Also, while the sum was considered adequate 
at the beginning, costs of labour, material and transport inflated over the 
year, so many owners of sites under construction found this sum insuf-
ficient, but lacked recourse to further funds. Besides, residents were to 
receive 20,000 rupees to build up to the plinth level. In cases where the 
location was close to the coast and people were advised to build higher 
plinths to avoid storm surge, this amount quickly ran out. In many cases, 
people ended up taking loans at an interest rate of 3 per cent per month 
for constructing these plinths, and hoped to repay those with the next 
tranche of money. Many remained indebted long after completion. While 
households with bigger families were being encouraged to build addi-
tional rooms, or access to the roof, most people did not have the resources 
to do so. Many mentioned that some additional low- interest loans would 
have been useful.
People prioritise risks and make trade- offs differently than the state, 
and both act based on their understanding of these risks as well as their 
abilities to respond to them. Different people prioritise risks differently 
depending on who they are, what they have, whom they can approach, 
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etc. This informs each of their actions towards risk reduction and trade- 
offs. Those who stay close to the coastal areas have learned to deal with 
onsets of cyclones and flooding, but for them to not have a secure liveli-
hood and access to other services is a much greater risk. The state is seen 
as inactive if it does not take actions to safeguard people from extreme 
events, and often takes actions to avoid this image, but ends up creating 
more everyday challenges for the people (see Chapter 4 by Johnson et al. 
in this book).
implementation and its challenges
Operational challenges
Provision of temporary transit housing needs to be integral to housing 
schemes, including those that involve in situ housing, for greater success of 





















Figure 3.4 Operational conditions, programme flexibilities and 
innovations were key levers identified in the implementation processes 
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have been identified, and they have been offered newly constructed 
housing, provision of temporary housing is still a big challenge. In cases 
where in situ development is planned, e.g. in Sonia Gandhi Nagar in 
Visakhapatnam, people still need to find alternative locations to stay in 
until their promised homes are completed. But the insecurity of being 
excluded and other locational dependencies compel them to stay close 
to the construction sites, leaving them exposed to physical hazards and 
safety issues. These self- build ‘temporary’ shelters often propagate more 
informal settlements (Bornstein et al. 2013). Such a situation could be 
avoided if transit housing were made a formal part of the project.
In many cases people also choose to rent neighbouring houses so 
that they can continue with their original livelihoods, but not all are able 
to take the additional financial burden of a rent. In ODRP, some steps are 
taken to support people with rents and shifting allowances up to 12,000 
rupees. But in other national and state scheme- related rehabilitations, 
temporary housing needs to become an important consideration.
There is still a lack of caste sensitivity at the time of beneficiary identifi-
cation, and this is leading to high risks for some resettled households. Social 
clustering, particularly by caste, is deeply ingrained in India – both urban 
and rural – and has implications for the outcomes of R&R interventions. 
In rural Odisha, for instance, people of many castes cohabit these vil-
lages, but they have their own sub- communities which act as social bind-
ers and economic networks. We encountered a situation in Devinagar in 
Odisha, where a single lower- caste family was resettled along with other 
higher- caste families, and had to face serious challenges when a woman 
in the family had to deliver a child but there was no one willing to help or 
touch her. Higher- caste families are also wary of housing schemes such as 
RAY and JnNURM where they have to share common spaces with people 
from lower castes. While there is some consideration for caste- based allo-
cations within the RAY, for instance, not being aware of this, beneficiar-
ies remain wary of outcomes.
While one may be tempted to assume that caste- based vagaries of 
society could be reduced through such interventions by remaining ‘caste- 
blind’ and treating everyone ‘equally’, these practices are so deep- rooted 
that any forceful changes can only create more challenges, especially for 
the marginalised section. The participation of the community during 
planning, decision- making and allocation of housing units is one way of 
managing this. For example, in Markandi in Odisha, house allocations 
were carried out as per the community’s suggestions on matters of caste 
and professional segregation. Three sites were identified for this one vil-
lage, according to the needs of its three sub- communities.
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Standard housing provisions are not accessible for the disabled. The 
Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 marked a shift in India when disability 
started being addressed from a rights- based instead of a largesse- based 
(generous gift) perspective. Steps have since been taken by governments 
to give preference to disabled people by providing housing to them on 
a priority basis. Yet the steps taken are currently not sufficient and the 
design of these projects further impairs access. For instance, some state 
governments offer wheelchairs to those who cannot walk after disasters. 
But design factors in these rehabilitation sites such as quality of internal 
roads and habitations being located on the seashore make these enti-
tlements impractical and unusable. The act of accessing systems and 
services (common toilets, public water pipes, public transport to local 
markets, etc.) makes disabled people dependent on others for their daily 
needs. Even during emergency evacuations, the process was found to be 
extremely harsh for them.
Mental illness is another challenge and cannot be conflated with 
physical disability. This is understood even less, despite the fact that 
there are a large number of people living with such challenges, or those 
who experience mental trauma due to the disaster. In R&R interventions, 
it has been observed that priority is accorded to those who are physically 
disabled, but not to those who are mentally ill. Cases of mental illness 
are also much more difficult to identify as there are often no objective 
and universal characteristics to ‘tick off’ on a form. The verification 
process needs to be sensitised to enable people’s inclusion and protect 
their rights.
Flexibilities
A multi- stage grievance redressal system needs to be in place, especially in 
urban areas. Some type 1 responders felt that they were left out for rea-
sons other than not meeting the selection criteria. There are undertones 
of class and caste politics that may give some people more voice to gain 
access or raise concerns than others have. Although a four- stage griev-
ance redressal system was set up for the ODRP’s rural components in 
Ganjam with a ground verification system that seemed to work for peo-
ple in having their needs addressed, no such system was planned for the 
project’s urban component. Due to their heterogeneity, urban dwellers 
are unable to unite to demand their rights, and they are often left worse 
off than their rural counterparts. This problem was faced by those who 
were evicted, but had no recourse other than approaching the judiciary. 
This would take several years to come to any conclusion, disincentivising 
this course of action by most people. Elected council members, to whom 
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people had access, were also seen to be politically biased and did not 
address issues equally for all.
Shelter is not the only need people have after a disaster, but they have 
no savings to fulfil those needs. All households we spoke with (158), in 
urban as well as rural areas, claimed to have bank accounts, which goes 
against popular belief. Many opened these accounts to receive disburse-
ments from the government, including for house construction. At the 
same time, most people stated that they would either not use them due 
to lack of trust, or because they did not save enough to put in a bank; 
whatever little they did save, they kept at home for any emergency needs. 
Thus, having access to a bank account itself may not mean better finan-
cial security.
Many women we spoke to were part of more informal self- help 
groups (SHGs) or social kitty systems, where 20– 25 women got together 
and put 10,000– 20,000 rupees per person into one account. They used 
these funds based on their needs and returned the amount with interest 
over a fixed period of time. The system works primarily on the basis of 
the social trust that people have in each other. Many people who have 
asset- based livelihoods, such as grocery stores, were also seen investing 
in buying more assets for their shops, instead of retaining liquidity.
In disaster scenarios, where people have limited liquid assets or 
financial security, they are left with no other option but taking loans 
at very high rates. There is a need to improve people’s awareness and 
their access to non- life and multi- hazard insurance products for housing 
and assets to help themselves recover in case of an extreme event. There 
could also be provisions made to provide low- interest loans as part of the 
rehabilitation schemes, to help people supplement for other needs not 
covered under the programme.
Formal and informal safety nets can be strengthened to improve peo-
ple’s resilience and ability to cope with losses due to hazard event impacts, 
thereby reducing the burden on the state for providing for housing losses. 
People trust their social knowledge more than formal knowledge, par-
ticularly when it comes to asking for help. Many women we spoke to who 
worked as domestic help in urban areas mentioned taking financial help 
from their employers at zero interest rates, as well as other health- related 
support. They got paid leave while rebuilding, which is uncommon even 
in many formal jobs. Many received regular subsidies on food supplies 
and other needs, while others took help from their neighbours, friends 
and relatives during and after the cyclone, but these cases were rarer in 
the urban context than the rural, potentially because of the large dis-
tances or the lack of adequate resources available to share.
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There are also other institutionally supported yet informal safety 
nets. In the case of the informal settlement of Khaja Sahi in urban Odisha, 
after the cyclone flattened the entire neighbourhood, the local Muslim 
Trust helped the residents rebuild again. The Tata Group of Industries, as 
part of its ‘corporate social responsibility’, sent medical vans to the areas 
where their factories are located in Ganjam, and many people mentioned 
how their health costs have gone down dramatically since the vans 
started visiting. There is a need to understand and enhance these safety 
nets and people’s access to them, even if they are informal.
Anganwadis (childcare and maternal support centres) and reg-
istered SHGs are formal institutions put in place by the government to 
provide support to people in different ways. While in a few situations, the 
anganwadis seemed to work well, in many others, particularly in urban 
areas, people raised concerns about trust, access and quality of services 
provided by their anganwadis. At the same time, anganwadi members 
also face many challenges in delivering their services. For instance, even 
if they were able to train people in generating livelihoods such as making 
candles, agarbattis (incense sticks), papads (crisp breads) or pickles, they 
did not have the capacity to market all the goods made by the residents, 
and so were unable to pay the latter as promised. This creates an atmos-
phere of mistrust towards the anganwadis, and they are even accused 
of corruption. Improved trust in anganwadis could in turn improve local 
resilience, as they could offer much- needed services during and after dis-
asters in helping people recover, mentally and economically.
SHGs are meant to provide more financial support by using a sav-
ing pooling system. But in most instances, people are still involved in 
unregistered social kitty systems and are therefore not able to access 
other benefits, such as the National Development for Agriculture and 
Rural Development scheme of loans that is open for formal SHGs. If these 
informal SHGs could be brought under the formal system, they may also 
substantially help building peoples capabilities to self- recover.
Innovations
Innovative interventions such as the mason training programme described 
below could reduce the challenges of labour scarcity during large- scale inter-
ventions, but their impacts on long- term economic diversification and other 
social outcomes are still unknown. Large reconstruction projects right 
after a disaster lead to a shortage of material and labour. These are man-
aged by bringing resources from neighbouring regions, but price escala-
tion cannot always be avoided. This was envisioned at the outset in the 
ODRP project in Ganjam, where sixteen thousand houses were planned 
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to be constructed. A local NGO, Gram Vikas, had been conducting mason 
training in these areas for a few years. They started training the benefi-
ciaries to build their own and their neighbours’ houses. It was observed 
in many cases that people, including women, who were earlier employed 
as unskilled labour were now able to earn a lot more after being trained. 
But a number of challenges were also noted.
According to the project community mobilisers, the training 
attracted people more for the stipend it paid than for the training itself, 
so attrition rates were high. Even for those who attended, people did not 
think that 30 days of training was enough for anyone to become a mas-
ter mason, and many beneficiaries from the same village were not com-
fortable getting these newly trained masons to build their houses. This 
was mitigated by sending trainees to other villages instead, where peo-
ple would not know the masons personally. It was observed that many 
men and women who were 60 years of age and above, and hence not 
eligible for the training, were using incorrect age proofs to get into the 
programme; they were advised by the mobilisers not to join the training 
as it could be a health hazard for them.
Many people who received training under this programme were 
observed to be migrating for work. They were earning 700 rupees per 
day in bigger cities versus 500 rupees per day in the rehabilitation sites. 
However, temporary reverse migration cases were also encountered, 
where unskilled labour migrants returned to the villages to get trained. 
Some women, who had been unskilled labourers and earned only 100 
rupees, stated that they were earning considerably more, although they 
did not migrate for work.
The questions that remain unanswered are whether the vision of 
using the mason training programme to diversify people’s incomes has 
been accomplished in the long term. While many women have attended 
the programme, it is yet to be determined if post- training earning has 
improved their status and empowered them more than before.
Some emerging questions
• Once the land is known to be exposed to hazards and is being vacated, 
could it still be considered for alternative uses? If yes, then with what 
justification and for what uses? If infrastructure upgrading is consid-
ered for using these sites for commercial purposes, then why are they 
not considered for rehousing people in situ? What are the costs and 
benefits of moving people and using these lands, versus keeping them 
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there and upgrading the physical and social infrastructure, and who 
bears the burden of these costs and who gets the benefits?
• Does the ‘objective’ beneficiary identification process widen the ine-
quality in society by excluding the already marginalised? Do these 
selection processes for interventions disincentivise self- investment in 
building resilience? In such scenarios, how can verification be made 
more subjective for beneficiary identification such that those in need 
do not lose out on entitlements?
• How can the state be made more aware of context- specific depend-
encies, caste sensitivities and everyday risks, and people made more 
aware of the hazard risks they are exposed to, so that a mutually agree-
able and sustainable outcome can be achieved? Can a bridge between 
these differential understandings be built, and if yes, can that help 
incentivise better inclusion practice and better perceptions of hazard 
risk for the people?
Conclusion
The various processes and the contexts in which these decisions on 
resettlement and relocation are made have far- reaching impacts on 
implementation as well as outcomes. Resettlement almost always dis-
turbs the balance of the existing neighbourhood, particularly if people 
have resided there for a long period of time, and the distances between 
the old and new locations are such that they disturb the existing loca-
tional dependencies. If the new locations do not address everyday socio- 
economic needs, people continue staying in existing locations. In situ 
housing, infrastructure upgrading or relocating nearby are preferred by 
most households, largely in that order, but the conditions for risk reduc-
tion without reducing exposure need to be assessed. Also, the problem 
of transit housing persists after the loss of shelter after disasters, lack of 
which could lead to extensions of informal settlements.
In many cases, people’s experiences post- resettlement suggested 
that ‘once resettled, long forgotten’. Many people in the post- cyclone 
resettled colonies in urban areas could not access public or private aid 
any longer owing to their distance from the city centre. While earlier they 
would manage to get back to normalcy quite quickly using their regular 
earnings, but with reduced income, this was also now difficult. Overall, 
when people’s needs are not addressed in the long term, they are left 
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Pre- emptive relocation is difficult to undertake and faces the most 
resistance from the people. Other pre- emptive actions for reducing risk, 
using planning instruments and building capacity to adapt using risk- 
sharing mechanisms such as insurance, could be considered.
Housing undertaken in a purely developmental context often 
ignores hazard risk reduction, whereas post- disaster housing develop-
ments focus narrowly on reducing hazard exposure, and in the process 
create other socio- economic risks. Long-term and emerging climate risks 
are understood even less, and relocation interventions which may seem 
‘successful’ now may still be exposed to hazards in the future.
Top- down decisions of relocating people as a means to reduce their 
hazard risk, often without enabling their participation in the process, 
have led to resistance and cases of forced eviction. This has further led to 
a lack of a sense of ownership from the people, and long- term functioning 
of these settlements suffers a great deal. Time taken between decisions, 
implementation and completion also affects the outcomes significantly; 
when it is too quick, participation could become difficult.
There is a clear relationship between land ownership and the deci-
sion to relocate or not, and this needs to be studied in greater detail.
The above findings merely provide some insights from the primary 
work in terms of new questions, but this chapter does not attempt to and 
is not able to provide all answers. While the insights might be from spe-
cific sites, they lead to questions which are relevant to the larger context 
of R&R after extreme events. These may not be an exhaustive set of con-
cerns and questions but help frame the relationship between decision- 
making processes, implementation design and eventual outcomes on 
people and places. Although there was limited scope within this research 
to address all these emerging questions, the author invites greater discus-
sion with a larger community to challenge existing norms and try to find 
practical solutions such that the outcomes of R&R interventions could be 
made more inclusive, thus making it possible to accomplish the intended 
objective of reducing risks and improving people’s lives.
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Notes
 1. The chapter is adapted from Jain, G. (2016) Risk- Related Resettlement and Relocation in Urban 
Areas: Research framework and summary of findings. Site report I. London: UCL.
 2. In this chapter, I use the terms ‘resettlement’ and ‘relocation’ as defined in the framing of 
this book. Resettlement is a major integrated, comprehensive movement of people and fami-
lies which normally involves significant distance between the original and new location. 
Resettlement involves not only new housing and services but also new social and economic 
relations, and new challenges such as access to work and social cohesion (Ferris 2014). 
Relocation, meanwhile, refers to non- systematic movements of families or individuals from 
hazard- prone locations to nearby areas. Relocation therefore would involve less upheaval in 
terms of access to work and social networks (Ferris 2012). In situ redevelopment is another 
approach used to improve living conditions at the same site, by housing upgrading, infrastruc-
ture improvements or both. This ensures minimal changes to all other connections people may 
have owing to their location. I use the term ‘rehabilitation’ as an overarching term that encom-
passes different forms of housing provisions, including relocation, resettlement or in situ rede-
velopment (Jain et al. 2017, 11).
 3. For the purposes of this chapter, I define ‘risk’ as a composite of everyday socio- economic vul-
nerabilities, exposure to intensive or extensive natural hazards, and lack of capabilities to cope 
or adapt (UNISDR 2015). Effectively, I see ‘risk reduction’ in the context of overall develop-
mental gains.
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Understanding and interpreting risk
The three chapters in this part deal with the questions that arise when 
prompted with the need to reduce risk, either pre- emptively or post- 
disaster: how are ‘risks’ defined, by whom and at what scale, and how 
do these definitions of risks inform risk reduction approaches? They 
further enquire about what role ‘at- risk’ people have at various stages 
of decision- making, and what bearing these decision- making processes 
have on resettlement outcomes for the people and places at large.
Cassidy Johnson, Garima Jain and co- authors (Chapter 4), and 
Emily Wilkinson (Chapter 6), contrast institutional perspectives of risks 
with those prioritised by households and individuals. They point to many 
factors – including potential for livelihoods, dangers of poverty, existence 
of social networks, cultural identities and place attachment – that often 
outweigh the hazard risk for the people. Johnson et al. suggest looking 
at risk as a spectrum, where people’s risk perception varies from accept-
able through tolerable to unacceptable risks, informing their trade- offs 
as a means to maximise benefits in the context of their everyday risks. 
Johnson et al. as well as Shuaib Lwasa et al. (Chapter 5) highlight that 
people’s position within this spectrum is not a static one, and that it 
changes over time with experiences and choices available for adaptation. 
They also bring to fore that for poor communities, especially those in the 
global South, abilities (or lack thereof) to take actions are a significant 
limiting factor affecting their choices for risk reduction measures.
Johnson et al. and Wilkinson note that, in contrast with commu-
nities, institutions tend to rely on specialised technical information to 
justify their understanding of risk. These framings are devoid of every-
day risks that are integral to people’s everyday developmental needs and 
wellbeing. Using cases from India, Peru and Montserrat, they illustrate 
how these understandings and definitions of risk find their way into legal, 
policy or investment frameworks, and how they play a consequential role 
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in the conceptualisation and delivery of risk reduction interventions at 
scale. Such interventions, while made with an attempt of reducing risk, 
are often detrimental for overall developmental objectives.
Lwasa et al. present another perspective on risk in terms of geo-
graphical and temporal scales. They offer an approach to ‘valuing’ risk 
from the perspectives of households and policymaking processes but 
within the larger systemic regional conditions including changing cli-
mate, in the absence of which interventions taken could introduce new, 
unknown risks in the future. They suggest the use of the asset accumula-
tion strategy to understand households’ decision- making behaviours, but 
they also stress the role of institutions in asset building and in enabling 
or limiting households’ accumulation of assets. Founding their argument 
on the principles of the social construction of risk, they stress the need to 
address endemic deficits in social, economic and environmental assets 
driven by inequitable processes of development, as a means to enable 
households to accumulate assets and reduce their own risks over time.
Wilkinson presents the Montserrat case as a unique condition coun-
ter to those presented through case studies of India, Uganda and Peru 
elsewhere in this book, where an infrequent but high- intensity long- 
lasting event such as a volcanic eruption widely changes perceptions of 
risks. This case also demonstrates that a longer- term view of risk (as was 
adopted by UK and local authorities, scientists and local communities) 
could result in substantial investments in safer locations. It offers lessons, 
especially for the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and other cities 
in the global South where few options for resettlement exist, in terms of 
how to anticipate and plan for deliberative dialogues in the event of a 
major disaster.
Altogether, the three chapters do not suggest the need to calculate 
precisely how much risk is acceptable by who, or to create a no- risk condi-
tion; rather, they point towards building platforms that promote a shared 
understanding of risks between multiple actors, developing capacities to 
identify and mitigate processes which impose unacceptable threats on a 
part of the society, and promoting integration of these multi- stakeholder 
deliberative processes within larger developmental agendas. Drawing 
from all the cases presented – from Uganda, Peru, India and Montserrat – 
it becomes evident that achieving an agreement on the most appropriate 





Risk as a subjective concept and its 
influence on decision- making
Cassidy Johnson, Garima Jain, Vineetha nalla  
and José delfín Cáceres- martínez
There is ample evidence that points out that resettlement is not advisable, 
unless it is indeed the last resort (Jain et al. 2017), and can be achieved 
through a thorough, holistic, participatory and inclusive social process. 
Faced with this conclusion, then, why is it still undertaken, increasingly 
frequently, and who initiates it? When resettlement is promoted with the 
objective of reducing risks, either pre- emptively or post- disaster, how are 
‘risks’ defined and by whom? How much power do ‘at- risk’ people have 
in these decisions and at what stages? Ultimately, what bearing do these 
decision- making processes have on the resettlement outcomes?
This chapter examines how different stakeholders interpret ‘risk’ 
and how this influences decisions about resettlement and relocation. 
Residents make habitation decisions based on their values and sets of 
available choices to cope with threats and take advantage of opportuni-
ties. The understanding of risk by the planning authorities is often diver-
gent from that of residents. Policies that seek to reduce the collective 
burden of exposure to hazard for a given population tend not to factor 
in individual perspectives on why residents might choose to tolerate or 
accept certain risks. This divergence in views is important in the issue 
of resettlement, because how a person perceives their own risks and 
their ability to mitigate them, or how risk is calculated or understood by 
decision- makers, has a bearing on actions for risk reduction, including 
the decision as to whether to participate in/ undertake resettlement and 
relocation or not.
The chapter opens with three case studies, from Peru, India and 
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project. The cases are all different in the scale of resettlements under-
taken and as regards who has the power to make decisions. The Peru 
and India cases exemplify institutional perspectives, while the Uganda 
case offers household- level approaches. Each of these cases examines: 1) 
how risk was ‘calculated’ and defined, 2) what were the legal frameworks 
and responsible institutions, 3) what alternatives were considered, apart 
from resettlement and relocation, 4) whether the affected had the power 
and agency to act and see risk differently than the institutions, and 5) the 
outcomes of relocation and resettlement. The case studies are followed 
by a discussion which seeks to engage with current understanding of risk 
perception and its influence on decision- making.
We find that legal and policy frameworks are increasingly impor-
tant elements of how institutional actors perceive and act on risks. The 
concepts of ‘unmitigable’ in Peru and ‘untenable’ in India present visions 
of risk that are acted on by institutional actors, resulting in resettlement 
or relocation of communities that are determined to be ‘at risk’. However, 
those conceptions of ‘unmitigable’ or ‘untenable’ derived through the 
application of policy seem to be very different from how communities or 
individuals see their own everyday risks. We argue that the concept of 
‘tolerable risks’, what residents are willing to live with because of other 
trade- offs and opportunities, and ‘tipping points’, the point at which they 
decide that relocation or resettlement is necessary, must be examined 
and thus understood from the differing vantage points of communities, 
governments and other stakeholders (see also Chapter 15 by Kisembo 
in this volume on tipping points). We argue for the need for a common 
platform to engage with all stakeholders, build consensus on a shared 
understanding of risk, enhance their knowledge about hazard exposure, 
learn from them about the everyday needs and priorities, and arrive at 
a common consensus for subsequent actions towards risk reduction and 
longer- term sustainable and resilient development outcomes.
Case 1: Peru
In Peru, a special law exists on preventive and post- impact resettlement 
(see also Chapter 8 in this volume by Chávez Eslava). This was estab-
lished in 2011 along with new laws on disaster risk management, as a 
reaction to various serious seismic and hydrological disaster events that 
occurred towards the end of the 1990s (the Arequipa earthquake and 
El Niño episode). The resettlement law enables the regional govern-
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the founding argument for a resettlement to take place (Congreso de la 
Republica 2017a, 2017b). A non- mitigable risk area is defined as ‘a zone 
where the probability exists that the population and its livelihoods will 
suffer damage and loss because of the impact of events and where the 
implementation of mitigation measures leads to greater costs and com-
plexity than relocating housing and urban infrastructure’ (Congreso de 
la Republica 2012).
In Peru, the expansion of urban areas over the last decades has been 
typified by increasing numbers of informal settlements, self- constructed, 
often in ecologically fragile areas, and with the ‘legalisation’ of unsafe 
lots and construction of risk reduction infrastructure in return for votes. 
According to official figures more than 21 million people live in condi-
tions of extensive risk and 1 per cent of these are in areas of non- mitigable 
risk, subject to the need for resettlement (Lavell et al. 2015).
A national institution, the Centre for Estimation of Risk and Disaster 
Risk Prevention (CENEPRED), developed a risk evaluation tool, which 
aids in the identification of non- mitigable risk and is used as a basis for 
decisions on resettlement. The risk evaluation is essentially quantitative 
and uses a scientific approach based on numerical data and very lim-
ited qualitative information (Cáceres- Martínez 2017). The calculation 
of the probability of natural hazard incidence in a specific area is based 
on frequency and magnitude. The CENEPRED manual for risk assess-
ment has detailed information on how to measure the possible hazard 
and requires multiple specialists to achieve this (CENEPRED 2014). For 
any such study, all relevant technical entities are required to participate, 
which can amount up to 15 institutions (Presidencia del Consejo de 
Ministros 2013). For measuring vulnerability, the current resettlement 
law establishes that the socio- economic baseline should be generated by 
the National Institute for Statistics and Informatics. The vulnerability of 
people and structures, defined by exposure, fragility and resilience, are 
assigned weighted averages. Once the level of hazard and the level of 
vulnerability are defined, the levels of risk are established following the 
criteria shown in Table 4.1. The thresholds for each vulnerability level 
are defined solely by the assessing entity or staff, based on their prior 
experience and knowledge, without participation or definition through 
consultation with affected communities. This leads to the conclusion that 
the decision is also political.
The resettlement law stipulates that a working group made up 
of persons from local, provincial and regional governments, as well as 
CENEPRED, decide on the resettlement process (Presidencia del Consejo 
de Ministros 2013). There have been numerous difficulties in applying 
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the law, due to technical aspects being counterposed with political con-
siderations, and a long list of legal requirements that need to be fulfilled 
(Lavell et al. 2015). Once approved, some resettlement projects have had 
to be suspended or remain unfinished. Others have been undertaken 
through special laws passed to promote them (which is contradictory 
or duplicative of the more general resettlement law). For example, the 
flood- prone area of lower Belén in Iquitos, Amazonia, following a 2014 
presidential promise of relocation.
But what happens when someone does not want to take part in 
the process? Residents’ views on the resettlement are secondary and not 
binding for the decisions on resettlement. In practice, the affected com-
munities have undertaken strategies to resist resettlement outright, to 
delay it as much as possible or to negotiate the terms in which this reset-
tlement takes place. Examples of this can be seen in the cases of Belén 
(see Chapter 8 by Chávez Eslava in this book) as well as several other 
cases across Peru, such as Polvorines, the Lomo de Corvina and Carosio. 
In all of these situations, many people consider that risk could be miti-
gated, that they have already built their lives and livelihoods around the 
place, and that the frequency of extreme events has previously stimu-
lated them develop preparedness and mitigation measures on their own 
(Modesto n.d.).
Under the law, participation is intended only to provide informa-
tion and feedback for the implementation of the resettlement process, 
rather than to influence the decision on proceeding with resettlement 
in the first place (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros 2013). Although 
Table 4.1 The current resettlement law establishes the need for generating a 
baseline for vulnerability of people and structures, defined by exposure, fragility, 
and resilience based on assigned weighted averages. Level of risk are established 
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there are spaces for dialogue and community representatives on a reset-
tlement committee, these are not binding or with voting rights.
Case 2: India
A quarter of the urban population of India lives in slums.1 To address this 
challenge, the central and state governments often introduce affordable 
housing schemes with the objective to provide ‘appropriate’ housing for 
the poor. One such centrally sponsored scheme was introduced in 2011 
called the Rajiv Awas Yojna or RAY (later, in 2014, renamed Pradhan 
Mantri Awas Yojna/ PMAY) by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty 
Alleviation (MoHUPA). According to the RAY guidelines, slums were 
categorised as tenable, semi- tenable and untenable – and intervention 
strategies were guided by these categories. Tenable slums were defined 
simply as those that were ‘not untenable’ and ‘considered fit for in- situ 
redevelopment/ improvement’ (MoHUPA 2011, 32). ‘Semi- tenable’ 
slums were defined as those which were located on sites earmarked 
for non- residential uses, including government lands, and after further 
review would be categorised as tenable or untenable.
These definitions make the definition of untenable slums key. These 
have been defined as slums which were a ‘safety’ or ‘health hazard’ even if 
redeveloped. These would include slums located on major stormwater or 
other drains, railway lines, major transport alignment, banks of rivers or 
water bodies, or other hazardous or objectionable areas, including those 
proximate to high- tension electric lines. Such untenable sites were ear-
marked for resettlement, preferably within the same zone or ward. But 
owing to the ‘unavailability’ of land, in practice, they have been moved 
to more distant locations. In a sense, this definition of ‘untenability’ 
assumes that the conditions of hazard exposure could not be addressed 
by any other intervention (such as infrastructure upgrading).
Meanwhile, it is argued that a robust methodology for measur-
ing such tenability is not universally applied, and many resettlement 
programmes are pursued on the grounds of ‘untenability’ (Counterview 
2015). In situ upgrading is often rejected by public authorities arguing 
that the community is ‘untenable’ not because of the presence of a hazard 
but, rather, because they do not adhere to the minimum development 
control norms or service level benchmarks (Bhan, Anand and Harish 
2014). Our research, which looked at decision- making processes and 
outcomes of such resettlement interventions, showed that low- income 
households build dwellings and settlements over time, and those who 
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have lived in these locations for several years tend to develop adapta-
tion/ coping strategies to deal with the hazard risks (Malladi et al. 2016). 
We found that the allowable intervention strategies for such slums could 
be widened, to include in situ redevelopment or slum upgrading, for 
instance, and resettlement should be avoided since it tends to increase 
the socio- economic burden on the people, apart from a financial, politi-
cal and environmental burden on the city at large.
For illustration, consider the case of Sevanagar, a slum settled for 
decades on railway authority- owned land in Visakhapatnam (Andhra 
Pradesh, India) which was identified as ‘untenable’ by the local authori-
ties under the RAY programme. The railway company received the help 
of the Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation (GVMC) to evict 
the residents on the pretext of hazard reduction and their ‘untenable’ sta-
tus. According to anecdotal sources, in return the railways gave GVMC 
a larger piece of land on the periphery of the city. Despite a court case 
between the evicted residents and the railways and GVMC, the vacated 
area was developed as a railway stadium, nullifying the definition of 
‘untenability’ on account of un- addressable exposure. Meanwhile, the 
residents were resettled as part of the RAY programme more than 25 km 
northward in Madhurvada, with limited access to livelihood options or 
social services. The poor social, psychological and economic outcomes 
following the eviction were felt deeply by the residents in their day- to- day 
lives. In addition, they were also left worse off during Cyclone Hudhud 
in 2014, when they did not receive any aid or government help owing to 
their distance from the centre (Malladi et al. 2016).
This is one of the many instances where resettlement has been 
undertaken pre- emptively on the grounds of false risk reduction argu-
ments (Jain et al. 2017; Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008). It illustrates the 
unidimensional understanding of risk and risk reduction approaches, the 
skewed power dynamics in these decision- making processes devoid of 
any participation, and poor developmental outcomes disproportionately 
experienced by already poor people.
India also has a weak national policy, legal framework or safety net 
mechanisms to protect or compensate such internally displaced popu-
lations, especially those affected by disasters or resettled on account of 
risk. The 2004 National Policy on Rehabilitation and Resettlement did 
not accommodate the government’s own experience of resettlement and 
relocation in the past 50 years of dealing with development, disaster and 
ethnicity- induced displacement. The policy gave no guidelines for calcu-
lating the cost or damage to a family but rather allocates an arbitrarily 
fixed amount of 10,000 rupees per family, which ultimately harms the 
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interests of the affected family (Kumar, Das and Banerjee 2004).2 It does 
not specify the timeframe for the rehabilitation, or the right to say ‘no’ to 
being displaced. Moreover, these measures cover only ‘project affected 
people’, i.e. development- induced resettlements, and not those affected 
by disasters or pre- emptive action, such as those described above. 
These concerns continue in the ‘updated’ 2007 Policy (Ministry of Rural 
Development 2007).
The 2013 Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 
aimed to provide fair rehabilitation of landowners and those directly 
affected by the loss of livelihoods due to resettlement with fair compen-
sation of land. It included persons residing in areas affected by natural 
hazard- based calamities, as a provision under the ‘Urgency Clause’. But 
the abuse of this clause has raised questions about land acquisitions in 
such scenarios, or their pretext, and what goes beneath, in the guise of 
development (Goswami 2011).
Case 3: Uganda
In Uganda’s capital city, Kampala, it is estimated that 85 per cent of the 
1.8 million residents live in informal settlements (see also Chapter 15 by 
Kisembo in this book). Rapid urbanisation has exacerbated a land short-
age, leading to intense formal and informal encroachment on wetland 
areas, which are more prone to flooding. Despite an awareness of the 
problems and clear understanding of the importance of wetland man-
agement for the sustainability of Kampala’s infrastructure and quality of 
life, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) has a very low capac-
ity to stop encroachment. This is partly because of the value of the wet-
lands as a site for industrial development, enabled through the Industrial 
Location Policy (Lwasa et al. 2009). Moreover, complex and overlapping 
land tenure patterns seemingly limit the powers of the local government 
to enforce compliance with environmental regulatory measures meant to 
protect the wetlands, leading to informal settlements in wetland areas.
Unlike Peru and India, Uganda has no specific policy on resettling 
or relocating people from exposed or high- risk areas.3 However, from our 
study, we found that disaster risk- induced relocation and resettlement 
does occur in Kampala in two distinct situations (Barrow et al. 2016a, 
2016b). Firstly, when people make their own decisions to relocate 
autonomously from highly flood- prone areas if they have the means to 
(see Chapter 15 by Kisembo in this book). Secondly, in the case of urban 
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been enacted to make way for drainage improvements. The resettle-
ment within these projects, for example Kampala Institutional and 
Infrastructure Development Project and its successor, are subject to the 
regulatory controls of the Resettlement Policy Framework, and attendant 
World Bank resettlement guidelines (see Chapter 9 by Marx in this book). 
Our case study in this chapter focuses on autonomous relocation pro-
cesses, because this is where decisions about relocation are more directly 
affected by perceptions of risk.
The research focused on two case studies of informal settlements 
in Kampala, Bwaise III and Natete. These neighbourhoods were chosen 
because they are both affected by flooding on a regular basis and they 
both have a large- scale drainage infrastructure project planned or imple-
mented. The two settlements are centrally located within the city, but 
have different economic contexts; one is a grain and agricultural pro-
cessing area (Natete), whereas the other has a stronger service economy 
(Bwaise). Interviews with households, businesses and other stakehold-
ers looked at the drivers, the tipping points and limits of acceptable risks 
that push or enable people to move out of flooding areas.
The research revealed that households’ autonomous decision- 
making about whether to move or stay in a particular location is a trade- 
off between the opportunities or benefits that the location provides and 
the risks or costs of living with frequent flooding events. Thus, the way 
that residents view risk is related to, or in tension with, other factors that 
they value in their lives.
There are several reasons that people tolerate the flood risks in 
Bwaise and Natete. One of the reasons for settling in these neighbour-
hoods is the cost of land and the ease of access to land through informal 
means. For example, access to land is predominantly through family or 
other social connections within Bwaise, and land in the two settlements 
is affordable compared to other locations. Secondly, many households 
interviewed indicated that they have lived in the area for more than 
20 years; their life revolves and evolves around these neighbourhoods 
with livelihoods and investments (largely in housing). For example, in 
Natete the attractiveness emerges from these social relationships, the 
affordability of living in the area, proximity to jobs and opportunities, 
and good transport links, which reduce living costs. Connected to liveli-
hoods are the issues of relocation costs that include costs for land, build-
ing houses and travel to working locations if such relocation is to places 
distant from the city. Some of the relocated households that were inter-
viewed indicated that the cost of living becomes higher, because they 
have been moved away from easy access to their jobs.
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Despite the arguably high degree of tolerance of flood risk in the 
settlements, there are some households that moved from the settlements 
due to flood risk. For example, in Natete for the households that relo-
cated, the tipping point is when floodwaters inundate the houses con-
sistently for long periods during the rainy seasons. Health risks, such as 
reported outbreaks of cholera, have also played a role in making house-
holds consider relocating in both settlements. Some have relocated tem-
porarily, perhaps seasonally (only to return during the dry season), or 
moved back after temporary settlement in other locations. However, 
those moving out permanently could be relatively well- off (by the stand-
ards of these neighbourhoods) households that had the capacity to relo-
cate, taking into account the costs of relocation. Others have been able 
to sell off their land rights to buffer the relocation costs. Relocation is a 
luxury and generally only those with the means to relocate can do so.
Discussion
That risk is socially constructed and is not limited to hazard exposure 
is now a widely accepted perspective (IPCC 2012). But who decides the 
threshold beyond which risk is too great to bear? What methodology do 
authorities use in their calculations in situations of potential resettle-
ment? There are two specific elements at play here: one is around power, 
and who has the power to make decisions or take actions; the other is 
how those in power measure or perceive the risk. Risk is essentially a sub-
jective concept and the threshold of tolerable risk varies by circumstance. 
Despite this, as can be seen in the Peru and India cases, authorities 
attempt and need to establish supposedly objective calculations of risk.
institutional perspectives on risk
Formal institutions, such as the Ministry of Housing in Peru or MoHUPA 
in India in the case studies described above, are tasked with addressing 
development issues at scale, and they rely on specialised technical infor-
mation to justify their understanding of risk. This specialised information 
is largely based on historical data, which has traditionally been biased 
towards documenting intensive catastrophic events, instead of the more 
frequent but smaller everyday losses, even though it is the latter that 
may form the bulk of the total losses experienced (UNISDR 2009). This 
produces a large ‘primary bias’ among institutions of over- estimating the 
rare causes of losses, and under- estimating the more frequent but less 
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intense risks (Lichtenstein et al. 1978). This explains why intensive risks 
attract more political, administrative and media attention, and therefore 
more resource allocations.
Risks to poorer communities remain unaccounted for, as their 
assets are neither perceived to be ‘significant’ at a larger scale nor are 
they insured. Current valuation processes look at insured losses and 
do not effectively capture the losses experienced by the poor, even in 
extreme events. There are limited tools accessed for measuring everyday 
risks, that are largely driven by inequality, poverty and other more invis-
ible/ intangible socio- economic conditions. While everyday risks and 
vulnerabilities accumulate over time (Bull- Kamanga et al. 2003), there 
is an evident disconnect in official practices and parlance between these 
developmental deficits and disaster losses. As is evident in the Peru and 
India case studies, the authorities do not account for these developmen-
tal deficits in their calculations.
Bornstein et al. (2013) and Scott (1998) explain how states use 
different instruments such as cadastral maps, housing types or building 
codes to make society ‘legible’, simplified and standardised for easy func-
tioning. As in Peru, for the sake of this simplicity and objectivity, the most 
tangible factors end up being considered in risk assessment frameworks 
and thereby policymaking processes: hazard risk exposure. Linder and 
Peters (2016) also suggest that the process by which these tools are cho-
sen are important political considerations. They argue that the way state 
representatives perceive these instruments ‘conditions their views of 
problem situations, biases their expectations of performance and shapes 
their choices … these perceptions operate within a complex ecology of 
contexts, beginning with the decision- maker’s immediate organisational 
circumstances and extending to features of their political system’ (Linder 
and Peters 2016, 1). Particular realities of people’s lives are represented 
and homogenised, which helps consolidate a state’s power.
The case studies of Peru and India exemplify how these understand-
ings and definitions find their way into legal and policy frameworks, and 
how they play a consequential role in the conceptualisation and deliv-
ery of risk reduction interventions at scale. The processes of identify-
ing ‘unmitigable’ or ‘untenable’ areas are based on a limited view of risk 
and risk mitigation options available. Once these laws are formulated, 
detailed context- specific economic, political and social feasibility studies 
are not undertaken to arrive at alternative risk management options such 
as infrastructure upgrading or in situ redevelopment (Correa 2011); the 
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only means assumed to reduce hazard exposure is through resettlement 
and relocation. They also under- estimate adaptation strategies adopted 
by people living in hazard- prone areas. It is becoming increasingly com-
mon for development institutions and formal organisations to focus on 
the identification of ‘at- risk’ populations and the creation of vulnerabil-
ity maps through participatory exercises. These exercises have a strong 
focus on the technical aspects in order to quantify reducing disaster risks, 
with little evaluation of the impacts of these efforts (Bowman and White 
2012). In Uganda, the state does not exercise this power, which is partly 
due to the complexity of land tenure arrangements (see Chapter 9 by 
Marx in this book).
These laws are rigid and often place too much power in the hands 
of the few (Jain et al. 2017). They legitimise the actions undertaken by 
the state, even if they are used as a garb of risk reduction to pursue other 
agendas, including city ‘beautification’ by removing unwanted slums (for 
an example, see Chapter 14 by Jain, Singh and Malladi in this book). As 
has been the case in India, there is little scope built within them for peo-
ple to deny, resist or affect such resettlement interventions. There are no 
meaningful transformative participation processes envisioned or under-
taken as part of these frameworks (Chandrasekhar, Zhang and Xiao 
2014). Unless the institutions involved have a strong long- term moni-
toring and evaluation framework and a knowledge system that informs 
their policies, these institutions continue with the same practices, with 
little learned from long- term outcomes of the previous investments.
individual- level and collective risks: acceptability of  
risks and tipping points
There is a tendency among policymakers and practitioners to believe that 
‘more and better’ hazard- based information could help people under-
stand their risks ‘better’. But O’Sullivan et al. (2012) find that this ‘infor-
mation deficit model’ for risk communication is insufficient and that 
the communications process needs to be multidimensional, taking into 
account people’s own perspectives of risks. We also find in our case stud-
ies from Peru, India and Uganda that people tend to deal with a wider 
array of risks, and they see them differently from the siloed formal insti-
tutional approaches. People prioritise between these various risks based 
on their level of acceptability of living with them, informed by their per-
ceptions and abilities (Correa 2011).
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The levels of risk acceptability could be seen as a spectrum: accept-
able, tolerable and unacceptable risks. To understand these conceptu-
ally, let’s take the example of housing. According to the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and 
UN- Habitat (2014), ‘adequate housing’ is more than a physical shelter; 
it must also fulfil other functions including accessibility to services and 
livelihoods, security of tenure, physical safety and cultural adequacy, 
within the affordable means of the household. Our research in Uganda 
shows that poor and marginal households find it difficult to garner all 
these functions within their means, and are left with no choice but to 
make trade- offs. Considering that access to livelihoods is directly con-
nected to their ability to afford, giving it up is an unacceptable choice. But 
in order to ensure access and affordability, they agree to tolerate a trade- 
off in the form of physical safety and security of tenure. This condition 
of making choices predisposes them to live with greater risks, including 
those due to hazard exposure.
Here, ‘tolerability’ must not be equated with ‘acceptability’. 
Tolerability is the willingness to live with ‘controllable’ risk so as to secure 
certain benefits. This risk may not be negligible or something that could 
be ignored, but rather something to be kept under review and reduced 
further if possible. ‘Acceptable’ risk, on the other hand, is what one 
may be prepared to take as is, for maximising opportunities or benefits 
needed for the purposes of life or work (Correa 2011; Health and Safety 
Executive 1992). This distinction is based on the premise that in no con-
dition is the risk absolutely zero and that there is always a certain level of 
risk everyone accepts living with: similar to the idea of ‘risk appetite’ as 
used in the insurance and banking industries (Deloitte 2014).
As such, trade- offs can be understood as a means with which dif-
ferent actors negotiate between the different acceptable and unaccep-
table risks, and eventually choose to live with a set of ‘accepted’ risks. 
But people’s position within this spectrum of acceptability of risk is not 
a static one. Risk acceptability changes over time with experiences and 
choices available (Whittaker 1986). As is seen through the case study 
in Kampala, households can experience ‘tipping points’, owing to either 
sudden events or accumulation of losses over time, that change the way 
what they value is at risk. Therefore, people’s acceptability of risk is 
informed by their perceptions of risks and what they value, and these 
perceptions are further influenced by many factors that vary widely situ-
ationally, across individuals (e.g. men and women) or as collectives.
So far research has investigated the evaluation, decision- making 
and trade- offs at an individual or a household level. However, collective 
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patterns of risk perception at the community or even population level are 
far less explored (Moussaïd 2013). Research in this line of inquiry shows 
that while individuals’ personal experience and existing socio- economic 
conditions play a major role in the perception of risk and how they 
respond to it (Gaillard 2008; Wisner et al. 2004), ‘individual risk judge-
ments tend to be correlated with the proximity of individuals in their 
social network’ (Moussaïd 2013, 1). Collective perceptions of risk, and 
how people respond to it, seem to be linked to the social group within 
which these interactions are taking place. This is perhaps significant for 
how whole neighbourhoods in Kampala tolerate risks despite the pres-
ence of serious hazards.
Some such factors that influence perceptions of risk are explored 
by different disciplines. The ‘social amplification of risk’ framework pro-
posed by Kasperson et al. (1988) suggests that informal dwellers face 
challenges on a daily basis to access basic services to build a livelihood. 
Hence, they see a ‘disaster’ as something that amplifies these challenges 
rather than as a single rare mega- event. Therefore, what formal institu-
tions may see as an emergency/ catastrophe is part of a continuum of 
everyday risks for the poor. According to this notion, although disasters 
are absolute, the knowledge of them and the way they are perceived is 
socially constructed. Certain aspects of the disaster interact with social, 
cultural and economic processes that may increase or decrease the per-
ceptions of risk.
Environmental psychology literature suggests that people’s rela-
tionship with place, in the form of dependence, attachment or identity, 
can shape their perception of risks associated with living in that place 
(Quinn et al. 2018). The longer someone lives in a place, the stronger 
the attachment is likely to be (Lewicka 2011). Although there is no con-
sensus in the literature on the relationship between attachment and the 
perception of environmental risk, our research in India and Uganda sug-
gests that longer- term residents seem to put less emphasis on hazard risk 
exposure than on other meanings they associated with the place, includ-
ing social links, access to social services, etc.
Perception of risk and actors’ ability to mitigate them  
informs their decision- making
Although the loss of life, injury and destruction of assets are the reali-
ties of a disaster, the question of ‘what is at risk’ is perceived differently 
by different actors. While government organisations and other formal 
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life and economic resources, the people fear loss of safety and security 
of their homes, their social relations, and their livelihood opportuni-
ties which are at risk from the disaster. The two divergent perspectives 
of defining risk by the people and institutions ultimately inform their 
respective risk reduction actions.
Risk literature points out that perceptions of risk influence the adap-
tation or coping measures taken by people, including decisions to move 
or stay. But high perception of hazard risk does not prevent them from 
living in high- risk areas, because people’s behaviour is influenced by both 
hazard- and non- hazard- related risk factors (Gaillard 2008). In addition, 
our study also points out that this decision- making is moderated by peo-
ple’s abilities, owing to their resource access and socio- economic condi-
tions. Poorer people, despite their high level of perception of risk, do not 
have many alternative choices for risk- mitigating actions (see Chapter 15 
by Kisembo in this book).
Some studies (largely based in developed country contexts) have 
attempted to look at the moderating effects of place attachment on risk 
adaptation behaviour in high- risk areas (Quinn et al. 2018; Lewicka 
2011; De Dominicis et al. 2015). They point out that ‘place attachment 
may function as a barrier for enacting preventive behaviours in order 
to cope with an environmental risk, especially when the perceived risk 
is higher due to the exposition to a higher objective risk’ (De Dominicis 
et al. 2015, 72). These perspectives, although useful, do not include the 
role of the choices of adaptation available to the people as a limiting fac-
tor. Our case studies from the global South indicate a strong role of the 
‘abilities’, or lack thereof, to take actions as a significant factor that affects 
people’s choices and decision- making.
At the same time, we find through our research across all three 
regions that institutional approaches for risk reduction are narrowly 
focused on hazard risk reduction that directs them towards limited 
options for risk reduction approaches. Furthermore, the approaches 
taken tend to disrupt the already limited choices of actions available to 
people. Urban communities, such as those in Kampala who live along 
waterways, move out frequently, due to flooding. This sort of routine or 
pattern of coping behaviour helps them in reducing the construction and 
accumulation of risk. However, this routine is ruptured when communi-
ties are moved into ‘stronger’ structures elsewhere, and this rupturing of 
routine itself can be viewed as a risk.
Formal institutions tend to approach risk reduction from a position 
of ‘better knowledge’ and see themselves as the custodians of this knowl-
edge and information. This information asymmetry, often including 
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deliberate withholding of information from communities by the govern-
ment, also creates greater risks for them, affecting their choice of cop-
ing mechanism. Communities are sometimes unaware of the risks they 
are exposed to objectively, whether they will be relocated or evicted, and 
their rights to stay, or even when and why are they being evicted. This 
renders them incapable of making decisions for their own risk reduction.
shared understanding of resilience targets  
and pathways of action
In practice, there is value to both objective and subjective risk assess-
ments. The former can enable a scientifically informed understanding of 
the issues, especially those due to changes likely to occur in the future, 
while the latter can facilitate consensus building and, in effect, promote 
political willingness among the people (Correa 2011). Eventually, the 
objective is not to calculate precisely the ‘acceptable risk’ or to create a 
no- risk condition; rather, it is to create the capacity to identify and miti-
gate processes which might impose unacceptable threats on part of soci-
ety (Phillips, Jones and Thomas 2018; Brown 1970).
We found through our research and consultative exercises that 
there are ways these divergent understandings of risk and acceptable lev-
els of risk could be aligned better, which in turn could affect the decision- 
making processes and therefore the outcomes on the people and the 
larger system. Sharing of ‘technical’ information with the people gives 
them a better perspective on their hazard risk exposure and decision- 
making opportunities. Consensus- building exercises to create a shared 
understanding of acceptable levels of current and future risk, agree on 
target resilience levels, and envision pathways for action could lead to 
better overall outcomes. These exercises can build a culture of more 
meaningful and transformative participatory processes (Chandrasekhar, 
Zhang and Xiao 2014). Overall, giving people the agency to affect their 
own risk reduction outcomes is likely to be one of the more sustainable 
approaches for development outcomes. At the same time, it is also criti-
cal for states to focus on improving overall development conditions and 
building systems that help people improve their own asset base, which 
can in turn widen their choices and abilities for adaptation.
Apart from more participatory methodologies available for prepar-
ing better preventative resettlements for risk reduction (Correa 2011), 
there is also evidence emerging from global South contexts that supports 
this approach for building consensus as a way for long- term sustainable 
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and resilient outcomes. The well- known experiences from Thailand’s 
Baan Mankong programme suggests the possibilities of building state 
institutions, like the Community Organizations Development Institute 
(CODI), which can work in close consensus with flood- affected low- 
income communities to arrive at mutually acceptable and more resilient 
solutions (Boonyabancha 2003; Castanas et al. 2016; Ratanawaraha 
2016). Our study of the Odisha Disaster Recovery Project in rural Odisha 
(see Chapter 3 by Jain in this book) illustrates the potential of multi- level 
grievance redressal systems that can improve communication between 
the people and formal departments, which gives more agency not just to 
the communities but also to the front- line officers to take more measured 
and context- specific actions. Cases in Uganda (Vlaeminck et al. 2016) 
and India (see Chapter 3 by Jain in this book) suggest that giving people 
better incentives (such as higher compensation, better infrastructure at 
the relocation sites, closer locational choices, etc.), for instance even in 
resettlement interventions, could also improve people’s own views and 
choices for decision- making.
Conclusion
This chapter has looked at how risk is perceived differently by residents 
than public agencies. It has tried to delve into the reasons behind this, 
looking at why government institutions or policymakers look at risk the 
way they do. We critiqued the narrow perspective that is often taken that 
blinds institutions to seeing wider criteria of livelihoods and services that 
are important to people’s lives and to development. We have also looked 
at how communities and individuals see risk as integral to many decisions 
they take on a daily basis. One of the elements that became clear through 
the research is that the negotiation, education and communication about 
the different views and perceptions of risk needs to be an integral part of 
a multi- stakeholder deliberative process, thinking through the feasibility 
of different options. This is rarely applied in practice, but needs to be.
Notes
 1. https:// data.worldbank.org/ indicator/ EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS?locations=IN.
 2. It mentions, ‘In case of projects relating to Railway Lines, High- ways, Transmission Lines and 
laying pipelines wherein only a narrow stretch of land extending over several kilometres is 
being acquired, the Project Affected Families will be offered an ex- gratia amount of Rs. 10,000 
per family, and no other Resettlement & Rehabilitation benefits shall be available to them.’
 3. There has been one rural resettlement project undertaken from the slopes of Mount Elgon in 
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A risk assessment framework 
for decision- making that transcends 
economic valuation: understanding 
why people choose to stay in disaster 
risk- prone areas
shuaib Lwasa, Amir bazaz and Garima Jain
Possible risk- mitigating options need to be examined before deciding on 
the most cost- effective strategy in the short, medium and long term. At 
the household level, factors including social attachment, connectivity 
and access to services in cities offer an extended value registry that needs 
to be incorporated into frameworks for assessing decisions about risk 
reduction alternatives. Any intervention (such as housing) results in both 
costs and benefits being incurred by the people. For instance, research 
reflects the fact that resettling people from high- risk areas eliminates the 
costs associated with the emergency and reconstruction phase (Correa 
2011). However, certain non- monetary costs, such as the loss of liveli-
hood opportunities, physiological and social consequences, and disrup-
tion of social cohesion are often overlooked, regardless of whether the 
intervention is beneficial or not.
Rightly, there is a global consensus underscoring the need for a 
comprehensive assessment of the economic, social and environmen-
tal costs prior to making any decision concerning resettlement (Cernea 
1999; Ferris 2014). But what could form the basis for such an assess-
ment? What risk is being reduced, for who, how and at what cost? In 
this chapter, we attempt to reimagine economic valuation, with alterna-
tive ways to think about ‘risk values’ which can inform decisions at vari-
ous levels of actors. We draw upon empirical data from case studies of 
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voluntary and involuntary resettlements in Uganda and India to illus-
trate this approach.
Valuing risk: household- level policymaking processes 
and systemic regional conditions
Risk can be defined and experienced in different ways. The first is that 
risk from flooding can be defined as a cost to the city, neighbourhoods, 
families and individuals, the environment, the conduct of business and/ 
or livelihoods. This is the normative approach to risk in that it is seen as 
the potential for losses. However, we can also define risk as an oppor-
tunity, or making a trade- off for benefits (Chelleri et al. 2015). In this 
sense, risk- as- opportunity corresponds to a classic economic formula of 
‘the higher the risk, the greater the opportunity for profit’. In this under-
standing, ‘risk’ is an indicator of the potential for achieving greater gains 
than would otherwise be achievable and is to be embraced and actively 
engaged with.
‘Costs’ and ‘risks’ are related to ‘value’. Here, ‘value’ is broader than 
financial measures and thus affords an opportunity to think of ‘value’, 
‘cost’ and ‘risk’ in many different ways. Objects in the everyday environ-
ment and different configurations of location, infrastructure, flows of 
people, goods and resources can have different values for different peo-
ple. These values can also change over time, for instance due to chang-
ing identities from a young person to an older parent. Values may also 
change due to changing registries of meaning: for example, land bought 
becomes an inheritance for children. In such a case, while the ‘market 
value’ has not gone away, the value of the land is understood within a 
different set of norms, expectations, obligations and relationships and 
affects what can and cannot be done with the land.
Household- level and project- level decisions play out within a wider 
regional and local dynamics of development (and not merely risk reduc-
tion). ‘Value’ is implicitly informed by the larger urban dynamics. These 
factors include histories of development policies, and urban land and eco-
nomic dynamics (Sawada et al. 2018). At the same time, risks also need 
to be understood in the context of a changing climate, which may not be 
articulated as such at the time of ‘valuing risk’ due to lack of knowledge, 
but could potentially introduce new unknown risks in the future. It is, 
therefore, equally important to locate decision- making within the wider 
context of regional and city development agendas and to use the analyti-
cal reference of outcomes as a critical lens to examine the conditions and 
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drivers of regional and local development trajectories which are often 
conveyors of systemic risk.
Economic assessments tend to estimate costs, often at an interven-
tion level, using monetised factors translated into calculable costs and 
benefits, but this is not definitive since not all values, by different actors 
at various scales, get captured. Valuation is usually based on expenditure 
methodology, which is defensive expenditure that essentially relies on 
assessing the costs of undertaking activities aimed at offsetting antici-
pated impacts of the disasters. The second type of expenditure is the 
indirect costs that are estimates of expenditure associated with defensive 
mechanisms at a scale larger than the unit of analysis and anticipating 
future impacts. Indirect costs also involve expenditure associated with 
activities that relate to the direct costs but not the actual impact. But the 
value list is more than direct and defensive costs or benefits. Risk reduc-
tion can also offer an opportunity if seen through these lenses; the assess-
ment of costs and benefits would require a different framework.
Framing our approach for evaluating risk
Asset accumulation and evaluation of risk
To understand what individuals and institutions value, we use the frame-
work of asset accumulation (Sherraden 1991; Sherraden et al. 2011). 
Literature suggests that households follow a strategy of asset accumula-
tion, which could be understood as an attempt at building their capa-
bilities to deal with disaster impacts for the future (Dodman et al. 2017; 
Vatsa 2004; McKernan and Sherraden 2008). This becomes part of their 
coping strategy while living in areas exposed to hazards, be it accumulat-
ing housing options, access to livelihoods or receiving aid in the time of 
disasters. Households are likely to assess trade- offs based on these strate-
gies. The households’ ability (capabilities) to accumulate assets as well 
as to use a diversified asset accumulation strategy (innovative livelihood 
practices) clearly provides a social and economic buffer to resettled/ relo-
cated households (Dobson 2017). Hence it is important to understand 
decisions to move (or not) in the context of asset accumulation and its 
interface with disaster risk reduction and development.
Meanwhile, institutions play an important role in asset building 
by enabling or limiting households to accumulate assets. It is important 
to note here that asset building is different from asset accumulation. 
Social protection policies protect vulnerable people (Hulme, Moore and 
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Shepherd 2001) from adverse risks and against erosion of assets, and cre-
ate more opportunities for asset accumulation. This creation of oppor-
tunities allows low- income families to accumulate assets and then build 
marketable/ non- marketable assets on their own (Dani and Moser 2008; 
Moser 2011; Solimano 2006). In a way this goes beyond the mere concept 
of savings. In asset building, state- level institutional structures are quite 
important and dominant. This helps develop mechanisms of self- insurance 
and marketable skills among individuals and communities, enabling them 
to become more resilient, and ultimately making them less dependent on 
social insurance to protect themselves against negative shocks.
To see this in the context of climate change, asset accumulation 
could be regarded as a strategy for improving adaptation and coping 
capacities and building resilience. The asset- based approach protects 
the vulnerable against risks and helps in the reconstruction of assets. 
Assets are embedded within social processes, structures and power rela-
tionships, which help in mediating access and the accumulation of their 
value. This approach, therefore, provides them with an opportunity to 
renegotiate their entitlements during the reconstruction period, despite 
physical loss and damage (Dani and Moser 2008; Moser and Stein 
2011). Over time, sound evidence has emerged that supports the view 
that increasing assets and capabilities is crucial to improving wellbeing 
(Moser and Dani 2008).
This approach, in the context of risk reduction interventions such 
as resettlement and relocation, therefore, plays out in how the state of 
assets and how localised economic and social networks facilitate asset 
accumulation. Using our case sites as settings, we chose, instead, to adopt 
a multi- scalar multi- actor asset accumulation strategy for assessing risk, 
while also addressing the larger risk- development narrative of the region.
In summary, our approach includes the following elements: first, 
situating the risk assessment (all costs and benefits) within the broader 
theoretical frameworks of urban poverty, asset accumulation strategies 
and the capability framework helps us understand structural and spe-
cific drivers of negative and positive outcomes and the interlinkages 
between them; secondly, assessing the interfaces between livelihoods, 
urban informality, climate impacts and regional development dynamics 
enables us to locate risk in a structural context; and third, the broader 
developmental pathways of transitions taking place in the urban and 
rural contexts. Here, disaster risk reduction (DRR) is viewed in the con-
text of the changing climate, dynamics of changing settlements and in 
their relationship with the city and the region, including understanding 
the changing forms of the macro- and micro- narratives of development.
rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south100
  
Cost– benefit analysis and evaluation of risk
This assessment of costs and benefits borne by different actors at differ-
ent scales from an intervention could be understood from the perspective 
of the individual household or neighbourhood scale as well as from the 
perspective of the city scale (Jain and Bazaz 2020).
Individual household or neighbourhood perspective
As discussed above, households have a strategy to accumulate assets, 
and this could be understood as building their capabilities for the future 
(Moser and Stein 2011). Risk reduction interventions can be seen by 
them as an opportunity to accumulate (housing options, access to liveli-
hoods or aid in the time of disasters, etc.) and they are likely to make 
some trade- offs based on this strategy. People may also have found ways 
of coping with various external hazards over time, and therefore may not 
consider those events as being risky. Their potential assets could be:
• social (health, education, social safety nets, networks, family exten-
sions, community structures, cultural practices, etc.)
• physical (buildings, systems, land, public spaces, trees and natural 
capital, productive and non- productive assets, food, etc.)
• economic (livelihood options, access to financial services, invest-
ments, risk transfer and sharing mechanisms, etc.)
• environmental (quality and quantity of water, air, green cover, biodi-
versity, etc.)
• political (agency and voice)
• overall quality of life determined by their levels of access to the various 
assets.
It is in this context of assets and their strategies to accumulate that 
people’s existing risks and opportunities need to be understood in the 
spatial contexts they are currently living in, which is best done with a par-
ticipatory process to understand their individual and cumulative coping 
mechanisms and acceptable trade- offs. Further, for any potential inter-
vention, the changes anticipated or experienced could be understood as 
costs and benefits: reduction of existing risks as benefits, loss of previously 
‘owned’ assets or opportunities as created risks and therefore costs; on the 
other hand, avoiding the creation of new risks as benefits, continuing risks 
when previous developmental gaps continue to remain and therefore an 
opportunity cost that could have been avoided with alternate interven-
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the changing climate, where the households may be exposed to future 
risks that we are uncertain about today. It is this overall comparison of 
the costs and benefits borne by them that could give an insight into the 
advantages and disadvantages of any potential intervention.
City perspective
The agency for institutional perspective is the municipality, city authority 
or government agency. Institutions always desire to maintain the func-
tioning of services and infrastructure in relationship with the people. Any 
intervention, therefore, must also be based on an overall future vision for 
the city development, informed by the city’s past. People may have a ‘give 
and take’ relationship with their environs in terms of flow of resources, 
livelihood extensions and other social and political dependencies, and 
any alterations to these must also be understood as costs for the city. The 
city’s overall opportunity cost of land, pressures on infrastructure provi-
sions and environment must also be understood as costs to the city when 
comparing the costs borne by people versus those borne by the city. City 
assets in terms of infrastructure are important to protect from risk, but 
this protection transcends the assets value. City jurisdictions also value 
the operations in the city, and their histories and functions, as well as the 
population. Thus, the smooth operation of city management is key in the 
evaluation of risk and risk- reducing measures. City authorities consider 
the opportunities of a well- functioning city with functional infrastruc-
ture to manage risk, including climate- induced disasters. The notion of 
value, then, broadens the valuation by city authorities beyond asset pro-
tection to include wellbeing, environmental services and social peace.
At city- wide scale, assessments can be made of the total costs of 
anticipated and or known risk such as climate- induced flooding. The 
costs have three elements: (1) the cost of mitigation, (2) the costs of 
adaptation, and (3) the cost of residual damage. The first refers to the 
cost associated with the reduction of the anthropogenic impact on the 
climate system, diminishing the extent of future climate change to which 
cities like Kampala or those in India contribute. The second refers to the 
cost of reducing the impacts of changes that are local to the city, in this 
case flooding in Kampala and India. The third refers to the cost of impacts 
that can be neither mitigated nor adapted to and that remain after such 
actions have been taken. As Markandya (2015) argues, the costs of the 
impacts of climate change can be defined as the sum of the costs of 
adaptation and the cost of residual damage. In this sense, two different 
economic assessments of the impacts of climate change can be accom-
plished. While estimates of damages refer to the total costs of the impacts 
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of climate change, estimates of adaptation refer to only one part of them, 
as they do not consider the cost of residual damage. In a sense, if these 
costs are avoided by the intervention, they can be referred to as avoided 
climatic costs.
Valuation literature also points at costs and benefits based on an 
expenditure methodology undertaken to avoid exposure to hazards or 
costs of treatment. Defensive expenditure involves costs associated with 
impacts of hazard incidence (intensive or extensive) such as health, 
infrastructure repairs, maintenance and costs related to sustaining life 
or businesses despite impacts. It relies on assessing the costs of activities 
aimed at offsetting changes associated with flooding and other extreme 
events. Such costs can in turn be seen as a way of avoiding future costs. 
The second type of expenditure is indirect costs due to illness or costs 
in the future – for example, monetised time lost for a worker unable to 
access his or her workplace due to inundation by floodwaters. This relies 
on estimating expenditure associated with infrastructure or defensive 
mechanisms at a scale larger than the unit of analysis and anticipating 
future impacts. Indirect costs also involve expenditure on activities which 
relate to the direct costs but not the actual impact. By this method, ben-
efits are considered as the savings that would otherwise be spent when 
there are defensive measures that deter the impacts of hazard incidence. 
This approach is illustrated below in the Kampala case, to show how 
institutional valuation of risk differs from households in applying the 
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Figure 5.1 Conceptual framework to assess intervention options. 
The figure shows intervention options in the context of the city, 
past and future climatic changes, and household strategies for asset 
accumulation and resilience building, for the most equitable ‘beneficial’ 
outcomes. © Authors.
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expenditure approach. These two approaches – value registry and the 
expenditure approach – enable us to situate risk in a historical and spa-
tial context. These aids in understanding the costs and benefits of any 
intervention to achieve the goal of transformative development are also 
relevant when studying the impacts of a past intervention or counter-
factuals, but most importantly they give insights that can direct policy, 
so that the overall quality of life of people and cities is improved in the 
process. A proof of concept is illustrated later in this chapter to show how 
these approaches are applied in a city setting at the levels of household, 
neighbourhood and city, and the decision to mitigate disaster risk. See 
Figure 5.1 that illustrates the framework described above.
Application of the framing and methods to two studies
The points made above are exemplified drawing on two of the country 
case studies from the ‘Reducing Relocation Risk in Urban Areas’ pro-
ject: the city of Visakhapatnam in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India, and 
the city of Kampala, in Uganda.
Three resettlement sites from the city of Visakhapatnam are 
used: Sonia Gandhi Nagar, Sevanagar and Paradesipalem. The first two 
sites were located next to one another in the original locations, yet the 
first was an example of in situ redevelopment while the latter two settle-
ments were moved on the grounds of ‘untenability’, i.e. the original slums 
were located in hazardous areas as defined by national affordable hous-
ing guidelines. A combination of methods was used, including stake-
holder interviews with government officials, project coordinators, NGOs, 
community leaders and select disadvantaged individuals, and focus 
group discussions. Interviews with three types of household each cor-
responding to the three sites were considered: those who received in situ 
housing (n=12), those who moved involuntarily (n=16) and those who 
moved voluntarily (n=12). Field observations, geospatial analysis and 
a secondary review of programmes and policies were also conducted. 
Since the study was done post- intervention, it relies largely on people’s 
memories and stated responses of how they perceived the changes from 
their previous locations and the process of resettlement.
In Uganda, the analysis draws on the data including 70 inter-
views with households and small enterprises in Bwaise and Natete and 
stakeholder interviews. Both Bwaise and Natete experience flooding. 
In addition, Bwaise has experienced an infrastructural intervention in 
canalising the main water channel as well as the compensated eviction 
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of landowners and resettlement of people living near the channel. In 
Natete, infrastructural improvements were underway at the time the 
research was conducted in 2015– 16 and compensated eviction for those 
affected landowners was due to begin.
In order to understand different responses, we analysed the data 
from the perspectives of individuals (household and small enterprise), 
‘small collectives’ (neighbourhoods) and ‘big collectives’ (city). Our view 
that these different perspectives were necessary was not so much to cover 
different scales, but to understand different ways in which people come 
together (or not) in response to flooding phenomena that do not typically 
bear any relation to ‘scales’. Although we were not able to shed insights 
on the ‘small collective’ activities within the scope of the project, it made 
it simpler to identify any gaps and/ or overlaps between household- and 
small enterprise- level and city- level perspectives. Addressing the per-
spectives at the ‘small collective’ level is an issue that should be picked 
up in future research.
We began with the objective to understand how different actors 
from individual, collective and city- wide levels value the risks and ben-
efits of relocation. The objectives were derived from two aims. First, to 
develop an approach that combines different methodological approaches 
to assessing risk and the benefits as well as costs of living and working 
in the hazard- prone areas (cyclones and floods in India, and floods in 
Uganda). Second, to generate evidence that transcends cost– benefit anal-
ysis from the different perspectives that tells us more about how different 
actors value or make trade- offs vis- à- vis living in hazard- prone areas.
In both cases, we pursue the approach as described above, albeit 
with slightly different methods of calculating costs and benefits. While 
the India case used the risks created and avoided and opportunity costs 
as a means, Uganda pursued the expenditure methodology. This dem-
onstrates that this approach is adaptable depending on the context and 
relevance.
In both cases, we focused the analysis at two levels – household 
and/ or small enterprise, and the city – for answering some more over-
arching questions. In Uganda, where the relocations were self- initiated 
by the households: why do people make decisions to relocate or stay? 
What are the costs and benefits for households and businesses of locating 
where they do? What shapes their decision- making? And in India, where 
the resettlements were done as a state intervention: what alternatives 
for risk reduction lead to outcomes that could be more beneficial in the 
short, mid and long term for people, communities and the city at large?
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The costs are borne by different actors at multiple scales of city oper-
ations. The syntheses of economic assessments here are meant to give an 
insight into the valuation process and estimated costs but not to be defini-
tive. While some elements at household level are included in assessment 
at the city- wide scale, other elements are unique to the neighbourhood 
and city- wide levels. This justifies the consideration of multi- level assess-
ment or estimation of costs and benefits of climate- related hazards, as 
defined by the framework above.
Case study 1: Visakhapatnam, india
Using 23 indicators for socio- cultural outcomes, 31 for physical, 19 for 
economic, seven for environmental and six indicators for quality of life, 
the overall costs and benefit outcomes for the three settlements following 
the interventions were assessed and compared. The analyses showed that 
those who were provided in situ housing, such as Sonia Gandhi Nagar, 
faced the least costs and fewer new risks. While some of their previous 
challenges persist, they could be resolved with other policy measures 
going forward. On the other hand, in Sevanagar, where the residents had 
been moved by force, the wellbeing of residents worsened, and no amount 
of resources could bring back lost lives and reduce the trauma caused. 
The results could have been more beneficial, and costs could have been 
avoided, if people had retained and had been able to sustain their previ-
ous ways of living despite resettlement. This could have been possible by 
relocating them closer to their original location, not 25 km away.
The outcomes experienced at the settlement level reflected the 
development trajectory of the city. While the city has been sprawling and 
experiencing increased daily minimum and maximum temperatures over 
the last hundred years, new affordable housing resettlements continue 
to be located outside the city limits, further aiding this sprawl. While 
the city historically has had poor education and health indicators, the 
outcomes experienced by people post- resettlement included worsening 
health due to poorer waste and sanitation facilities and a higher number 
of school dropouts due to greater distances.
According to the census of India in 2011 (Directorate of Census 
Operations 2011), close to 56 per cent of Visakhapatnam’s district pop-
ulation was not employed. The number of workers in 2011 decreased, 
compared to the percentage of workers in 2001. Female workers’ par-
ticipation decreased from 70.1 per cent in the 2001 census to 66 per 
cent in the 2011 census. Of those working, 3 per cent were involved in 
home- based industry. The experience in the two resettlement projects 
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studied aligned with this trajectory. Many people had lost their jobs post- 
resettlement. Women, especially, indicated losing work, since travelling 
long distances was not considered safe. Of those working, many were 
employed in home- based industry, such as watch- repair work or metal-
work, although even those had suffered because of a poorer customer 
base in these new locations.
Even though the city is a primary city for the state, and boasts of 
growing industrial, higher education and healthcare sectors, the overall 
human development indicators have remained poor for many years. In a 
way, two out of three resettlement interventions seemed to replicate or 
worsen these entrenched socio- economic vulnerabilities disproportion-
ately for the poor and the marginalised. Such interventions, which seem 
to be perpetuating inequity, with the only clear benefit of hazard expo-
sure reduction, raise questions for their overall contribution to sustain-
able development and wellbeing of people. (For more details on the case 
and the use of this methodology, please refer to Jain and Bazaz 2020.)
Experiences of risk valuation in Kampala, Uganda
Value registry and evaluation of risk
Kampala provides an example of how the framing explained earlier 
informed understanding how different actors evaluate risk at multiple 
scales. The two approaches applied to illustrate this example include 
the value registry on the one hand and the expenditure methodology 
on the other hand, applied at household and institutional levels. Both 
approaches tend to converge at the outcome – that is, the total cost (eco-
nomic, social, environmental) and the benefits (asset protection, social 
networks, robust infrastructure) – although the detailed steps differ. 
At household level, the guiding issues included the actual stated costs 
associated with living in flood- prone areas in the context of a decision 
to relocate or resettle; the actual stated benefits associated with living in 
flood- prone areas in the context of a decision to relocate or resettle; the 
strategies implemented in managing trade- offs of not moving; and the 
processes of decision- making and how decisions affect outcomes, includ-
ing who bears the costs and who gains the benefits.
Analysis of experiences at the household level shows that with both 
time and money in short supply, almost immediate access to the essen-
tials of daily life – food, water, cleaning, transport to workplaces, energy 
supplies – is important for many poorer households, extending the value 
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registry. At a more nuanced level, the unit cost of items sold in small 
quantities is convenient, though the total costs tend to be higher. This 
is because costs (time and money) saved accessing goods mitigate their 
higher per- unit price. People indicated several financial and opportunity 
costs of living in flood- affected areas. In two of the settlements studied 
in detail, Bwaise and Natete, households were coping with flooding by 
a variety of methods, including raising up furniture in the house when it 
rains, raising the height of the house, cleaning up after floods and staying 
home when it floods to protect children and property. Each of these activ-
ities has associated costs: for example, respondents in Bwaise said that 
they spend two days preparing for the floods. This preparation includes 
actions such as preparing sandbags, constructing embankments on 
houses, moving fragile property from the house and securing the house 
and property in case the household temporarily moves out.
This value registry varied across the two different groups of people 
surveyed. The first group relocated autonomously (although within the 
same areas) and the second was evicted by the state to make way for infra-
structural improvements. For those moving autonomously, there were a 
range of reasons that combine to explain the evaluation and decision – 
not least the suffering and hardship caused by the flooding. One respond-
ent was prepared to incur costs relating to changing from ownership to 
tenancy in order to escape the costs of dealing with the flooding. This 
reflects the effects of the fact that many residents have small houses that, 
they explained, poverty drove them to construct in flood- prone areas. In 
Natete, the costs are similar, with life- threatening events or death occur-
ring occasionally due to flash floods. Effectively, for respondents that 
have moved within Bwaise and Natete, they have sought to retain the 
value of living in such central locations and when the costs of managing 
the risks became overwhelming, they relocated autonomously. For those 
moving as a result of eviction, this is a disruption to configurations of 
value, cost and risk that respondents were comfortable or satisfied with. 
The compensation provided was not sufficient for them to participate 
in the land market elsewhere. Since most of the evicted people contin-
ued to live in the same neighbourhoods, their costs for flood protection 
continued, and for those replacing assets destroyed and lost at the time 
of the evictions, costs were newly created. In sum, those respondents in 
Bwaise who had been evicted or those in Natete facing eviction appeared 
considerably worse off than they had been prior to the actual eviction or 
announcement of eviction. But eviction also reveals an institutional per-
spective on the value registry, which is the desire, in flood- prone areas, 
to protect the people from risk by relocation or resettlement. There are 
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no examples of resettlements in Kampala, while in Uganda more broadly 
there have been only a few. Even with relocation, it is largely voluntary 
(King et al. 2014). Thus, for the institution, the value registry includes 
two elements. The first is to relocate using the market value of household 
assets to protect people’s lives, while the second element is institutional 
asset accumulation by building flood- mitigating infrastructure robust 
enough to manage floods in the future.
Due to a focus on physical asset valuation, the land dynamics in 
Kampala greatly influenced decision- making at both the household and 
the institutional level. Within the complex and heterogeneous tenure 
types, ‘people move between them in terms of their relations to land, or 
because a particular piece of land may lie between two systems which may 
be subject to conflicting rights and duties’ associated with different value 
registers (Mukwaya, Sengendo and Lwasa 2010, 58). Market forces – 
influenced by private real estate companies, infrastructure development 
and expansion, residential housing and industrial development – further 
influence decision- making, whether people continue to stay or agree to 
move. The higher the cost of land, the more likely people are to be will-
ing (or indeed be forced to) occupy high- risk land. The presence and 
grounding of the ‘informal’ underscores its role in the making of the city, 
in terms of both economic opportunities and housing. These economic 
undertakings are taking root and expanding fast in informal settlements, 
and people recognise they can easily make entry into the economy and 
labour market through these initiatives, furthering their intention to 
stay. At the institutional level, valuation of land rights as defined by a 
given type of tenure is used, on the one hand, to secure the easement for 
risk- reducing infrastructure, and on the other for motivating residents to 
consider relocation. Institutional securing of the easements implies asset 
accumulation for the institution; moreover, the constructed infrastruc-
ture is also valued for its sustenance of a robust response to disaster risk 
and thus the functional operation of the city.
Expenditure approach to risk decision- making
Using the expenditure approach, we again draw on experiences at house-
hold and institutional levels. At household level, the direct and indirect 
costs discussed earlier of living with and managing flood risk were esti-
mated using the defensive mechanism. Treatment of water for drinking 
and domestic use was selected as a key defensive expenditure due to 
the importance of water to life and wellbeing. The treatment of water 
was coupled with estimates of actual treatment of illnesses associated 
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with water and the indirect cost in terms of lost hours and wages due 
to ailments that keep households away from work. The inclusion of lost 
hours/ wages was established as vital given that many households in the 
flood- prone areas work in low- skilled jobs either at home or nearby. The 
economic assessment results show that through defensive expenditure 
to treat water in Kampala, each household incurs an average cost of 
US$13.60 per month associated with flooding; given an average income 
of $62.80, the expenditure is just under a quarter of income. At neigh-
bourhood scale, estimated household expenditure on flood- related costs 
is $17.4 million annually. This estimate, though not done by households, 
reflects some of the decision outcomes when evaluating the risk of living 
in flood-prone areas.
City- wide expenditure estimates considered a number of indica-
tors, taking into consideration the future costs in view of climate change, 
including loss of life, affected people, infrastructure destruction, infra-
structure damage and disaster relief, which are calculated as a propor-
tion of GDP. The analysis in Kampala showed that on average three 
deaths have occurred per year due to floods between 1993 and 2014 
and that floods were estimated to cost $0.22– 5.7 million in life years 
lost, while effects on people were estimated to be $0.17– 0.57 million per 
year. Destruction and damage to buildings due to floods was estimated 
to cost between $0.16 and $0.88 million per year. The future possible 
impact of increased flooding in Kampala utilised scenarios from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Three scenarios are 
considered. First is the current situation of flood events, with 2013 as the 
base year. The second is based on Representative Concentration Pathway 
(RCP) 4.5 and the third is based on RCP 8.5. With uncertainties notwith-
standing, the costs are estimated to increase four- fold with an increase 
of 4.5°C and ten- fold with an increase of 8.5°C. The estimate runs from 
2025 to 2050. The increase in temperature is likely to be associated with 
redistributed rainfall events, including extreme events that would affect 
assets. With respect to infrastructure, costs to climate- proof infrastruc-
ture in Kampala are estimated as significant: between $3,259 million 
and $3,699 million over the 2015– 50 period, or between $560 million 
and $600 million over the period 2015– 30. Costs increase with time, to 
a large extent due to population growth and associated infrastructure 
demands if the development trajectory continues with business as usual. 
Costs start out quite small but build up over the period to 2050. In 2020 
they range from $11 to $13 million a year but by 2050 they are as high 
as  $380– 485 million. In terms of percentage of GDP, they go up from 
0.03– 0.04 per cent in 2015 to around 0.1 per cent in 2050.
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Total costs vary considerably by socio- economic and climate sce-
nario. With the more climate- friendly scenario, the total cost to 2050 is 
around $3.2 billion, while with the less friendly one, with little mitiga-
tion, it goes up to $3.7 billion (a 27 per cent increase). The calculation of 
current costs by the Kampala Capital City Authority and the government 
of Uganda was used to evaluate and inform risk- intervention measures for 
upgrading the drainage system. One element of this was the relocation or 
eviction of the residents to facilitate the widening and deepening of the 
primary drainage systems in the city. This example illustrates the differing 
indicators of evaluating risk by households and institutions, and further 
exemplifies how actors in disaster risk reduction arrive at decisions from 
their own perspectives. The downside of the expenditure approach taken 
by institutions is that the costs estimated are in respect to assets such as 
infrastructure. What is missing in this valuation are costs associated with 
relocation, breaking of social ties and community cohesion, business relo-
cation and loss of proximity to workplaces or markets. These issues were 
raised by categories of people in the study sites as important and thus 
cannot be overlooked. These can be assessed as opportunities but also as 
costs of relocation. Distances to markets, customers and workplaces and 
the cost of housing are opportunities that the settlement offers which are 
not monetised. This disjuncture between the two levels of risk evalua-
tion illustrates the convergence of the value registry and the expenditure 
approach methods in risk reduction decision- making.
Reflections
In both cases, we find:
• Clear evidence of collective action arrangements (informal safety 
net collectives, women’s groups enabling the exercise of rights, local 
development committees) and their profound impact in terms of 
reducing risks.
• The factors that enabled the formation of innovative collectives and 
groups play a positive role by acting as a buffer against residual risk, 
most significantly in terms of negotiating the impact of economic or 
environmental shocks.
• Sufficient evidence to indicate the lack of social infrastructure pro-
vision (health and education) as a critical impediment to building 
adaptive capacities of households, particularly in the intergenera-
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of health hazards, lack of safe access to educational opportunities). 
For example, the experience of poor health and education could seri-
ously impair the adaptive capacities of young inhabitants of resettled/ 
affected households.
• The lack of access to employment opportunities within affordable 
distance, and the disruption of economic activities (many house-
holds rely on extended social networks to support profitable micro- 
enterprises) was a common problem experienced across settlements, 
except in cases where the distance was minimal. This is evidence of 
the inappropriate structural arrangements that can threaten the eco-
nomic security of affected people and their livelihoods.
• Skill building (offered as a bundled product with relocation decisions) 
can help diversify livelihood opportunities for affected people. The 
provision of enablers such as skills training and access to financial ser-
vices benefits affected communities in two critical ways: by improving 
their chances of asset and related accumulation strategies (through 
sustained income opportunities), and by strengthening their adaptive 
capacities, offering a much wider possibility of negotiating rights and 
opportunities and thereby contributing towards enhancing the politi-
cal agency of the individual/ household. Such skills make possible a 
better choice matrix and better negotiating terms.
• A clear linkage between the structural strength of new houses, envi-
ronmental services (such as water and sanitation) and quality of life. 
While overall the new houses were structurally strong (and therefore 
able to provide protection in case of cyclonic storms), poor provision-
ing of environmental services led to poor quality of life outcomes. It is 
essential to recognise that the absence of appropriate provisioning of 
infrastructure services creates its own cycle of informal infrastructure 
provisioning – eating into the economic and asset base of households. 
This vicious cycle creates an endemic and endogenous poverty trap, 
which gets exacerbated through the larger, highly inequitable devel-
opment trajectories. It is important to guard against a situation where 
economic opportunities that are created through larger development 
processes are left untapped by the vulnerable population because of 
their poor capabilities, such as poor asset and economic base.
• A strong correlation (in simple analogous terms) between effective 
official institutional frameworks (such as an efficient public food 
distribution system, accessible financial institutions, dedicated skills 
training programmes) and better economic, socio- cultural, political 
and environmental outcomes for affected households/ settlements. 
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institutional arrangements that focus on the eradication of urban pov-
erty as their central mission (both structurally and non- structurally) 
and continuously reinvent them with the changing dynamics of 
regional development processes.
Conclusion
We argue that there are serious endemic deficits in key social, environ-
mental and economic assets, which are largely driven by non- inclusive 
processes of development or the inability of the state to deal with risks 
(from a broader, regional perspective), partly driven by structural changes 
and the dynamic transitions involved (from agriculture to manufacturing 
to a services- led economy). We use the city framework to illustrate seri-
ous deficiencies in individual and systemic capabilities to address shocks 
or endemic stresses (such as poverty). We argue that, partly because of 
a lack of convergence in regional development and clustered economic 
development activity – and the imbalances in regional development – 
certain regions/ cities will continue to be in a state of constant flux, with 
the creation of new risks as people migrate to the city in search of liveli-
hoods, and the challenge of providing them with a decent quality of life.
The examples of Visakhapatnam and Kampala illustrate how city 
development processes (when faced with the challenges of supporting 
a higher than desirable human population) are unable to respond effec-
tively in the context of risk management. We argue that asset accumula-
tion cannot be looked at in isolation from the ability of individuals to do 
so, unless the city development process addresses the opportunity gap 
(in its various forms) through risk- focused development strategies. This, 
we argue, would result in serious erosion of the individual’s and commu-
nity’s ability to respond to environmental stresses and shocks. Moreover, 
unless we address the fundamental blocks of development processes in 
the most inclusive manner, we will be unable to address risk- development 
exposure (which goes beyond hazard exposure) in an effective manner.
From the synthesis of the two case studies, it is clear that differ-
ent actors make decisions to relocate based on various factors including 
health, economics, livelihoods and social ties. The extended costs and 
benefits framework combined with assets and non- monetised benefits 
provides an insight into why people choose to stay in risk- prone areas or 
resist relocation/ resettlement or experience deteriorating experience of 
risk in both Kampala and India. Relocation decisions are not significantly 
influenced by disaster events unless their recurrence provides more 
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evidence for the actors to decide on relocation or resettlement. Such evi-
dence includes the destruction of livelihoods, inability to live in dignity, 
breakdown in social ties and lack of finances. Relocation is based on a 
decision made by individuals or households who are influenced by many 
interconnected factors. Individuals make decisions on their location 
and movements on the basis of their quality of life and the livelihoods 
of themselves and their families. Some people’s inability to relocate is 
not significantly influenced by inadequate finances but rather by the 
proximity to education and health facilities as well as social ties. Thus, 
the issues of access to land, affordability, relocation costs and social ties 
are more influential on decisions around relocation. Inability to relocate 
leaves a trapped population with heightened vulnerability to extreme 
events and resultant floods. People with low to medium asset levels often 
become trapped in their homes during disasters, while inadequate social 
networks beyond their settlements also increase the possibility of people 
being trapped despite the desire to relocate.
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Resettlement in Montserrat 
after the volcanic crisis: a consensus 
on tolerable levels of risk?
Emily wilkinson
While risk can be objectivized through metrics such as annual 
average loss (AAL) or probable maximum loss (PML) or through 
maps, these metrics only become useful if they are socially appro-
priated. Given that risk is socially constructed, this is a prerequisite 
for a transformation in how the social and economic constraints 
and opportunities facing households, businesses or governments 
are valued. What is considered acceptable or unacceptable risk, 
or what is an optimum strategy for risk management can only be 
understood in the relationship between the stakeholders and these 
opportunities and constraints (UNISDR 2015, 149).
Perceptions of risk reflect how individuals understand and experience a 
phenomenon. Many factors influence people’s perceptions of risk, includ-
ing familiarity with the source of danger (Ittelson 1978), control over the 
situation (Rachman 1990) and the intensity of the events (rare, extreme 
events tend to be over- estimated and more frequent events tend to be 
under- estimated; Lichtenstein et al. 1978). Much of the literature on risk 
perception focuses on the negative consequences of living in hazardous 
locations. Yet living in a specific hazardous location or context can also 
produce benefits; and this balance between risks and benefits, as esti-
mated by individuals, can be a critical factor influencing risk perception 
(Wachinger and Renn 2010).
The benefits of taking risks are more often considered with respect 
to technology and technological hazards, and it is often the case that 
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levels of what is considered an acceptable or tolerable level of risk var-
ies between different social groups. Wachinger and Renn (2010, 16– 17) 
describe the events surrounding the closure of a nuclear power plant in 
Valdecaballeros in Spain when a national nuclear moratorium came into 
force in 1993: ‘Villagers actively protested against the dismantling of the 
power plant as it would have provided a substantial benefit for the town.’ 
Hence non- economic considerations such as attachment to place, and 
even an emotional link with the hazard, also need to be balanced against 
any potential risk (Arranz- Lozano 2004).
This certainly appears to be the case for communities living close 
to volcanoes. As Kelman and Mather (2008) point out there are multi-
ple benefits from populations locating themselves close to volcanoes, 
despite their negative impacts. These include good farmland and reli-
able water supplies. Robertson (1995) describes, for example, the ben-
efits to agriculture, mining and tourism offered by La Soufrière volcano 
in St Vincent and the Grenadines. For local farmers, the ‘pull’ factor 
of sustainable livelihood activities close to volcanoes simply outweighs 
many of the threats. Similar pull factors were seen in the Philippines 
in 1998, when seven years after the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, and 
despite the fact that lahars had caused around 250 deaths triggered by 
rainfall in subsequent years, people chose to face the threat: ‘[The] cul-
tural attachment to Bacolor … pulled people back to their native town 
… Perception of risk related to poverty and the loss of cultural heritage 
was actually higher than perception of risk linked to volcanic hazards’ 
(Gaillard 2008, 324).
Disaster risk management (DRM) is unlikely to be effective without 
an understanding of different risk perceptions and preferences, and why 
these might vary between individuals facing multiple threats and those 
public officials charged with managing risks (Slovic 1987). Different 
people and cultures respond to disaster risk differently (Gaillard 2008; 
Heijmans 2001; Paton, Millar and Johnson 2001; Paton et al. 2010), and 
in the context of volcanic hazards, proximity to the hazard (Gregg et al. 
2004), living memory of an eruption and level of impact (Paton, Millar 
and Johnson 2001) all shape levels of risk tolerance among individuals 
and groups. Even if risk perception is high, people may still put concerns 
about convenience and living costs ahead of their desire to lessen their 
exposure (Gaillard 2008). This suggests that the idea of an acceptable 
level of risk is inappropriate. Rather, people do not accept risks but tol-
erate them because they are associated with certain benefits (Pidgeon 
et al. 1992; Simmons and Walker 1999) and/ or because risk manage-
ment measures are able to control risks, allowing development to take 
place and people to thrive.
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Continued investment in businesses and commercial activities 
despite frequent and sometimes significant economic losses associated 
with an active volcano reflect a level of risk tolerance among proximal 
communities. However, the values underlying any notion of tolera-
ble risk may not be shared by everyone; in fact, much research on risk 
analysis and societal reactions to different threats highlights the differ-
ences between institutional responses (such as regulation) and public 
responses (Barnes 2002). In particular, the creation of new official rules 
to control risk, for example through the creation of exclusion zones and 
resettlement policies, may be considered inappropriate or excessive by 
those living in exposed areas and who may end up being resettled in 
‘safer areas’ (Wilkinson 2015).
How these different values and preferences overlap, and the poten-
tial for their alignment and integration, is determined by broader risk 
governance arrangements. Risk governance is defined by the United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) as ‘the system 
of institutions, mechanisms, policy and legal frameworks and other 
arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster risk reduction 
and related areas of policy’. One key aspect is the relationship between 
different decision- making units, from informal local institutions and local 
governments to tiers higher up the scale – including provincial govern-
ments (or states in federal systems of governance), national government 
and regional authorities like the European Union (EU). Incoherence in 
DRM often occurs because of poorly defined mandates across govern-
ment agencies (where emergency management agencies are assumed to 
be responsible for all DRM), overly complex administrative structures, 
capacity and funding constraints, as well as centrist and paternalistic 
tendencies (Wilkinson 2012). Conversely, high levels of integration can 
help to promote more effective DRM. This includes not only the partici-
pation of actors from one level of decision- making processes at another 
but also institutions and knowledge produced at one level influencing 
processes at another (Pahl- Wostl 2009). More participatory forms of risk 
governance offer greater opportunity for different perceptions of risk and 
priorities for managing it (alongside other development and livelihood 
priorities) to be brought closer together.
Research methods
This research draws on focus group discussions and interviews con-
ducted during a workshop held in Montserrat in September 2012 with 
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70 participants representing five stakeholder groups: scientists, UK gov-
ernment officials, Montserrat government officials (including disaster 
managers), regional agency staff and community representatives.1 The 
aim was to explore components of resilience during and after the vol-
canic crisis as well as internal and external factors that have undermined 
it. Moderated focus group discussions on key events, tipping points and 
phases of change were held and recorded. In addition, 16 semi- structured 
interviews were conducted with local and UK government officials and 
community leaders. Workshop and interview recordings were tran-
scribed and coded and analysed using Atlas- ti software.
The coding categories for this research capture data on: (1) risk 
management policies and key decisions taken during different time peri-
ods (before, during and after the crisis); (2) roles and responsibilities 
of different actors for DRM activities; (3) relationships between UK and 
local government authorities; and (4) public perceptions of government 
decisions on risk management policies (both UK and local). Interview 
and focus group data were also coded for issues of (5) risk perception, 
(6) trust, and (7) participation. Data was triangulated across the five 
stakeholder groups and with secondary literature, to help explain differ-
ences in judgements about decisions taken by local and UK authorities. 
Tensions arose as roles and responsibilities changed during and after the 
crisis, and these are highlighted, as are the contrasting views of citizens 
and formal institutions on levels of tolerable risk.
It is important to point out that primary data was collected from the 
focus group discussions and interviews to supplement existing data and 
analysis of the Montserrat crisis and recovery processes. This explains 
why only a few interviews were conducted. While this has its limitations, 
the research team felt that governance during the crisis and its immedi-
ate aftermath had already been studied in depth, albeit from the perspec-
tive of the science– policy interface (see, for example, Donovan, Bravo 
and Oppenheimer 2013; Donovan and Oppenheimer 2014). Further 
data was therefore collected to complement this and bring it up to date, 
situating the analysis of risk governance within broader decisions about 
development and the future of the island.
Governing risk in Montserrat, before the volcanic crisis
Montserrat is a UK Overseas Territory (UKOT) located in the eastern 
Caribbean (see Figure 6.1). The governance of UKOTs is unique because 
of their colonial history, although there are some similarities with 
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countries that have very decentralised public administration systems. 
Local governments in UKOTs have autonomy over day- to- day decision- 
making and planning with regard to social and economic policy, receiv-
ing some budget support to do so, but defer to central government over 
decisions regarding internal security and defence. This includes emer-
gency management functions, if the capacity of the local government to 
respond is surpassed; but in pre- and post- disaster risk reduction deci-
sions, local government are expected to play a dominant role.
From the 1960s up until the volcanic crisis in 1995– 7, the local gov-
ernment in Montserrat enjoyed very high levels of autonomy from the UK. 
The 1960s saw a period of decolonisation in the Caribbean, and although 
Montserrat’s leaders chose to remain part of Britain, the island became self- 
governing with the formation of a locally elected ministerial government. 
From then on, Montserrat, like the Turks and Caicos, Cayman Islands and 
Anguilla, was treated as a quasi- independent state. A new constitution in 
1989 set the parameters for these governance arrangements, giving the 
local government close to full autonomy over decision- making within the 
territory. The governor of Montserrat, a UK government representative 
and civil servant in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), was 
Figure 6.1 Map of Montserrat, locating the island in the eastern 
Caribbean. The map shows the Soufrière Hills volcano and the exclusion 
zone around the volcano. © Katy Mee, British Geological Survey. Based 
on data from multiple sources.
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responsible for defence, external affairs and internal security but per-
formed ceremonial roles, while the local government carried out most nor-
mal areas of government activity such as provision of health and education, 
policing and land- use planning, with relatively little interference from the 
UK government, requiring minimal budget support and even developing 
some infrastructure projects independently (Clay et al. 1999).
In terms of vertical coordination, a set of ad hoc and ‘personalised’ 
governance arrangements had evolved between the UK and its Caribbean 
Overseas Territories before the volcanic crisis. These reflected neither 
a sense of shared sovereignty (as in the French Caribbean) nor negoti-
ated autonomy (as in the Dutch Caribbean), but rather an assumption 
by the UK government that these territories would become independ-
ent (Hintjens and Hodge 2012, 202). Even the constitution created 
ambivalence, recognising Montserrat’s separateness, but maintaining 
the UK’s constitutional power to invoke emergency orders and intervene 
directly in domestic affairs. In line with this broad level of independence, 
Montserrat was also able to design and implement its own policies in 
response to perceived disaster risks. However, limited local capacity to 
identify and analyse risk was a major problem, as were the concentration 
of political power within a few wealthy families, party politicking and 
personalised politics (Skinner 2002).
Like many of its Caribbean neighbours, Montserrat is prone to a 
range of geological and hydro- meteorological hazards, and yet risk man-
agement knowledge was not well developed and had not been incorpo-
rated into mainstream development (World Bank 2002). Knowledge of 
volcanic risk was extremely low among local politicians and UK govern-
ment representatives on the island, despite the publication of the ‘Wadge 
and Isaacs’ report (Wadge and Isaacs 1986), which had been commis-
sioned by the Pan- Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention 
Project (CDPPP). The report warned of volcanic activity and the potential 
impact that an eruption would have on the island’s capital, Plymouth.
Disaster and resettlement in Montserrat
On 18 July 1995, the Soufrière Hills volcano became active after a long 
period of dormancy. Approximately six thousand people were evacu-
ated from the capital Plymouth and nearby towns. They returned to 
their homes, were evacuated again, and on 3 April 1996 Plymouth was 
evacuated for the last time. From 4 to 8 August a series of large erup-
tions destroyed approximately 80 per cent of the capital, burying it under 
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1.4 metres of ash. By 1997 up to 1,600 people were housed in temporary 
public shelters, which suffered from overcrowding, lack of privacy, poor 
sanitation and lack of access to good nutrition. Many Montserratians left 
the island, supported by UK resettlement packages, family and friends. 
By 2011, the population of Montserrat had dropped by 60 per cent, 
from 11,314 in 1991 to 4,491 in 2001 (CARICOM 2009). Of those who 
stayed, some were still in shelters three years after the eruption. Those 
who decided to stay and resettle in the north of the island faced severe 
challenges in re- establishing their livelihoods (Rozdilsky 2001). Firstly, 
there was a shortage of available land in the north (Hicks and Few 2015). 
A few families owned the land and did not want to sell it, and this short-
age meant that land prices rose sharply. While this had an effect on the 
government of Montserrat, who needed to purchase agricultural land 
from private landowners to start building housing developments, soar-
ing prices particularly affected farmers, who could not afford to purchase 
replacement land:
land was at a premium here [in the north] because people wanted 
places to build houses, they wanted places to establish businesses 
… So the farmland started going at rates that were  comparable 
to business leases (interview with local government official, 
2 October 2012).
Secondly, the north of the island is much drier and less fertile than the 
south, and those who were able to rent land faced difficulties in culti-
vating in unproductive, infertile soils on small plots, resulting in low 
yields (Hicks and Few 2015). Consequently, few farmers could make a 
living solely from farming, so many had to obtain a second occupation 
such as fishing or construction (Halcrow Group and Montserrat National 
Assessment Team 2012).
Thirdly, one of the longer- term effects of the land shortages was 
the construction of housing in unsafe and unsuitable locations such as 
ravines. The north of the island is more exposed to hurricanes and flood-
ing than the south, offering few affordable ‘safe’ relocation sites (Mitchell 
2002). In one of the new housing developments, Lookout, some houses 
were built on steep, exposed slopes that have limited shelter against hur-
ricanes, earthquakes and windborne salt (Mitchell 2002; Smith Warner 
International 2003). Another redevelopment in Little Bay is affected by 
regular coastal flooding (Mitchell 2002).
Resettlement in the south, meanwhile, has been controlled and in 
some areas prohibited. Exclusion zones have been set up to control access 
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to areas close to the volcano according to the level of volcanic activity 
(see Figure 6.2). The governance arrangements and relationships shap-
ing these decisions and collective responses to volcanic risk are dis-
cussed below.
Post- disaster resettlement: an alignment of risk 
perceptions?
By the end of 1997, investment in infrastructure in the north was well 
underway, although people were still living in shelters and many of the 
investments needed for recovery were undertaken with only a short- 
term focus: the hospital was upgraded at the St John’s site, not rebuilt; 
an emergency jetty was built at Little Bay instead of a harbour; and tem-
porary government headquarters were set up in Brades (Sword- Daniels 
et al. 2014). These investments did not yet signal a reorientation in DRM. 
For many, it was not until 1999 that the emergency phase really ended. 
Eruptive activity continued, but a new governance regime was beginning 
Pre-eruption settlements - abandoned or destroyed
Existing settlements
Soufriere Hills volcano









Figure 6.2 Map of the various Soufrière Hills volcano exclusion zones 
in 2011, showing where settlements used to be in those areas before the 
volcanic eruption. The key shows how access to different areas is related 
to the level of volcanic activity. © Katy Mee, British Geological Survey. 
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to emerge, with a vision of the island’s future development, and this ‘co- 
governance’ regime would continue to dominate central– local relations 
in Montserrat to the present day. The local government began to take 
the lead on day- to- day management functions, such as the procurement 
and supervision of development projects and some control over spending 
decisions, but with strong oversight and financial control from the UK.
Greater coherence between UK and local levels of risk tolerance 
can be observed from 2001 onwards, with the development of a strat-
egy to sustain the on- island community and promote long- term invest-
ment in the north (Clay et al. 1999, 13). By restricting access to proximal 
areas (the boundaries of which have changed over time: see Aspinall 
et al. 2002) and investing in basic and road infrastructure, housing and 
services in the north, levels of exposure to pyroclastic flows and lahars 
have all been dramatically reduced (Sword- Daniels et al. 2014). For the 
Montserrat government these decisions marked an important turning 
point in the recovery process:
In 2001 the economy began to recover and economic plans were 
made, based on scientific advice. The scientists said that the far 
north was of low negligible risk. Once that was said they set the 
foundations for serious thinking about investment for those who 
stayed. They realised it would have to be in the north (interview 
with local government official, 3 October 2012).
There was no formal public consultation process to establish how dif-
ferent actors viewed volcanic risk on the island (Haynes, Barclay and 
Pidgeon 2008), but perceptions of risk appear to have been broadly 
aligned at this point, with residents starting to consider the north their 
permanent home (interviews with local residents, 1– 3 October 2012). 
Many had already left the island, prompted by the ‘Boxing Day col-
lapse’ in 1997 (a major collapse of the old volcanic edifice and fresh lava 
dome), and facilitated by relocation packages offered in 1998; but even 
for those who stayed and had lost their houses, land and jobs, the north 
did not represent an ‘acceptable option’ in terms of levels of risk and 
livelihood options until housing reconstruction began (interview with 
UK government officials, 2 October 2012). This perception of the south 
being dangerous (approximately 60 per cent of the island) and the north 
being safe for habitation was broadly in line with the scientific assess-
ments, through which areas were established as exclusion zones – some 
permanently, and others in accordance with the level of volcanic activ-
ity. Despite informal reports of people entering the permanent exclusion 
rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south124
  
area (Zone V) without permission, the general perception among island-
ers is that this area will continue to be highly exposed to volcanic hazards 
and they will never be able to return (interview with local residents, 1– 3 
October 2012).
The volcanic crisis had uncovered some of the inherent contradic-
tions in the autonomous system of governance in Montserrat, but it also 
prompted UK and local authorities to consider and make explicit their 
own views on acceptable levels of risk and their responsibilities for reduc-
ing exposure to volcanic hazards. UK and local government perceptions 
became more closely aligned in 1999, with both accepting that the future 
of the island would have to be in the north despite the disadvantages. 
This was endorsed through the definition of an exclusion zone and sub-
sequent investment in the north.
More recent studies note, however, that these formal notions of tol-
erable risk may not be shared by the local population or even the local gov-
ernment (Haynes, Barclay and Pidgeon 2008). Exposure to high- impact 
events such as pyroclastic flows has been dramatically reduced through 
officially prescribed norms intended to reduce risk (relocation and estab-
lishing exclusion zones), but the north of the island was affected by ash 
fall and acid rain until recently, representing a low- level, intermittent 
but widespread risk that is given low consideration in development plan-
ning. Ash fall presents health risks, and asthma sufferers, in particular, 
have reported suffering respiratory problems from heavy ash fall (inter-
view with local residents, 1– 3 October 2012). Infrastructure built during 
the recovery period has also been affected and needs constant cleaning, 
replacement and repair. Most buildings (and homes) have tropical slat-
ted windows, which allow ash to enter buildings because they cannot be 
properly sealed (Sword- Daniels et al. 2014).
The negative impacts of relocating people in the north of the island 
and of the social upheaval of Montserratians moving to the UK should 
not be overlooked. Most Montserratians on the island today are worse 
off economically than before the eruption. Farming activities are less 
lucrative, and farmers are reluctant to invest as they do not have secu-
rity of tenure and are aware of the threat of future ash fall and acid rain 
(Halcrow Group and Montserrat National Assessment Team 2012). Land 
shortages in the north have meant that new houses have been erected in 
unsafe and unsuitable locations such as ravines (Hicks and Few 2015). 
Although resettlement has reduced exposure to volcanic hazards, these 
policies have created new vulnerabilities for the island population that 
may be more tolerable than volcanic hazard exposure for now, but this 
may not always be the case.
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Examples of individuals not subscribing to official rules also dem-
onstrate that the tolerability of risk varies among social groups and is 
not static. People entering the exclusion zone for livelihood reasons, such 
as tending to crops and illegal scrap metal collecting, as well as those 
building too close to the exclusion zone, are examples of this. Expatriate 
residents continue to live in Old Towne, which can become part of the 
exclusion zone with heightened volcanic activity, and have expressed 
their reluctance to evacuate and lack of confidence in the alert levels 
issued by the Montserrat Volcano Observatory and temporary evacua-
tion decisions (interviews with local residents, 3 October 2012). Salem 
has a secondary school and a primary healthcare clinic and is home to a 
growing immigrant population and an ad hoc business district (Sword- 
Daniels et al. 2014). Rental housing is cheaper in this area and new arriv-
als appear to be less aware of the risks associated with volcanic activity 
than Montserratians (interview with local residents, 1– 3 October 2012). 
Overall, the view that the future of the island is in the north appears not 
to be as unanimous as recent patterns of investment in housing and infra-
structure suggest.
Another factor indicating that local authorities may not entirely 
endorse the idea of development in the north is the temporary nature 
of much of the island’s vital infrastructure. Sword- Daniels et al. (2014) 
note that many of the buildings and essential services that were put up 
during the recovery period were not permanent structures. These facili-
ties have been upgraded incrementally over time but the perception of 
sites as temporary has in some cases obstructed funding, leaving some 
buildings in an inadequate state. These ‘quick fixes’ need to be redressed 
to enable further progress of the island towards its development goals.
Discussion
The disaster risk governance regime in Montserrat has undergone a radi-
cal shift following the volcanic crisis of 1995– 7 due to alterations in cen-
tral and local perceptions of volcanic risk. Essentially, a longer- term view 
of DRM is now being taken, with new investments in vital infrastructure 
being made in safer locations further from the volcano and the UK gov-
ernment, local authorities, scientists and local communities agreeing that 
the future of the island is in the north. DRM in Montserrat is no longer 
concerned with when and how people will return to the south and how to 
protect them there. This represents an important shift in risk governance.
 
rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south126
  
People’s tolerance of risk is not static, however, and the analysis 
presented above demonstrates how new people coming into a high- risk 
volcanic area, as well as the passing of time, can change ‘local’ percep-
tions. Risk governance in Montserrat may become less effective if stake-
holders no longer agree that development of the island should be based 
on low levels of volcanic risk. Without this convergence, policies for risk 
management will be ineffective at best, divisive at worst.
Many of the government- led relocation and resettlement cases 
described in this book reflect the very low levels of risk tolerance held 
by central and city government authorities. This contrasts sharply with 
the experiences and views of those living in hazardous places, who often 
tolerate these known risks because they have strategies to reduce them 
and because the risks associated with moving are even greater. Bringing 
these views closer together and achieving some consensus on the most 
appropriate risk management responses requires dialogue and risk gov-
ernance systems that are well integrated, so this interaction can take 
place. In Montserrat this was partially achieved, but the dialogue needs 
to continue.
The Montserrat experience is atypical, and caution should be exer-
cised in drawing lessons for other contexts. In particular, the relationship 
between the UK and its overseas territories is unique and different from 
French and Dutch overseas territories in the Caribbean, as witnessed 
in 2017 in these respective government responses to Hurricane Irma. 
Central governments elsewhere may not be so inclined to provide ongo-
ing financial support to local governments after the recovery process is 
considered to have ended. Similarly, local governments with significant 
levels of autonomy in decentralised and particularly federal systems 
of governance elsewhere are likely to reject sustained central interfer-
ence in local affairs following a protracted crisis. Governance reform in 
Montserrat was the product of conflict, but ultimately compromise, and 
in other contexts consensus between central and local assessments of 
risk may be harder to achieve. Notwithstanding these caveats, however, 
the transition to a system of co- governance and the reframing of disaster 
risk that have taken place in Montserrat provide useful examples of how 
transformations in disaster risk governance systems can occur following 
high- intensity, long- duration volcanic events.
The experience of Montserrat also provides useful insights for vol-
canic small island developing states (SIDS), and SIDS with disaster risks 
more generally. SIDS have few options for resettlement when significant 
parts of the territory are destroyed by a disaster, or when the pre- emptive 
decision is taken to move populations before a disaster to prevent loss of 
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life. The benefits in terms of reducing disaster risk have to be weighed 
against loss of livelihoods for a significant proportion of the population, 
considerable social upheaval and often economic decline. In coastal 
areas, where managed retreat is being considered for many atolls and 
coastal cities around the world threatened by sea- level rise and storm 
surge, the impact of this resettlement on tourism and local economies 
could be huge.
Critical to the success and sustainability of these risk management 
decisions is the need for high levels of vertical integration in risk govern-
ance. In Montserrat, this has been partly achieved through its insertion 
into regional agreements and mechanisms such as the Caribbean Disaster 
Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), and via the establishment 
of an economically dependent but politically autonomous system of co- 
governance with the UK. But unless communities are engaged in risk 
management decisions and consensus is built, the tacit state– society 
agreement to pursue a low- volcanic- risk development model could come 
unstuck. Small islands with large risks can learn from the Montserrat 
experience. They can anticipate and plan for how these dialogues might 
take place in the event of a major disaster.
Note
 1. The Montserrat workshop was run by the STREVA programme as part of a ‘forensic’ research 
process, from 25 to 29 September 2012.
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Protest and power: resistance 
to resettlement
The two chapters in this part discuss the practices, dynamics and reasons 
behind resistance to resettlement. Chapter 7, by Anthony Oliver- Smith, 
presents a wide- ranging and explanatory discussion of why protest is the 
dominant form of response to proposed resettlement. He points out that 
government entities are the agent of resettlement – enacting it – and that 
these entities usually have multiple agendas, not only moving people out 
of harm’s way but also influenced by development projects, and often 
deep- seated race and class agendas. As many of the cases in this book 
show, those who are chosen as the subjects of resettlement are often less 
powerful or marginalised, and can therefore be politically expendable. 
Oliver- Smith also reminds us that decisions about managing climate 
change and disaster risks are always embedded in the political.
The lack of an accepted definition of uninhabitability means that 
decisions around managing risk can be interpreted by different actors, 
and that the proposal for resettlement often descends into bureaucratic 
chaos, even when there are clear definitions. Angel Wilson Chávez 
Eslava’s chapter provides an excellent example of the bureaucratic chaos 
of resettlement, and how differing perspectives on the part of the com-
munities to be resettled impact on the feasibility of the project. He shows 
how different interlocutors with their own agendas can influence the 
outcomes of the project. Both Chávez Eslava and Oliver- Smith remind 
us that people interpret the benefits of resettlement differently, or may 
perceive different levels of utility from what is offered in a resettlement 
package, and that these will influence whether resettlement is acceptable 
or not.
Chávez Eslava’s chapter exemplifies how protest may be driven 
by individual rejection of the judgement and choices underlying risk 
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Protest may also be influenced by interpersonal relations, or the need to 
confirm to dominant views within the community. However, the ability to 
resist resettlement depends largely on a number of factors, summarised 
by Oliver- Smith, including 1) the ability of communities to come together 
to protest, which must be enabled by a level of community organising; 
2) the cause of resettlement and whether the location is inhabitable 
or not; 3) the importance of the place in people’s lives, including emo-
tionally and economically; 4) relation to the state – including trust in 
whether what is promised would be delivered and whether protest is 
politically possible; 5) the existence of allies, and their motivations to 
contribute to resistance; and 6) the quality of what is offered as a reset-
tlement package.
So many resettlements are top- down propositions – communities 
being told they need to resettle, based on decisions that have been made 
by government powers, imposed on poor or marginalised communities. 
Community- led resettlement does exist, but is not the norm. Sometimes 
communities can successfully resist resettlement, and sometimes they 
are unable to wield enough power to stop the resettlement. Ideally, the 
proposition of resettlement needs to be negotiated, and protest is often 
about enforcing this ability to negotiate – to demand answers to com-
plex questions such as: have all options for reducing risk in situ been 
exploited? Are the risks going to get worse in this location due to climate 
change? Should resettlement wait until such a time that the location 
becomes uninhabitable? What do I gain by resettling? How do I know 




The choice of perils: understanding 
resistance to resettlement for urban 
disaster risk reduction and climate 
change adaptation
Anthony oliver- smith
While environmentally forced resettlement is a relatively new topic in 
the climate change literature, disaster risk- induced resettlement by gov-
ernmental authorities has a long history. However, the topic of resist-
ance to hazard risk and disaster displacement, despite a general focus 
on various forms of resistance over the last several decades (Scott 1985, 
1990; Ortner 2011; Foucault 1978), has garnered significantly less atten-
tion than other types of protests such as resistance to displacement by 
infrastructural and other development projects. Protest and resistance to 
resettlement for disaster risk reduction (DRR)/ climate change adapta-
tion (CCA) are mentioned frequently in the media, but have infrequently 
been the focus of detailed study. Since the little detailed research that 
exists has focused on rural cases of resistance to resettlement for DRR/ 
CCA, much of what follows will draw on the few urban cases that exist 
and much will be extrapolated from the findings of resistance to urban 
renewal/ slum clearance (Ockey 1997; Mahadevia and Narayanan 1999; 
Perry 2004) and urban development- forced displacement and resettle-
ment (Oliver- Smith 1982, 2010; Cernea 1988, 1997; Scudder 2005, 
2009; De Wet 2006; Koenig 2009; Bennett and McDowell 2012). These 
processes share many similar characteristics with DRR/ CCA resettle-
ment in that the agent of displacement is some government entity, often 
operating with multiple agendas, including not only development pro-
jects, but racial and class agendas as well (Perry 2004).
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Local and national governments have frequently resettled people 
affected by disasters in the past, but usually on an ad hoc, ‘as needed’ 
basis and usually as a post- disaster reconstruction project (Oliver- Smith 
1991). However, the increasing exposure and vulnerability of urban pop-
ulations today, compounded by the intensification of hazard risk from cli-
mate change, is now creating the need for resettlement as a policy option 
for DRR/ CCA. National and sometimes local authorities are moving 
towards developing policy options that move people away from highly 
exposed environments as a strategy for reducing unmitigable risks of dis-
aster. However, the tendency for people to resist resettlement, preferring 
to remain in or return to live in high- risk areas or locations that continue 
to be dangerous after disasters, has been noted, sometimes quite briefly, 
both today and in numerous cases in widely disparate cultures through-
out history.
The case of Antigua, Guatemala is illustrative. Between the six-
teenth and the eighteenth centuries the capital city of the colony of 
Guatemala, Santiago de los Caballeros de Guatemala, suffered eight 
serious earthquakes and a huge landslide, finally prompting the captain- 
general of the colony in 1773 to order the evacuation and relocation of 
the city to safer terrain. The citizens vigorously resisted the decision to 
relocate the capital, but the resettlement was undertaken, establishing 
the new capital, Nueva Guatemala de la Asunción. However, many citi-
zens refused to abandon the old site, although the authorities forcibly 
closed down the city’s remaining stores in 1779. Nevertheless, the old site 
was very quickly reoccupied and still exists today as the city of Antigua, 
one of Guatemala’s major tourist attractions, famous for the beauty of its 
environment and colonial architecture (Tobriner 1980).
I first became aware of the importance of place in people’s lives 
and their resistance to being uprooted in the aftermath of the Peruvian 
earthquake of 31 May 1970, one of the most devastating disasters in 
the history of Latin America. One of the central tragedies of that event 
took place in the city of Yungay, the capital of its province, which was 
destroyed by an enormous avalanche of ice, rock and mud shaken loose 
by the earthquake from Mount Huascarán, Peru’s highest mountain, 
killing 95 per cent of its inhabitants. Several months after the disaster, 
I began a study of recovery and social reconstitution in Yungay that was to 
last for 10 years (Oliver- Smith 1986). The surviving Yungainos, grouped 
in a makeshift camp just north of the avalanche, faced the daunting task 
of constructing a new city and reconstituting a decimated community. 
To compound the losses experienced in the disaster, the government, for 
reasons of safety from further landslides, announced plans to resettle the 
 
 
thE ChoiCE of PEriLs 135
  
survivors in the camp to a town called Tingua some 15 km to the south, 
which was intended to become the provincial capital.
The reaction to this project was an immediate and definite rejection 
on the part of the urban survivors residing in the camp, known as Yungay 
Norte. In addition to strong emotional ties to the location close to the 
old city, Yungaino leaders compiled an impressive list of practical rea-
sons to oppose the move to Tingua (Oliver- Smith 1977). The reluctance 
of Yungainos to leave the general area of their destroyed city for an osten-
sibly safer location was based on a matrix of understandings, including 
deeply felt emotional ties to place and a solid grasp of the structural pre-
requisites of their urban socio- economic order. The Yungaino leaders rea-
soned that Yungay Norte would thrive because it was centrally located 
in the network of peasant villages of the district. These peasant villages 
were the life force of a town because they provided food as well as a mar-
ket for commerce and administrative services in the town. Since Tingua 
did not have a large network of surrounding villages, any substantial 
urban settlement there would not be self- sustaining.
The importance of the peasant population in the decision to relo-
cate the provincial capital of Yungay was clearly not understood by the 
authorities in charge of the programme. The primary motivation on the 
part of the authorities was to get the population moved to a safer area, 
out of the way of potential landslides. The risks of both alternatives were 
weighed, and removal to a safe but unpropitious site for urban growth 
was clearly rejected in favour of a site which, while less safe from geo-
logic accident, was far better suited to the growth of a new city. Their 
resistance was successful and the city remains on the site of the survivor 
camp of 1970 now 50 years later.
This chapter will address the contexts and parameters of resistance 
to resettlement for DRR to gain a deeper understanding of the stakes 
that are at play for people faced with such an outcome. This issue needs 
to be addressed in the context of the rapid and essentially uncontrolled 
urban growth, not only of capital cities of the global South, but of second-
ary cities as well, although protest and resistance are not unheard of in 
industrialised nations such as Japan (Edgington 2010) and the United 
States (McPherson and Saarinen 1977). It further needs to be framed 
as a discourse about rights and risks, between expert and local knowl-
edge, and between government and citizenry. After this introduction, the 
second section will briefly discuss the question of risk perception, with 
a particular focus on differential interpretations. The third section will 
then explore the evolving role of governance in risk and disaster manage-
ment, focusing on changing state– local community relations in terms of 
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expectations and obligations. The fourth section addresses the question 
of rights and the risks of resettlement. I then examine the choices made 
to accept or resist relocation or resettlement. As a conclusion, the final 
section will speak to the basic issues that people bring up as part of resist-
ance as keys to improving resettlement policy and practice.
The question of threat: perception and  
interpretation of risk
Resistance to resettlement for DRR is based on assessments of a variety of 
threats and risks, as well as resources. The question of threat entails the 
apprehension of an indication or warning of the possibility that some-
thing unwanted will happen.1 It is the assessment of the likelihood of a 
threat that constitutes the degree of risk that is presented. Risk generally 
refers to variable processes with degrees of predictability (or unpredict-
ability) of probable dangers or harms (Tucker and Nelson 2017). In our 
context, risk comprises both external and internal characteristics that 
affect the propensity to put people at risk. To the degree that natural and 
technological hazards are systemic features of socio- ecological systems, 
threats and hazards are generally recognised, but rarely part of daily con-
sciousness. People are usually more occupied in coping with and adapt-
ing to the micro- threats and risks of daily life, but low- predictability, 
high- impact threats are ignored, denied, in some cases minimally pre-
pared for, or seen as the purview of larger political and administrative 
systems. Every society has to adapt to its total environment, including 
the local natural environment with its resources and hazards, but also 
its social environment, with its own resources and hazards, which are in 
fact derived both locally and from sources often very distant from their 
local contexts. For the poor and marginalised, daily life is consumed with 
adapting much less to environmental hazard than to the multiple sys-
temic social hazards, many of which are a consequence of the location of 
their homes and/ or livelihoods that are imposed on them by the society 
at large.
Although originally informed by the formal logic of rational choice 
theory, with individuals assessing risk on the basis of available infor-
mation, studies of risk perception and interpretation now approach the 
problem from a more holistic perspective that encompasses not only 
information (or lack thereof), but also the social, cultural and psycho-
logical sources of attitudes and beliefs that are often inflected by such 
emotional variables as degree of trust in such sources. The choices to act 
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or not are made in the context of uncertainty, a condition that can refer 
to the recognition of incomplete knowledge, a prioritisation of values, 
an assessment of probabilities or simply an existential condition of life. 
According to Eiser et al. (2013), whose work largely informs the approach 
adopted in this chapter, people’s interpretations of risks are shaped by 
their own experience, personal feelings and values, local knowledge, cul-
tural beliefs and interpersonal and societal dynamics. More importantly, 
however, risk arises not just from some description of a future event, but 
from the uncertainty, actual or perceived, that characterises that descrip-
tion. It is because the consequences of choices are uncertain, and may 
have positive or negative outcomes, that ‘risk’ becomes a factor in how 
decisions are made.
It is clear that risk, however, is interpreted differently by different 
individuals and groups, particularly in terms of how the outcomes of 
choices they make or are made on their behalf by other decision- makers 
are anticipated. These choices are based on interpretations of forms of 
information that come from many different sources. Uncertainties often 
lead people to depend on others to provide information, but acceptance 
of information in turn will depend on the level of trust that is inspired 
by such sources. The interpretation of risk in specific contexts requires 
understanding the values people assign to different kinds of outcomes. 
Moreover, individuals influence and are influenced by one another in 
social and institutional contexts. In point of fact, people tend to behave 
‘less like utility calculators and more like puzzle decryptors, simplifying 
cues and sorting options using heuristic algorithms’ (Gigerenzer and 
Selten 2002, cited in Tucker and Nelson 2017, 163).
When interpreting risk on the basis of experience, people attend 
to multiple characteristics of risks: the severity of the threat, the magni-
tude of potential consequences, their ability to do something about the 
risk, uncertainties and ambiguities about the risk, and what they know 
about the hazards creating the risk in question. Experiences provide a 
perspective, but any learning derived from experience is always partial 
because evidence may be uncertain and incomplete. It is also important 
to consider the interactions between the decisions made by several actors 
rather than those of individuals considered singly, as well as groups of 
individuals who interact and communicate with one another, thus cre-
ating social networks that may determine responses to resettlement for 
hazard mitigation.
The judgements and choices underlying risk interpretation and 
action, then, are not merely personal, but also interpersonal, both within 
communities and between a community and its larger socio- political 
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authority structure across a range of risks, environmental, social and 
political. In the context of resettlement for DRR/ CCA, therefore, resist-
ance is ultimately based on a choice of perils. In framing those risks, it is 
common for people’s interpretations to differ markedly from those of for-
mal governmental assessments. Since protection from hazards is gener-
ally framed as a techno- scientific problem best managed through rational 
approaches to management, governments tend to assess risks through 
formal methods, calling on the technical expertise of engineers, geolo-
gists, urban planners, architects and social workers. In effect, the tools of 
these specialised fields, assessing risk on the formal basis of degrees of 
probability, tend to disguise or elide socio- political causes and solutions 
by foregrounding technical solutions instead (Tucker and Nelson 2017). 
Local people, on the other hand, must take into account a host of vari-
ables that comprise the resources and risks of their total environment.
Politics and governance in DRR/ CCA implementation
Resistance to resettlement for DRR/ CCA is fundamentally a statement 
about rights and power relations. The political nature of hazards and 
disasters is long established in social science research. Groups, interests 
and institutions interact to make decisions, often intertwining with other 
expressions of power and wealth, about the use of public resources in 
preparing for and responding to extreme natural events. Moreover, dis-
asters and their management, both before and after such events, become 
part of unfolding political histories (Pelling and Dill 2009). While much 
of the research on the politics of disasters deals with their potential for 
bringing about social change (e.g. Olson and Gawronski 2003), dis-
placement and resettlement, and any resistance to those processes, are 
in many senses simply part of the day- to- day business of urban politics 
of growth and development. Cities are constantly changing, demolish-
ing structures, building others in a process Harvey (2007) calls ‘creative 
destruction’ which, he posits, provides the basis for ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’, a process that has often seemed possible to people facing 
displacement for disaster risk reduction. Indeed, efforts to resist displace-
ment and resettlement are deeply enmeshed in local issues of race, eth-
nicity and class as well as broader issues of development, human rights 
and specific political issues and goals regarding the wellbeing of the poor 
and the marginalised.
Displacement and resettlement policies, practices and projects are 
generally constructed in the institutional, legislative and legal contexts 
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and agendas of the state, although other interests may sometimes impinge 
on the process. The state gains authority over a particular territory and 
simultaneously that territory becomes identified with that authority. 
This association enables the state to assume the role of holding exclusive 
authority over territory and, by virtue of that authority, exclusive grantor 
and guarantor of rights, particularly in the relationship of people to terri-
tory (Sassen 2008, 1, 6). A fundamental component of such governance 
is the social contract. In theory, a contract is drawn between government 
and a civil community that defines the rights and responsibilities of each 
party. In exchange for accepting certain obligations (taxes, obeying rules 
and regulations, etc.), citizens are afforded certain benefits and protec-
tions (maintenance of order, safety, wellbeing, etc.) by the state (O’Brien, 
Hayward and Berkes 2009).
We are at an interesting moment in the existence and evolution of 
the state, particularly as regards the social contract between the state and 
its citizenry. Various aspects of the relationship are undergoing signifi-
cant change, altering rights and responsibilities of the parties in ways that 
have profound implications for displaced and resettled peoples (Sassen 
2008). On the one hand, over the last three to four decades the current 
form of capitalism known as neoliberalism has enacted a number of basic 
shifts in fundamental relationships. Specifically, there has been a shift 
in the relationship between capital and government from one in which 
government played a role in regulating the economy and provided social 
programmes for general welfare to one in which the role of government 
is basically reduced to ensuring strong individual private property rights, 
the rule of law and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free 
trade (Ortner 2011). The transfer of public assets to private interests as 
well as the deregulation of social, political and economic processes is 
fundamental to this ideology, allegedly to improve efficiency and produc-
tivity and reduce costs and taxes (Harvey 2007). Further, the state’s con-
tract regarding the security of the citizenry is seen to be achieved most 
efficiently through the functions of the market and individual solutions 
to structural problems (Lampis 2016; Zeiderman 2016).
However, on the other hand, the same three to four decades have 
also seen a significant shift in the way disasters are conceptualised that 
has profound implications for disaster policy and practice, particularly 
as regards the state. The shift from seeing disasters as unfortunate acci-
dents or acts of nature (or God) to framing them as the outcomes of social 
processes set in motion by human priorities and decisions has begun 
to alter the role of the state from disaster response in emergency man-
agement, which continues to be necessary, towards disaster reduction 
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through prevention. In effect, as Zeiderman (2016) argues, disaster risk 
management becomes a feature of governance through which the state 
establishes and maintains authority and legitimacy and intervenes in the 
lives of citizens in the city and how they in turn address the state.
In the context of disaster management these two trends produce at 
best ambiguous responsibilities for the state, and at worst outright con-
tradictions with varying consequences. On the one hand, interests and 
forces are freed up to pursue unrestricted gain with diminishing regard 
for social or environmental impact, and on the other, greater understand-
ing of disaster causation has increased participation by the state in disas-
ter prevention by increasing regulatory constraints, for example in land 
use and building codes, as well as active interventions, such as resettle-
ment for DRR. However, many of the processes that create risk and vul-
nerability are standard development strategies that actually constitute 
drivers or compound them (Cannon and Müller- Mahn 2010). For exam-
ple, Pelling notes in the case of Barbados that the post- independence 
modernisation project has generated an economic surplus, much of 
which was invested in environmental infrastructure to enhance security 
at the same time that it degraded the environment (Pelling 2003).
Moreover, globalised norms are pressuring the state role towards 
greater responsibility and intervention. Under international human 
rights law, states have legal responsibilities towards other states, indi-
viduals who are their own citizens, people under their jurisdiction, inter-
national organisations (e.g. the United Nations) and the international 
community as a whole. In the case of disasters, states normally provide 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction and resettlement assistance, 
although there are no international legal requirements binding them to 
these functions. However, United Nations covenants and conventions 
establish the human rights to health, a decent existence, work and occu-
pational safety, an adequate standard of living, freedom from hunger, 
an adequate and wholesome diet, decent housing, education, culture, 
equality and non- discrimination, dignity, harmonious development of 
the personality, security of person and of the family, peace and develop-
ment. These rights are considered the ideal that all governments should 
strive for. They are the basic life requirements to which all human beings 
are entitled.
However, in terms of resettlement, many states currently do not 
have the required legislation, responsible institutions and trained per-
sonnel to carry out resettlement in an effective, humanitarian and 
developmental way (Jain, Singh and Malladi 2017; Nalau and Handmer 
2018). There are few agreements as yet on guidelines for anticipatory 
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resettlement (that is, resettlement in advance of significant impacts), or 
indeed by what criteria such resettlement might be deemed necessary. 
Ferris (2012) notes that the lack of a clear internationally accepted defi-
nition of uninhabitability of a location, and the probability that such con-
ditions are due to multiple factors makes it difficult to determine both 
causality and responsibility. Furthermore, it is unclear whether residents 
of a risk- prone area should be moved in advance of potential impacts, 
even given uncertainties concerning timing and magnitude, or whether 
it is best to wait until after a major disaster occurs (Kelman 2008).
In general, when confidence in government is low, there is likely to 
be more community resistance (Oliver- Smith 2010). However, in some 
contexts resistance has discouraged governments from considering relo-
cation as a DRR option (Nalau and Handmer 2018). Resistance demon-
strates that there is a need to reconcile the ethics of policies that remove 
people from high- risk areas with the potential that they will undermine 
historical freedoms and long- standing cultural patterns of settlement, 
mobility and livelihood (Johnson 2012). This risk that vacated lands 
might be appropriated for financial gain or that resettlement might be 
used as a tool against politically marginalised peoples suggests that crite-
ria and guidelines are needed. Further, the lack of appropriate legislation 
on resettlement at the state level often leads to bureaucratic and adminis-
trative confusion, often resulting in internally inconsistent, contradictory 
and costly projects. Because jurisdictional and administrative responsi-
bilities are not clearly articulated in laws and regulations, many resettle-
ment projects result in bureaucratic chaos (Marino and Schweitzer 2009; 
Bronen 2008).
Rights and risks in urban resettlement for DRR
It can be reasonably argued that depriving people of access to safe and 
secure locations and the corresponding conditions in which to live sus-
tainably is violating human rights since it infringes on the basic principles 
asserted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Robinson 2003). 
Specific rights that are placed at risk are articulated in Article 11(1) of 
the 1966 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which affirms the right to an adequate standard of living, includ-
ing food, clothing, housing and steady improvement of living conditions. 
Therefore, urban resettlement for DRR/ CCA can be rights violating if it 
destroys, and does not replace, communities where people have devel-
oped livelihoods, social institutions and networks, and a meaningful 
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context in which to live their lives. By the same token, such resettlement 
can become rights affirming if it supports and enables people to improve 
their living conditions, with better food, improved shelter and adequate 
livelihoods (Koenig 2009). Moreover, the state has the obligation to deal 
with the injustices generated by the reigning neoliberal development 
model. In effect, the balance of proof ultimately lies in implementation. 
As such, it can also be reasonably argued that the state’s purpose is to 
address its failure to protect the basic rights of populations at risk of 
disaster, and that resettlement for DRR is actually a recognition of their 
equality and rights as citizens and a fulfilment of its obligation, thereby 
integrating the marginalised more fully into the larger society (Lampis 
2016; Zeiderman 2016).
Before the risks of resettlement are considered, a distinction must 
be drawn between the refusal to evacuate in emergencies, resistance 
to resettlement and rejection of actual resettlement projects. There is a 
clear temporal dimension to each. Refusal to evacuate is either prior to or 
just after a disaster and may be followed by return or subsequent reloca-
tion. Resistance to resettlement is prior to project implementation, and 
rejection is the refusal to occupy or reside in the constructed settlement, 
which in the final analysis signifies project failure. Each occasions specific 
kinds of losses and risks. The losses of people displaced for DRR/ CCA 
are similar to those experienced by people uprooted for infrastructure 
development projects. Displacement and resettlement generate a wide 
range of impacts that encompass both socio- cultural and psychological 
losses and economic and material losses. Both kinds play important roles 
in conditioning people’s perceptions of, and reactions to, post- disaster 
resettlement (Oliver- Smith 1982, 1986). Regardless of the nature of their 
concerns, it is clear that in many cases, affected people both perceive and 
interpret resettlement as more of a threat than a solution.
It is either the risk or the substance of losses that energises the pro-
test and resistance of citizens to resettlement for DRR/ CCA. Many settle-
ments that have suffered a disaster that makes their location completely 
insecure or those similarly exposed to risks that cannot be mitigated are 
the result of long and arduous processes of occupation, often in opposi-
tion to national or local governments, as migrants seek to escape rural 
poverty to gain a foothold in the urban environment. People risk a great 
deal to establish themselves as communities (often through carefully 
planned campaigns of occupation), regardless of the hazardous condi-
tions in which they are obliged to live. Over time in such settlements, 
despite the hazards and hardships that residents face, deep connections 
to place are established. Further, dense networks of social relations are 
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formed that enable people to access necessities, jobs and services that 
would otherwise be out of economic reach in pure market transactions. 
Although residents lack legal title, holdings can often be multigenera-
tional, as families establish themselves throughout the community. In 
effect, such communities sink deep roots in the place they occupy and 
form close ties with the people they live with. Removal from these social 
resources and foundations of identity is both materially and emotionally 
experienced as loss.
In addition, urban resettlement also may bring concrete economic 
losses in terms of decreased access to employment, markets and clien-
tele. The displacement and resettlement of communities also occasions a 
loss of social and political power in local affairs, and, if people are moved 
into an existing community, conflict with original residents over access to 
resources may result. Features of the resettlement project itself are often 
the cause of protest and resistance as well. The mechanisms by which 
expropriation and compensation are enacted, subsidies, the cost of new 
housing and eligibility criteria frequently elicit protest and fuel resistance 
by individuals, groups and entire communities.
Resettlement project- affected people, regardless of cause, are con-
fronted with a complex, cascading sequence of events and processes 
most often involving risks of dislocation, homelessness, unemployment, 
the dismantling of families and communities, adaptive stresses, loss of 
privacy, political marginalisation, a decrease in mental and physical 
health status and the daunting challenge of reconstructing one’s onto-
logical status, family and community (Oliver- Smith 2005; Cernea 1988, 
1977; Scudder and Colson 1982; Colson 1971). All may suffer the endan-
germent of the formulation of a sense of meaning and identity, and all 
must mobilise social and cultural resources in their efforts to re- establish 
viable social groups and communities and to restore adequate levels of 
material and cultural life (Bennett and McDowell 2012). Given the risks 
of disruption and trauma that may be generated by displacement, it is not 
surprising that it often generates significant protest and resistance.
Claiming rights and confronting risks
When confronted with DRR/ CCA resettlement, people must decide 
which risks require their immediate attention: those associated with 
natural hazards, those that issue from the societal context (crime, pov-
erty, health, etc.) or those that are posed by a resettlement project from 
a government that has rarely served them well. For marginalised people, 
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the projects of governments are often met with a scepticism borne of a 
long record of unfulfilled promises and, in their eyes, dubious motives. 
Many people in Colombian resettlement projects for DRR thought, for 
example, that the risk designation for their community would cause 
property values to fall, thereby generating speculation for land appro-
priation for more profitable uses (Zeiderman 2016). In that context the 
record of resettlement projects itself does little to inspire confidence. 
Post- disaster projects have led not only to greater impoverishment but 
also to increased vulnerability (Birkmann et al. 2013). Moreover, in post- 
disaster contexts, people may be less able to resist resettlement because 
the disaster has skewed the power dynamics in favour of the government 
(Jain, Singh and Malladi 2017). Therefore, in contexts in which resettle-
ment is being considered for people in high- risk situations, dealing with 
the risks of daily life by remaining in place may be afforded a higher value 
than reducing the risk of a low- probability/ high- impact event by reset-
tling. Indeed, even when the probability of an event is high, its unpredict-
ability may reduce the value of taking precautions because resettlement 
is seen as presenting more immediate risks and losses.
The forms and modalities of resistance to DRR/ CCA resettlement 
can be both individual and collective, legal or illegal, non- violent or vio-
lent. Not all people included in such projects will be opposed, since they 
may be attracted by benefits of better housing and services that have been 
promised. Sometimes a proposed resettlement project can be the cause 
of significant dissension in a community between those who favour and 
those who oppose. Resettlement is almost always a contentious issue. 
While a project may not elicit full- blown resistance, complaints, argu-
ments over eligibility for participation, disputes over benefits, refusals to 
participate, foot- dragging and other delays characterise to one extent or 
another most resettlement projects. Chapter 8 in this volume by Chávez 
Eslava provides an excellent example of the kinds of conflicts that reset-
tlement for DRR/ CCA will increasingly elicit in the future. It is for that 
reason that many resettlement project guidelines call for conflict reso-
lution mechanisms, complaints handling mechanisms and/ or grievance 
procedures to be included in implementation plans.
The potential for conflict and resistance lies in the experiential 
basis of human cognition, which relies on past understandings for the 
formulation of actions with higher probabilities of predictable results. 
In effect, the known is preferable at some basic level to the unknown, 
because it is thought to provide greater accuracy in predicting the future. 
In that sense, then, one of the most significant dimensions of change is 
the degree of understanding and control which human beings can exert 
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in dealing with the forces of change. Consequently, where understanding 
and control are diminished, we may expect change to be characterised by 
conflict, tension and resistance. At some fundamental level, all change, 
even positive change, in human affairs may involve a difficult process of 
negotiation and transition between the old and the new (Marris 1975).
Resistance to uprooting and resettlement not only involves the cog-
nitive predisposition for order and predictability, but also implies a rejec-
tion of the imposition of superior forces or power to control either choice 
of action or resources (Mack and Snyder 1973, 75– 6). It is in this sense 
that resettlement is seen as a violation of rights. The involuntary nature 
of the migration and resettlement process involves a loss of control over 
both choices and resources. The record of resettlement strategies and 
schemes in general is at best uneven in affording the affected populations 
sufficient information to reassert satisfactory control and understanding 
over the changed circumstances of their lives, much less the restoration 
of control over equal or similar resources. In a single stroke, resettlement 
can create a ‘community which does not effectively control its own affairs 
… and in which a feeling of powerlessness is pervasive’, or, as Kushner 
goes on to characterise it, ‘an administered community’ (1988, 29). This 
loss of control and understanding is more than compounded by the often 
extremely negative material impacts of resettlement projects on affected 
peoples as motivation for resistance. More important, however, is the fact 
that such resettlement schemes are the direct result of purposive policies 
and actions, and consequently are seen as open to contestation and rejec-
tion, or alteration and improvement.
Drawing on research on resistance from development- forced dis-
placement and resettlement and slum clearance/ urban renewal, a 
number of factors have proven to play important roles in the ways that 
resistance is decided upon, organised and carried out. Clearly, a major 
factor in the decision to resist resettlement is the community or group’s 
capacity to mobilise itself for organised resistance. The existence, or lack 
thereof, of patterns of internal differentiation based on ethnicity, class or 
race may undermine or enhance the establishment of the necessary lev-
els of solidarity and cooperation for effective resistance to a resettlement 
project (Gans 1962). A history of internal coherence and solidarity, long- 
term effective leadership, pre- existing local organisations and previous 
successful defence of interests may also affect the community’s ability to 
mount serious resistance efforts (Waldram 1980).
A second factor which influences the decision to resist is the cause 
of resettlement. The nature of the force or forces threatening resettle-
ment will affect resistance in that some forces are clearly resistible, others 
rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south146
  
permit the possibility of resistance, and still others preclude resistance 
entirely. Disasters associated with earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and 
avalanches result in circumstances in which dislocation takes place by 
sheer destruction. Survivors must often be relocated because their previ-
ous locale has become uninhabitable. However, disaster- affected people 
often are among the most contentious and resistant to further subsequent 
relocation, and have been known to ‘invade’ their devastated home sites 
(Oliver- Smith 1982, 1986).
A third major factor influencing resistance to resettlement is the 
multifaceted relationship of the target population to its environment. 
This relationship is based on a number of elements. In urban contexts, 
access to employment, political factors such as territoriality and inter-
group relations, and cultural factors such as the intimate connections 
between components of the built environment and individual and cul-
tural identity may all play significant roles in the relationships of a soci-
ety to its general environment. Ultimately, such ties lie at the core of 
both individual and collective constructions of reality, and the threat of 
removal from their most basic physical manifestation may elicit deeply 
rooted resistance efforts.
A fourth factor affecting resistance to resettlement is the target pop-
ulation’s relationship to the resettlement agent, which today is generally 
the nation state. As previously discussed, the relationship between the 
state and the diverse peoples under its control is crucial in the decision 
to resist resettlement. In numerous cases, this relationship is complicated 
by ethnic or class differences between those in control of the state appa-
ratus and those subjected to its authority. Clearly, the general democratic 
or authoritarian character of the state will set a ‘climate’ for resistance or 
acquiescence, but even in authoritarian regimes with poor human rights 
records, resistance to resettlement has taken place. The past performance 
of the state in other contexts on behalf of the target population may also 
affect the reaction of people to proposed resettlement projects. Where 
the state’s record is non- existent or bad, trust and confidence may be 
low, conditioning the response to resettlement projects (Drucker 1985; 
Waldram 1980).
A fifth factor in the decision to resist resettlement may be the 
availability of local and non- local allies. Local allies in urban areas may 
include non- affected neighbourhoods, co- ethnics, or non- governmental 
organisations (NGOs) working in the local context (Cernea 1988). 
International NGOs – particularly those concerned with environmental 
and human rights issues – may also get involved. Other potential allies 
include opposition political parties, student organisations, labour unions 
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and spontaneous groups which form to combat the resettlement project 
for a variety of environmental or human rights causes. Allies in the media 
become particularly valuable in a resistance struggle. However, it must be 
recognised that allies generally have their own interests in mind and they 
may not always coincide perfectly with those of the affected population, 
as the chapter by Chávez Eslava (in this volume) clearly demonstrates.
A final major factor in the choice to resist or accept resettlement will 
be the quality of the resettlement project itself. As mentioned earlier, a 
resettlement project which does not enhance control and understanding, 
or, in other words, provide relocatees with a significant role in design 
and implementation, will not inspire much confidence in a population 
facing such a challenge to its lifeway. An ill- considered or hastily drawn 
up resettlement plan which does not attend to such crucial factors as 
employment opportunities, local housing and settlement patterns, inter- 
ethnic relations, physical security, leadership and local authority insti-
tutions, among other dimensions, will be likewise unconvincing. A plan 
which is vague or obtuse about these or other issues of importance to the 
target population will engender only doubt. Conversely, a plan which is 
extravagant in its claims may also provoke distrust particularly if such 
claims can be easily disproven.
One further dimension of resettlement plans which will only be 
mentioned here is the resistance to the project which may be engendered 
in host populations. Projects which do not adequately plan for the impact 
of the resettled group on a host region risk provoking the resistance 
and hostility of the host population (Cernea 1988; Nalau and Handmer 
2018). Ultimately, a relocation project not only has to be well designed 
and entirely adequate to the task, but it also has to be well presented and 
communicated in terms which permit comprehension and stimulate dis-
cussion among the affected population (Cernea 1988).
Strategies of resistance
At such time that people decide to resist resettlement, they are faced with 
a major strategic decision, namely whether to resist the resettlement pro-
ject or to accept it as a fait accompli and put their efforts into improving it. 
Such a decision is often the source of much conflict within the population 
threatened with resettlement and between the affected population and 
its real and potential allies at both local and international levels. In such 
contexts, resistance to resettlement in reality becomes resistance to bad 
resettlement. Such resistance in fact signifies the adoption of a strategy 
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of negotiation in which varying tactics of resistance are used to acquire 
bargaining chips in the effort to secure better terms and conditions for 
resettlement, such as improved replacement land, compensation for 
losses, housing allowances, better urban services such as transportation 
or better public facilities such as medical clinics or schools.
Resettlement resistance tactics
The repertoire of tactics available to people threatened with resettlement 
is broad, ranging from passive forms of resistance to extremely active 
options. Much depends on where and when tactics are initiated in the 
resettlement process. Tactics appropriate to early stages of planning a 
resettlement may not be appropriate for resistance at the implementa-
tion stage. The choice of tactics at any stage, however, will be a function 
of both local culture and the political space created by relations between 
the resettlement agent and the group facing resettlement. Generally, 
resisters are operating at a distinct disadvantage in terms of power and 
resources. However, they may seize a moral advantage based on viola-
tion of their rights as citizens which may be difficult for the state to com-
bat or deflect. A primary and obvious distinction which must be drawn is 
between legal and illegal tactics. A second important distinction in resist-
ance tactics is between non- violent and violent tactics.
Some tactics, particularly under authoritarian political regimes, 
employ personal connections, such as patron– client ties to influence 
government decision- makers (Ockey 1997). The Yungainos, for exam-
ple, facing a military dictatorship, recruited prestigious professionals 
from their migrant community in Lima to advance their case before the 
government (Oliver- Smith 1986). Other initial tactics are more direct, 
if it is politically feasible, such as letters of appeal to the resettlement 
agent, which, if ignored, may be followed by letters of protest. In demo-
cratic regimes, elected officials may also be recruited to assist. In some 
contexts in which implementation has already begun, resistors may take 
more active measures by removing designations assigned to houses to be 
removed or uprooting stakes that mark terrain to be excavated or pre-
pared for construction.
An important organisational tactic may be the election of a spe-
cial commission or delegation of representatives of the group to visit 
the offices of the resettlement agent, deliver letters of appeal and pre-
sent the case against resettlement in person. Crucial allies include the 
media, particularly if the resettlement agent is sensitive to its public 
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image in human rights issues. Indeed, communication is always a crucial 
resource for a resistance movement, both in disseminating information 
about their struggle or in acquiring information about the resettlement 
project, which is often carefully controlled by planners. Establishing link-
ages with other causes, most notably environmental and human rights 
organisations, is also an important tactic. Other NGOs concerned with 
such issues as healthcare, nutrition, housing and water resources have 
also proved to be extremely helpful allies, particularly in legal matters 
(Cernea 1988).
Public non- violent demonstrations at the project site, the offices 
of the resettlement agent or the offices of funding agencies, which in 
urban contexts are easily accessible, are also effective in focusing atten-
tion on the cause of resistance. Such demonstrations serve to gain 
the attention of the public about the determination of the resistance. 
These events are also important in creating and maintaining solidar-
ity in that they constitute ritualised expressions of resistance goals. In 
addition, these demonstrations may be the vehicle of expression for a 
variety of public messages of resistance, including threats of escalation 
in tactics, which may gain further media attention. Such escalation may 
include various forms of passive resistance, such as halting project pro-
gress by placing people in the path of machines, blockades at strategic 
entry points to the neighbourhood or community, or a simple refusal to 
move, even under the threat of armed troops. In that vein, there have 
been open physical confrontations between police or troops and people 
resisting resettlement.
Conclusion
Several years ago, I was invited to give a talk at a workshop in Bogotá 
on resettlement for DRR/ CCA. Expecting a small gathering of specialists, 
I was surprised on arriving at the workshop venue to see a large room with 
perhaps as many as 250 people, both women and men, young and old, in 
attendance. My talk was the first on the programme and was followed by 
two presenters from government agencies associated with current DRR/ 
CCA resettlement programmes in Bogotá. I gave my talk, focusing on the 
complex challenges that resettlement presents to affected people. It was 
politely received and I then sat down to follow with interest the presenta-
tions on prospective plans and projects from the government agencies. As 
soon as the second government presenter finished, hands instantly shot 




rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south150
  
the government presenters, protesting the resettlement programmes 
with angry accusations ranging from corruption to land usurpation to 
destruction of community.
Their fierce rhetoric was met initially by stoic silence from the gov-
ernment presenters. The anger of the public was palpable and their con-
cerns were clearly deeply felt, as were their feelings that their basic rights 
were being violated by an undemocratic and authoritarian government. 
Not only were they rejecting the risk assessment and interpretation of 
the city government, but they were clearly aware of and ready to accept 
the risks of their location rather than abandon their hard- won foothold 
in the urban environment for what they saw as a dubious project with 
an uncertain future. They appeared to hold no illusions about their cur-
rent locations, fully aware of their marginalised condition within the 
larger political economy of the city and the nation, but feared resettle-
ment would constitute a further infringement of their rights, yet one 
more manifestation of the problems of the society in which they lived. 
Subsequent attempts by the government presenters to respond to the 
protests were met with further outcries. In effect, the frictions, struggles 
and contestations that energised their resistance signalled eloquently 
that they saw contemporary urban development in Bogotá as following 
paths that clearly place people at risk (Allen, Lampis and Swilling 2016). 
Their resistance to resettlement for DRR/ CCA demonstrated both a dec-
laration and defence of their rights as citizens and at the same time, their 
outrage pointed to their sense of injustice and the desire to address the 
serious problems in their society.
Note
 1. Definition from the Cambridge Dictionary online, http:// dictionary.cambridge.org/ us.
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Resistance and resilience of the 
community of Belén, Iquitos, Peru, 
to resettlement
Angel wilson Chávez Eslava
It is important for Peru to generate a broad debate about the importance 
of population resettlement under conditions of disaster risk in a context 
where historical alterations in the equilibrium between humans and the 
environment have increasingly led to the proposed relocation or reset-
tlement of the population from high- risk areas, where their personal 
security and livelihoods cannot be guaranteed. One such case is the 
ongoing resettlement of population from the Lower Belén Flood Zone 
(LBFZ), a non- mitigable high- risk1 sector located in the district of Belén, 
in the city of Iquitos, Province of Maynas, Department of Loreto, which 
is part of the Amazon region of Peru.2 The LBFZ comprises a riverside 
community, accustomed to regular annual flooding, principally between 
March and July. This community has more than fifteen thousand people 
living under conditions of very high disaster risk and extreme poverty. 
The human– environment balance in which they live has been severely 
altered due to the inadequate historical occupation of the flood plain of 
the River Itaya (a tributary of the Amazon), and a recent increase in the 
number and recurrence of extreme flood events, usually attributed to 
climate change.
Faced with this situation, the national government of Peru decided 
to implement measures to help reduce the disaster risk of the popula-
tion. The New City of Belén project, implemented by the Ministry of 
Housing, Construction and Sanitation (MHCS) since 2014, is the most 
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examine the resilience to floods of the LBFZ population and the resist-
ance to the New City of Belén resettlement project, and thereby contrib-
ute to further analysis and debate on resettlement in Peru. The study on 
which the chapter is based employed a method of participatory action 
research, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, including 
fieldwork, participatory observation, questionnaires and interviews with 
key informants from the affected population and government authorities 
at a local and national level (see Table 8.1).
The chapter has eight sections. The first provides a brief history 
of urban disaster risk in Peru. Second, the disaster risk from flooding in 
Iquitos city is reviewed. A third section considers urban growth and flood 
risk in the LBFZ. Fourth, the two major alternatives proposed as solutions 
to disaster risk are reviewed. A fifth section provides an analysis of stake-
holders and examines their level of interest and influence on the resettle-
ment project. The sixth section presents an analysis of conflicts between 
the different actors and the power relations among them. Seventh, a 
reflection on resilience and its impact on culture is carried out. Eighth 
and last, a summary conclusion is provided.
Table 8.1 The sample of surveys, interviews and focus groups in high-risk 
zones and in the areas of the resettlement and with government authorities and 
employees at a national, regional and local level.
Zone Condition Surveys Focus 
groups
Interviews
Lower Belén Population under 
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Background: disaster risk in Peru
The diverse geological and hydro- meteorological phenomena that 
threaten Peru expose more than fifteen million people, four million 
homes and thirty-four thousand population centres to hazard.3 An esti-
mated 10 per cent of the population is located in very high unmitiga-
ble risk areas, where their lives and heritage are in danger. The National 
Water Authority (ANA) has recently identified 563 urban settlements 
located in hazardous flood plain areas (ANA 2016). During the El Niño 
event in summer 2007, all the important northern, central and southern 
coastal cities were severely affected by flooding and landslides, including 
Lima, Piura, Chiclayo, Trujillo, Huarmey and Arequipa.
Accelerated processes of urbanisation occurred in Peru from the 
mid- twentieth century onwards, which was mainly associated with 
agrarian reform and political violence, particularly in rural areas. These 
processes led to migratory waves from the countryside to the city, to 
such an extent that today 79.3 per cent of the national population lives 
in towns and cities (INEI 2018). Many unplanned urban settlements 
were then built in highly hazard- prone zones. Small settlements subse-
quently became cities and metropolises, driven by the housing boom at 
the beginning of the twenty- first century. As a result of modern technol-
ogy and infrastructure, the old human– nature relationship was modi-
fied and a new, more risk- prone human– environment relationship was 
established.4
Disaster risk due to flooding in Iquitos city
In the Department of Loreto, where Iquitos is located, more than sixty-
five thousand homes are at very high risk. This number has been arrived 
at considering the number of houses that were lost or damaged in the 
most recent  extreme flooding in 2012 and 2018 (see Figure 8.1). Iquitos 
city itself is almost an island, bordered on three sides by the Itaya, Nanay 
and Amazon rivers, with flood zones along all the rivers.
The absence of land- use planning, accompanied by high levels of 
poverty and a historical culture of riverine flood plain occupation, has led 
to large numbers of people settling in flood- prone areas (the Belén area, 
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Studies carried out by the Peruvian Navy report that the Amazon 
is  migrating closer to the Itaya river and that in approximately 30 years 
it will occupy and permanently flood the LBFZ sectors of Muyuy and 
Aguajal (Dirección Nacional de Hidrografía y Navegación 2015). The 
Amazon is the largest river in the world and contains more water than 
the Nile, the Yangtze and the Mississippi together. This means that when 
the waters of the Amazon reach the Itaya it will be impossible to reduce, 
in situ, the flood hazard for the LBFZ population, thus making resettle-
ment unavoidable (Chávez 2016).
In 2012 Iquitos suffered the most extreme floods in decades, severely 
affecting the LBFZ. That same year a large urban fire also consumed a large 
sector of the LBFZ. Both disasters increased the already precarious living 
conditions of the population and placed Belén firmly on the national dis-
aster risk agenda. In 2015 the city and the LBFZ were once more affected 
by severe flooding, increasing pressure for remedial actions.
In the past, the extreme rainfall that Iquitos suffered every year 
was discharged through natural channels that functioned as a rainwater 
drainage system. However, these natural drains were destroyed by urban 
growth, causing an increased level of flood hazard during regular seasonal 
rainfalls. Despite their potential use for flood drainage, no inventory of 
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Figure 8.1 Number of houses in the Department of Loreto destroyed 
and affected by flooding between 2004 and 2018. © Angel Wilson 
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Urban growth and flood risk in the LBFZ
More than a century ago, the LBFZ was the port area of Iquitos and an 
access point for agricultural products to the Belén market. The market 
generated economic activities in the area of Belén, such as fishing, river 
and land transport services, agriculture, retail trade, informal street trad-
ers, and commerce in stolen and used items, among others. Currently the 
market is in the process of relocation within the same district of Belén, a 
process widely accepted by the local government.
The Belén municipality was founded in 2002. This led to the mobi-
lisation of population demanding basic services, such as electricity, tel-
ecommunications, healthcare and education. The authorities attended 
to many of these demands. However, the severe environmental condi-
tions did not facilitate the provision of some basic services. Potable run-
ning water, sewerage services and solid waste management are pending 
in many places. Moreover, the levels of poverty and exclusion mean that 
families do not pay municipal taxes for basic services. It is a challenge for 
the municipality of Belén to finance and execute basic service projects 
in the LBFZ given the adverse environmental and social conditions that 
exist due to the floods.
The original settlers of Belén did not severely suffer the effects of 
floods because they lived on raft- houses that floated during flooding. 
However, these rafts were built with local materials which have been 
over- exploited, making them difficult to find any more. Over time, the 
city’s population occupied more and more land in the flood plain of the 
Itaya river, changing the pattern of land use and consolidating residen-
tial urban areas. Building raised houses with stilts avoided flooding. The 
local authorities also provided the floodable area with health clinics, 
schools, churches and parks, among other things, without considering 
risk. In this way they institutionalised disaster risk. Some houses in the 
LBFZ were built with brick and concrete, imitating big- city, non- flood- 
zone building practices because the use of the more adequate, albeit rus-
tic materials was not seen as ‘progress’. This population did not value the 
past culture of the riverine settlers, who constructed using the available 
local materials which were more adaptable to the flood season.
Although rivers are a source of life for riverine populations, the 
city of Iquitos is highly deficient in the management of solid waste. It dis-
poses tonnes of garbage into its rivers, causing dangerous levels of envi-
ronmental contamination. This has a substantial impact on the health 
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high incidence rates in the LBFZ and elsewhere. Although for decades 
the people of Belén have lived under threat of pollution and flooding, 
the conditions have now grown worse. Today the higher contamination 
includes fecal coliforms, toxic residues and heavy minerals, which are all 
detrimental to the health and quality of life of the riverine inhabitants 
and greatly aggravate the problem of floodwaters.
At present, the LBFZ is a type of ghetto, an underworld of formal 
society. Made up of a culturally defined, socially excluded group of peo-
ple, it comprises an economically poorer population, dedicated in good 
part to illicit activities under the guise of informality. In addition, the 
illegal activities of certain sectors of the population legitimate and sup-
port grave conditions of exclusion, such as in the trafficking of persons 
and child slavery. Many inhabitants want to leave the zone and start 
over again elsewhere. However, for others any such relocation would 
seriously affect their economic status and lifestyle. These two oppos-
ing views are expressed in the project proposals developed to favour the 
LBFZ population.
The alternatives
Faced with flooding, the city has a history of small- scale, intermittent 
relocations to safer areas during the 1990s, beginning with the Los 
Delfines resettlement project and later the Calipso resettlement project. 
These and other attempts were largely unsuccessful due to insufficient 
planning and political commitment. The relocated population does not 
yet own the land they occupy and still lacks some basic services. This has 
increased the possibility of them abandoning the areas and returning to 
their old sites. During the 2012 flooding, the more seriously affected pop-
ulation of the Iquitos city districts of Belén, San Juan Bautista, Punchana 
and Maynas were temporarily relocated to the Fuerte Vargas Guerra 
and Olympic Village areas. The affected population was provided tran-
sitional shelter and other basic services. With the end of support to the 
shelters, the LBFZ population agreed to leave if they were transferred 
to Varillalito, the new resettlement site for the LBFZ population planned 
by government (see below). This occurred in mid- 2016, initially with 70 
families.
The critical situation of the LBFZ has led to two disaster risk reduc-
tion proposals. The first focused on an in situ urban renewal solution. 
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urban renewal in situ: sustainable belén Project
The historic floods in Belén in 2012 came to the attention of the national 
authorities because of the unusually high critical conditions faced by the 
population. The government of President Humala (2011– 16) made the 
political decision to search for a solution for families living in the LBFZ. 
A so- called Presidential Promise for finding a solution was made to the 
local population. The Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation 
(MHCS) developed an on- site improvement programme called the 
Sustainable Belén Project. This consisted of urban renewal in the LBFZ 
with new stilt homes, installation of sanitation services, aerial drainage 
systems, roads, sidewalks and parks. Technical aspects were based in 
part on models used in South- East Asia.
The project managers found it very difficult to comply with con-
struction demands due to technical difficulties installing houses and 
adapting basic services in the area subject to flooding. The project was 
cancelled after approximately a hundred of the planned 2,600 houses 
had been constructed. High costs and technical difficulties were used to 
explain the cancellation of the project. However, the reasons were never 
openly presented or discussed with the population. Despite the constant 
demands by the people of LBFZ for the reactivation of the Sustainable 
Belén Project, the environmental conditions made the proposal unfeasi-
ble. A second catastrophic flood in 2015 confirmed this conclusion.
the new belén resettlement scheme
As a measure of the political will to solve the existing problem in Belén, in 
December 2014 the national government promulgated Law No. 30291. 
This action was for the relocation of the Lower Zone of Belén, and it 
proposed a completely new resettlement scheme. With the enactment 
of the law, known as the New Belén City Project, the Sustainable Cities 
Programme (SCP) of the MHCS was created. This project planned to 
resettle nearly 2,600 families to Varillalito, an area to the south of the city 
of Iquitos on the LO- 103 road located in the district of San Juan Bautista, 
13 km from Iquitos (Cruzatt 2014).
The project proposed a new city with the potential to become an 
economic development pole. A 50- hectare plot of land bought by the 
government was divided into 120 m2 lots. On each lot, a free housing 
module of 40 m2 will be constructed. Potable water, sanitation, flood 
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have sidewalks, sports areas, parks, gardens, schools, health centres, a 
market and a police station (Cruzatt 2014).
The beneficiaries include people from the nine Lower Belén com-
munities of October 6, August 30, Prolongación Santa Rosa, Belén III 
Stage, Pueblo Libre, Sachachorro, Zona Belén de Belén, Caserío and 
Nuevo Liberal. Unfortunately, five years after the law was enacted, the 
project had only built 400 of the 2,600 homes, and the promised services 
(water, sewage, education, etc.) are not properly functional. Because 
of this, some of the relocated family groups have chosen to keep their 
houses in the LBFZ.
Analysis of actors: level of interest and influence  
on the project
The slow overall progress made in implementing the New City of Belén 
project has been one reason for the existing levels of organised support or 
opposition for the scheme by different stakeholders. With the change of 
national government in July 2016, project implementation slowed even 
more, given that the current MHCS authorities do not have the same 
political interest in executing the project as the previous administra-
tion had. The delays have permitted different stakeholders to develop a 
strategy for defending or opposing the project. The nature of the power 
relations, as well as the structure of stakeholder support and opposition, 
are analysed below in order to help understand the projects’ govern-
ance context and the types of difficulty large- scale resettlement of well- 
consolidated population groups may signify.
the dynamic of the relationship between stakeholders
With the cancellation of the Sustainable Belén Project and the subsequent 
passing of Law No. 30291 for the relocation of Lower Belén, a significant 
part of the population grew distrustful of the government. The rejection 
of the resettlement project was inevitable. Local actors mobilised against 
the project and formed a tacit alliance with leaders of neighbourhood 
councils, local merchants, the tabloid press, NGOs, the municipality of 
Belén, various opposition political parties, and regional and national 
social movements.
However, another group of leaders of the LBFZ accepted and pro-
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benefits of the project. The previous mayor of the municipality of San 
Juan Bautista had also supported the project with its economic and 
developmental benefits, because the 2,600 families would have been 
resettled in an area under his jurisdiction.
For the population to widely support the project, a strategy that 
results in a win– win situation is required (Flint 2001). This option would 
exist if the families were able to take full ownership of the housing in the 
New City of Belén and in turn managed to retain property in the LBFZ. 
However, this strategy is not feasible because the law of relocation for 
Belén clearly establishes that the abandoned land must be expropriated 
by the state and that the area may only be zoned for purposes other than 
urban uses. The lack of a favourable alternative for all those involved 
may be expressed using the prisoner’s dilemma analogy. If all the options 
are unfavourable, which one is furthest from a zero- sum solution? The 
position taken by the population, social organisations, politicians and 
economic interest groups to the New Belén Project depends on positive 
results for all those deriving benefits from the alternatives offered.
Another positive alternative for a large sector of the population of 
Belén would be on-site improvement, that is to say, a project similar to 
the Sustainable Belén Project, but this time with feasible technical pro-
posals. This option is one of the most popular among the inhabitants of 
the LBFZ but is not acceptable to the state. The state notes the projected 
movement of the Amazon towards the Itaya, along with the predicted 
future of unmitigable flooding in the Belén area no matter what technical 
solutions are sought.
Families in favour of the resettlement project consider it beneficial 
to search for better living conditions outside the flood zone of Belén. 
However, for the much larger group that does not want to leave the 
flood zone, the project means being uprooted and fracturing the exist-
ing social, economic and political power relations. If the New Belén City 
project were cancelled, villagers who rejected the project would maintain 
their status quo on-site, while people who are affected by the flood would 
miss an opportunity to generate other development opportunities away 
from the high- risk areas.
The opposition group to the project may employ legal and illegal, 
violent and non- violent tactics and has voice, determination and mag-
nitude (Tilly 1995). Voice is expressed in the ability to put the issue on 
the local and national political agenda, while determination is demon-
strated in the sacrifice that people are willing to make to oppose the pro-
ject, including the sacrifice of their own lives. Magnitude refers to the 
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three factors do not exist in the group that favours the project. They only 
have voice and leadership, but they do not have determination and mag-
nitude. If they did, it would be expressed in far greater social pressure 
on the authorities to accelerate the execution of the project. People who 
do not reject the project have a contemplative attitude, not a belligerent 
attitude. They are only waiting for the project to be implemented in order 
to support and defend it.
The opposition group, which is highly organised and consolidated, 
has an ideology that fosters radical opposition to the project. All radical 
groups recreate their own history of battles and heroes, rewriting sto-
ries to depict them as winners (although they are not) and allow them to 
generate bonds of union within the group. The settlers who do not reject 
the project outright are neither cohesive nor pragmatic. They do not 
fully trust the state, and their support and confidence in the authorities 
depends on the level of progress of the works at the new city site. Given 
this, they do not offer any real opposition to those who openly oppose 
the project.
Based on interview results with 54 people, Figure 8.2 reveals cer-
tain contradictions. For example, many who protest daily are not nec-
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Figure 8.2 People’s reactions to obligatory resettlement: results from 
interviews conducted with 54 people. © Angel Wilson Chávez Eslava.
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project, despite their actions to the contrary. They protest because of 
social pressure to do so, and they know that if they do not protest, they 
will be recriminated against by the opposition group. On the other hand, 
there is a very small radical group who would fight to the death to reject 
the project, or they would accept resettlement with resignation. Finally, 
there is a group who would return to their place of origin later if they 
were forced to relocate.
The possibility of the opposing group weakening its collective posi-
tion will depend on the extent to which a ‘free rider’ effect is generated. 
This measures when a protest is losing its efficacy, and when more and 
more residents obtain individual benefits produced by the opposition 
group without having to protest themselves. That is to say, free riders 
grow within the group. Such people reject the project, but do not mobi-
lise to protest, because they feel that those inhabitants already mobilised 
are sufficient to sustain the goals and benefits expected by resistance 
(Paramio 2005). To the extent many free riders are created in the opposi-
tion group, mobilisation will lose voice, magnitude and determination.
Another factor that generates free riders is the high transaction cost 
of social mobilisation that leads to project failure. The benefits of staying 
in the flood zone may be superior to those expected at the new location, 
but if the costs of staying in the flood zone are higher, the free rider effect 
will spread and collective mobilisation against the project will be weak-
ened. There has been a significant increase in the number of free riders 
as the project has proceeded and infrastructure has been built. This has 
meant that radical groups have attacked many free riders and accused 
them of being traitors, thus generating conflict in neighbourhoods.
Positive and negative resilience
Resilience is the ability of society to absorb the impacts of dangerous phe-
nomena and recover to a normal state (UNISDR 2009). Resilience is a 
supplement to the human– environment relationship, helping to prevent 
it from breaking down under stress. However, resilience can be harm-
ful if it supports a perverse relationship between poor humans living in 
unhealthy environments.
Adaptation to climate change can be expressed as maladaptation 
if a perverse relationship is established between humans and the envi-
ronment. Unlike resilience, adjustments to climate change are slow 
and occur in the short, medium and long term, such that the popula-
tion may not perceive them. Resilience includes not only adjustments to 
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environmental changes, but also resistance and recovery when encoun-
tering climate variability, particularly when faced with the effects of 
extreme events. The settlers of Belén meet this definition of resilience 
because they survive under conditions of extreme poverty, under- 
employment and lack of opportunities, pollution and periods of flood. 
They have made informal activity a way of life, and this allows them to 
maintain their families. They know of no other viable option in life and 
they remain averse to change. They have made Belén their territory, a 
place where they establish their own rules for coexistence. This form of 
resilience is negative because the informality in which they live forces 
them to coexist without complaint with crime, violence and impunity, as 
well as the destruction of their own environment. The settlers are highly 
tolerant of living standards well below those that would be considered 
decent and salubrious under other circumstances. This type of resilience 
perpetuates and legitimises discrimination and exclusion.
It is difficult for the population of Belén to trust the state and its 
promises, or to imagine living in another area in the future when now-
adays they barely manage to survive and to maintain their families on 
a day- to- day basis. The ability to project to the future is not part of the 
resilience of this population. This means that resettlement is not a cred-
ible option for them. Thus, their resistance to the resettlement process is 
strengthened.
As the population struggles to survive in the flood zone, a form of 
positive resilience is expressed when people have hopes of improving 
their living conditions (work, health, education, water, sanitation and 
drainage), and care about their children’s education, especially for pre-
venting them from joining any of the local gangs. During flood periods, 
these families lock themselves in their homes to prevent their young chil-
dren from drowning or contracting lethal diseases. For them, if the strat-
egy to improve their condition of life happens to be relocation outside of 
Belén, they are willing to accept it. In Figure 8.3, one can see the position 
of the settlers of the LBFZ with regard to relocation.
Local politicians and the inhabitants believe that high exposure 
to flooding is normal. The romantic view held by some actors about a 
‘culture of water’ among those living in flood zones impedes them from 
considering how flooding is a problem for the security of the society. 
Moreover, a sector of the population of the LBFZ does not want to be 
relocated, preferring instead to accept the risks to their health and physi-
cal integrity.
According to Michel Foucault, ‘normalisation’ is the process by 
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mechanisms expressed in sanctions, discipline, ideology, education or 
other means. Normalisation formalises social differences and exclusion, 
which does not allow for further questioning (Foucault 2010). Poverty, 
inequality and living in constantly flooded areas of the LBFZ are very 
common. This has been ‘normalised’ in such a way that the actors con-
sider that such living conditions are socially acceptable. Those accepting 
such normalisation do so without exerting pressure on the authorities to 
generate change.
Conclusion
The state has created a hyper- centralism of power in Lima, causing the 
cities of the Andes and Amazonia to be systematically excluded, thus gen-
erating a constant mistrust of the elites among local populations. In this 
institutional context, the resettlement project has been implemented, 
with high levels of distrust on the part of the community and the radicali-
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Figure 8.3 Do you approve of the New Belén project in Varillalito? 
Reactions of people of Belén to relocation are mixed. Those who believe 
that moving will improve their conditions of living and safety approve 
of it, while those who do not trust the state to keep its promises and 
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in 2016, the political will for the project has diminished. As a result of 
these factors there is now evidence of a slowdown in the execution of the 
work. This delay gives more time for opponents to design new strategies 
and plan sabotage against the project. Although the project has not been 
cancelled, the situation does create greater distrust in the population and 
weakens support.
The human– environment balance has been profoundly altered by 
the inadequate occupation of territory and a recent increase in cata-
strophic climatic events. Resilience, a mechanism that allows society to 
face extreme conditions of life, has been surpassed by the destructiveness 
of recent events. Decent living conditions, and above all the mitigation of 
or adaptation to disasters in situ, is now a very difficult challenge to face. 
On the other hand, resilience contributes to legitimising marginality and 
exclusion and is especially important in generating incentives for resist-
ance to resettlement.
The resettlement project places the population in a difficult position 
because it is not the typical situation where the state uses force to impose 
an abrupt relocation of the population. Even though there is resistance 
and opposition to the project, there is also support for it. Therefore, bipo-
larity in the population means that if the project fails or succeeds there 
will always be losers and winners. The prisoner’s dilemma exists here, as 
does the free rider effect. The endgame of political mobilisation is not yet 
decided, and this will depend on the results of each group’s strategies.
Disasters during the last decade have shown that secure conditions 
cannot be achieved in situ with the implementation of mitigation meas-
ures. Damage and loss caused by disasters have revealed to the public 
the need to develop population resettlement processes for cities facing 
high risks. In this sense, the New Belén City Project is crucial for decision- 
makers because it is needed in order to validate a model of successful 
resettlement policy for the country. Also, future land use and territorial 
planning must ensure that risk is not reconstructed in any new locations 
which are highly prone to flooding.
Beyond the power game and protest by actors, the Belén project 
opened a door of opportunity for a sector of the population that does 
not wish to continue living in conditions of exclusion and marginali-
sation. Assuming the project is not cancelled, it will be a challenge for 
project implementers to sustain the limited trust already gained among 
an increasing part of the population. The state may not have the politi-
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Notes
 1. Zones of very high, unmitigable risk are defined in the 2012 Law on Population Relocation 
(Law 29869) as those where the implementation of mitigation measures in situ is more expen-
sive and complex than a process of human resettlement.
 2. See Chapter 7 in this book by Oliver- Smith, who comments on one of the first processes of 
resettlement in Peru associated with the destruction of Yungay in 1970 due to an avalanche 
caused by the Ancash earthquake.
 3. According to a 2014 report of the Commission for Housing and Construction of the National 
Congress, based on official data of the National Statistics Office for 2007.
 4. Another form of expressing this relationship is environment = technology – infrastructure + 
nature.
References
ANA. 2016. Identificación de Poblaciones Vulnerables Por Activación de Quebradas 2015– 2016. Lima. 
https:// hdl.handle.net/ 20.500.12543/ 198.
Chávez, Angel. 2016. Reasentamiento Poblacional En Zonas Urbanas Por Impacto de Fenómeno 
Hidro- Meteorológicas, Incluyendo Efectos Del Cambio Climático: Caso Belén. Lima.
Cruzatt, Sandra. 2014. Estudio de Análisis Micro Social de Involucrados. Iquitos.
Dirección Nacional de Hidrografía y Navegación. 2015. Informe Técnico: Variación Del Rio Amazonas 
en relación al Río Itaya. Loreto.
INEI. 2018. Perú: Perfil Sociodemográfico. https:// www.inei.gob.pe/ media/ MenuRecursivo/ publi-
caciones_ digitales/ Est/ Lib1539/ libro.pdf.
Flint, Pinkas. 2001. Negociaciones Eficaces: Implemente las mejores estrategias y tácticas. Lima: El 
Comercio.
Foucault, Michel. 2010. Vigilar y Castigar: Nacimiento de la prisión. Mexico: Siglo XXI.
Law 29869. 2012. Ley de Reasentamiento Poblacional Para Zonas de Muy Alto Riesgo No 
Mitigable. Peru.
Law 30291. 2014. Ley Que Declara En Emergencia y de Necesidad Pública La Reubicación de La 
Población de La Zona Baja Del Distrito de Belén, Provincia de Maynas, Departamento de 
Loreto. Peru.
Paramio, Ludolfo. 2005. ‘Teorías de la decisión racional y de la acción colectiva’. Sociológica 
(México) 20 (57): 13– 34. http:// www.scielo.org.mx/ pdf/ soc/ v20n57/ 2007- 8358- soc- 20- 57- 
00013.pdf.
Tilly, Charles. 1995. ‘Los movimientos sociales como agrupaciones históricamente específicas de 
actuaciones políticas’. Sociológica (México) 10 (28): 13– 36. http:// www.sociologicamexico.
azc.uam.mx/ index.php/ Sociologica/ article/ view/ 667/ 640.
UNISDR. 2009. Terminología Sobre Reducción Del Riesgo de Desastres. Geneva. https:// www.unisdr.



























Land issues in resettlement
The four chapters in this part are concerned with understanding how 
land tenure and property rights influence risk and resettlement. They 
also look at the growing rate of evictions in urban areas. Land dynam-
ics are a primary driver of risk accumulation in certain areas – some 
people cannot afford safe places to settle so they build where it is inex-
pensive and convenient, in flood plains and coastal areas, along rivers 
and slopes, many of which are becoming more at risk due to climate 
change. Risk- related resettlement may be a knee- jerk reaction that tries 
to mitigate the risk in a city where populations have informally settled 
on exposed sites – thus, as is mentioned in the introduction to this book, 
resettlement is a response to failed development planning, and should 
be a last- resort option.
The chapters in this part all use a rights- based approach, essen-
tially building on the definitions of relocation and resettlement set out in 
the introduction to this book, and argue for people to have the right not 
only to housing (which may be provided in resettlement), but to the full 
spectrum of land, property and livelihood rights. The cases examined in 
this part make clear that resettlement is not voluntary and for the most 
part would be classified as a forced eviction, firstly because people did 
not choose to be moved, and secondly because they are denied the rights 
to property and livelihood at the resettlement sites. Furthermore, as is 
pointed out in Chapters 10 (by Yves Cabannes), 11 (by Giovanna Astolfo) 
and 12 (by Bill Flinn and Holly Schofield), the resettlement usually 
results in a second market- based eviction, as families are not able to keep 
up payments or meet the criteria to remain eligible for the new housing – 
amounting to a second eviction and the ultimate denial of housing rights.
Chapter 9, by Colin Marx, puts forward the idea that property rights 
have an influence on risk reduction measures – using the notions of insu-
lating and isolating effects on people. For example, in Kampala, Uganda, 
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those people who were perceived to hold bona fide property rights to 
settle in low- lying areas were not seen a being ‘at fault’ for causing the 
flooding problems – they were insulated from being held accountable for 
degradation of the wetlands. Also, the perceived lack of property rights 
insulated the authorities from having to worry about individual loss from 
disasters, i.e. if they were not owners then the authorities were absolved 
from needing to offer assistance.
In Chapter 10, Yves Cabannes outlines how climate change and 
risks tend to be used as a key ‘rational discourse’ to justify either forced 
or market- driven evictions, by putting into perspective climate- induced 
relocation and resettlement with other forms of land and housing evic-
tion that have increased in scale, number and brutality over the last 
40 years. He outlines how climate change and risk- related displacements 
are among many causes of evictions that are intrinsically linked with one 
another, and gives examples of this snowball effect or chain reaction. 
Drawing on David Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession, 
Cabannes argues that Harvey’s concept needs to be nuanced as a socially 
and spatially selective accumulation by dispossession process, affecting 
primarily the most vulnerable groups and globalised territories that can 
absorb massive amounts of capital and offer the most lucrative invest-
ments. This chapter also lays out how current UN frameworks show a 
regressive attitude through weak wording and exclusion of key phrases, 
which are making people more exposed to eviction and insecurity of land 
rights, and offers some glimmers of hope with positive examples of secur-
ing rights.
As an example of the need for a nuanced argument of accumulation 
by dispossession, Giovanna Astolfo, in Chapter 11, takes us through the 
genealogy of land systems in Cambodia and relates the current round of 
evictions to the making of the global city, and foreign investment, and 
traces how this process has been enabled by the history of land expul-
sions in the country. She explains how the evicted communities lack 
knowledge (no maps, no clear plans, no information) and resources to 
enforce their rights. This links to Oliver- Smith’s outlining, in Chapter 7, 
of the ability for community resistance to evictions.
Chapter 12, by Bill Flinn and Holly Schofield, looks at the tensions 
that land tenure security brings up for international and national NGOs 
supporting families with recovery after disasters. They compare NGO 
approaches in two areas affected by Typhoon Haiyan in 2013: one rural 
area where families have relatively secure tenure status, and an urban 
area of Tacloban in the Philippines, where families were forced by the 
government to resettle on the outskirts of the city, where their rights to 
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livelihoods, social connections and education were impossible to main-
tain. Thus, in urban areas of Talcoban, the NGOs found themselves faced 
with either supporting household recovery in a way that the households 
did not choose (resettlement), or illegally supporting households to 
recover in the No- Build Zones. They conclude that in these situations, 
supporting indirectly can be much more pertinent – through advocacy, 
mediation, legal support on tenure issues, services and infrastructure 





Land, property rights and risk
Colin marx
This chapter starts from the assumption that the intensity of weather 
variability associated with climate change is likely to make some cities 
more hazardous – and specific population groups within them more 
vulnerable. Thus, innovative and equitable actions are needed that go 
beyond current mainstream responses. Among these actions, developing 
an understanding of our collective complicity in creating the vulnerabili-
ties, and hence the need for collective responses, will be necessary to add 
to more individually based responses. Put more bluntly: it is evident that 
dominant representations of collective responsibility for creating haz-
ards currently do very little to offer progressive ways of addressing the 
unequal distribution of the burdens of hazards.
There are many analyses of why and how disasters are created, and 
unequally so. This chapter builds on the seminal work of Wisner et al. 
(2004), Oliver- Smith (2013), Lavell (2012) and the recent Urban ARC 
project (Adelekan et al. 2015), among many others, which has estab-
lished that disasters are not ‘natural’ and that disasters are created and 
accumulate through the interaction of systemic issues. Disaster risk 
emerges, in these accounts, as one way of accounting for the exposure 
to configurations of vulnerability and hazards where vulnerability is 
already an outcome of systemic inequalities and hazards are not natural. 
In these accounts, risk serves as a golden thread of analysis into the ways 
people are differentially exposed to hazards and the effects of disasters.
In a similar way, this chapter uses risk as a guiding thread into anal-
yses of the unequal distribution of the burden of disasters. However, it 
draws on a different aspect of risk to think about social accountability 
for events and processes threatening societies: in this case, for the col-
lective creation of disasters. The logic of the argument is that analysing 
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risk can help to understand how accountability for the creation of disas-
ters is commonly understood. Furthermore, because understandings of 
accountability for problems are related to action to address these prob-
lems, if we have further insights into how accountability is constructed, it 
can alert us to what might need to be engaged with to generate different 
actions.
To ground the chapter, I explore urban flooding in Kampala and 
the way notions of urban flood risk are shared across different groups 
and institutions. The focus on sharing is important because it is one way 
in which accountability for floods comes to be constructed and agreed 
upon across different social groups and institutions. There will be many 
ways in which accountability can be shared and agreed, but I look at the 
effects of property rights on how notions of risk are shared in the context 
of resettlement from flood risk. Property rights are useful because they 
are fundamental to the financial compensation provided for resettlement 
in Kampala, as in many other countries. If the logic of my argument holds 
up, then the sharing of risk through property rights should tell us a lit-
tle about the social construction of common perceptions about the crea-
tion of disasters: specifically, that they tend to obscure the ways that an 
important part of being together in a city is a relational experience that is 
always already unequal.
The idea that one of the functions of ‘risk’ is to offer a social way 
of working out accountability for threatening events is developed by 
Douglas (1990). In this view, risk is shared and mediated through cul-
tural activities to protect valued social institutions. In other words, 
how risk is understood and how these understandings are shared can 
offer insights into what societies consider valuable and who should 
be responsible for dealing with threats. In relating to accountability, 
assessing questions relating to risk is about interrogating solidarities – 
renewing the solidarities of old or questioning them. When it comes to 
attributing accountability for actions, questions of justice come to the 
fore because such social mechanisms work out ‘who is most at risk, who 
will suffer the risk, and who will be held accountable for exposing the 
others to risk’ (Douglas 1990, 17). Such questions are even more urgent 
in the context of highly unequal cities where disaster risks are unevenly 
distributed.
As understandings of risk are shared, there are two interlinked 
representations that could concern people: the probability that some-
thing will happen and the consequences of that happening (the loss). 
Understandings and forms of accountability will vary depending on 
whether people are thinking about the probability or the consequence. 
LAnd, ProPErty riGhts And risk 175
  
Anticipating some of the evidence provided later in this chapter, it 
seemed as if policymakers in Kampala tended to focus on the prob-
abilities of risk existing, while people (and without sophisticated mod-
elling resources) relate more strongly to the losses. In this chapter, the 
assumptions underlying these two ways of representing risk are used as 
clues to sketch out people’s world view and, in such a world view, what 
might prove threatening, and what steps could be taken to mitigate such 
risks. Despite people having differing world views, all world views share 
a belief in a particular form of order and what can threaten this order. 
In this way, ‘risk’ is also constitutive of particular understandings of the 
world (see Chapter 4 by Johnson et al. in this book). It is this point that 
I return to in the concluding sections of the chapter.
The chapter begins by describing the context and the principal 
axis of ‘location– settlement– property rights– compensation’ that relates 
to resettlement from disaster risk in Kampala. This axis establishes the 
importance of perceptions of (private) property rights and leads to 
two sections which detail how property rights have effects that simul-
taneously work in different ways. The data that the section draws on 
relates to thematic analysis of semi- structured, open- ended interviews 
conducted in 2015– 16 with policymakers in Kampala Capital City 
Authority (KCCA) and Uganda’s National Environmental Management 
Authority (NEMA), residents of Bwaise III who had been evicted and 
compensated, those from Natete who were awaiting eviction and com-
pensation, and civil society organisations working in urban develop-
ment (Lwasa et al. 2016). The final section then looks at the effects of 
property rights on understanding how disasters are collectively created 
in the city.
The context
The city of Kampala is built on a series of hills and wide wetland val-
leys that drain away into Uganda’s river and lake systems. Historically, 
the wetland valleys were used for low- intensity agriculture. However, 
with increasing urbanisation, more of the wetlands have been settled 
on, thus degrading their drainage system functions. The degradation, 
and the consequent inability of the wetlands to perform their ecosystem 
functions of absorbing higher rainfall, are due to a number of factors. 
In Kampala’s context, the people settled in the wetland areas tend to be 
poorer residents availing themselves of cheaper land that is relatively 
well located with respect to work and services, or people who historically 
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settled in the areas before they became flood prone (and now find them-
selves increasingly impoverished as they own an asset of decreasing 
value). The combination of the wetlands no longer being able to fulfil 
their ecosystem function of absorbing excess rainfall, and greater rain-
fall due to weather variability associated with climate change, has meant 
that those living in the wetlands face greater and more prolonged flood-
ing events (Kabesiime et al. 2015; UN Habitat 2013).
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) groups prop-
erty rights under four different forms of tenure – customary, freehold, 
mailo and leasehold. The simplicity of the statement in the Constitution 
belies the complexity and ambiguity of interpreting property rights 
in practice (Lwasa 2010). Overlap these tenure forms with a diverse 
series of informal practices and discerning ‘legitimate’ property rights 
becomes exceedingly complicated (Nkurunziza 2007, 2008). This pro-
cess of discernment is also often politically fraught as large areas of 
Kampala are considered to be part of the Buganda Kingdom (Meinert 
and Kjær 2016). The value and control of land are a central feature of 
the kingdom’s political, cultural and social claims (Médard and Golaz 
2018). The legal complexity of property rights makes compensa-
tion especially difficult in Kampala, and this form of complexity often 
absorbs all the attention.
Beginning in the mid- 1990s, the Kampala City Council1 began 
investigating ways of managing flood risk – typically in the form of 
upgrading drainage infrastructure – and the financial resources pro-
vided to do so usually came as a package requiring institutional reforms. 
A good example is the various phases of the World Bank- funded Kampala 
Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP).2 KIIDP is 
conceived, inter alia, as ‘drainage system improvement’ to contribute to 
public confidence which, in turn, relates to the economic and commercial 
development of the city.3 As part of this sectoral trajectory of upgrading 
and institutional reforms in KCCA, this chapter focuses on the drainage, 
transport and sanitation upgrading in two areas: Bwaise III (in 2006) and 
Natete (2015/ 16). See also Chapter 15 by Kisembo in this book. In both 
cases, the infrastructure upgrading induced resettlement of residents 
and commercial enterprises. The rationale for the resettlement was that 
people and businesses were located in an area where the city wanted to 
build risk- reducing infrastructure even though the people living there 
were experiencing flooding. In Kampala, the approach to resettlement is 
governed by the Land Act (1998) and works through financial compensa-
tion to people who are evicted. The responsibility for finding a new place 
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The axis
In this section, I identify a ‘settlement– location– property rights– 
compensation– resettlement’ axis and the importance of perceptions of 
property rights in this axis. These perceptions equate settlement in spe-
cific (flood- prone) areas and ownership of land with private, individual 
property rights. Most importantly here, because resettlement is facili-
tated by compensation and compensation turns on property rights, the 
role of property rights is central.
In most countries, land may be acquired by the state for public pur-
poses. In Uganda, acquisition can be in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality or public health (Articles 26(2) and 
237(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995). The process 
of acquiring land for public purposes and providing compensation (as a 
resettlement measure) is governed and bolstered by a series of national 
laws and, in this case, funding conditionalities. Here I single out four that 
relate most directly to resettlement compensation.
First, the Constitution provides for the taking of privately owned 
land on condition that prompt and fair compensation is paid prior to the 
taking of the property (Article 237(2)). Second, the Land Acquisition Act 
(1965) provides for compensation as the only remedy for eviction. There 
is no requirement to move people or buy or make available alternative 
land. Receipt of compensation extinguishes any claim to the land – a 
point that will become crucial in our consideration later in the chapter 
on how understandings of risks are shared. Third, the Land Act 1998 
(amended 2004) Section 77 provides for valuation principles of open 
market value for customary land, replacement value for buildings and 
disturbance allowances. Fourth, the World Bank’s Policy on Involuntary 
Resettlement (OP/ BP/ 4.12) also applied because the projects involved 
World Bank funds. This policy stipulates that people who are displaced 
should be compensated at full replacement cost and assisted with reloca-
tion or resettlement. The policy encourages the implementing agency to 
offer replacement land, especially when any residual land holdings are 
not economically viable. The policy broadens the support to include sup-
port for any impact on livelihoods.4
Uganda’s national laws do not require compensation to tenants, 
squatters (unlawful tenants) and residents or land users on land that was 
identified and gazetted for public purposes prior to people’s use of the 
land. Under national laws, tenants and squatters can only be compen-
sated if they have resided on the land for longer than 15 years. However, 
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World Bank guidelines require compensation regardless of how long they 
have stayed, provided that they fall within the stipulation of any project 
cut- off date. In the event, a socio- economic survey of affected persons 
commissioned by the Kampala City Council revealed that the majority of 
respondents (94 per cent) preferred (among a list of options that did not 
allow for continued residence in the same location) ‘fair, adequate and 
prompt compensation’ and not resettlement to an alternative location 
(Geomaps Africa et al. 2006).
Thus, the following property rights were recognised as eligible for 
compensation5 in Bwaise III and Natete:
• Registered landowners with either leasehold or private mailo land 
titles.
• Bona fide occupants – persons sitting on registered land, having been 
settled by the government or its agents and those having settled on 
the land between 1983 and 1995 without interference by the regis-
tered owner.
• Lawful occupants – persons who came onto the registered land with 
the permission of the registered owner.
• Licensees – persons without legal claim to the land but with the per-
mission of the landowner to carry out activities on the land.
• Squatters – persons using the land without the permission of the 
landowner and having no legal nor traditionally recognised claim to 
the land.
The aim of this section has been to identify the ‘settlement– 
location– property rights– compensation– resettlement’ axis. It is clear 
that property rights interpreted as ownership are one of the clearest 
determinants of eligibility for compensation as a resettlement remedy. 
It is also worth highlighting here that property rights (as a basis for eli-
gibility) work as an individualising logic – matching a single owner to a 
single property right – even if one of the hallmarks of mailo tenure is that 
it creates the possibility of there being overlapping single ownership of 
property rights. It is the individualising logic that I will return to, after 
considering the effects of property rights on risk.
The effects of property rights on risk
In this section, I draw together a few of the ways in which risk was being 
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in flood- prone areas of the wetlands. One of the most important ways 
in which risk was conceived, by the local authority, for the city, was as 
the probability of risk to the city’s commercial development, as most 
succinctly expressed in World Bank funding motivations (World Bank 
2014). In this view, risk threatened future growth through the probabil-
ity of more flooding and loss to city assets in seeking to ensure a risk- free 
investment environment. The authorities thought of it in terms of ‘flood 
protection’ for the delivery capabilities of the city. This view has emerged 
as part of what the World Bank and Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) have termed the triple dividend from disaster risk management 
(see Tanner et al. 2015). One dividend is reducing existing risk, another 
is avoiding risk and thus encouraging investment and development in 
non- hazard- prone areas.
From the perspective of the people living in the risk- prone wet-
lands, they conveyed the flood risk not as a probability – as people were 
painfully resigned to the inevitable fact that floods would come – but as 
actual loss; in other words, as the other component in ways of conceiving 
risk: loss of assets, loss of work days, loss of loved ones, loss of comfort 
and security (Barrow et al. 2016). Although such a simple representation 
is a caricature of a complex reality, the simplicity provides a means of 
capturing the dominant positions and their internal logics repeated most 
commonly by the different respondents. With this representation, it is 
possible to consider the two effects of property rights in relation to how 
understandings of risk are shared.
Insulating effects
The first effect was how people living in the flood- prone areas and con-
sidered as legitimate property owners (i.e. those with eligible property 
rights) tended to be insulated – that is, protected from the harshest social 
criticisms – from being held accountable for the degradation of the wet-
lands.6 Certainly, a wide range of actors, from different institutional posi-
tions, including people who had settled in the wetlands, recognised that 
settlement degraded the wetlands and increased the chance of flood risk. 
In addition, any land transactions and settlement were in contraven-
tion of Uganda’s national laws protecting wetlands. As a representative 
from the National Environmental Management Authority pointed out, 
ignorance of the law was no defence (interview, 5 November 2015). Yet 
the same representative (as well as other senior officials from Kampala 
Capital City Authority) pointed out that bona fide landowners could be 
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considered legitimate, legal land users.7 As noted above, the Constitution 
defines legitimate property rights where the land belongs to the people of 
Uganda. Arguably, if people were not insulated from accountability, their 
presence would not be tolerated and they could be summarily evicted 
without compensation.8 This is brought into even greater focus for those 
residents who are/ were extremely poor and who, traditionally, often 
become scapegoats for wider social ills.
However, simultaneously, the very same function of insulation 
worked in different ways and less advantageously for those living with 
the floods. For the most part, it would seem that the understandings of 
risk that came to be imposed from the authorities were those that are 
focused on the probability of disaster happening and not so much on the 
immediate loss to households. In part, this is because property rights 
insulated the authorities from having to worry about individual loss. 
Because it is private property, the (public) authorities have neither the 
basis nor the power to intervene and are thus absolved of responsibilities 
for loss.
Isolating effects
This section identifies how the very same property rights had another 
effect in isolating the residents from receiving assistance for their losses 
and ways of mitigating risk. With the local authority insulated from 
having to provide support, households were isolated from any support 
to recover their losses from disaster. In this sense, property rights cut 
households off from any meaningful assistance. That is, respondents 
in the settlements could only ever recall one instance when they had 
been supported after a flood, which had been in 2007 (just prior to the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting hosted by the Ugandan 
government in Kampala; Barrow et al. 2016). Isolated from any signifi-
cant support, households repeatedly endured actual losses.
In this way, the effect of property rights is to prevent the possibility 
that risk, either as probability or as actual loss, could be shared across 
different contexts – despite individuals in households wishing that 
KCCA would pay more heed to their plight, and individuals in the local 
authorities wishing they could be of more assistance. It is only when the 
possibility of compensation – which could extinguish property rights – 
arises through KIIDP that owners of property rights can be connected to 
assistance and this can enable them to resettle away from the flood risks 
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connect their perceptions of risk as probability to households in order to 
evict/ resettle them and make way for the implementation of drainage 
improvement projects.
These effects are significant in explaining why local institutions 
struggled to manage settlement in the wetlands and mitigate the risks of 
floods for people living there. Property rights clearly play a broader role 
than simply being the basis upon which compensation can be calculated 
in a resettlement process. However, more than this, these effects point 
to the significance of an individualising logic in understanding the con-
struction of broader world views and how risk is generated in the first 
place. By individualising logic, I refer to a system of categorising and 
classifying people and events based on how they can be associated with 
separately identifiable units. From such an approach, the collective tends 
to be understood as an aggregation of individual units.
Understanding the creation of risk
I now shift the focus from the effects of property rights on how under-
standings of disaster risk might be shared (or not) to how they also work 
to restrict the ways in which the creation of disaster risk is understood: in 
other words, how notions of risk are constitutive of broader world views 
and what is of value in such social orders. The effect of property rights on 
not allowing risk to be shared is shown above, as it is that these effects 
emerge primarily from the perception that property rights are funda-
mentally individual and belong to a person or persons. Despite the dif-
ferent effects of property rights as insulating and isolating from risk, they 
share a common foundation in mapping risks against individual units – 
whether these be individual households or people. If disaster risk is com-
monly understood through property rights then it is inevitable that an 
individualising logic of perceptions of property rights will imperceptibly 
slide into an individualising logic for risk: risk belongs to the identifiably 
separate owners of property rights (because property rights are essen-
tially private).
There will, of course, be many cases where the straightforward 
aggregation of individual behaviours and actions in relation to flood risk 
will be relevant and important. An example might include the aggre-
gated effects of certain forms of (individual) development decisions to 
reduce hard surfaces that are associated with higher rainfall run- off. 
Critics might also point out that sharing a common belief, that property 
rights are private and individual, binds together all those who hold this 
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view and offers a common platform for understanding cumulative or 
compound effects. However, I would argue that the logic of this approach 
is still to understand risk as aggregations of individuals making it difficult 
to conceive of the creation of risk in other, collective ways. It also means 
that there is a danger that risk is limited in playing its social function of 
attributing responsibility ‘correctly’ and equitably.
A collective understanding of how risk is created in the first place 
relates to the complex interplay of relational processes that drive poorer 
households to settle in hazard- prone areas. Borrowing from the idea 
of relational poverty, where someone’s impoverishment is likely to be 
another’s gain (Mosse 2010), a collective understanding of the crea-
tion of disasters opens the possibilities to see how individuals’ ways of 
being in the city always have relational consequences – even before they 
are aggregated. Such relations work through processes including rural– 
urban migration, land markets, infrastructure provision, livelihoods 
and cultural and economic values, among other things. Importantly, 
these processes go beyond aggregating the actions of certain groups to 
consider the interactions of different processes and the way they differ-
entiate the opportunities open to people to make their way in the city 
(Adelekan et al. 2015).
Thinking only through (individual) property rights restricts the 
analysis from accounting for these relational interactions. It prohibits 
analysis of all urban residents’ complicity in the production of a world 
view in which disaster risk is created through their unequal everyday and 
unwitting engagements with the systemic features listed above. It tends 
to limit the development of a world view in which relational features can 
come to be considered as part of the cumulative and compound flood 
risks generated by the city. Put differently, is the risk the probability of 
flood and consequent loss (or costs) to the city, or is the risk that people 
can only afford to own land in flood- prone locations and compensate for 
this by developing livelihood options under such conditions?
Conclusion
At issue is how the property rights in a resettlement process function to 
either facilitate or slow down the sharing of understandings of disaster 
risk. Thinking about risk as a thread to guide analysis has shown that 
the property rights in this case both slowed down and made possible 
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shared understandings of risk and how accountability for disasters could 
be shared across different social groups. These effects are important in 
terms of issues of social justice. However, the individualising logic on 
which they are based also has effects on limiting the emergence of collec-
tive understandings of the creation of disasters.
The limitations arise because of the way the individualising logics 
of private property rights tend to be asocial and disregard the way that 
being together in cities is always already an unequal relational experi-
ence. Considering that activities and relating to others are a fundamental 
aspect of urban life opens up possibilities to see how individuals’ activi-
ties and ways of being in the city always have relational consequences – 
even before they are aggregated. By only thinking in aggregated terms, 
we miss the possibilities of collectively accounting for the ways these 
activities operate unequally and create disasters.
Thus, in the case of Bwaise III and Natete, people considered to have 
legitimate property rights tended to be insulated from being identified 
as solely responsible for causing disasters by degrading the wetland and 
settling in places that were flood prone. But the local authority was also 
insulated from having to respond with significant resources, and prop-
erty rights holders were isolated from being able to make claims. It was 
only when the property rights could be extinguished that understand-
ings of disaster risk could be shared or imposed – depending on the view-
point. In this process, accountability for the causes of resettlement from 
risk are seen through the particular lens of the individualising logic of 
private property rights. It would appear that this offers a stunted under-
standing of the requirements of resettlement. Compensation for reset-
tlement should consider not only the (individual) market value of land 
and assets in determining the amounts but also the nature of risk- prone 
residents’ relations to urban processes. The basis for enhanced solidarity 
that affords such support lies in recognising the common accountability 
for the creation of urban disasters.
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Notes
 1. The Kampala City Council was replaced by the Kampala Capital City Authority in 2011.
 2. KIIDP was preceded by earlier initiatives to reduce flood risk in Kampala through improved 
drainage infrastructure, such as the Nakivubo Channel Rehabilitation Project.
 3. This is important because the increased probability of flood risk would jeopardise this 
development, and Kampala’s ability to provide the resources to address poverty and under- 
development elsewhere in Uganda.
 4. Other relevant national laws that were applicable in Bwaise III and Natete were: the Land 
Acquisition Act (1965), the Land Act (1998), the Roads Act (1949), the National Environment 
Act (1995) and the Town and Country Planning Act (1951)
 5. The chapter is not concerned with the amount, acceptability and timely payment of compen-
sation, nor with how compensation filtered down (or did not) from principal property claim 
holders and those holding other, ‘lesser’ claims to the land. I also do not deal with the inevi-
table questions of how to compensate for ‘non- measurable’ losses such as proximity to family, 
neighbourhood networks and employment opportunities.
 6. In some ways, this is to be expected. One of the perceived prime advantages of the (private) 
ownership of property rights is that they offer high levels of protection and security from the 
actions of neighbouring land users.
 7. In a legally plural society, it is arguable as to which legal system is more significant in 
 people’s lives.
 8. The fact that even legitimate and reasonable evictions in the public interest required presi-
dential approval is further evidence in support for the argument that property rights insulated 
people.
 9. Some respondents reported that other people had been able to sell their land and move to less 
risky locations without waiting to be evicted and compensated.
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Climate change, land and housing- 
induced evictions: another round of  
accumulation through dispossession?
yves Cabannes
The number of women, men and children reported displaced by sudden- 
onset extreme weather disasters is overwhelmingly dramatic: Oxfam 
(2017) reports 21.8 million each year between 2008 and 2016. The 
impact on people of sudden- onset disasters including floods, storms, 
wildfires, extreme weather conditions, earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions and landslides will keep rising. Despite strong variations accord-
ing to sources and scenarios, by 2050, it is likely that such events will 
affect between twenty- five million and one billion people, with two hun-
dred million being the most widely accepted number (according to the 
International Organization for Migration).
The starting point for this chapter comes from a woman’s testimony 
during the fieldwork of the ‘Reducing Relocation Risk in Urban Areas’ 
project: ‘When they speak about relocation and resettlements, they really 
mean eviction.’ It raises in simple words several research questions: who 
are ‘they’? Do climate change- induced resettlements and relocations, in 
their multiple forms, actually lead to evicting dwellers from the place 
they were occupying? If so, what are the drivers for such evictions, and 
their overarching logic?
After a conceptual clarification of the concepts of relocation, reset-
tlements, forced and market- driven evictions, under a rights- based 
approach, this chapter puts in perspective climate- induced relocation 
and resettlements with other forms of land and housing evictions that 
have increased in scale, number and brutality over the last 40 years. It 
explores to what extent they relate to each other and highlights their very 
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specific links, the central argument being that depending on the situa-
tion, climate change often worsens, speeds up or scales up other forms 
of evictions. The climate change imperative also acts as a pretext for mul-
tiple forms of eviction, but conversely, climate change- induced evictions 
might result from forced displacements under various motives.
In order to better understand the drivers behind this, and the under-
pinning logics, I discuss David Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dis-
possession (Harvey 2004) as the ‘hallmark of what the new imperialism 
is about’ (Harvey 2003) and explore to what extent the concept is suffi-
cient to explain the breadth, the depth and the variety of evictions taking 
place worldwide, and primarily those that are climate change- induced. 
The chapter then explores the role played by the United Nations system 
and argues that various UN agencies have shifted over the last 20 years 
from being a land rights and anti- evictions defender to an accommoda-
tive force, avoiding conflict with dominant eviction processes, or even 
avoiding playing a mediating role to find solutions that would benefit 
citizens and their multiple rights.
Despite an apparently rather dark future, the final section brings 
to the fore how market- driven, forced and climate change- induced evic-
tions are currently addressed and challenged. Multiple community- led 
struggles, innovative programmes and actions are taking place in differ-
ent locales and some innovative ones are briefly introduced, paving the 
way for future anti- hegemonic practices and signalling hope for all those 
who challenge the current economic (dis)order in favour of spatial and 
social justice.
Conceptual and analytical debate on relocation, 
resettlement and forced evictions: introducing a  
rights- based perspective
This chapter takes into account the overall definition given in the intro-
duction to this book that seeks to differentiate between the concepts 
of resettlement, relocation and rehabilitation. Resettlement is a major 
integrated, comprehensive movement of people and families which nor-
mally involves significant distance between the original and new loca-
tion. Resettlement involves not only new housing and services but also 
new social and economic relations, and new challenges such as access to 
work and social cohesion (Ferris 2014). Relocation, meanwhile, refers 
to non- systematic movements of families or individuals from hazard- 
prone locations to nearby areas. Relocation, therefore, would involve less 
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upheaval in terms of access to work and social networks (Ferris 2012). 
Rehabilitation is an overarching term about processes of restoration of 
housing and urban conditions. It could be either relocation or resettle-
ment, but could also mean in situ upgrading or a host of other kind of 
interventions.
Displacement Solutions and the participants in the Peninsula 
Declaration (Leckie 2013b), which focused precisely on climate change 
displacements, embrace both concepts of resettlement and relocation as 
defined previously under the notion of relocation, and bring in essen-
tial complements for our exploration in this chapter: ‘Relocation means 
the voluntary, planned and coordinated movement of climate displaced 
persons within States to suitable locations, away from risk- prone areas, 
where they can enjoy the full spectrum of rights including housing, land 
and property and livelihood rights and all other livelihood and related 
rights’ (Leckie and Huggins 2016, 179). The first complement is a clear 
rights- based approach, not limited to housing but embracing it; the sec-
ond is the reference to livelihoods. This is of prime importance, as dis-
placements in most cases, even if they provide a safer roof, mean losing 
livelihoods and falling lower in the spiral of poverty. The third comple-
ment refers to the voluntary (or involuntary) dimension of people’s 
movement, which stands at the core of what forced eviction is about.
When referring to forced evictions, the definition adopted in 
1997 by the United Nations will be used: ‘The permanent or temporary 
removal against their will of individuals, families and/ or communities 
from the homes and/ or land which they occupy, without the provision 
of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection and with 
or without State sanction.’1 The definition echoes the previous one as it 
insists on the voluntary dimension as a marker (‘removal … against their 
will’). It encompasses the individual, family or community dimensions 
that evictions can entail, and that effectively are a second marker, and 
it insists on the responsibility of the state. This global definition needs 
to be complemented with another UN resolution that allows us to link 
forced evictions with a broad range of human rights, far beyond adequate 
housing:
The practice of forced evictions constitutes a gross violation of a 
broad range of human rights, in particular the right to adequate 
housing, the right to remain, the right to freedom of movement, 
the right to privacy, the right to property, the right to an adequate 
standard of living, the right to security of the person, the right to 
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security of the home, the right to security of tenure and the right to 
equality of treatment.2
The United Nations definition, when referring to evictions, considers 
only ‘forced’ ones as defined before and remains blind to market- driven 
evictions, which tend to occur through foreclosures, for example, result-
ing primarily from the financialisation of housing and the subprime 
crisis, mass touristification of some cities or gentrification of entire 
neighbourhoods. These processes are much less visible as they tend to be 
individual instead of collective and are conducted within national legal 
frameworks, and are much more difficult to defend, one of the reasons 
being that international human rights definitions remain blind to them. 
In this chapter, ‘evictions’ will refer to both forced and market- driven 
ones under the assumption that they are intrinsically related and refer 
to the same logic.
Previous analysis of forced and market- driven evictions processes3 
led to the differentiation of five different stages:
1. Threat – when local or central governments have designated a site as 
a renewal area or for mega- projects such as commercial centres, high-
ways, golf courses, etc. However, the plan has not yet been officially 
approved.
2. Planning process underway – when a plan for renewal of the neigh-
bourhood has been approved or is likely to be approved. Negotiations 
with owners and purchasing of properties are taking place. Evictions 
may not have started but will likely begin soon.
3. Demolition ongoing – some residents have been evicted and some 
houses have been destroyed. Such processes might last for years.
4. Demolition completed – the residents have been evicted and the 
houses have been destroyed.
5. Repeated evictions – people are displaced. However, they might be 
forced to leave their new homes because they cannot afford to pay 
their monthly loan repayments or other costs, or are too far from any 
services and jobs, or simply because they cannot make a livelihood 
any more. They are not forcibly evicted (as per the UN definition), but 
subject to what is considered here market- driven evictions.
In summary, from a rights- based perspective, relocation should be 
the exception and not the rule, ‘an option of last resort’ (Oxfam 2017), 
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Climate change- induced displacements: one among 
many causes of evictions
This section explores the specific links between displacements and evic-
tions resulting from climate change- related hazards with the multiple 
other forms that exist globally. I argue that climate change displacements 
are one among many causes of evictions that are intrinsically linked. 
Before highlighting some of these links and exploring in the next sec-
tion to what extent they answer the same underpinning logics, a typol-
ogy of the most frequent causes of evictions will be briefly summarised 
(International Alliance of Inhabitants 2013).4
simplified typology of frequent causes of evictions
1. Urban regeneration, neighbourhood improvements,  
smart cities and their destructive impact on smaller human  
settlements and rural villages
The regeneration of central and historic districts, the beautification of 
cities and the eradication of favelas are often synonymous with forced 
eviction processes, particularly when such districts enjoy a good urban 
location. Technical reasons might be to lower housing densities, improve 
hygiene or security or to expand internal circulation systems, through 
opening streets, avenues or car parks. Very few of these ‘improved’ neigh-
bourhoods will benefit the population that might have lived there for gen-
erations. Usually, urban regeneration results in gentrification, attracting 
wealthier people looking for centrality, pushing away the poorest inhab-
itants, for example the elderly or the young who will not be able to meet 
the costs of housing, services, shopping, car parks, etc. Gentrification 
also affects tenants, particularly those without formal contracts, another 
form of eviction, via the market, which affects millions of people (see 
category seven below).
2. Major urban works, to promote the global city
Malls and shopping centres, automobile racing circuits, giant sports sta-
diums, shopping centres, central business districts, marinas, stellar inter-
national or national hotels and golf courses, constitute some of the most 
land- consuming pages of the global city catalogue. As a whole, they tend 
to transform cities into places of spectacular consumption, mostly destroy-
ing the remaining productive industries, local markets and livelihood- 
based locales for the benefit of a limited number of inhabitants. Again, 
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3. Infrastructures and large industrial projects: circulation and 
distribution of goods, transport and communication to facilitate 
the import and export of products at a global level
Urban highways, modern ports adapted for containers or international 
tourism (cruise ships, tourism ports), heliports, inter- nodal communica-
tions hubs, metropolitan highway networks and airports for an increas-
ing volume of low- cost traffic constitute land- consuming elements 
necessary to interconnect the constitutive elements of the globalised 
city: the airport with the regenerated historical centre, or the stadium 
with the stellar hotels. These large infrastructures of the city of the fluxes 
(Castells 1989) also allow the flow of goods and services (water, sanita-
tion, water drainage), as well as the connection of the global city with 
other globalised spaces. They also constitute a major source of the forced 
eradication of spaces, as referred to by Castells (1989), and more impor-
tantly of their inhabitants.
4. Mega- events impact on evictions
Major events in the sports industry such as the Olympic Games, World 
Cup, Inter- American or Commonwealth Games, World Expo and major 
events of the recreation industry (Miss World, Miss Universe, beauty pag-
eants, competitions, etc.) serve in many cases as a pretext to ‘modernise’ 
and ‘uplift’ cities. During the preparation stages, a kind of building state 
of emergency is practised, during which urban planning regulations and 
basic rights, in particular the right to adequate housing, are not taken 
into account, in the name of fast- track processes and the imperative of 
the deadline of the event. The international and national investments 
that attract these events are of such magnitude that entire neighbour-
hoods are destroyed and mass evictions occur. These occurrences are 
relatively well documented and have generated large mass protests (e.g. 
relating to the World Cup in Brazil, and the Olympic Games in Tokyo), 
sometimes capturing media attention.
5. Market- driven evictions
The speculative production of housing, ‘financialisation’, housing bub-
bles and subprimes, and the touristification of heritage cities (Barcelona, 
Lisbon, Seville, for instance) are responsible for large market- driven evic-
tions, within national legal frameworks, as in Spain, where nearly half 
a million cases of evictions resulted from a law (hipotecaria) from the 
dictatorship period (Duval and Martín 2015). Legal procedures against 
defaulting tenants, primarily those without formal contracts, resulting 
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of people: as an example, in France alone, more than fifteen thousand 
home evictions were conducted by the authorities in 2016, the highest 
recorded number over the last 15 years. Since this modality deals with 
individuals or single families, it is tremendously difficult to compute num-
bers, to make them visible and to form an organised defence movement.
6. Land and water grabbing, mining expansion, dispossession  
of the planet’s scarce non- renewable resources
Mining sites, forests, biosphere reserves (such as springs, groundwa-
ter, rivers and their surroundings) increasingly constitute territories of 
fierce struggle between international and national capital (International 
Alliance of Inhabitants 2015b) and populations opposing such a deple-
tion. Such an uneven battle results most of the time in forced evictions. 
According to the United Nations Environment Programme, ‘over the 
last 60 years, 40 percent of all internal conflicts have been linked to the 
exploitation of natural resources’ (UNEP 2015, 10).
As a result of a growing world food crisis with more than two bil-
lion over- fed and under- fed people, countries with high financial reserves 
such as China or several oil- producing countries tend to acquire land in 
developing countries to grow their own food industrially for the sake 
of their own food security. Small and family farmers, agro- pastoralists, 
nomads and indigenous peoples are thus dispossessed of thousands 
of hectares of land. On the other hand, uncontrolled urban expansion 
means for thousands of urban inhabitants, usually the poorest, the loss of 
the few metres of land they cultivated for their own consumption or as a 
source of income. These evictions are probably the least defended today.
7. War and conflicts, internal and international displacements
Ethnic conflicts, wars and political conflicts leading to internal displace-
ments are probably the most dramatic cases in terms of scale and depri-
vation of rights and affect millions every year. Evictions of Roma and/ 
or Gypsy populations, evictions of ethnic minorities in some cities, such 
as Istanbul’s historic districts (where Roma and Kurds were the first to 
suffer from so- called urban renewal), or Dalits in India, or migrants in 
some European cities are a few among numerous urban cases (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre 2017).
In general terms, according to UNHCR, the world counted at the 
end of 2018 at least 70.8 million persons displaced by force, a 2.3 million 
increase in relation to 2017 (see Breteau 2019). An explosive increase 
occurred over the last 20 years: the number of people being cared for 
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relations between climate change displacements and other 
causes of evictions
Snowball effect and chain reaction
In some cases, the causes just identified that led to forced evictions might 
have disastrous effects on the environment, increasing vulnerability to 
climate change effects and leading to further climate change displace-
ments. Such a chain effect relation can be anticipated on a larger scale 
in the future.
For example, in the name of urban regeneration (category one of 
the typology), residents of the Boeung Kak Reservoir area in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia, were forcefully evicted, despite a long and exemplary 
mobilisation and struggle by the population. As a result, about 12 hec-
tares were left to the inhabitants, while 144 hectares were ‘cleared’ and 
given to private developers. Importantly, in relation to the issues debated 
here, this vast piece of land originally acted, as its name implies, as a 
reservoir, regulating water levels, primarily in the case of heavy rains. 
The reclaiming of the reservoir and its transformation into tenements for 
the upper and upper- middle classes will probably bring dramatic impacts 
not only for the people who have been evicted but also for the environ-
ment: floods are likely to occur, and in the case of climate change haz-
ards, the neighbourhoods around Boeung Kak Reservoir will probably be 
affected, and climate change displacement can be anticipated. The whole 
point is that these new evictions are resulting from other causes (profit- 
oriented urban regeneration), and therefore mirror another aspect of 
forced evictions.
Similarly, illegal wood extraction in the Amazon forest (category 
six of the typology) leads to forced evictions, as happened for instance 
with a thousand families of the Asháninka nation in Peru.6 The result is 
not only the evictions of people but at the same time the devastation of 
large areas of prime forest, which will lead to an increased vulnerabil-
ity of the Amazon to the effects of climate change. Will the next people 
affected be considered climate change displaced?
These two examples, chosen among many, illustrate that climate 
change displacements are intrinsically linked to environmental plun-
dering provoked by multiple causes, suggesting that they are part of a 
single system. This consideration remains central to addressing not only 
the consequences of climate changes but also its origins: once the floods 
reach Phnom Penh’s low- income areas or remote Amazonian settlements, 
climate change might be pointed out as the cause, when it is in fact the 
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Climate change as a pretext and an opportunity
My argument is that climate change is being used and will be used to 
speed up multiple eviction processes, increase their size and make them 
more organised. They tend to become a key justification for displace-
ment. In other words, the climate change rationale tends to be used as 
a key ‘rational discourse’ to justify either forced or market- driven evic-
tions. This is nothing new as, ironically, environmental reasons such 
as the protection of watersheds, preventing people from being flooded 
or being exposed to earthquake- prone areas, have been largely used 
as a justification for wholesale evictions and displacements (e.g. the 
massive displacement in Mumbai in 2008 of a population settled on 
watersheds).
The land and water grabbing in Morocco (see Box 10.1) resulting 
from a project selected as part of the UN Green Climate Fund highlights 
the way the Moroccan government takes advantage of the climate change 
rationale to evict nomadic tribes from their ancestral lands.
box 10.1 Land and water grabbing in morocco
This same logic of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which consists 
in closing public goods to the benefit of private for- profit interests, 
is at work in the projects submitted by Morocco to access the UN 
Green Climate Fund, the financial mechanism of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), created in 
2009. The objectives of this fund are to limit or reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in developing countries and to help vulnerable com-
munities adapt to the impacts of climate change.
One of the projects currently selected for Morocco, in the 
Boudnib region in Tafilalet, poses enormous problems. It pro-
vides irrigation to cultivate 5,000 hectares outside the oasis in a 
public– private partnership. This is only possible by pumping into 
the groundwater. The planned area can only be secured by evicting 
the nomadic tribes from the collective lands where they practise 
extensive livestock farming, a process that has already begun.
The project will also lead to a significant disruption of ances-
tral traditions of water management and distribution in the oasis, 
especially since it is foreseeable that the distribution of water 
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Climate change- related projects as a means to avoid forced, legally 
condemnable evictions and introduce market- driven evictions
The award- winning Pluit Reservoir revitalisation project7 in Jakarta is 
one among various climate change- related initiatives that deserve criti-
cal attention. On the one hand it undoubtedly introduced impressive and 
bold approaches. Its aim was to ‘restore and improve the coastal reser-
voir’s performance as one of the vital drainage retention basins’ (C40 
Cities n.d.). Among the most tangible results, three thousand families 
living in floodable kampongs were displaced and relocated to high- rise 
tenement buildings, the water reservoir capacity was improved by over 
6 million m3 and a 20 hectare park and city forest were developed, with 
around ten thousand trees newly planted, contributing positively to cli-
mate change mitigation for absorbing carbon dioxide (C40 Cities n.d.). In 
order to convince reluctant families to be relocated into high- rise build-
ings, when traditionally they had lived close to the land and the water, 
a rental/ loan subsidy was offered for a limited number of years. What 
remains unclear is what will happen when the subsidy ends. Experience 
suggests that many of these relocated families will not be able to stay and 
will probably have to find once again a place to stay, which is likely to be 
further away from the Pluit Reservoir area.
between the ‘modern’ and ‘solidarity’ [= traditional] sectors will 
be to the detriment of the latter, which has little power and a weak 
capacity for pressure and negotiation. Thus, this project, which is 
supposed to contribute to the struggle against climate change, and 
in particular against desertification, and to help the most vulner-
able populations, is based on:
• The eviction of indigenous communities from their collective 
lands and pastoral activities.
• The diversion of part of the water supplying the oases to artifi-
cial irrigated areas benefiting foreign investors in the region for 
intensive export- oriented production.
• The inaccessibility of traditional water points for livestock and 
the enclosure of the remaining grazing trails and areas.
Extracts from Daumas 2017. Translation by author.
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The other preoccupying consequence of this project, again relatively 
common, was to transform communities and their cohesive strength 
into isolated and individual renters and loan- takers, who sooner or later 
will be exposed to market- driven evictions. In other terms, the project 
avoided forced evictions, which would have fallen under international 
and national criticism, but introduced market- driven eviction possibili-
ties, perfectly legal and much more difficult to address. Most probably, 
after one or two decades, and possibly much sooner, a gentrification 
of this area will take place, and a fifth stage of eviction (see the stages 
described earlier in this chapter) will occur for those families who can-
not pay. Once again, this case illustrates the close links existing between 
climate change and non- climate- change- induced evictions.
Theoretical debate: accumulation by dispossession
In this section we discuss David Harvey’s concept of accumulation by 
dispossession as the ‘hallmark of what the new imperialism is about’ 
(Harvey 2004, 82) and explore to what extent the concept is sufficient 
to explain the breadth, depth and variety of evictions taking place world-
wide, primarily those that are climate change- induced.
According to Harvey, a central argument to understand the cen-
tralisation of wealth in the hands of a shrinking number of few people 
and institutions relates to neoliberal capitalist policies, to ‘global capi-
talism that has experienced a chronic and enduring problem of overac-
cumulation’ (Harvey 2004, 64) and to the dispossession of the public of 
their wealth or land. Fundamentally, when the excess of capital exists in 
a given nation and cannot be absorbed, then ‘they must be sent elsewhere 
to find a fresh terrain for their profitable realization’ (Harvey 2003, 117). 
These neoliberal policies are guided by privatisation, financialisation, 
management and manipulation of crises, and state redistributions.
Since Harvey developed his theory in the early 2000s, the creation 
of money and the subsequent excess of capital has exploded. Global 
financial liquidity represented less than 10 per cent of global GNP in 
2004, but reached an unprecedented 30 per cent in 2018. In abso-
lute numbers the amount of liquidities increased over ten- fold. Two 
main factors explain this increase: the decision of some central banks 
to increase their currency reserves, notably China and more recently 
Japan (Arthus 2017), and the creation of currency through quantita-
tive easing8 practised by the United States and the European Central 
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Bank as a response to the 2008 financial crisis. This policy has injected 
hundreds of billions of dollars and euros, which were made available at 
a very low rate for banks, transnational companies and investors, which 
could look for new land and territories to dispossess. The current inter-
national financial system will lead, as various economists are alerting 
us, to new financial bubbles and crises. Meanwhile, though, the avail-
ability of low- interest capital remained the key driver to acquiring new 
profitable lands in a new cycle of unprecedented accumulation by dis-
possession processes.
Climate change- induced displacements and relocations, and the 
difficulty for displaced dwellers of settling back on their lands, need to 
be examined within this context. Our central argument is that climate 
change displacements emerge as a new fix, in Harvey’s double meaning 
of a short- term remedy for capitalism and of ‘localised’ processes (that 
are physically ‘fixed’ somewhere). However, this fix, instead of a short fix, 
could become a longer- term one, as climate change displacements will 
expand in the next decades. Disasters destroying homes, entire neigh-
bourhoods and cities turn out to be an opportunity for massive channel-
ling of surplus capital available internationally and a massive transfer of 
assets, primarily land, from their original owners and users to interna-
tional banks and funds. Our observations indicate that people are effec-
tively, as underlined by Harvey, dispossessed from common and public 
lands. However, dispossession is not limited to common and public lands 
but also takes place on private lands. When they are hit by a disaster 
these are not spared by international investors either, whenever they 
offer a possibility of profitable investments – very rarely for the benefit of 
original dwellers, especially when they are poor. Therefore, from a theo-
retical point of view, accumulation by dispossession in a climate disaster 
context goes beyond Harvey’s proposition of public and common lands 
and embraces private ones as well.
A second adjustment needs to be made to Harvey’s argument 
when referring to the assets that are dispossessed when referring to 
climate change displacements. Our argument is more restrictive than 
Harvey’s: acquiring land is central, followed by water, as both are needed 
for any new profitable development. New lands, easy to develop for build-
ing smart cities, commercial centres, housing and international tourism 
developments, or for export- oriented agriculture, are among the most 
profitable assets to be captured in the short term. Dispossession of land 
can absorb huge amounts of capital and open up even larger amounts for 
profitable investments.
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Accumulation by selective dispossession
As rightly underlined in Oxfam’s occasional paper Uprooted by Climate 
Change (Oxfam 2017, 25), ‘no country is immune from the impacts of cli-
mate change’. However, one needs to differentiate those territories that 
are of interest for international capital, and that are able to absorb gigan-
tic amounts of capital and labour, from those that offer much less poten-
tial for profit. Harvey’s theory seems too generic, and should be nuanced 
as an accumulation by selective dispossession. In 2004 I identified, in the 
case of Latin America, at least four categories of globalised territories 
(Cabannes 2004) of prime interest for international capital and for the 
expansion of capitalism. As a consequence, they tend to be the first target 
for accumulation by dispossession. Climate change hazards will have a 
much higher probability of resulting in massive displacements with little 
chance for the displaced to regain their land in:
• City states – corresponding to the majority of the capitals and metrop-
olises that are part of the globalised economy.
• Enclave cities – the economic base of these cities is similar to that of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth- century colonial enclaves. Three types of 
cities fall into this category:
• International tourism cities.
• Highly profitable mining areas and cities. In general, they are being 
privatised, as in the case of the concessions of oil companies in 
Ecuador or the Vale do Rio Doce company in Brazil.
• Free trade zones that offer low production costs, reduced wages, 
import and export facilities and access to modern services. The cit-
ies that host maquiladoras on the Mexico– United States border are 
a good example of this situation (Gun Cuninghame 2007).
• Cities on the nodes of the global market – airport and port cities in 
particular.
• Cities located in ecological biospheres and raw material reserves.
Fifteen years later, at least a fifth category of territory should be 
included, corresponding to land and spaces that are needed to secure a 
cheap food supply for the richest countries. The food security impera-
tive implies land and water grabbing as a necessity and at the same 
time can absorb huge amounts of excess capital (see for instance how 
Singapore’s food security is assured thanks to land grabbing in Malaysia 
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or the expansion of their food supply companies, such as for poultry in 
Vietnam). The Moroccan case previously analysed is another illustrative 
example.
Evictions, whether forced or market- driven, provoked or not by cli-
mate change impact, cannot be explained systematically by an accumula-
tion by dispossession. Evictions, including climate change- related ones, 
go well beyond the accumulation by dispossession argument. As argued 
previously, in non- globalised territories in poor countries, displacement 
tends to benefit a bourgeois comprador or petty bourgeoisie for a very 
limited form of primitive accumulation, not only with national capital 
but, depending on the case, also with aid money, corruption or sheer 
repression. However, in most cases, these new disaster- related settle-
ments (e.g. Canaan in Haiti, with 200,000+ inhabitants), climate refu-
gee camps or transit camps housing war refugees but exposed to climate 
change hazards (e.g. Zam Zam in Darfur, South Sudan, with 165,000+ 
inhabitants) are usually left to their fate and no international capital 
threatens them. This being said, these camps might be closed or threat-
ened with closure (stages one and two in our typology) for other reasons, 
well beyond accumulation by dispossession. This is the case in Kenya for 
Dadaab transit camp, which has a population of about 350,000 Somalis 
according to UNCHR and is quite vulnerable to climate change hazards. 
It faces an uncertain future as the Kenyan government announced its clo-
sure, allegedly for being a base for radicalised Muslims active in Somalia 
and Kenya. The new massive eviction of hundreds of thousands of mostly 
children and women (stage five of our typology) cannot be considered 
‘accumulation by dispossession’.
selective social dispossession
In a similar way as for spatial selective dispossession, the analysis of mul-
tiple cases of evictions clearly indicates that the most vulnerable groups 
have the most chance of being evicted, or of becoming climate change 
refugees after a climatic hazard (Oxfam 2017): women and children are 
disproportionately high in number, as are ethnic minorities. Evictions are 
highly discriminatory. This was particularly the case in Istanbul, where 
Roma people occupying a neighbourhood were the first to be evicted, as in 
Sulukule neighbourhood for instance. Similarly, those historically inhab-
ited by Greek or Kurdish people were the ones that suffered most from 
evictions (Cabannes, Asan and Baysal 2009). The situation in Istanbul is 
far from unique and can be observed repeatedly. Displacements and evic-
tions occur for non- economic reasons such as ethnic ones (e.g. repeated 
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evictions from Bedouin villages in Israel, constantly exposed to climate 
change hazards – see International Alliance of Inhabitants 2015a). 
Operation Murambatsvina (‘Move the Rubbish’) in Zimbabwe was 
launched by President Mugabe in 2005 and led to brutal evictions and 
the destruction of the homes of at least seven hundred thousand  people. 
The reason, beyond the official eradication of illegal housing was, as 
explained by the opposition party, political revenge and punishment of 
those who dared to vote against Mugabe. In India, the growing difficul-
ties of Muslim street hawkers to keep their activities in Ahmedabad’s 
main central market in Gujarat mirrors the growing nationalism in India 
and the exclusion suffered by non- Hindu believers (Oriard 2018).
In summary, Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession theory 
explains largely forced and market- driven evictions, as well as those 
resulting from climate change, particularly so as the amount of liquidity 
at global level has dramatically increased over the last decade. Climate 
change displacements and relocations are, and will be for years to come, 
a new fix to capitalism, and an additional opportunity of accumulation by 
dispossession, primarily of land.
However, Harvey’s theory needs to be nuanced: accumulation by 
dispossession is a socially and spatially selective process, affecting above 
all the most vulnerable groups and globalised territories that can absorb 
massive amounts of capital and that offer the most lucrative investments. 
In addition, a large number of evictions, including those resulting from 
climate change impact, can be driven by other factors, be they ideologi-
cal, ethnic, nationalist or religious.
Losing ground over the last 20 years
While the New Imperialism expanded and evictions, under multiple 
forms, reached an unpresented scale, the United Nations as a whole 
shifted over the last 20 years from a land rights and anti- evictions 
defender to an accommodative force, avoiding conflict with dominant 
eviction processes, or even playing a mediating role to find solutions that 
would benefit citizens and their multiple rights. This seems understand-
able as the UN is controlled by central governments and funded by the 
most powerful ones that at the same time facilitate market- driven and 
forced evictions and support land and asset dispossession worldwide. 
Such an evolution, if it continues, is a prime concern for climate change- 
induced displacements and evictions, as they will become even more dif-
ficult to address from a government and rights- based perspective.
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Second, and more importantly in relation to the discussion on evic-
tions in the present chapter, the prevention of forced evictions became 
(articles 25, 103 and 106) ‘the prevention of arbitrary forced evictions’ 
(my emphasis; see Box 10.2). Such a significant conceptual turn raises a 
couple of unanswered questions: what is ‘arbitrary’? Who defines what 
is arbitrary? How will this arbitrariness be monitored and enforced and 
new urban Agenda
The New Urban Agenda (NAU; see UN- Habitat 2016), approved in 2016 
during Quito Habitat III summit, is a regression when compared to the 
declarations and agendas of Habitat I (Vancouver, 1976) and Habitat II 
(Istanbul, 1996), if one considers housing and land rights or forced evic-
tions, which are scarcely mentioned, without a single measure to address 
them. Two key elements need to be discussed in light of paragraph 25 of 
the Agenda – see Box 10.2 below.
First, the shift from the realisation of the right to adequate hous-
ing as a universal right identical for all, to its ‘progressive’ realisation 
only. This substantial change was introduced in 1996, under the coor-
dinated lobby of nations such as the United States, Iran and the Vatican, 
for varying reasons. This means that any progress, however minimal, is 
considered a realisation of the right, and it also means that its normative 
universal value was largely lost. The regressive shift introduced at the 
last minute in 1996 unfortunately remained in 2016’s agenda, confirm-
ing a regressive trend that started over 20 years ago.
box 10.2 the new urban Agenda
We commit to promote national, sub- national, and local housing 
policies that support the progressive realisation of the right to ade-
quate housing for all as a component of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, that address all forms of discrimination and vio-
lence, prevent arbitrary forced evictions, and focus on the needs 
of the homeless, persons in vulnerable situations, low income 
groups, and persons with disabilities, while enabling participation 
and engagement of communities and relevant stakeholders, in the 
planning and implementation of these policies.
New Urban Agenda 2016, paragraph 25 (italics my emphasis).
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by whom, and how will people threatened by evictions be able to make 
a case with such a notion? A second significant consequence is that each 
country or each city will have the freedom to use their own perception of 
arbitrary forced evictions, leaving aside universal value. A third obser-
vation is that no mention is made of market- driven evictions that have 
become dramatically significant over the last 20 years, or of climate 
change- induced displacements and evictions that will become dominant 
in the future.
In summary, both notions – arbitrary forced evictions and right to 
progressive housing – turn the New Urban Agenda, supposedly the city 
agenda for the next 20 years, into quite a weak tool for the defence of the 
access to land for all, and a powerful tool to facilitate all sorts of evictions 
anywhere in the world.
Structural limits of the Sustainable Development Goals
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were approved and 
endorsed one year before the New Urban Agenda, illustrate a similar 
direction. This is primarily the case for SDG 11, ‘Make cities and human 
settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’, which is blind to 
evictions and security of right to land and other assets. None of the seven 
targets of this goal refer to security of land tenure, or stopping forced 
evictions, be they unlawful, market- driven or induced by climate change. 
Unfortunately, very clear targets addressing an increase of secure rights 
of land were eliminated during the formulation process. They were 
included in the original document (UN- Habitat 2013, 5) but were omit-
ted along the way and not included at the end:
By 2030, increase by x% the share of women and men, communi-
ties and businesses with secure rights to land, property, and other 
assets.
By 2030, ensure equal right of women to own and inherit prop-
erty, sign a contract, register a business and open a bank account.
This evidences once again the dismissal of the UN system in relation to 
preserving or improving secure land rights for both men and women, 
which have been deleted from the two main agendas. This tends to leave 
the gates open to evictions of all kinds and to a system of insecure rights 
to land.
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Millennium Development Goals and slum index
The deconstruction of the protection against evictions within a rights- 
based approach did not start recently with the SDGs and the NAU, but 
can be traced back to around 15 years ago, in the context of the monitor-
ing of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the predecessor to 
the SDGs. The operational measurement of slum improvement (Target 
11: ‘By 2020, achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 
100 million slum dwellers’) included as one of its five indexes secure 
tenure, defined as ‘the right of all individuals and groups to effective 
protection by the State against forced evictions’ (UN- Habitat 2007, iv).
As per a recommendation made at the Expert Group Meeting on 
Urban Indicators – in which I participated – held in Nairobi in November 
2002, and fully documented by UN- Habitat (2003, 7, 10, 11) the meas-
urement of slum improvement, called the slum index, should consider 
five key dimensions, each of which is measured with indicators:
• Access to safe water
• Access to sanitation
• Secure tenure
• Durability of housing
• Sufficient living area
The secure tenure sub- index was measured with the following 
indicator: proportion of individuals who have secure tenure, i.e. who 
have: (1) evidence of documentation that can be used as proof of secure 
tenure status, and (2) either de facto or perceived protection from forced 
evictions. Three component indicators were recommended for this 
measurement:
• Proportion of urban households with documents can be used as evi-
dence of tenure
• Evictions: proportion of men and women who are evicted from their 
residence in the past 10 years
• Perception of security of tenure: proportion of households’ heads 
who believe that they will not be evicted from their present residence 
within the next five years
Unfortunately, and despite its relevance, the secure tenure sub- 
index was simply deleted by UN- Habitat reports on the MDGs (see for 
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instance UN- Habitat 2007). Hence, the most important source of data 
that qualified evictions on a global scale was lost and the issue became 
invisible. In addition, if a slum was ‘improved’ by its original dwellers, 
whether renters or owners, being forcibly evicted, there was no way to 
count them in, and such an ‘improved slum’ would meet target 11.
dismantling of the Advisory Group on forced Evictions  
to the executive director of un- habitat
During its nineteenth session (2003), UN- Habitat’s Governing Council 
‘requested the Executive Director, in line with the recommendations of 
the World Urban Forum to establish an advisory group to monitor and 
identify, and if so requested, to promote alternatives to unlawful evic-
tions’ (Resolution 19/ 5). As a result, 15 pro bono independent members 
were appointed by the executive director as an Advisory Group on Forced 
Evictions (AGFE) to provide him with advice, with a clear set of respon-
sibilities: to monitor acts of forced evictions; facilitate learning; advo-
cate and support research, training and capacity building. The country 
missions that were supposed to document forced evictions and propose 
actions and solutions to the UN were always problematic and they were 
scarcely attended to by UN- Habitat’s executive director, Anna Kajumulo 
Tibaijuka.9 Her successor, Joan Clos, decided to dismantle it, and in doing 
so, stopped meeting the request made by the Governing Council. As a 
consequence, one of the very few independent mediation channels at 
international level was closed and has not been reopened since, despite 
the request from the Governing Council still being present. This clearly 
indicates that the decision was taken by the UN bureaucracy and not so 
much by government representatives.
ohChr and the special rapporteur on Adequate housing
When considering more specifically climate change- induced displace-
ments and evictions, a similar ‘permissive’ evolution can be observed at 
the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), 
including the Office of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing. 
For instance, the OHCHR’s Key Messages on Human Rights and Climate 
Change (OHCHR n.d.) highlight the essential obligations and respon-
sibilities of states and other duty- bearers, but do not include a single 
word on addressing as a priority climate change- related displacements 
and subsequent potential evictions. The problem is simply ignored. 
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simply indicative: ‘States should engage in cooperative efforts to respond 
to climate- related displacement and migration and to address climate- 
related conflicts and security risks.’
From the early 2000s, the OHCHR Office on Adequate Housing 
had been one of the most influential bodies to deal with forced evictions 
and displacements. In 2012, the second Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing drew attention to the effects of climate change on the right to 
adequate housing (OHCHR 2012), particularly on women and girls. She 
confirmed the trends observed with respect to rehabilitation and recon-
struction following natural disasters, i.e., that women encounter prob-
lems related to their lack of tenure and property rights and are frequently 
ignored in the process of rebuilding livelihoods.10 Unfortunately, since 
that date and the appointment of the third Special Rapporteur, very little 
attention has been devoted to these issues, which might be interpreted as 
regressive trend similar to that seen in the UN as a whole, with no goals 
or targets on secure land tenure in the SDGs, and the New Urban Agenda 
position on arbitrary evictions and the progressive right to housing that 
followed the dismantling of AGFE and the deletion of the indicator on 
eviction and land tenure security. The next section will highlight some 
positive actions taken by different actors, challenging the new imperialist 
dispossession currents and the UN’s regressive attitude.
The way forward
How to face market- driven, forced and climate change- induced evictions 
remains a challenge for the years to come, and proposals made by the 
defunct AGFE might still be a contribution (Cabannes 2005). However, 
on the positive side, multiple community- led struggles, resistance and 
initiatives are taking place that deserve much more documentation (see 
Cabannes, Guimarães- Yafi and Johnson 2010, 6), reflexive research and 
dissemination. In this concluding section some of them are briefly intro-
duced, as being of direct interest for climate change and paving the way 
for future anti- hegemonic practices.
Knowledge and advocacy: the need for local  
and global observatories
The last global survey on forced evictions dates from 2009 and was pub-
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the 2007– 8 period (COHRE 2009). Eviction reports were provided for 53 
countries and 835 cases, concerning over four million people and cov-
ering actual evictions, threatened and planned ones and a meagre five 
experiences where evictions could be averted. Since that date no global 
data are available, and gradually the type of evictions, their scale and the 
rights they are violating became more and more invisible, and therefore 
more difficult to be advocated for. Even if not focused on climate change- 
induced displacements or eviction cases, local observatories have been 
founded in different parts of the world in order to partially fill the void. 
The São Paulo Observatory on Removals in Brazil is an interesting case 
for the tools and methods it designed; for its multi- actor partnership, 
closely related with social movements, and spearheaded by various labo-
ratories from two local universities; and for its capacity to produce acces-
sible knowledge (Rolnik et al. 2017).
Advocacy: local and regional tribunals on evictions
As a reaction to the growing difficulty of advocating for housing and 
local evictions, and in the aftermath of the dismantling of AGFE, the 
International Alliance of Inhabitants established an annual International 
Eviction Tribunal that allowed the identification of numerous cases at 
global level. For instance, in 2016, 86 cases were filed by organisations 
from 31 countries, concerning 1.8 million people. An annual one- day 
session allowed some of the claimants to introduce their case to an inter-
national jury that was producing recommendations. The limitation of the 
tribunal, under its current format and given its institutional isolation, lies 
in its incapacity to provide any support to desperate residents who are 
threatened by evictions or have recently been evicted; just as importantly, 
it has been unable to mobilise the media to raise awareness on the issue 
and change the situations. During the Quito habitat summit in 2016, the 
session was attended by a few dozen people despite the thirty thousand 
visitors to the various conferences, and its media impact was almost nil.
Local and regional tribunals on evictions, independent from the 
International Alliance of Inhabitants, have encountered a more sustained 
success and impact. In Cameroon in particular, the People’s Tribunal on 
Evictions (Tribunal Populaire des Evictions) finalised its second edition 
as part of the Cameroon Network of Inhabitants (RNHC) triennial meet-
ing, where thousands of community delegates from the whole country 
were present and strongly mobilised. The eviction cases are usually docu-
mented and introduced by volunteers from an associated NGO, ASSOAL, 
or by the concerned communities. In addition, the tribunal is only one 
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among various land and housing activities carried out by the national 
network. Interestingly, some of the cases filed result from climatic haz-
ards, such as heavy rains and flooding. Cameroon’s People’s Tribunal 
on Evictions remains a source of inspiration and an example for other 
countries.
Emergence of locally grounded innovative practices
Various successful projects and programmes have been reaching a sig-
nificant scale and gained international recognition. Each one of the 
examples below, selected from among a significant number, highlight in 
their own right some paradigm shift, and they demonstrate that climate 
change- induced displacements can be avoided and are not an automatic 
fate. They challenge the dominant selective land dispossession trend 
through in situ solutions. They deserve to be better disseminated and bet-
ter known, and would benefit from peer- to- peer exchanges of knowledge 
and knowhow.
Preventing typhoon damage to housing
In Central Vietnam, a country exposed to sea- level rise and its associ-
ated hazards, Development Workshop France has supported the large- 
scale programme Preventing Typhoon Damage to Housing since 2000 
to strengthen the capacities of families, communities and grassroots 
organisations to make their homes and communities safer, in the context 
of participatory commune Damage Action Plans. Collaboration with and 
the involvement of commune people’s committees and local and national 
authorities remains a distinctive and positive feature (World Habitat 
Awards n.d.; Development Workshop France and Viêt Nam 2010). One 
key lesson learned is that ‘the preventive strengthening of the houses is 
viable and efficient in terms of cost, performance and social acceptabil-
ity’ (World Habitat Awards n.d.; Development Workshop France and Viêt 
Nam 2010): for instance, the houses and public buildings strengthened 
through the programme withstood the impact of a major typhoon in 
2016, and none of them were displaced, while thousands of others were 
severely damaged.
Bridging the gap between participatory budgeting and climate change
Lisbon, Portugal, another country particularly exposed to sea- level rise, 
floods and fire hazards, was the first European capital city to introduce in 
2008 a participatory budgeting (PB) process for the citizens to decide on 
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Commitment aims at integrating climate projects into its PB and at creat-
ing a platform that materialises ‘Lisbon’s Commitment for Resilience to 
Climate Change’. In 2020– 1 ‘Green’ PB will dedicate five million euros 
exclusively to proposals that contribute to climate change and environ-
mentally friendly projects. Considering the five thousand or more PB 
experiences in more than 45 countries and the massive amount of pub-
lic resources at stake, this dedicated approach to climate change, from a 
citizen and local government perspective, will be a significant measure to 
prevent the effect of climate hazards at neighbourhood level and at the 
same time to reinforce the capacities of citizens and their communities to 
resist and avoid climate change- induced displacements.
Community, collective and cooperative forms of land tenure
Caño Martin Peña Community Fideicomiso de la Tierra is:
an innovative community land trust [CLT] designed by residents of 
historically disenfranchised and underserved informal settlements 
at the heart of San Juan, Puerto Rico, to secure land rights and 
prevent displacement as an unintended consequence of an envi-
ronmental restoration project that, by reconnecting several inland 
bodies of water, will transform the city (personal communication 
from Lyvia N. Rodríguez del Valle, November 2018).
This large- scale programme, on 78 hectares and concerning over sixteen 
thousand inhabitants, is one among hundreds of collective, communal and 
cooperative forms of land tenure that are mushrooming in various coun-
tries, as a successful resistance to dispossession, foreclosures and evictions 
(Cabannes and Baysal 2012; Cabannes 2014; United Nations 2012).
Directly related to the debate in this chapter, when an exception-
ally strong typhoon hit the island in 2017, Caño Martin Peña Community 
was not spared, but demonstrated a remarkably higher level of resilience 
and recovery when compared to other communities. Importantly, no 
families were relocated outside the neighbourhood and no dispossession 
occurred, because of collective ownership and the social cohesion result-
ing from the CLT process (Rodríguez del Valle 2016).
Self- recovery, on- site rehabilitation and build back better
The Post- Haiyan Self- Recovery Housing Programme in the Philippines 
illuminates various paradigm shifts in relation to how to approach mas-
sive climate change hazards.11 In 2013, Typhoon Haiyan, the strongest 
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homes and four million people were displaced. Through the Post- Haiyan 
Programme, CARE Philippines helped about sixteen thousand families 
made homeless to rebuild their homes themselves (World Habitat 2017). 
The concept of shelter self- recovery can be summarised as a ‘process of 
households making use of their own resources to repair and rebuild their 
homes’ (Schofield and Flinn 2018); it remains at the heart of this innova-
tive approach, which provided guidance on ‘building back safer’. Another 
key element was focusing on people working together to rebuild their 
homes, reactivating the community spirit,12 and fostering the importance 
of resilience as a collective asset. Through on- site reconstruction, the 
programme preserved families’ access to their livelihoods, where possi-
ble, and maintained access to health and education services when they 
existed, an asset considered more important than the house itself (Twigg 
et al. 2017; World Habitat 2017).
Conclusion: land- based solutions and human  
rights- based improvements
I fully agree with Scott Leckie’s conclusions and beliefs (Leckie 2013a, 
77): ‘that many aspects of climate displacement can be resolved with 
land- based solutions and human rights- based improvements in domes-
tic housing, land and property law and policy’. I also agree with his 
concluding remark referring to the centrality of land in addressing cli-
mate displacements challenges: ‘At the core of all solutions will be land. 
Identifying this land, accessing it, acquiring it and, ultimately, allocat-
ing it remains the challenge of the era of climate displacement in which 
we live’ (Leckie 2013a, 81). As Leckie rightly states, this will effectively 
depend on political will, and the Peninsula Principles on climate displace-
ment within states (Leckie 2013b) seem a good way to start. However, 
what still remains to be underlined is the necessity of facing with bold 
determination the new imperialist logic of dispossession through selec-
tive accumulation competing precisely for the same pieces of land. This 
competition is harsh, and will be harsher in the future, and it is not only 
through political will and good policies that land will be secured for 
people displaced by climate change. It is through mobilisation, educa-
tion, organisation and struggle, too. Challenging the current economic 
(dis)order remains at the core of the problem, as does the need to sup-
port grassroots organisations, tenants’ families with and without formal 
title13 in their initiatives and struggles for survival, for not being ‘climate 
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Notes
 1. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 7: The right 
to adequate housing – forced evictions, 20 May 1997.
 2. Resolution 1998/ 9 on Forced Evictions, E/ CN.4/ SUB.2/ RES/ 1998/ 9 (20 August 1998).
 3. Typology adapted from Cabannes, Asan and Baysal (2009, 7).
 4. For a longer version see the International Alliance of Inhabitants’ typology on evictions and 
Cabannes 2016.
 5. This number includes people forcibly displaced, internally displaced or assisted by UNHCR 
after they have been able to return home.
 6. International Tribunal on Evictions, file on Pueblo Asháninka eviction, November 2015, 
unpublished material, International Alliance of Inhabitants.
 7. Among the various international recognitions for this project, see C40 Cities n.d.
 8. In theory, quantitative easing can be summarised as consisting of four phases: (1) In agree-
ment with the treasury, the central bank creates money. This currency is not physically cre-
ated, it is simply a credit line to the central bank account. (2) To inject this newly created 
money, the central bank buys sovereign bonds from financial institutions (banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds). (3) Banks therefore end up with more cash, which can be lent 
more easily (and at a lower rate) to companies and households, in order to boost investment 
and consumption. (4) Once growth is restored through increased investment and consump-
tion, the Central Bank should in theory sell the previously purchased sovereign bonds (or wait 
for the bonds to mature), and destroy the currency that has been created. If the intervention is 
totally sterilised, the currency created at the time of the crisis to boost investment must then be 
destroyed to avoid inflationary pressures. Translated from French by the author, from Captain 
Economist, 6 April 2012.
However, the last phase that consists of the destruction of the money injected, might happen… 
but only after the cheap money permitted to acquire new lands, and after therefore disposses-
sion has taken place for the benefit of few banks, hedge funds and international investors and 
a massive dispossession of many families and individuals.
 9. Testimony by the author as AGFE convenor for both mandates, until the dismantling of 
the group.
 10. A/ 64/ 255, paras. 15 and 59.
 11. As Chapter 12 by Bill Flinn and Holly Schofield in this volume is dedicated to this approach, the 
programme and its lessons learned will be only briefly referred to here.
 12. Locally called bayanihan.
 13. Tenants, with or without formal titles, deserve a much longer discussion, as they are the prime 
losers in any resettlement, relocation or displacement of any kind. They are often the most 
deprived, least protected and the first to be hit by the consequences of climate change.
References
Arthus, Patrick. 2017. ‘La liquidité mondiale continue à augmenter’. Flash Économie NATIXIS, 2017. 
https:// www.research.natixis.com/ GlobalResearchWeb/ Main/ GlobalResearch/ GetDocument/ 
EEQOsP3z4qWu3krxvo1CXQ==.
Breteau, Pierre. 2019. ‘Vers quels pays ont fui les 74,8 millions de personnes contraintes à l’exil?’ Le 
Monde, 20 June 2019. https:// www.lemonde.fr/ les- decodeurs/ article/ 2019/ 06/ 20/ ou- ont- 
fui- les- 74- 8- millions- de- personnes- contraintes- a- l- exil_ 5479071_ 4355770.html.
C40 Cities. n.d. ‘Jakarta: Socially inclusive coastal protection today and for 2030’. https:// www.
c40.org/ profiles/ 2014- jakarta.
Cabannes, Yves. 2004. ‘Réponses des villes latino- américaines aux défis posés par la planification 
urbaine participative’. In Quels plans pour la ville? Gouvernance, gestion et politique urbaines. 
UNESCO MOST Discussion Paper 69.
Cabannes, Yves. 2005. ‘Forced evictions: Reflection on some innovative solutions and the way for-
ward’. In Forced Evictions: Towards solutions? First report of the Advisory Group on Forced Evictions 
(UN AGFE) to the Executive Director of UN- Habitat, 138– 55. https:// reliefweb.int/ report/ world/ 





















CLimAtE ChAnGE ,  LAnd And housinG-induCEd EViCt ions 211
  
Cabannes, Yves. 2014. ‘Cooperative, communal and collective forms of land tenure and their con-
tribution to the social function of land and housing’. In Take Back the Land! The social function 
of land and housing, resistance and alternatives, 137– 44. http:// www.citego.org/ bdf_ fiche- 
document- 1364_ en.html.
Cabannes, Yves. 2016. ‘The challenge of slum evictions in a neo liberal world’. In Who Owns the 
City? Exclusion and inclusion – some global perspectives, 16– 24. Oslo: Habitat Norway. http:// 
habitat- norge.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2016/ 10/ Who- owns- the- city- summary- report.pdf.
Cabannes, Yves, Arif Asan and Cihan Uzuncarsili Baysal. 2009. Forced Evictions in Istanbul: Report 
from the Advisory Group on Forced Evictions to the Executive Director of UN- Habitat. https:// mir-
ror.unhabitat.org/ downloads/ docs/ 10008_ 1_ 593995.pdf.
Cabannes, Yves and Cihan Uzuncarsili Baysal. 2012. ‘When national policies stand against human 
and housing rights: Lessons from Istanbul’. Passerelle 7: 122– 7. https:// www.coredem.info/ 
IMG/ pdf/ housing_ in_ eurp.pdf.
Cabannes, Yves, Silvia Guimarães- Yafi and Cassidy Johnson, eds. 2010. How People Face Evictions. 
Development Planning Unit, UCL. https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ bartlett/ development/ sites/ bart-
lett/ files/ how_ people_ face_ evictions_ eng.pdf.
Castells, Manuel. 1989. The Informational City: Information technology, economic restructuring, and 
the urban- regional process. Oxford: Blackwell.
COHRE. 2009. Global Forced Evictions Survey 2007– 2008. Geneva. https:// issuu.com/ cohre/ docs/ 
cohre_ forcedevictions_ globalsurvey2_ 17a2f1db41a915.
Daumas, Lucile. 2017. ‘Accaparement des terres et de l’eau au Maroc’. Committee for the 
Abolition of Illegitimate Debt (CADTM), 21 October 2017. https:// www.cadtm.org/ 
Accaparement- des- terres- et- de- l.
Development Workshop France and Viêt Nam. 2010. Impact Study on Developing Local Capacity to 
Reduce Vulnerability and Poverty in Central Viêt Nam. https:// www.preventionweb.net/ files/ 
submissions/ 20274_ dwfimpactstudyofdwfprogrammeinvietnambshf2011.pdf.
Duval, Jérôme and Fátima Martín. 2015. ‘Casi medio millón de desahucios producto de una ley 
hipotecaria franquista’. America Latina en Movimiento, 17 December 2015. https:// www.
alainet.org/ es/ articulo/ 174318.
Ferris, Elizabeth. 2012. Protection and Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change. UNHCR 
Geneva. https:// www.unhcr.org/ protection/ globalconsult/ 5024d5169/ 27- protection- 
planned- relocations- context- climate- change- elizabeth- ferris.html.
Ferris, Elizabeth. 2014. Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating good 
practices and preparing for the future. Background document. Sanremo consultation, 12– 14 
March 2014. UNHCR, Brookings- LSE and Georgetown University. https:// www.unhcr.org/ 
53c4d6f99.pdf.
Gun Cuninghame, Patrick. 2007. ‘Globalisation, maquiladoras and transnational identities at the 
US- Mexico border: The case of Ciudad Juarez- El Paso’. Revue Interventions Économiques 35. 
http:// journals.openedition.org/ interventionseconomiques/ 648.
Harvey, David. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Harvey, David. 2004. ‘The “new” imperialism: Accumulation by dispossession’. Socialist Register 
40 (1): 63– 87.
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2017. Global Report on Internal Displacement. 
Geneva: Displacement Solutions. https:// www.internal- displacement.org/ sites/ default/ 
files/ publications/ documents/ 20170522- GRID.pdf.
International Alliance of Inhabitants. 2013. Guia Popular Cero Desalojos y para la Defensa del 
Territorio. https:// www.habitants.org/ content/ download/ 199298/ 2594789/ version/ 10/ 
file/ %28Espa%C3%B1ol%29+Guia+Popular+Cero+Desalojos+y+para+la+defensa+del
+territorio.pdf.
International Alliance of Inhabitants. 2015a. Archive file on Bedouins eviction case in Israel.
International Alliance of Inhabitants. 2015b. Archive file on Pueblo Asháninka Eviction.
Leckie, Scott. 2013a. Finding Land Solutions for Climate Displacement: A challenge like few others. 
Geneva: Displacement Solutions. https:// environmentalmigration.iom.int/ finding- land- 
 solutions- climate- displacement- challenge- few- others.
Leckie, Scott. 2013b. The Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement within States. 
Geneva: Displacement Solutions. http:// displacementsolutions.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 
2014/ 12/ Peninsula- Principles.pdf.


























rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south212
  
OHCHR. n.d. Key Messages on Human Rights and Climate Change. https:// www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/ Issues/ ClimateChange/ KeyMessages_ on_ HR_ CC.pdf.
OHCHR. 2012. Women and the Right to Adequate Housing. https:// www.ohchr.org/ Documents/ 
Publications/ WomenHousing_ HR.PUB.11.2.pdf.
Oriard Colin, Lila. 2018. ‘Street vending from the right to the city approach: The appropriation of 
Bhadra Plaza’. In Cities in Asia by and for the People, edited by Yves Cabannes, Michael Douglass 
and Rita Padawangi, 259– 82. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. https:// doi.org/ doi 
10.5117/ 9789462985223/ ch10.
Oxfam. 2017. Uprooted by Climate Change, Responding to the Growing Risk of Displacement. 
https:// www- cdn.oxfam.org/ s3fs- public/ file_ attachments/ bp- uprooted- climate- change- 
displacement- 021117- en.pdf.
Rodríguez del Valle, Lyvia N. 2016. ‘El caso del Caño Martin Peña en Puerto Rico: Fideicomiso de 
la tierra para asegurar el derecho a la ciudad’. America Latina en Movimiento: Las agendas del 
Hábitat 519: 25– 6. https:// www.alainet.org/ sites/ default/ files/ alai519.pdf.
Rolnik, Raquel, Karina Leitão, Francisco Comaru and Regina Dulce Lins. 2017. ‘Observátorio das 
remoções 2015– 2017: Relatorio final do projeto’. São Paulo: FAUUSP. http:// www.labcidade.
fau.usp.br/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 12/ 1707OR_ publicacaofinal_ revDigital_ menor.pdf.
Schofield, Holly and Bill Flinn. 2018. ‘People first: Agency, choice and empowerment in the sup-
port of self- recovery’. In The State of Humanitarian Shelter and Settlements. International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. https:// www.sheltercluster.org/ resources/ documents/ state- humanitarian- shelter- 
 and- settlements- 2018pdf.
Twigg, John, Emma Lovell, Holly Schofield, Luisa Miranda Morel, Bill Flinn, Susanne Sargeant, 
Andrew Finlayson et al. 2017. Self- Recovery from Disasters: An interdisciplinary perspective. 
London: ODI. https:// www.odi.org/ sites/ odi.org.uk/ files/ resource- documents/ 11870.pdf.
UNEP. 2015. ‘UNEP marks international day for preventing the exploitation of the envi-
ronment in war and armed conflict’. Press release, 6 November 2015. https:// www.
unenvironment.org/ news- and- stories/ press- release/ unep- marks- international- day- preventing- 
exploitation- environment- war.
UN- Habitat. 2003. Improving the Lives of 100 Million Slum Dwellers: Guide to monitoring target 
11. https:// unhabitat.org/ improving- the- lives- of- 100- million- slum- dwellers- guide- to- 
monitoring- target- 11.
UN- Habitat. 2007. Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global report on human settlements 2007. 
https:// www.un.org/ ruleoflaw/ files/ urbansafetyandsecurity.pdf.
UN- Habitat. 2013. Revised Compilation for Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements in the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) within the post- 2015 Development Agenda. https:// sus-
tainabledevelopment.un.org/ content/ documents/ 2913Revised Cities SDG Compilation 20 
Dec 2013.pdf.
UN- Habitat. 2016. New Urban Agenda. Quito Declaration on Sustainable Cities and Human 
Settlements for All. http:// habitat3.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ NUA- English.pdf.
United Nations. 2012. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and the Right to Non- Discrimination in This Context, 
Raquel Rolnik. https:// documents- dds- ny.un.org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ G12/ 189/ 79/ PDF/ 
G1218979.pdf?OpenElement.
World Habitat. 2017. ‘Self- recovery housing programme in the Philippines wins World 
Habitat Awards 2017’. Press release. https:// world- habitat.org/ news/ press- releases/ 
self- recovery- housing- programme- philippines- wins- world- habitat- awards- 2017.
World Habitat Awards. n.d. ‘Preventing typhoon damage to housing in Central Viet Nam’. https:// 
world- habitat.org/ world- habitat- awards/ winners- and- finalists/ preventing- typhoon- damage- 






















Relocation, expulsion and risk 
in Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Giovanna Astolfo
The machinations of global capital have left a deep scar on the coun-
try, as land grabbing, forced eviction and environmental destruc-
tion have ensured the perpetuation of Cambodia’s encounter with 
violence (Brickell and Springer 2016, 2).
For a long time, Phnom Penh was an unmapped land, with no land policy, 
planning or registration system as the French cadastre was destroyed dur-
ing the Khmer Rouge period (Diepart and Sem 2015; Fauveaud 2016). 
Starting from the 1990s, and following the clichéd patterns of newly 
emerging nations, Cambodia opened its markets to foreign investment 
(Clerc 2016). The Phnom Penh strategic orientation masterplan devel-
oped during the mid- 2000s and a number of corollary local develop-
ment plans attracted investments from foreign companies (Connell and 
Grimsditch 2016; Percival 2016). With the ambition to resemble a col-
lage of fragments from Singapore, South Korea and China, Phnom Penh 
follows the trend of what Percival terms ‘intra- Asian urbanism’ (Percival 
2016, 186; see also Nam 2012). The masterplan paved the way for the 
acquisition of 5,000 hectares of reclaimed urban marshlands for the 
building of satellite cities and consumption spaces (Clerc 2016). Taking 
advantage of a weak state and widespread corruption, satellite cities 
represented the globalisation of capital, while urban development was 
monopolised de facto by the market. As Shatkin would put it, this rep-
resented the ‘transfer of power over and responsibility for the visioning 
of urban futures and the exercise of social action for urban change from 
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Satellite cities, however, are not the only developments and real 
estate dynamics characterising Phnom Penh’s mixed- use periphery, as 
they are paired with small resident projects that nurture the informal 
land market (Percival 2016; Fauveaud 2016). Such a market, though, 
is not accessible to marginalised communities, who continue to occupy 
public or private interstitial land along canals and unused infrastructure, 
mostly vulnerable and prone to flooding, while gated communities and 
satellite cities are growing in number (Goad 2012; Fallavier 1999, 2002).1 
Given that half of the urban population is below the poverty line, who 
can afford these houses? Gated communities and residential projects are 
probably aimed at a middle class or, better, at foreigners and officials who 
are part of a highly corrupted political system. As marginalised dwellers 
are not involved in decision- making and planning, the city transforms 
beyond their control. In the face of aggressive commercialisation of land 
markets, and market- oriented tenure reforms, they struggle to secure a 
place (Asian Coalition for Housing Rights [ACHR] 2004; Springer 2013, 
2016, 2020; Flower 2018). Most of them lack basic knowledge and suf-
ficient resources to enforce their rights, while the government and the 
private sector take advantage of the regime of uncertainty, provisionality 
and informational opacity.
Like several other Asian cities, Phnom Penh developed beyond the 
intentions of its dwellers (Satterthwaite 2008). In this light, this chapter 
examines involuntary resettlement as a mode of urban production, pur-
sued by the state as a deliberate strategy of exclusion and expulsion and 
engineered through economic and land reforms (Springer 2013; Brickell 
2016; Flower 2018), deregulation and informational opacity.
A satellite pattern of displacement: some numbers
Relocating communities is fraught with difficulty. In the past 
20 years, more than 300 million people have been resettled as a 
result of conservation, urbanisation or development schemes, 
including dam and road- building, mainly in developing coun-
tries. Most moves faced local resistance and were detrimental to 
livelihoods, health and wellbeing. Remuneration for lost income, 
land and jobs rarely compensated for reduced access to resources, 
fractured social networks and emotional trauma (López- Carr and 
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Resettlement in Phnom Penh is extremely well documented in multi-
disciplinary literature – rightly so, given the scale of the phenomenon. 
Resettlements took place from the 1990s to, officially, the early 2010s. 
According to Amnesty International (2008, 7), in 2008 there were 
around 150,000 Cambodians at risk of displacement. According to Land 
and Housing Working Group (LHWG), ‘in total, at least 26,600 Phnom 
Penh families, approximately 133,000 residents or 11 per cent of the 
city’s population of 1.2 million, have been evicted since 1990’ (LHWG 
2009, 3). According to the Cambodia Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 120,000 individuals in 
Phnom Penh have been evicted since 1990, and thousands more face the 
risk of being forcibly displaced in the coming years (OHCHR 2012, 2). 
Finally, according to the local NGO Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT), the 
number of families evicted between 1990 and 2014 in Phnom Penh was 
29,715 (STT 2014, 9).
According to the most recent report by STT (2020), the largest 
number of evictions and relocations was carried out between 2001 and 
2010 as a result of the 2001 law. After 2010 there was a slowdown, but 
evictions still happen, including during the Covid- 19 outbreak in 2020.
Although the figures do not match, the number of people forcibly 
displaced as a consequence of urban development is set above one hun-
dred thousand. The scale of the expulsion had little precedent in history, 
except for the evacuation (‘exurbanisation’) that took place during the 
Democratic Kampuchea regime of 1975– 9. Counting the displaced is 
difficult, as the government has never released official data, and figures 
entirely rely on unsystematically recorded surveys conducted by NGOs 
and international agencies (Connell and Grimsditch 2016, 226).
Interestingly enough, there is no available holistic cartographic 
material that documents the designation of resettlement land. Only the 
maps elaborated by STT (2012a, 2012b, 2014) can actually help us to 
grasp the physical scale of the resettlement process. Over the period 
1998– 2012 the number of resettlement sites grew exponentially (STT 
2020, 16). Early in 2004, ACHR argued that ‘since 1998, more than 8,100 
people have relocated to 18 sites across rural Phnom Penh’ (ACHR 2004, 
10). The number doubled in a few years. According to STT, in 2007 there 
were more than 40 resettlement sites in and around Phnom Penh (LHWG 
2009, 4); in 2012 the number increased to 50, while the sites were, for 
evident reasons, increasingly distant from the city (STT 2012b,  1). By 
December 2014, the resettlement sites numbered 54 (STT 2014, 14); see 
Figure 11.1.
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Figure 11.1 Map of resettlement sites in Phnom Penh, 2014. 
© Sahmakum Teang Tnaut.
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Three years of engagement with relocated  
communities in Phnom Penh
A study over a number of resettlement sites2 conducted by ACHR (2004), 
Community Architects Network Cambodia (CAN CAM) and Community 
Development Foundation (CDF) since the 2000s formed the starting 
point of our three years’ engagement and action research within the MSc 
Building and Urban Design in Development (BUDD) programme at the 
Bartlett Development Planning Unit at UCL.
During our work with relocated communities in and around Phnom 
Penh between 2014 and 2016, we listened to numerous testimonies that 
referred to a condition of non- belonging from individuals and families 
who were both displaced and dispossessed. A dire sense of uncertainty, 
suspension and temporariness pervaded our informal conversations. 
Tenure security was the most sought- after asset – although amid wide 
confusion and disagreement around old and new titles and their valid-
ity before the law. In some settlements there were multiple typologies 
of tenure, reflecting unchanged complexity compared to Payne’s (2002; 
Khemro and Payne 2004) earlier research; but in truth, I cannot cite a 
single interviewee who said he/ she had received a title after resettle-
ment, not even after many years. Mobility between former and new sites 
was a common mechanism for coping that emerged during our survey 
visits to the many unoccupied houses. As the neighbours explained to 
us, the owners were travelling. Land and titles transactions, as well as 
rapid turnover within the same resettlement site, were also very com-
mon, resulting in mixed populations and a high proportion of renters.
The presence of multiple coping mechanisms, including mobility 
and title transactions, mitigated the way in which everyday risk – of evic-
tion and flooding – was perceived, though interviews clearly revealed the 
extent to which people were more highly exposed to risk in the resettle-
ment sites compared to the original ones. The loss of a job following reset-
tlement was a principal factor that could potentially undermine familial 
stability and produce indebtedness, as is also widely documented in the 
literature (STT 2020; Connell and Grimsditch 2016; OHCHR 2012). The 
poorest group seemed to be less able to absorb or mitigate the shock as 
they were still struggling to save even a number of years after resettle-
ment. As a result, they were suffering a greater risk of being relocated 
again. However, people who were slightly better off at the time of reset-
tlement, or were part of a community that was resettled en bloc, seemed 
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to have better managed to adapt to the new conditions. With the support 
of ACHR and CAN CAM, they have started saving groups and are now 
involved in upgrading efforts.
An overview of the literature on resettlement in 
Phnom Penh
The process has interrupted and seriously modified the existing 
livelihood options and the types of access to existing services with 
the substantial disruption of social relations and habitat (Lavell 
2017, 23).
In the case of Phnom Penh, resettlement is referred to in various ways in 
the literature, including ‘involuntary resettlement’,3 ‘displacement’ and 
‘development- induced displacement’ (Connell and Grimsditch 2016, 
223). There is wide agreement that it is related to development activities 
and particularly to infrastructure projects, urban beautification, private 
development and land speculation (Durand- Lasserve 2007; STT 2014, 
2– 9; Connell and Grimsditch 2016, 223; OHCHR 2012; LHWG 2009, 
4; ACHR 2004, 11). Resettlement happened in the form of large- scale 
relocation of households from one location to another at a consider-
able distance, following forced evictions. In most cases resettlement 
was undertaken in violation of basic human rights, without consulta-
tion, notice or adequate compensation (Mgbako et al. 2010; STT 2012a, 
2012b). The only documented case of participatory resettlement dates 
back to the late 1990s (ACHR 2004, 11; LHWG 2009).
Some forms of resettlement brought a resource bundle with them, 
including land, housing and service provision, albeit meagre or inade-
quate, but in most cases displaced people did not receive assistance (Nop 
and Thornton 2019; STT 2020). In some cases the resettlement sites 
sat on virgin land, without housing or services of any sort (Talocci and 
Boano 2015, 16; LHWG 2009, 4; Mgbako et al. 2010).
There is unanimous agreement that resettlement has been a large- 
scale failure, in terms of the reproduction of inequality and an increase 
in poverty, as living conditions for relocated families after resettlement 
were worse than before (Khemro and Payne 2004; Grimsditch and 
Henderson 2009; STT 2012a, 2014; Bugalski and Medallo 2012; Connell 
and Connell 2016; OHCHR 2012; ACHR 2004; LHWG 2009; Durand- 
Lasserve 2007; Tyskerud and Linsdtrom 2013).
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Financial stress, the increasing cost of transport and uncertainty 
related to income adversely impacted relocated families. Connell and 
Grimsditch (2016) argue that resettlement resulted in further impover-
ishment even when compensation was in place, and highlight that there 
is no statistical evidence that the condition of resettled people improved 
over time. According to STT (2012b), the increased distance of the reset-
tlement sites resulted in higher costs for electricity and water for each 
household and this led to the creation of debt. Additionally, resettlement 
stress contributed to marriage difficulties, family separations result-
ing from men leaving or both parents migrating (STT 2012a, 2014). 
Homelessness, indebtedness and social and family disruption increased 
settlers’ dependency on NGOs, as families did not receive any support 
from the government according to the OHCHR report (2012).
The lack of assistance and services, the loss of jobs and increased 
indebtedness, and the disruption of existing social networks forced many 
people to abandon the resettlement site shortly after. Some returned 
to the city to squat in even more precarious conditions.4 Others started 
moving between new and old sites as a coping mechanism (Connell and 
Connell 2016). Most people were promised tenure security on the new 
land, but the status granted for the plot was conditional and temporary. 
Years after resettlement, tenure security remains the main issue, as the 
lack of tenure increases the risk of further eviction. Monvilaite (2014) 
and Connell and Grimsditch (2016) highlight how in response to insecu-
rity, people tried to sublet or sell the land, starting markets of temporary 
titles to cope with unemployment.
Connell (2015) mentions how resettlement tends to split groups 
and reduce intra- community solidarity, although social integration 
mechanisms in resettlement sites have not yet been thoroughly studied. 
According to Talocci and Boano (2016), resettlement is fundamentally 
a ‘process of pacification and de- politicisation’ to undermine people’s 
cohesion and the possibility of mobilisation, while relocated subjects are 
stripped of any rights. However, the emergence of women leading pro-
tests is highlighted in some literature (STT 2012a, 2014; Brickell 2016; 
Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights 
[LICADHO] 2016). Early forms of resistance are also documented, par-
ticularly in the paradigmatic cases of Borei Keila and Boeung Kak Lake.5
Resettlement undertaken to support policies targeted at disaster 
risk reduction, environmental conservation and climate change adap-
tation are more recent, and very little is known and researched about 
resettlement induced by climate change in Phnom Penh, although there 
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is evidence that risk related to climate change affects resettled people 
more severely. In the case of Phnom Penh, resettlement happened in un- 
urbanised peripheral low land which is more exposed to the effects of 
climate change; in many cases development, accompanied by landfilling, 
exposes contiguous communities to the risk of resettlement due to the 
combined effect of land development and climate change.
Similarly, there is a paucity of literature that looks at the phenom-
enon of involuntary resettlement at scale, in historical and political terms 
(Diepart and Sem 2015; Dwyer 2015; Simone 2008; Talocci and Boano 
2015, 2016). In the following section, this chapter attempts to look at 
resettlement as urbanism, its historical roots and drivers.
Resettlement as urbanism
A moto taxi driver, the man compared Phan Imex’s action to the Pol 
Pot era, which he was old enough to remember clearly. The com-
parison, extreme as it is, seem apt (Greenwood 2012).
The scale of involuntary resettlement in Phnom Penh suggests it is a radi-
calised mode of urban production rooted deeply in the urban history of 
the city and sustained by the legal apparatus (Springer 2013; Brickell 
2016; Flower 2018). With thirty thousand families displaced since the 
1990s (STT 2014), the resettlement process has become the main way of 
producing the city (STT 2020, 8). However, there are two long- standing 
narratives that need to be corrected. The first relates to the anti- urban 
bias of the Khmer Rouge period, which Shawn (2007) and Bishop and 
Clancey (2004) have defined as the most paradigmatic ‘urbicide’ in his-
tory (Tyner et al. 2014); the second is related to how a ‘land issue’ has 
been aptly constructed in order to favour the resettlement process and 
how land law enforcement, rather than the supposed lack of a legislative 
framework, has historically legitimised violent dispossession (Springer 
2013; Dwyer 2015; Brickell 2016; Flower 2018).
In present- day Cambodia such violence is palpable, as the tenor 
of accumulation by dispossession is shot through the various pro-
cesses of neoliberalisation that the country has implemented under 
international tutelage since the United Nations- sponsored transi-
tion of the early 1990s (Springer 2013, 609).
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Springer (2013) continues:
In other words, property is impossible without accumulation by 
dispossession and both are impossible without organised violence. 
Accordingly, Blomley (2003) recognised law as the glue that binds 
this bloody trinity of property, accumulation by dispossession and 
violence together and argues that violent geographies must be rec-
ognised at all three levels of legal formation: origin, legitimation 
and enforcement (Springer 2013, 617).
The concept of urbicide6 has been employed in a number of different 
cases of violence specifically directed to the destruction of an urban 
area. In this chapter I argue that urbicide was in fact a process of con-
struction through destruction and that it occurred multiple times in the 
urban history of Phnom Penh following analogous patterns. Although 
they occurred within substantially different timeframes and contexts, 
the evacuation (‘exurbanisation’) of the capital city that took place in the 
1970s under the Khmer Rouge and the current resettlement process fol-
lowing the economic reform in the 1990s and early 2000s are forms of 
urbicide, acts of extreme violence towards the city and what it represents 
for its people. Both were major factors of poverty- creation in the city.
Although there is no clarity on numbers and the scale of the phe-
nomenon, during the Pol Pot regime, a vast majority of the urban popula-
tion was forcibly deported to the countryside, in order to fulfil the utopia 
of a rural Kampuchea and a classless agrarian society, and urban public 
buildings, cultural and institutional symbols were emptied, abandoned 
and eventually destroyed (Shawn 2007; Bishop and Clancey 2004; Beng 
Hong 1984). According to a more recent study conducted by Tyner et al. 
(2014), while Phnom Penh was evacuated and many buildings destroyed, 
a simultaneous reconstruction process took place, and old administra-
tive functions were replaced with new ones closer to the regime. Such an 
intentional destruction/ construction process is not the reason but rather 
the model for the resettlement process that happened 20 years later, in 
the 1990s. In other words, we could argue that the current neoliberal 
production of the city entailing the expulsion of the poor is a reproduc-
tion of a socialist schemata:
The city had to be remade from scratch following the evacuation … 
Phnom Penh had to rapidly accommodate a population that was in 
essence a residue of its former self (Simone 2008, 2).
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At the end of the war, after the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, people 
returned to Phnom Penh. Again, there exists little evidence of such move-
ment (see Desbarats 1995), but it is plausible to assume that the large 
majority of the displaced population was reunited with their old commu-
nities. As refugees in their own city, they occupied abandoned buildings 
or settled in vacant land, particularly around lakes and along water chan-
nels (Khemro and Payne 2004). As already stated at the beginning of 
this chapter, for a long time after the war the land remained unmapped. 
There was no cadastral or formal property system in place, as during the 
Khmer Rouge period all land ownership was dissolved and land titles 
destroyed; tenure was simply regulated by social consensus (Grimsditch 
and Henderson 2009). When in the 1990s Cambodia opened to the 
global market and foreign investment flooded into the city, the central, 
informally regulated land became attractive to new developers (Percival 
2016; Clerc 2016; Connell and Grimsditch 2016; Nam 2012). The lack 
of regulations, planning and policy became handy. Not only did the local 
government make little effort in resisting the land grabbing, it largely 
and intentionally favoured it through land reforms – and later planning 
tools – that encouraged investment (Khemro and Payne 2004; Percival 
2016; Flower 2018; STT 2020). The timely construction of a ‘land issue’ 
served the purpose.
In order to justify other agendas, informality became a problem to 
be urgently fixed. The long- lived dual tenure system, based on possession 
and ownership, was no longer acceptable. A legal tool and a large- scale 
campaign for land registration and titling were vital. The 2001 Land Law 
was widely supported by the Royal Government of Cambodia, financially 
and technically by the World Bank and German Technical Assistance 
(GTZ) as well as foreign governments (Grimsditch and Henderson 2009; 
Khemro and Payne 2004). Officially aimed at the formalisation of the 
property system to ensure poor people’s access to land and pave the 
way out of poverty, in reality the reform ended up legalising land grab-
bing through the removal of precedent titling and the customary tenure 
system in order to fulfil the ‘Hun Sen neo- liberal path of marketisation’ 
(Springer 2016, 3; see Dwyer 2015; Fauveaud 2016).
In Cambodia, land was and still is the most highly sought- after asset 
and a central issue deeply rooted in the history of the country. Contrary 
to the common narrative, conflict over land was not born after the Khmer 
Rouge, but rather earlier, during the colonial period. The French made 
the first attempt to formalise land tenure and create a cadastral system, 
though the formalisation process was left incomplete, leaving customary 
systems – based on possession – unreconciled with the newly introduced 
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ownership system. The result was a dual system that laid the founda-
tions for many problems to follow. The 2001 Land Law – based on French 
regulations – took responsibility for completing the job by entirely sup-
pressing the customary system, making existing tenure forms unlawful 
and land certificates illegal. In simple words, the law promoted evictions 
(STT 2020) and produced more informality and illegality than before 
(Diepart and Sem 2015).
Consequently, the preoccupation with strengthening the legal 
system in Cambodia is not a benevolent act for the betterment of 
Cambodian society. Rather, its primary function is the imposition of 
a ‘grid’ of property rights (Blomley 2003) that serves to legitimise 
the violences of property and thus reinforce a ‘trilateral of logics’ 
(Springer 2013, 610).
Additionally, despite nearly two decades of efforts to provide titles to 
Phnom Penh urban dwellers, at least 200 communities continue to lack 
tenure security, according to STT (2020, 8). Land registration and titling 
have failed people, while the legal provisions have resulted in increased 
informal tenure and exposure to eviction. As Flower (2018, 2408) puts 
it, ‘insecurity in Phnom Penh was perpetuated by laws, rather than their 
absence or the circumventing of laws’.
The construction of a ‘land issue’
In their genealogy of tenure systems in Cambodia, Diepart and Sem 
(2015, 15) remind us that in the traditional Khmer rural codes, the king 
owned the land and the farmers were the users; the right to land (pos-
session) could be claimed by settling and cultivating it. During the colo-
nial period, the French attempted to replace possession with ownership, 
officially in an effort to ‘modernise’ land tenure regimes by introducing 
land title and registration (cadastre), but in reality, in order to secure 
the alienation of a large portion of land for investment. While only a tiny 
percentage of the land was actually titled, leaving customary systems 
unchanged, the high cost for land registration triggered indebtedness 
and landlessness among farmers. It is at this point that the two systems – 
possession and ownership – started coexisting and the confusion between 
them, responsible for many contemporary land difficulties, began.
During the Democratic Kampuchea period, both systems were 
abolished, all land was nationalised, cadastral administration stopped 
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functioning and documents were destroyed (Grimsditch and Henderson 
2009). In the years that followed the regime, a de facto land reappropria-
tion took place, in spite of the government’s attempt to redistribute it.
Starting from the 1990s, Cambodia embarked on a series of reforms 
that laid the foundations for the 2001 Land Law.7 Its objective was to 
reinstate the French cadastral and titling system, to improve tenure secu-
rity through market- based access to land. From a government perspec-
tive, the law was useful to incentivise taxation and stimulate investment. 
In the eyes of international organisations and donors, the law was the 
right approach to reduce inequality and protect people from unlawful 
evictions (Diepart and Sem 2015; Biddulph and Williams 2016; Khemro 
and Payne 2004; Durand- Lasserve and Royston 2002).
Evidently, it missed the point.
The new law recognised possession, but only if it commenced 
before 2001. Any form of customary tenure that started after that date 
was rendered illegal by law (Royal Government of Cambodia 2001, arti-
cles 30, 31; Grimsditch, Leakhana and Sherchan 2012, 25). The first land 
titling campaign started soon after the law was passed, and by November 
2011, 1.7 million titles had been issued. Titling targeted only conflict- free 
cases and did not happen in a fair and even way (Grimsditch, Leakhana 
and Sherchan 2012, 25; Biddulph and Williams 2016; Grimsditch and 
Henderson 2009). New campaigns for land titling in disputed areas8 
and further laws tried to address the issue, including the well- known 
Circular 03 targeting informal settlements (Royal Government of 
Cambodia 2010).
Overall, the formalisation process did not improve tenure security; 
on the contrary, it destabilised it, ultimately legitimising land grabbing 
and violent dispossession (Diepart and Sem 2015, 99; Dwyer 2015; 
Springer 2013). Entire communities were brutally evicted and forced to 
move to peripheral resettlement sites (Connell and Grimsditch 2016).
Dispossession was globally justified as a poverty alleviation strategy 
(Neef and Touch 2012), while in the eyes of the evictees, it was presented 
as the only way to be granted land tenure. Motivated by such a condi-
tional promise, thirty thousand families moved out of the city, making 
little or none resistance. The promise was never fulfilled, as the govern-
ment never had any intention of giving up the peripheral land, especially 
in light of potential future development. After many years of deceptive 
relocation, the displaced families are still waiting for the promised title, 
while in the meantime their political agency and ability to organise and 
resist have been completely neutralised.
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Once again, the Cambodian government’s strategy has kept the 
urban poor in a state of ‘intentional insecurity’ (Monvilaite 2014, 53). 
Not only did resettlement never translate into tenure security, it also gen-
erated greater precariousness (Connell and Grimsditch 2016). Either 
due to the consequent urban growth (and renewed appetite for land) 
or the increased vulnerability of some areas (consequent to landfilling 
of lakes and water networks), some communities underwent relocation 
again or are currently facing relocation risk again.
The process of expulsion has become potentially endless, and reset-
tlement is getting radicalised and becoming a structural feature of the 
city, to the point that its scale and modality are analogous – rather than 
antithetical – to the evacuation and destruction/ reconstruction process 
that the Khmer Rouge regime engineered 40 years ago.
Conclusion
After reflecting on the literature as well as the discourses and actions 
of those involved in our three- year engagement and action research – 
both NGOs and community members – it is worth concluding with a few 
points learned from the resettlement process in Phnom Penh. Firstly, 
although resettlement is increasingly acknowledged as a legal weapon to 
fulfil projects of expulsion, a large portion of the population is still very 
much excluded from such knowledge. People are intentionally kept unin-
formed or receive contradictory information regarding the future devel-
opment of their land; maps, documents and information are not shared; 
when shared, they are not explained and therefore not understood. The 
production and sharing of knowledge therefore becomes a central issue 
to be addressed.
Secondly, resettlement has proved very rarely to be ‘necessary’, 
especially in relation to development. Its necessity is a discursive con-
struction and a propagandistic tool to cover other agendas. Options such 
as on- site upgrading and re- blocking are equally if not even more fea-
sible, although they are rarely presented to the people. Furthermore, 
and particularly in the case of Phnom Penh, when landfilling operations 
are involved, resettlement is less cost effective than upgrading, even in 
cases where no compensation is offered – leaving aside, of course, the 
social cost.
Finally, there can hardly be a successful resettlement process with-
out the involvement of the people at the different stages. To return to 
Simone’s idea of ‘remaking’ Phnom Penh, people can adapt, find ways, 
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circulate knowledge and create relationships of trust. As he argues, inclu-
siveness is not a matter of policy, but rather a by- product of residents 
having access to rights and knowledge: ‘even under siege, [inclusiveness] 
is their exemplification of how the ambivalence of urban life can be man-
aged’ (Simone 2008, 10).
Notes
 1. This is also where living conditions are the harshest: in makeshift shelters under the level of 
flooding for a large part of the year, in areas very difficult to reach, in the alleys and corridors 
of dilapidated buildings, or on their rooftops (Fallavier 1999).
 2. Including Pong Ro Senchey and Steung Kombot, two relocation sites located on narrow strips 
of public land between privately owned land; Andong, probably the largest and most contested 
resettlement in Phnom Penh; Borei Keila, a very conflictual case of on- site relocation and land 
sharing; and Kompong Thom village, in Kompong Thom Province, the only participatory relo-
cation case we have been part of, with the local community engaged in land negotiation with 
local government.
 3. Heterogeneous typologies of resettlement are documented, including direct resettlement 
(with and without compensation); induced or secondary relocation (without compensa-
tion); and post- resettlement displacement (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011; Grimsditch, Leakhana 
and Sherchan 2012; LHWG 2009). As Connell and Grimsditch (2016, 225) remind us, there 
are countless nuances between direct and induced relocation, as people might get slowly dis-
placed by economic, political and environmental dynamics that ‘gradually reduce their liveli-
hood’; yet secondary relocation is the most difficult to record. In the case of Phnom Penh, many 
communities were secondarily affected by development either because of flooding consequent 
to landfilling (see for instance the case of Boueng Kak Lake discussed by Mgbako et al. 2010, 
52), or the increase in land price over time; as they were not deemed affected, they were not 
compensated (STT 2012a).
 4. ‘Many relocation sites, such as the notorious Andong relocation site, were barren fields in peri- 
urban areas, without proper housing, potable water or sanitation. Access to basic facilities 
such as schools and hospitals was hampered by the distance of these sites from inner Phnom 
Penh. Perhaps most troubling was the diminished access to employment opportunities by the 
remoteness of the sites – the cost of traveling to jobs in the city often exceeds daily average 
earnings. As a result, many were forced to return to the city centre and rent or squat in order 
to continue their livelihoods. Often titles were not issued to households at the relocation sites, 
creating renewed situations of tenure insecurity and the possibility of further forced evictions 
as Phnom Penh continues to sprawl’ (LHWG 2009, 13).
 5. ‘Renters at Boeung Kak have protested against the government and demanded the same 
offers of compensation that those with soft- title have received, but the arrest of one renter on 
October 15, 2008, whom the government accused of leading the protests, has halted the dem-
onstration for renters’ rights and resulted in an increase of “voluntary” departures of Boeung 
Kak renters’ (Mgbako et al. 2010, 51). The Boeung Kak Lake case (four thousand households 
evicted in 2007) serves as a pertinent example of the dangers of uneven implementation of the 
existing regulatory framework, and apparent manipulation of the land classification system in 
order to serve powerful interests, as residents have been unlawfully evicted and barely com-
pensated (Grimsditch and Henderson 2009).
 6. The term urbicide was first used by a former mayor of Belgrade, Bogdan Bogdanovic, in 1993, 
in relation to the deliberate physical destruction and ethnic cleansing of the city of Vukovar 
in Croatia by Serbian forces in 1991– 2. What is involved in urbicide is the negation of all nor-
mal urban existence, both literal – in physical terms – and even more significantly symbolic – 
in terms of such values as liberty, civility, diversity and coexistence (Safier 2001, 422). For 
Bogdanovic, the term urbicide came into existence where the entire city, all its citizens and the 
symbols of their humanity, civility and diversity were under attack by superior armed forces 
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 7. According to the first Land Law (1992), all land belongs to the state and all Cambodians have 
possession rights. However, the law does not reflect the ‘three main tenure regimes inherited 
from history: the acquisition “by plough”, state and private ownership promoted by the French 
and the socialist ideology’ (Diepart and Sem 2015, 29). The dualisation of the land tenure 
regime between possession (socially recognised) and private ownership (acquired through 
cadastral procedure) has become conflictual. In fact, the latter can invalidate the former, and 
therefore can cause dispossession. In other words, land reforms starting from the 1990s paved 
the way for landlessness.
 8. A new titling campaign occurred in 2012 – further to Hun Sen’s announcement of the freez-
ing of economic land concessions (ELC) when it became clear to the world that the govern-
ment was involved in land grabbing through concessions and to recognise rightful claims by 
people within areas of ELCs (Diepart and Sem 2015; Dwyer 2015; Biddulph and Williams 
2016; Percival 2016). ELCs can be traced back to the French system of enclosures; reshaped 
and retooled over time, ELCs are currently the main instrumentum regni. They have largely 
contributed to land dispossession and induced the emergence of land struggle (Diepart and 
Schoenberger 2016, 157).
References
ACHR. 2004. ‘Negotiating the right to stay in the city’. Environment and Urbanization 16 (1): 9– 26. 
https:// doi.org/ 10.1177%2F095624780401600103.
Amnesty International. 2008. Cambodia: Rights razed: Forced evictions in Cambodia. www.amnesty.
org/ en/ documents/ ASA23/ 002/ 2008/ en.
Beng Hong, Kry. 1984. ‘Survey of the housing and infrastructure of Phnom Penh’. Phnom 
Penh: State of Cambodia.
Biddulph, Robin and Shaun Williams. 2016. ‘From chicken wing receipts to students in mili-
tary uniforms: Land titling and property in post- conflict Cambodia’. In The Handbook 
of Contemporary Cambodia, edited by Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer, 169– 78. 
London and New York: Routledge. https:// www.routledgehandbooks.com/ doi/ 10.4324/ 
9781315736709.ch14.
Bishop, Ryan and Gregory Clancey. 2004. ‘The city- as- target, or perpetuation and death’. In Cities, 
War, and Terrorism: Towards an urban geopolitics, edited by Stephen Graham, 54– 74. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell. https:// doi.org/ 10.1002/ 9780470753033.ch3.
Blomley, Nicholas. 2003. ‘Law, property, and the geography of violence: The frontier, the survey, 
and the grid’. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 93 (1): 121– 41.
Brickell, Katherine. 2016. ‘Gendered violences and rule of/ by law in Cambodia’. Dialogues in 
Human Geography 6 (2): 182– 5.
Brickell, Katherine and Simon Springer, eds. 2016. The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia. 
London: Routledge. https:// doi.org/ 10.4324/ 9781315736709.
Bugalski, Natalie and Jocelyn Medallo. 2012. Derailed: A study on the resettlement process and 
impacts of the rehabilitation of the Cambodian railway. Phnom Penh: Bridges Across Borders 
Cambodia. https:// data.opendevelopmentmekong.net/ dataset/ 4db84e8a- 498b- 41f4- bf8f- 
b993a655b17f/ resource/ 5ad5d2c0- 1751- 4056- 84c4- 61db5f21eac3/ download/ 6190da0f- 
53f5- 44ff- b450- b5acdd193504.pdf.
Clerc, Valerie. 2016. ‘A competition for land policies towards informal urban settlements in 
Cambodia, from regularization to eviction’. In Learning from the Slums for the Development 
of Emerging Cities, edited by Jean Claude Bolay, Jérôme Chenal and Yves Pedrazzini, 173– 87. 
Cham: Springer.
Connell, Jessie. 2015. ‘Resettlement and borderlands: Adapting to planned population resettle-
ment on the Cambodian– Thai Border’. In Global Implications of Development, Disasters and 
Climate Change: Responses to displacement from the Asia Pacific, edited by Susanna Price and 
Jane Singer, 142– 58. London: Routledge.
Connell, Jessie and John Connell. 2016. ‘Development- induced displacement, adaptation and 


















rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south228
  
Connell, Jessie and Mark Grimsditch. 2016. ‘Forced relocation in Cambodia’. In The Handbook of 
Contemporary Cambodia, edited by Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer. London: Routledge. 
https:// www.routledgehandbooks.com/ doi/ 10.4324/ 9781315736709.ch19.
Desbarats, Jacqueline. 1995. Prolific Survivors: Population change in Cambodia, 1975– 1993. Tempe, 
AZ: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies.
Diepart, Jean- Christophe and Laura Schoenberger. 2016. ‘Concessions in Cambodia: Governing 
profits, extending state power and enclosing resources from the colonial era to the pre-
sent’. In The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia, edited by Katherine Brickell and Simon 
Springer, 157– 68. London: Routledge. https:// www.routledgehandbooks.com/ doi/ 10.4324/ 
9781315736709.ch13.
Diepart, Jean- Christophe and Thol Sem. 2015. The Cambodian Peasantry and the Formalisation 
of Land Rights: Historical overview and current issues. Groupe de Recherches Asie de l’Est 
et du Sud Est. https:// orbi.ulg.ac.be/ bitstream/ 2268/ 186135/ 1/ DIEPART- SEM_ 2015_ 
Cambodian- Peasantry- Formalization- Land- Rights.pdf.
Durand- Lasserve, Alain. 2007. ‘Market- driven eviction processes in developing country cities: The 
cases of Kigali in Rwanda and Phnom Penh in Cambodia’. Global Urban Development 3 (1): 
1– 14. https:// www.globalurban.org/ GUDMag07Vol3Iss1/ Durand- Lasserve.htm.
Durand- Lasserve, Alain and Lauren Royston, eds. 2002. Holding Their Ground: Secure land tenure 
for the urban poor in developing countries. London: Earthscan.
Dwyer, Michael. 2015. ‘The formalization fix? Land titling, land concessions and the politics of 
spatial transparency in Cambodia’. Journal of Peasant Studies 5 (42): 903– 28. https:// doi.org/ 
10.1080/ 03066150.2014.994510.
Fallavier, Pierre. 1999. Poverty Analysis in Phnom Penh: Laying basis for strengthening participatory 
urban development – An identification of the most vulnerable and excluded population. Action 
Nord Sud (ANS) and United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS). https:// www.
academia.edu/ 19523974/ Fallavier_ P_ 1999_ Poverty_ Analysis_ in_ Phnom_ Penh_ pp_ 57_ 
Phnom_ Penh_ Action_ Nord_ Sud_ United_ Nations_ Centre_ for_ Human_ Settlements.
Fallavier, Pierre. 2002. ‘Urban slums report: The case of Phnom Penh, Cambodia’. Global Report on 
Human Settlements 2003. https:// www.researchgate.net/ publication/ 200538441_ Urban_ 
Slums_ report_ The_ case_ of_ Phnom_ Penh_ Cambodia.
Fauveaud, Gabriel. 2016. ‘Real estate productions, practices, and strategies in contemporary Phnom 
Penh: An overview of social, economic, and political issues’. In The Handook of Contemporary 
Cambodia, edited by Kathrine Brickell and Simon Springer, 212– 22. London: Routledge. 
https:// www.routledgehandbooks.com/ doi/ 10.4324/ 9781315736709.ch18.
Flower, Benjamin. 2018. ‘Legal geographies of neoliberalism: Market- oriented tenure reforms 
and the construction of an “informal” urban class in post- socialist Phnom Penh’. Urban Studies 
56 (12): 2408– 25.
Goad, Hallam. 2012. Phnom Penh and Its Informal Settlements: A chronological overview of key events 
(1992– 2012). https:// cityofwater.files.wordpress.com/ 2014/ 03/ phnom- penh- informal- 
settlements- 1992- 2012- main- text- jan2014goad.pdf.
Greenwood, Faine. 2012. ‘Borei Keila evictees shunted aside to inhumane refugee camp’. http:// 
faineg.com/ tag/ relocation- sites.
Grimsditch, Mark and Nick Henderson. 2009. Untitled: Tenure insecurity and inequality in the 
Cambodian land sector. Phnom Penh: Bridges Across Borders Southeast Asia, Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions, Jesuit Refugee Service. https:// data.opendevelopmentmekong.
net/ library_ record/ untitled- tenure- insecurity- and- inequality- in- the- cambodian- land- sector.
Grimsditch, Mark, Kol Leakhana and Depika Sherchan. 2012. Access to Land Title in 
Cambodia: A study of systematic land registration in three Cambodian provinces and the capi-
tal. Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia. https:// www.academia.edu/ 3859491/ Access_ 
to_ Land_ Title_ in_ Cambodia_ A_ Study_ of_ Systematic_ Land_ Registration_ in_ Three_ 
Cambodian_ Provinces_ and_ the_ Capital.
Hall, Derek, Philip Hirsch and Tania Murray Li. 2011. Powers of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in 
Southeast Asia. Singapore: NUS Press.
Khemro, Beng Hong Socheat and Geoffrey Payne. 2004. ‘Improving tenure security for the urban 
poor in Phnom Penh, Cambodia: An analytical case study’. Habitat International 28 (2): 
181– 201. https:// doi.org/ 10.1016/ S0197- 3975(03)00067- 5.
Lavell, Allan. 2017. ‘Colombia, Peru and Mexico: Closure report’. Reducing Relocation Risk in Urban 




















rELoCAtion, ExPuLsion And risk in Phnom PEnh, CAmbodiA 229
  
LHWG. 2009. Land and Housing Rights in Cambodia Parallel Report 2009. https:// tbinternet.ohchr.
org/ Treaties/ CESCR/ Shared%20Documents/ KHM/ INT_ CESCR_ NGO_ KHM_ 42_ 9415_ 
E.pdf.
LICADHO. 2016. Human Rights 2015: The year in review. http:// www.licadho- cambodia.org/ 
reports/ files/ 217LICADHO_ YearInReview_ 2015.pdf.
López- Carr, David and Jessica Marter- Kenyon. 2015. ‘Human adaptation: Manage 
climate- induced resettlement’. Nature 517 (7534). https:// www.nature.com/ news/ 
human- adaptation- manage- climate- induced- resettlement- 1.16697.
Mgbako, Chi, Rijie Ernie Gao, Elizabeth Joynes, Anna Cave and Jessica Mikhailevich. 2010. ‘Forced 
eviction and resettlement in Cambodia: Case studies from Phnom Penh’. Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 9: 39– 76.
Monvilaite, Gabija. 2014. ‘Phnom Penh: Towards comprehensive resettlement planning post- 
resettlement land transactions and tenure insecurity’. Thesis, Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan. 
https:// www.diva- portal.org/ smash/ get/ diva2:730002/ FULLTEXT01.pdf.
Nam, Sylvia. 2012. ‘Speculative urbanism: The remaking of Phnom Penh’. PhD thesis, Berkeley, 
University of California. https:// escholarship.org/ uc/ item/ 5nt8h7mz.
Neef, Andreas and Siphat Touch. 2012 ‘Land grabbing in Cambodia: Mechanisms, narratives, 
resistance’. Paper presented at the Global Land Grabbing Conference II at Cornell University, 
Ithaca, NY, 17– 19 October 2012.
Nop, Sothun and Thornton, Alec. 2019. ‘Urban resilience building in modern development: A case 
of Phnom Penh City, Cambodia’. Ecology and Society 24 (2): 23.
OHCHR. 2012. Eviction and Resettlement in Cambodia: Human costs, impacts and solutions. A study 
on selected urban resettlement cases. Phnom Penh: OHCHR. https:// cambodia.ohchr.org/ sites/ 
default/ files/ Thematic- reports/ Resettlement_ Study- 28_ Feb_ 2012_ Eng.pdf.
Payne, Geoffrey. 2002. Land, Rights and Innovation: Improving Security of Tenure for the Urban Poor. 
London: ITDG.
Percival, Tom. 2016. ‘Urban megaprojects and city planning in Phnom Penh’. In The Handbook 
of Contemporary Cambodia, edited by Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer, 181– 90. 
London: Routledge. https:// www.routledgehandbooks.com/ doi/ 10.4324/ 9781315736709.
ch15.
Royal Government of Cambodia. 2001. The 2001 Land Law. Phnom Penh: Royal Government of 
Cambodia.
Royal Government of Cambodia. 2010. Circular on Resolution on Temporary Settlements on 
Land which Has Been Illegally Occupied in the Capital, Municipal and Urban Areas. Phnom 
Penh: Secretariat of Council for Land Policy, Royal Government of Cambodia. http:// coun-
trysafeguardsystems.net/ sites/ default/ files/ KH%20Circular%203%20Resolution%20
Temporary%20Settlements%20on%20Land%202010.pdf.
Safier, Michael. 2001. ‘Confronting “urbicide”: Crimes against humanity, civility and diversity, and 
the case for a civic cosmopolitan response to the attack on New York’. City 5 (2): 416– 29.
Satterthwaite, David. 2008. ‘Understanding Asian cities: A synthesis of the findings from eight city 
case studies’. Global Urban Development Magazine 4 (2): 1– 24. https:// www.globalurban.org/ 
GUDMag08Vol4Iss2/ Satterthwaite.htm.
Shatkin, Gavin. 2008. ‘The city and the bottom line: Urban megaprojects and the privatization of 
planning in Southeast Asia’. Environment and Planning A 40 (2): 383– 401.
Shawn, Martin. 2007. What Is Genocide? Cambridge: Polity Press.
Simone, AbdouMaliq. 2008. ‘The politics of the possible: Making urban life in Phnom Penh’. Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography 29 (2): 186– 204. doi:10.1111/ j.1467- 9493.2008.00328.x.
Springer, Simon. 2013. ‘Violent accumulation: A postanarchist critique of property, dispossession, 
and the state of exception in neoliberalizing Cambodia’. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 103 (3): 608– 26.
Springer, Simon. 2016. ‘Homelessness in Cambodia: The terror of gentrification’. In The Handbook 
of Contemporary Cambodia, edited by Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer, 234– 44. 
London: Routledge. https:// www.routledgehandbooks.com/ doi/ 10.4324/ 9781315736709.
ch20.
Springer, Simon. 2020. ‘The violence of homelessness: Exile and arbitrary detention in Cambodia’s 
war on the poor’. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 61 (1): 3– 18. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ apv.12273.
STT. 2012a. Losing the Plot: Rapid assessment of household debt in Trapeang Anhchanh. Edited by 

























rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south230
  
STT. 2012b. ‘Resettling Phnom Penh: 54 – and counting’. Facts and Figures 21: 1– 14. http:// teangt-
naut.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2013/ 01/ 20121218_ FF21_ relocation- sites_ vsFINAL1.pdf.
STT. 2014. ‘Phnom Penh’s history of displacement: Evicted communities from 1990 to 2014’. Facts 
and Figures 23: 1– 11. http:// teangtnaut.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2014/ 12/ FactFigures23_ 
Evicted- Communities- PP- 1990- 2014_ VsFinal.pdf.
STT. 2020. ‘Eviction and relocation: Research on the process of eviction and relocation in Phnom 
Penh’. https:// media.business- humanrights.org/ media/ documents/ files/ documents/ STT- 
Eviction- and- Relocation_ ENG_ Final.pdf.
Talocci, Giorgio and Camillo Boano. 2015. ‘The politics of urban displacement practices in 
Phnom Penh: Reflections from Borei Santepheap Pi and Oudong Moi’. Pacific Geographies 
43: 15– 20. http:// www.pacific- geographies.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ sites/ 2/ 2017/ 06/ 
PG43_ Research_ Note_ Talocci_ Boano.pdf.
Talocci, Giorgio and Camillo Boano. 2016. ‘Phnom Penh’s relocation sites and the obliteration of 
politics’. In The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia, edited by Katherine Brickell and Simon 
Springer, 245– 56. London: Routledge. https:// www.routledgehandbooks.com/ doi/ 10.4324/ 
9781315736709.ch21.
Tyner, James A., Samuel Henkin, Savina Sirik and Sokvisal Kimsroy. 2014. ‘Phnom Penh during 
the Cambodian genocide: A case of selective urbicide’. Environment and Planning A 46 
(8): 1873– 91. https:// doi.org/ 10.1068%2Fa130278p.
Tyskerud, Yani and Nora Lindstrom. 2013. End of the Line: Impacts of resettlement under the railway 












Stay or leave? The dilemma 
of typhoon survivors in urban 
Tacloban, Philippines
bill flinn and holly schofield
For an international humanitarian aid worker, visiting the site of a 
recent cyclone can be a salutary and humbling experience. Within days 
the community is restoring vital infrastructure, families are rebuilding 
their homes and the incipient recovery process has begun. Astonishingly, 
after the unprecedented destruction caused by Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, 
severely damaged schools were reopened within a few weeks and many 
families had rebuilt and repaired their homes.
Generalisations are rare in the world of humanitarian response, 
but the Filipino experience is far from unique. On the island of ‘Eua, in 
the Kingdom of Tonga, houses were being repaired, roofing sheets nailed 
back on, within a day or two of the passing of Tropical Storm Gita in 
2018 – long before the humanitarian system had mobilised. There are 
many other recent examples: on the tiny island of Anewa in the Pacific 
island nation of Vanuatu, not only had the community prepared exten-
sively for Cyclone Pam in 2015 by strengthening their homes and evacu-
ating to known safe buildings, but they had also rebuilt many of their 
pole, reed and thatch houses within a week.
It has long been recognised that survivors are the first respond-
ers. In 1982, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO) 
Guidelines for Assistance, Shelter after Disaster, stated that ‘the primary 
resource in the provision of post- disaster shelter is the grass- roots moti-
vation of the survivors, their friends and families. Assisting groups can 
help, but they must avoid duplicating anything best undertaken by 
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survivors themselves’ (UNDRO 1982). Much more recently, the Global 
Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction’s Safer Homes, Stronger Communities 
handbook has as one of its guiding principles: ‘Reconstruction begins 
the day of the disaster … Owners are almost always the best managers 
of their own housing reconstruction; they know how they live and what 
they need’ (Jha et al. 2010). Indeed, self- organising, voluntary groups 
and individuals are a common but under- recognised feature of disasters, 
responding to immediate needs long before formal organisations are able 
to mobilise (Twigg and Mosel 2017). In recent years, the term self- recov-
ery has been coined to describe this process of rebuilding that relies on 
the mobilisation of the family’s own resources, and there is much interest 
in developing humanitarian responses that recognise the inevitability of 
this process and actively seek to support it (Parrack, Flinn and Passey 
2014; Twigg et al. 2017; Schofield et al. 2019).
This developing interest is a welcome departure from the sector’s 
conventional product- based approach that has tended to target the most 
vulnerable. While the principle of leaving no one behind, and especially 
society’s most vulnerable, must be upheld, the practice of providing a 
whole house – often temporary, sub- standard and not intended to last 
more than a year or two – has been much criticised (Ashdown 2011; 
Davis 2012).
This chapter explores the notion of self- recovery in Tacloban, 
Philippines following the devastating impacts of Typhoon Haiyan 
in 2013. It focuses on the notions and perceptions of safety in post- 
disaster housing within the context of differing levels of insecure ten-
ure. The discussion is based on qualitative, interdisciplinary research 
involving social scientists and geo- scientists, engineers and humani-
tarian shelter practitioners, which took place in April 20171 and June 
2018.2 These two research projects studied the recovery trajectories of 
families that lost their homes in the typhoon, which overwhelmed the 
Visayas region of the Philippines. The first focused on the largely rural 
barangays (a formal division roughly equating to a village or parish) 
on the island of Leyte, while the second concentrated on poor urban 
areas of the city of Tacloban that were severely affected by the storm. 
The research centred on the concept of self- recovery, investigating 
what this meant for the relatively secure rural population compared 
to the very insecure urban dwellers who were, and still are, facing 
eviction and relocation. This is complemented by observations from 
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Self- recovery
It is often stated that humanitarian shelter assistance only ever reaches 
between 10 and 20 per cent of the need (Parrack, Flinn and Passey 2014; 
Miranda- Morel 2018). The conclusion that can be drawn is that, one way 
or another, 80 to 90 per cent of households recover their homes using 
their own resources, coupled with assistance drawn from the commu-
nity itself, remittances from the national diaspora living overseas or gov-
ernment subsidies. They self- recover. The data, and the observational 
evidence from Philippines, Tonga, Vanuatu and in common with many 
disaster- affected communities in the global South, shows that this is a 
powerful and inevitable force for recovery, and one that has been conven-
tionally under- valued and little understood. Moreover, it shows that peo-
ple exercise agency and choice, and set their own recovery priorities (see 
Figure 12.1). These two factors – the inevitability of self- recovery and 
the primacy of agency – are central to the thinking behind the develop-
ment of response approaches that support self- recovery (Schofield and 
Flinn 2018).
Figure 12.1 Signs of self- recovery within a few weeks of Typhoon 
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Supporting this process of self- recovery has been characterised as a 
combination of cash transfers, in- kind assistance in the form of building 
materials and technical assistance (Maynard, Parker and Twigg 2016). 
This approach has met with considerable success in rural areas, and 
indeed was recognised by the World Habitat Awards (WHA): the CARE 
Philippines post- Typhoon Haiyan shelter programme won the global 
South award in 2018 expressly for its self- recovery project (WHA 2017; 
Flinn and Echegaray 2016). In this instance, CARE Philippines and its 
national NGO partners recognised the self- motivation of the families and 
communities. Almost sixteen thousand houses were built, but each one 
was unique, tailored to the needs, priorities and choices of the family. 
Other major international agencies took similar approaches, making a 
significant impact on the post- Haiyan recovery process. However, inves-
tigating self- recovery in the cities of Chautara and Bhaktapur in Nepal, 
and Tacloban in Philippines, showed that this ‘three- pronged’ approach 
of cash, materials and technical assistance was far from adequate for 
the diverse needs and circumstances of urban contexts (Schofield and 
Flinn 2018; Schofield et al. 2019). Helping to develop an enabling envi-
ronment that can support the process of self- recovery in these complex 
contexts demands a strategy that lifts barriers such as land tenure, infra-
structure, access to markets and community mediation as well as directly 
supporting families in the process of informed decision- making.
The proponents of self- recovery advocate the pre- eminence of peo-
ple’s choice and agency, and their right to decide their own priorities and 
needs and to define the rate and direction of travel of their recovery path-
way. This presents a challenge to the humanitarian shelter sector, which 
conventionally prioritises structural safety and often makes this a condition 
of support. It calls for a better definition of what is considered a ‘good house’, 
with structural safety being just one element alongside improved health, 
sanitation, space standards, durability, livelihood opportunities (through 
the construction of small household stores, for example), and even simply a 
home that is dignified, beautiful and loved (Flinn 2019, 2020).
Supporting self- recovery has now been accepted as part of the 
humanitarian shelter discourse and it aligns well with a more bottom- up 
and participatory, flexible approach. The Global Shelter Cluster recog-
nises supporting self- recovery as one of its strategic approaches (Global 
Shelter Cluster 2018). The Grand Bargain agreement, ratified by the 
2016 World Humanitarian Summit, endorses the wide use of cash and 
an increase in ‘localisation’ (Inter- Agency Standing Committee 2016). It 
also calls for a ‘participation revolution’. One of the four priority areas 
of action of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction ‘is to 
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enhance disaster preparedness for effective response, and to “Build Back 
Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction’ (UNDRR 2015). 
These strategic approaches, now being promoted by international bod-
ies, all point to the need for increased flexibility and this is reflected in 
an acceptance of the need for ‘adaptive management’, a recognition 
that needs and priorities change with time in a way that is impossible 
to predict at the outset. Finally, there is a current interest in uncondi-
tional multi- purpose cash transfer programming that, in a world of 
increasing need and decreasing resources, is likely to become a standard 
ingredient of future humanitarian programming (Overseas Development 
Institute and Centre for Global Development 2015). Assisting people in 
their inevitable self- recovery pathways fits well with each of these cur-
rent humanitarian concerns, especially the need for a flexible, reflective, 
participatory and agile response that recognises changing needs and the 
primacy of the agency of the affected population.
Typhoon Haiyan
Typhoon Haiyan, known locally as Yolanda, devasted large parts of the 
Philippines in November 2013. The largest typhoon ever to make land-
fall, Haiyan displaced more than four million people, and damaged or 
destroyed 1.1 million homes. While the Philippines is battered by several 
severe typhoons each year, Haiyan was exceptional in its strength and 
destructive power as well as for striking an area of the country less accus-
tomed to such powerful storms. The city of Tacloban was particularly 
badly affected, with very significant loss of life, because of the unexpect-
edly high storm surge.
The severity and extent of the destruction and suffering prompted 
a generous global outpouring of support. Donors and aid agencies com-
mitted to both immediate emergency relief and medium- term recovery. 
Shelter, or the provision of housing, was seen as a high priority, along 
with water and sanitation and the recovery of livelihoods. Coastal towns 
were particularly affected by calamitous devastation to coconut planta-
tions and the fishing industry.
Rural Philippines: secure enough
Rural, agricultural Filipino society remains largely feudal. The land is 
owned by large landowners and many poor families are sharecroppers, 
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paying an annual rent in- kind through a proportion of their harvest. 
Householders would say that they own their house, but not the land it is 
built on. One man, observing a coconut tree that had been blown down 
by the storm, said that although he himself had planted the tree many 
years ago, he couldn’t use the timber to rebuild his house because it was 
the property of the landowner. Those with no access to farmland tend 
to be day- labourers depending on the agricultural cycle, which can, of 
course, be disrupted by typhoons. Increased mechanisation also threat-
ens their livelihood: a group of women described the new rice harvester 
as an ‘enemy’ of the day- labourer. However, the rural families are inven-
tive, spirited and determined. Backyard farming of pigs, chickens and 
ducks is commonplace, families join together to buy a water buffalo 
that they rent to neighbours, small convenience stores attached to their 
houses proliferate.
The housing typology reflects this reality. Most families do not feel 
that there is an immediate threat of eviction, despite their security of 
tenure being largely informal and essentially tenuous. They feel secure 
enough. However, landowners sometimes forbid them from building in 
durable materials such as concrete blocks, and families themselves feel 
reluctant to invest too heavily in their homes in case the landowner has a 
change of heart, or perhaps his or her inheritors might take a less benevo-
lent stand. So many homes are built of timber or bamboo; and of course, 
the simple matter of affordability also forces many poor families to build 
in these relatively economic materials. Nonetheless, these houses are 
invariably beautifully designed and constructed, with intricate woven 
bamboo screens and an astonishing array of pot plants and shrubs.
Those able to observe the extraordinary devastation of Typhoon 
Haiyan in the week following the storm witnessed first hand the immedi-
ate self- recovery process as families repaired and rebuilt with no outside 
assistance at all. The first needs assessments were carried out to the back-
ground sound of chainsaws and hammers. Contrary perhaps to expecta-
tion, the Filipino example shows how poor landless rural families can in 
fact have more resources to fall back on than their urban counterparts.
We stayed the first night with my aunt. Then my father built us a 
house. He is not a carpenter, but he became a carpenter that day 
(interview with female resident, 30, of Estancia, Pannay by Bill 
Flinn, November 2013).
Many post- Haiyan housing projects recognised the potential benefit 
of supporting families in this very evident self- recovery process. The 
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Philippines Shelter Cluster prepared a series of Build Back Safer (BBS) 
messages that were used to guide the training of carpenters. Compliance 
with these messages was frequently used to condition the release of sec-
ond and third instalments of cash. A small cash grant (for example the 
amount given by CARE was just £43) was complemented by some basic 
high- value materials – typically corrugated metal roofing sheets, fixing 
straps (hurricane straps) and tools. The government did provide a grant 
for families with destroyed houses called the ESA (Emergency Shelter 
Assistance) that was worth about £450, but this often came very late. 
Many aid agencies supported ‘roving teams’, two to three people from the 
community with extra training who provided advice and encouraged the 
rebuilding efforts of the families.
We started by building a temporary house, then every time we got 
cash support we added a little. That’s how we built. It took a year to 
get ESA and we used it to expand our house. That is why it has two 
rooms now (interview with female resident, 30, of Cambucao by 
Bill Flinn, April 2017).
With this support families rebuilt according to their own needs, pri-
orities and resources. They were able to complement the assistance by 
reusing materials and sharing labour between families. The cash alone 
was clearly not enough, and some invested extra money through loans, 
savings or remittances from the Filipino diaspora. In most communities, 
where the practice of bayanihan was strong (this is a traditional system 
of community cooperation that is embedded in the Filipino culture), it 
was unusual for anyone to be left behind as the community prioritised 
the elderly, the infirm or those living on their own.
Technical quality and the consequent robustness of the houses was 
sometimes patchy – and this is something that the sector needs to keep 
in mind and improve. However, in general, programmes that adopted 
this approach of supporting self- recovery resulted in a high level of satis-
faction, very considerable coverage and therefore high value for money 
(CARE 2014).
Urban Philippines: day- to- day safety
The city of Tacloban, on the island of Leyte, is built at sea level. The San 
José neighbourhood is a spit of low- lying land that stretches out to the air-
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the whole of this peninsula, resulting in considerable loss of life. The resi-
dents do not count the number of destroyed and damaged houses: they 
describe it as a washout, with just floor slabs left in place and debris scat-
tered far and wide. All the low- lying areas of Tacloban suffered a similar 
fate, with the destruction of more than twenty- eight thousand houses 
(Iuchi and Maly 2016). Invariably these were poor settlements, many of 
them squatters, some paying rent to a landowner. All were living in the 
most precarious circumstances, some of the homes built out over the sea 
(see Figure 12.2):
My house was washed out because the water was so strong and it 
also brought the containers from the port on the other side of the 
bay. My house before Yolanda was bigger and made of cement but 
now we built a small one just to have somewhere to sleep because 
I’ll be given a permanent shelter in the relocation site. Because of 
that we wouldn’t build a bigger or nicer house. The government 
will remove us from here (interview with female resident, 37, of 
Anibong by Bill Flinn, June 2018).
Figure 12.2 The informal settlement of Anibong, just outside 
downtown Tacloban. The houses are built out over the sea and accessed 
via dangerous planks. © CARE UK/ Bill Flinn.
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On presidential recommendation, the municipality very quickly declared 
a 40- metre ‘no- build zone’ (NBZ) along the coastal strip, later altered to 
a ‘no- dwelling zone’ (NDZ). It was estimated that at least fourteen thou-
sand families would have to be relocated from within Tacloban (Stodart 
2016). Nonetheless, five years on, the area remains home to thousands 
of Tacloban’s poorest families, who depend for their livelihood on fish-
ing, small- time buying and selling in the markets and pedicab (rickshaw) 
driving. A daily income of 200 pesos (£2.90) is normal, less than the 
national minimum wage. The city’s land use map, which pre- dates the 
typhoon, zones most of this land as commercial and recreational.
The residents of these barangays have lived in these locations for 
decades. Despite the designation of ‘no- dwelling zone’, most have rebuilt 
on the site of their previous homes. At the time of writing, five and a 
half years after the 2013 Typhoon, these barangays remained bustling 
and dynamic communities (see Figure 12.3). However, while before the 
storm they felt they had relatively secure tenure, they now face the immi-
nent possibility of eviction and relocation:
Figure 12.3 Self- built housing and the lively community spirit of an 
informal settlement in a barangay in San José, close to the centre of 
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The government have said they will implement the no- dwell zone 
policy. This is a squatter area. We won’t have a choice. If we had the 
choice we would stay here. It’s better for us because our livelihoods 
are here. Although it is not safe, we prefer it here (interview with 
male resident, 52, of Anibong by Bill Flinn, June 2018).
The official policy is one of relocation to purpose- built sites some con-
siderable distance, over 10 km, to the north of the city. The area where 
this new housing is being built is referred to as a new economic zone 
and is quite close to the bridge to the neighbouring island of Samar. 
The National Housing Authority (NHA) initially proposed the building 
of thirteen thousand units over several new sites. As well as the NHA, 
private companies, church groups and national and international NGOs 
have also been engaged in the development of some sites. The charac-
ter of the sites varies from single- room dwellings with a separate bath-
room to slightly more spacious one- up, one- down two- storey houses. 
Many were still under construction at the time of the research (2018), 
but some were partially occupied. All are terraced, or row, housing. The 
Figure 12.4 One of the relocation sites over 10 km outside Tacloban, 
far from people’s original community and their livelihoods. The plants, 
gates and fences show the Philippine home- making spirit. © CARE UK/ 
Bill Flinn 2018.
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construction quality is very variable indeed. Residents complain of a lack 
of community facilities such as schools, the absence of water and power, 
and a general absence of community cohesion. At times the allocation of 
houses was done by lottery, so families were fractured and communities 
scattered. This apparently random relocation of families was seen as very 
detrimental to the cohesion of the neighbourhood communities that had 
been established over many decades. Universally, families mentioned the 
high cost of public transport back into the city where their livelihoods are 
located (see Figure 12.4).
I’m worried that the houses there are substandard. The walls are 
not strong. We went to look and we saw the unfinished houses and 
the materials that they were using. The steel was thin, and the 
blocks were cracked. The toilets were already clogged (interview 
with female resident, 50, of San José by Bill Flinn, June 2018).
I prefer it here [downtown] because my grandchildren are at 
school here in Anibong and I want to spend my time with my neigh-
bourhood before the last relocation site is finished and everyone 
gets evicted. My neighbours all come back here [during the week] 
from their relocation sites too, we all come back together. We’re all 
being broken up. Even my daughters have houses at different sites. 
Relocation is good but the ‘raffle process’ has broken my family and 
my community up (interview with female resident, 66, of Anibong 
by Bill Flinn, June 2018).
Although the mechanism varies and there are conditions attached, most 
families will one day take ownership of these new houses. Clearly this 
is very attractive to a family that has never had the opportunity to own 
an asset, and is especially so given the ever- present fear of eviction from 
their homes in downtown Tacloban. Nonetheless, there is a reluctance to 
relocate. A number of different factors explain this. The most notable is 
the absence of livelihood opportunities and the impossibility of continu-
ing normal economic activity closer to town. The shortage of schools and 
the loss of community spirit and cohesion are also important.
Many families spend weekends in the relocation sites, and week-
days in their original homes in the no- dwelling zones. Once a house has 
been allocated there is an obligation to occupy it; failure to do so can 
result in that house being given to another family. Some families are split 
between the two sites, typically with older, retired members staying in 
the new houses. While eviction remains a threat and is not yet a reality, 
this dual residence can work in the family’s favour: a home in the city 
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near to their source of livelihood; and a ‘weekend home’ that will one day 
provide them with an asset.
I was given a government house but it got taken away as I wasn’t 
going there frequently enough. It is hard to go because of the bus 
fare. I only make 250 pesos [less than £4] a day from selling lem-
ons (interview with female resident, 51, of Anibong by Bill Flinn, 
June 2018).
Regardless of where the family lives – under threat of eviction near the 
city centre, or over 10 km away in a relocation site – their homes always 
display a strong sense of pride and place. The outsides are painted, shrubs 
are planted, fences and gates are constructed, and pot plants multiply.
At the risk of being seen as complicit in a policy that was not 
viewed favourably by the affected population, very few international and 
national NGOs became involved in the design, location and construction 
of the relocation projects. There were a few exceptions, notably a Catholic 
Relief Services site and Pope Francis Village, a site funded by a coalition 
of church- based organisations. Both had a consultative and participatory 
approach, notably lacking in the other sites. While these relocation sites 
epitomise a contractor- driven process, by contrast in San José, and in 
the other Tacloban urban barangays destroyed by the typhoon, the indi-
vidual houses were rebuilt by the residents themselves in a process of 
self- recovery. Compared with rural families, there was less support from 
international agencies for these families, and indeed permanent shelter 
support to people living in the NBZs was not permitted. Nonetheless, 
there were some interventions in informal settlements outside the NBZs 
and the Build Back Safer messages were promoted. However, there is lit-
tle evidence of this guidance being followed, despite an acknowledgment 
that the Build Back Safer messages had been disseminated and training 
conducted. Nonetheless, residents rank safety as a very high priority. But 
when this question is probed, it transpires that the families do feel safe – 
on a day- to- day basis – as they are familiar with the procedure in the case 
of a storm warning, when to evacuate and where to go. During Tropical 
Storm Urduja, which passed through in 2017, they evacuated and later 
returned to find minor damage to their homes.
Eviction and relocation loom real for the residents of these mar-
ginal areas of Tacloban. Under the circumstances, their reluctance to 
invest in durable materials, and the cross- bracing and hurricane straps 
recommended by the humanitarian shelter sector, is entirely understand-
able. They feel safe in this day- to- day manner, and have found ways of 
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managing such risks as repeat flooding. Meanwhile the real threat of 
being moved on hangs over them.
What I like about my house is that it is my own … We had to rebuild 
here as there was no other option, we are not in the NBZ and so 
couldn’t apply for a relocation house. I have no plans to make any 
further changes to my house, as we don’t own the land and it would 
be a waste if [we were] evicted … When the creek floods, there is 18 
inches of water in the house. We just stay here; that is why the bed 
has such long legs (interview with female resident, 39, of Barangay 
83C by Bill Flinn, June 2018).
Discussion
It is clear that an insistence on structural safety as a condition for shelter 
assistance would not be appropriate for the residents of these communi-
ties in Tacloban. They feel ‘safe enough’. They do, however, have many 
other needs and priorities that are shelter- related and have a direct bear-
ing on their recovery. If we adhere to the principle of the primacy of the 
family’s right to choose and have agency over their recovery, then these 
priorities should be given equal, or higher, consideration than the shel-
ter professional’s understandable desire to increase structural safety and 
robustness against the next storm. It is hard for a shelter practitioner, 
often an architect or engineer, to accept that the appearance or size of the 
house can be as important as its strength. Less contentious is a family’s 
need to include a small store, or a latrine, or a concrete floor – and their 
decision that this is more important than the strength of the house.
Although this argument – that assistance should not be conditional 
on structural safety measures – can also hold good for rural families, it is 
much more evident in the informal settlements of urban Tacloban where 
land tenure is so insecure. Observation and talking with the residents 
make it clear that making their house a ‘home’ is more important than 
making it safer. People are well aware that no amount of strengthening 
will make their homes strong enough to withstand a Haiyan- type storm 
surge, and the regular annual storms cause light damage that can be 
repaired. Besides, eviction is more than likely to result in the demise of 
their house and home before the next Haiyan comes along.
In Tacloban, the humanitarian shelter sector is caught in a double 
bind: on the one hand relocation is almost always seen as the option of last 
resort; on the other, supporting the construction of permanent houses on 
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unregistered, and frankly precarious, land is seen as inappropriate and 
risky. Assisting families in rural Filipino locations was generally less risky, 
and more straightforward. Frequently this conundrum puts the sector at 
odds with its mandate to support the most needy without discrimination 
(Stodart 2016). While this can be true of both rural and urban Filipino 
contexts, there is a stark distinction between the ‘secure enough’ posi-
tion of the rural families, and the acutely insecure tenure of the urban 
dwellers.
Moreover, supporting families in the process of moving to the relo-
cation sites is particularly problematic and challenging, especially in a 
way that holds true to the principles of self- recovery. While it is acknowl-
edged that families may choose to relocate, residents essentially fall vic-
tim to the push- pull of the threat of forced eviction and the carrot of an 
asset, and cannot really be said to be exercising genuine agency or choice. 
It could be said that they have no choice at all; and this is starkly high-
lighted by the random process of allocating houses – referred to as a lot-
tery – and the lack of provision of services and livelihoods.
Nonetheless, the reality is that families will relocate, and many 
already have. Once they have moved, the process of making their new 
house into a home is akin to self- recovery. Within the very tight confines of 
a small contractor- built terraced house, there is almost no scope to physi-
cally adapt or expand. Despite this limitation, by 2018 small businesses 
were seen to be emerging in the few areas that were already occupied. 
These ranged from taking in laundry and photocopying to small shops 
and bakeries, demonstrating the industrious spirit of Filipino families.
Supporting both the family and community self- recovery pro-
cesses in the circumstances of forced relocation requires an approach 
that recognises the variety and complexity of the issues, the limitations 
of a constrained site and the power of the community to self- organise. 
A report written through the eyes of local Filipino NGOs emphasises the 
importance of community organisation in any self- recovery approach 
(CARE 2019).
There are clear differences between the ‘secure enough’ situation 
of rural families and the precarious tenure of urban Tacloban residents. 
However, even within the urban context the contrast between supporting 
families remaining in their original urban context and those that have 
relocated, or will relocate, is every bit as extreme. While direct support 
to rural families has a high beneficial impact, it will be the indirect sup-
port of advocacy, livelihoods, mediation and legal aid that can be of most 
benefit to those who relocate.
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Assisting families in the construction of their homes in the reloca-
tion sites is clearly impossible given the contractor- driven approach to 
the provision of identical housing units. However, even in rural areas, 
assisting organisations were reluctant to build permanent houses with-
out a contractual agreement with the landowner stating that the family 
would have the right to remain for a given number of years, typically 
between five and ten. Programmes that supported the process of self- 
recovery were able to avoid this barrier, simply providing cash, materi-
als and technical assistance in a process that accompanied families and 
allowed them to make their own choices and take their own risk with 
respect to security of tenure. This also proved to be efficient and appro-
priate and resulted in a high level of satisfaction and some delightful 
houses (Flinn and Echegaray 2016). Although the approach may strug-
gle to meet the needs of the most vulnerable families, which some 
housing programmes target precisely because of their lack of capacity 
to self- recover, some agencies were able to overcome this by providing 
these families with top- up grants and through the promotion of systems 
of bayanihan.
The same approach had little traction in urban Tacloban. Supporting 
reconstruction in the NDZs through cash and with permanent housing 
material was not permitted, although there were occasional projects 
that assisted repair and strengthening in settlements outside the NDZs 
with mixed formal and informal status. While all poor urban residents 
of Tacloban might share similar economic circumstances, the precarious 
nature of their tenure did vary from one location to another. The resi-
dents of the coastal strip of Anibong, to the north of downtown Tacloban, 
live in very crowded makeshift shacks, built on stilts out into the ocean. 
Their latrines are over the water and accessed by dangerous narrow 
planks. Residents talk of the planned highway construction project that 
will oblige them to relocate. Across the existing road and up a steep hill-
side, the houses are no longer in the NDZ, are protected from the storm 
surges, and the threat of eviction is diminished. Somehow, however, some 
of these families had successfully registered for a new relocation house.
All my eleven children live here, more than 50 grandchildren 
and 16 great grandchildren. That represents more than 50 votes 
(interview with resident of Anibong, a great- grandmother, by Bill 
Flinn, June 2018. The family was allocated several new relocation 
houses).
rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south246
  
Generally, an inverse law applies: the greater the need, the more difficult 
it is to effectively support the family’s shelter and recovery needs. This 
perhaps presents a substantial challenge to the humanitarian sector: sim-
ply opting to support rural families, where the impact is more apparent, 
is not adequate. The sector is rising to the challenge with very significant 
interest in urban post- disaster shelter and a shift away from a product- 
based approach to a wider use of cash and more emphasis on ‘software’.
Does the success of a self- recovery approach in rural Philippines 
give an indication that a similar approach would be equally successful in 
urban Tacloban? The answer is both yes and no. Support to self- recovery 
can be both direct and indirect. The approach adopted in the rural baran-
gays was almost entirely direct. Support was given to the families and 
communities in the form of cash, materials and technical assistance. 
Little was done, in these rural areas, in the form of indirect support that 
would lift or mitigate the barriers that hinder a family’s recovery. For 
urban families, where direct support was sometimes not allowed and 
investment in durable housing seen as risky in light of the threat of evic-
tion, supporting indirectly could be much more pertinent. In practical 
terms this can be in the form of advocacy, mediation, legal support on 
tenure issues, services and infrastructure improvement, access to mar-
kets and more. Understanding the shelter- related priorities of the urban 
Tacloban families as they juggle the uncertainties of eviction and difficul-
ties of a new life away from livelihoods and community can translate into 
a self- recovery programme that can provide permitted direct support and 
 appropriate indirect support. The people of urban informal settlements 
in Tacloban, caught between living in their traditional communities and 
relocation to new sites, have real shelter priorities and are just as in need 
of support as the rural population.
Conclusion
Advocates of self- recovery recognise the right of people to exercise their 
own agency, but also point to the ability of a self- recovery approach to 
support those who really have no choice at all. This could be the resi-
dents of San José and Anibong, caught as they are between the rock of 
insecure tenure and the hard place of unwanted relocation; but it equally 
applies to the most vulnerable in our global society living on the slopes 
of ravines, flood plains and informal settlements in major cities around 
the world. By working both directly with the families and indirectly with 
the barriers that hinder their recovery, a self- recovery approach allows 
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them to make the decisions that best meet their needs and priorities. The 
lack of formal secure land tenure should not be an obstacle to helping the 
most vulnerable – an increasing number of whom are now found in poor 
and very vulnerable urban settings.
Notes
 1. Funded by the Global Challenges Research Fund via Natural Environment Research Council. 
Grant ref: NE/ PO16200/ 1.
 2. Funded by the Global Challenges Research Fund via British Academy Cities and Infrastructure 
Programme.
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Natural resource and human 
occupation issues
Continuing from the previous part that dealt with land-related con-
cerns, the three chapters in this section further explore the relationships 
between human occupation and resettlement interventions on the envi-
ronment, within the context of urbanisation and land pressures. Natural 
resources such as wetlands are among the most valuable assets that can 
help mitigate climate change, and at the same time, are also the most 
fragile to human interventions. The three cases from Mexico, India and 
Uganda presented in this part foreground the urbanisation pressures on 
the limited available land, forcing the settlements to occupy environ-
mentally fragile and hazard-exposed areas. While they also illustrate the 
disproportionate impact of these risks on the marginalised poor commu-
nities, they bring to the fore some important insights for the future of risk 
and people’s habitations. 
Mansilla, in Chapter 13, explores the particular case of people liv-
ing in natural protected areas in Las Charcas, where degradation and 
‘illegal’ occupation of environmentally sensitive flood-prone areas over 
two decades are a consequence of a lack of planning and demographic 
dynamics. The settlement’s formalisation over the years through ser-
vice provisions further ignored its environmental consequences, until 
recently when the losses due to floods and increased climate risks began 
to be seen as untenable by the authorities. The decision to resettle the 
communities came without due assessment of alternatives or dialogue 
with the people, raising some critical questions for the potential of co-
habitation of humans and natural resources for the benefit of both, ver-
sus making these resources ‘untouchable’. 
Jain, Singh and Malladi, in Chapter 14, describe the history of devel-
opment of the city of Chennai, where state and local authorities have 
systematically built tenements on ‘under-utilised’ environmentally sen-
sitive marsh areas, classified as ‘wastelands’, using funds from centrally 
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sponsored schemes for affordable housing. With increasing urbanisation 
pressures, the state began using these ‘wastelands’ instead of otherwise 
expensive urban land for purposes such as affordable housing, sewage 
treatment plants and landfills, with a persistent lack of concern for the 
environment and marginalised sections of the society. Despite large 
investments, hazard exposure and experiences of losses continue to 
increase. This is locking the city’s growth into an unsustainable and ineq-
uitable pathway. The case demonstrates how long-term socio-economic 
and ecological risks are created for the people as well as the city at large 
as a consequence of poorly planned interventions. 
Kisembo, in Chapter 15, describes the conditions of the two settle-
ments in Kampala, located on low-lying areas along the natural drainage 
channels. In this case, in contrast with the Chennai case, the authorities’ 
attempt to scale up greening of all open spaces to deter flood incidences 
is faced with the challenge of lack of land. Despite several attempts at 
incorporating water management systems at site level, there are few 
incentives for private developers to comply. In an attempt to protect 
the wetlands, the authorities are pursuing either technical solutions of 
widening of the water channels, or legal approaches of deregistration of 
land titles. The logic behind the cancellation of titles is not for ‘flood risk 
reduction’ directly, but rather the protection of ecologically important 
areas of the city by stopping the degradation of wetlands. In either case, 
these actions are forcing people (mainly the poor) to relocate themselves 
in lieu of compensation. 
Mansilla and Jain et al. further highlight that the adverse effects of 
environmental degradation can go beyond the local geography and affect 
more extensive territories. But scarcity of land for growth and urbani-
sation, and the interest in environmental conservation and the popula-
tion’s right to both adequate housing and sources of income, are various 
reasons for conflict between the communities and authorities. The three 
chapters together point to the underlying challenges of governing the 
commons, while ensuring the wellbeing of the people (especially the 
most marginalised) and conserving the environment. 
Important questions arise from this part which are relevant for not 
just the cases in point, but more broadly for resettlement cases that are 
considered within the context of environmental conservation. Is it possi-
ble to reimagine resettlements as developments based on comprehensive 
management of the environmental, social and urban challenges? Can 
there be a holistic risk-informed development planning such that future 
hazard and socio-economic risks are mitigated, and the wellbeing of the 




Population resettlement in the Ría 
Celestún Biosphere Reserve: an 
opportunity for development?
Elizabeth mansilla
In Mexico, the resettlement of populations from risk areas has become 
popular in recent years. During the last few decades a significant number 
of such interventions have been identified throughout the country, mainly 
in post- disaster circumstances. Even though evidence exists at the inter-
national and national levels about the complexity of these  processes – 
whether with development projects or in post- disaster  situations – and 
despite the failure of most experiences worldwide (Inspection Panel 
2016, 18– 20), most interventions are still made uncritically and with 
inadequate information and knowledge on the part of decision- makers 
and those responsible for implementing them.
The resettlement of populations living in natural protected or con-
servation areas is even more complex. In these cases, the right of posses-
sion, occupation and exploitation of land (sometimes ancestral), safety 
from future disaster risk, and the need to preserve or restore areas with 
significant environmental value are all important, and at times compet-
ing, issues. These processes also imply land tenure conflicts that are 
sometimes irresolvable.
In such areas, the need for urban growth and the scarcity of land 
suitable for urbanisation are often the most common triggers of conflict 
between authorities and populations, as well as between the interest in 
environmental conservation/ restoration and the population’s right to 
both adequate housing and sources of income. Conflicts between author-
ities at different levels of government are also frequent, since they neces-
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from the interests of private individuals in the exploitation of natural 
resources and the development of tourism projects with a high environ-
mental impact.
This contradiction between desired development and required con-
servation leads to a clear paradox in natural protected areas. On the one 
hand these are among the most valuable natural assets the planet has 
and provide a mechanism for cushioning the possible adverse effects of 
climate change. On the other hand, they are extremely fragile ecosys-
tems susceptible to the unplanned action of humans. In natural protected 
areas where human settlements exist with little planning and uncon-
trolled levels of exploitation, the benefits of nature often convert into 
risk factors. Indeed, the adverse effects of development in such places 
can transcend the local geography and affect more extensive territories. 
Such is the case, for example, with mangrove destruction, which reduces 
the landscape’s capacity to absorb intense hurricanes and extreme wave 
action, leading to great effects on populations that may be relatively far 
from the site of impact.
There are around nine hundred Natural Protected Areas (NPAs) 
in Mexico, and in 2005, 279 of these had human settlement, with a 
 population of over 3.4 million inhabitants (Bezaury- Creel and Gutiérrez- 
Carbonell 2009, 387– 8). During the last 15 years, there has been steady 
pressure on the NPAs. By 2005 half of the population living in these areas 
was urban (population centres of more than fifteen thousand inhabit-
ants) or mixed rural/ urban (in centres with from 2,500 to fewer than 
fifteen thousand inhabitants). In at least 73 NPAs under federal jurisdic-
tion there was significant demographic pressure, despite the fact that the 
General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection 
establishes, in article 46, that new population centres cannot be author-
ised in the NPAs and the growth of existing ones should be monitored 
(Garcés- Fierros and Ruiz- Guzmán 2010, 210– 11).1 Despite the wide 
availability of natural resources, an estimated 83 per cent of these popu-
lations are highly to very highly marginalised (Garcés- Fierros and Ruiz- 
Guzmán 2010, 222), clearly manifesting the contradiction between 
natural wealth and human poverty, or more specifically, between social 
development and natural conservation.
It is in the former contexts that we may fully appreciate that popu-
lation resettlement projects in NPAs – whether for the purpose of risk 
reduction, recovery of areas with environmental value or for any other 
reason – cannot be implemented through isolated or specific actions. They 
must be analysed in the framework of genuinely integrated development 
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In the framework of the ‘Reducing Relocation Risk in Urban Areas’ 
project, two resettlement experiences were studied in depth in the Ría 
Celestún Biosphere Reserve (RCBR), located in the Mexican state of 
Yucatán and part of the state of Campeche. The first of these cases, con-
cluded several years ago, was a small post- disaster project that involved 
the relocation of 83 families – the FONDEN project. The second is a major 
ongoing project for the resettlement of more than seven hundred families 
covering about one- third of the inhabitants of the town of Celestún in the 
area known as Las Charcas.2
This second case is this chapter’s focal point. It synthesises the 
contradictions of development manifested in the previous paragraphs 
and allows a rich analysis of those processes that must be creatively 
contemplated in the search for comprehensive and sustainable devel-
opment. This is helped by the fact the project is ongoing. I must note 
that the research resulted in more questions than answers; however, it 
is a good beginning and allows issues to be put on the table, for them 
to be considered in an integrated manner, and for options for future 
progress to be assessed. The orientation of the analysis is futuristic 
given the incipient nature of the scheme I analyse in depth. That is to 
say, as opposed to identifying problems with the enactment of a fin-
ished resettlement scheme, I take advantage of the incipient nature of 
the Las Charcas scheme so as to identify needs and challenges for the 
future and for the implementation of non- conventional, holistic reset-
tlement initiatives.
Celestún: the transition from a fishing village  
to a biosphere reserve
Physical and social context
Celestún is internationally renowned as a winter refuge for pink flamin-
gos and other species of birds and protected wildlife. Surrounded by a 
large mangrove swamp, it is one of the largest and best- preserved wet-
lands in Mexico and the world (Villalobos Zapata 2004, 398; Secretariat 
of Environment and Natural Resources [SEMARNAT] 2002, 5– 6). Due to 
its importance, it was declared a Wildlife Refuge Zone and in November 
2000 declared the Ría Celestún Biosphere Reserve.3 Covering an area of 
81,482.33 hectares, it is located within the municipalities of Celestún and 
Maxcanú in the state of Yucatán, and Calkiní in the state of Campeche 
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The rural/ urban mixed area of Celestún, located in the heart of 
the reserve has about eight thousand inhabitants (National Institute of 
Statistics and Geography [INEGI] 2015), and although this is a relatively 
small population, it exerts a high pressure on natural resources and gen-
erates a significant impact on the physical environment. The town, for 
which pre- Hispanic origins can be traced, became the head of the munic-
ipality in 1918. Since then, salt extraction and fishing have been the pri-
mary employment and income sources, with seasonal tourism growing in 
more recent years. Salt extraction has been important for more than two 
centuries and to a large extent determined the demographic and urban 
dynamics of the settlement (CONANP- RBRC n.d.).
When the salt industry declined in the late 1940s and, above all, 
when the state government promoted a policy of peasant migration to 
coastal communities, as a result of a drop in the demand for henequen 
fibre – the most relevant productive activity in the Yucatán peninsula in the 
1970s, and especially in the 1980s – the population of Celestún began to 
grow steadily. It rose from 476 inhabitants in 1900 to 7,836 in 2015; popu-
lation projections estimate that by 2020 there will be 8,745 inhabitants 
in the area (INEGI n.d.; see Figure 13.1). Despite rapid relative popula-
tion growth in recent decades, the locality has no legal instruments for the 
adequate planning of urban growth and land use. At the socio- economic 
level, the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy 
(CONEVAL) estimates that 83.6 per cent of Celestunians live in poverty, 
with 26.4 per cent living in extreme poverty (CONEVAL 2010).
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urban dynamics and increased risk
Population growth has forced urban development to occupy environ-
mentally fragile and unsuitable areas (see Figure 13.2). With the scarce 
land available for human settlements being exhausted or earmarked 
for more profitable purposes, families have opted to infill wetlands or 
so- called ‘salt ponds’ with garbage and waste material in order to build 
houses. Some houses are precariously constructed using lightweight 
materials and others are consolidated homes of one or even two storeys. 
Currently, more than 60 per cent of dwellings are located in flooded 
areas (SEDUMA- SEDATU- AXIS 2015, 36; SEDUMA 2015). The effects of 
unplanned urban sprawl, poor solid waste management, and the lack of 
adequate and sufficient drainage systems result in severe sanitary prob-
lems and environmental and groundwater contamination, with serious 
effects on the environment and the health of the inhabitants (Villalobos 
Zapata 2004, 404).
Due to the physical characteristics of the land and the process 
by which it was occupied, the population is susceptible to flooding 
and subsidence, suffering constant damage and loss during the rainy 
1986
Wetlands




Figure 13.2 Urban sprawl in Celestún. © Author, based on 
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season and the passing of tropical cyclones. Although losses – with 
some exceptions – have been relatively moderate to date, risk construc-
tion processes are prevalent in the area, and may increase the potential 
for damage both among the population itself and in the vicinity. More 
recurrent extreme events, intensified by the effects of climate change, 
are to be expected. Hurricanes Gilbert in 1988, Isidore in 2002, Emily 
in 2005 and Dean in 2007, as well as Tropical Storm Alex in 2010, and 
a series of lesser storms, provide recent experiences of severe direct 
damage to the population and economic activity in the area. This also 
shows that a recurrent pattern of considerable damage can be observed 
every two or three years over the last few decades. Here it should be 
noted that given the high levels of exposure and vulnerability that 
exist, no extraordinary events are required to cause significant dam-
age to the population. During the astronomical phenomenon known 
as the ‘supermoon’ on 14 November 2016, the increase in the tide pro-
duced floods of up to 60 cm, affecting a considerable number of houses 
and streets in the town, in addition to direct damages to the fishing 
activity.4
Resettlement experiences in the area
recent cases
The government of the state of Yucatán, motivated by the occurrence 
of disasters and the availability of federal funds for the resettlement of 
at- risk populations, has implemented a series of projects over time, with 
diverse results.5 Two of these cases involve the town of Celestún.
The FONDEN neighbourhood, as it is known among residents, is 
a scheme implemented following the floods caused by Hurricane Dean 
in 2007. This relocation of 83 homes provided houses for families from 
different flooded parts of the same urban area. Atypically, the relocation 
of the families was carried out without conflict. A register of affected 
people was made, land was acquired within the urban area and housing 
was constructed and directly allocated to beneficiary families. This was 
undertaken with resources from the Natural Disasters Fund (FONDEN) 
and was operated by authorities from the Yucatán state government. The 
land is located in the central area of the town, very close to the affected 
area. Because of this the beneficiary families offered no resistance to the 
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and the population was allowed to retain ownership of their original 
dwelling.
Such conditions do not exist in the second project – the central 
object of analysis in this chapter. This project consists of the resettle-
ment of irregularly settled families in the El Arenal area, better known 
among residents as ‘Las Charcas’, and is being promoted by the Yucatán 
state government’s Ministry of Urban Development and Environment 
(SEDUMA). This project is currently underway and differs markedly in 
magnitude when compared to the FONDEN project, since in this case, 
about one- third of the total population of Celestún is to be resettled. All 
families come from informally occupied areas and to resettle this popula-
tion on a single site close by requires a large plot of land, which would 
necessarily affect another part of the reserve since the municipality does 
not have sufficient territorial reserves for such an allocation. Such a move 
would also involve a process of environmental restoration of the old 
occupied areas and a strong programme that prevents them from being 
invaded again.
Las Charcas: the current settlement and the resettlement project
Characteristics of the current settlement
The settlement subject to intervention is a product of the demographic 
dynamics suffered in the municipality in recent decades and a conse-
quence of the lack of planning by the local authorities and the federal 
authorities responsible for the RCBR. Both have allowed the illegal occu-
pation of this flood- prone federally protected area for over two decades. 
It is only now, with increased risks of flooding and other environmental 
disadvantages, along with projections for climate change, that such a 
situation is considered untenable.
The area is occupied by low- to middle- income families who, lack-
ing access to better land, have established their dwellings by invading 
federal lands adjacent to the salt ponds and wetlands on the periphery 
of the town centre. By infilling with garbage or riverine bank materials, 
villagers have gained ground and built houses ranging from the most 
precarious, made with cardboard and other waste materials, to more 
consolidated homes involving greater relative investment in financial 
and temporal terms. The neglect for years by several municipal admin-
istrations and federal authorities has brought the problem to a critical 
state: currently, 2,298 people occupy 763 dwellings in the threatened Las 
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The paradox is that some of the villagers have documentation that 
‘proves’ the legal estate of the land they occupy, despite them being 
national lands under federal protection.6 However, this estate has been 
improperly granted by the municipality, since the occupied areas have 
not been ‘dissociated’ and urbanisation has not been authorised by the 
Agrarian Attorney’s Office or any other appropriate instance, as estab-
lished by Mexico’s current Agrarian Law.7
Although the settlement was established illegally, over the years 
it has been ‘formalised’, to the point that today it has a relatively broad 
coverage of basic services. According to the feasibility study carried out 
by SEDUMA for the resettlement project, 89.7 per cent of the dwellings 
have piped water and 55.9 per cent have electricity, while 76.9 per cent 
of the houses have sanitary facilities. As for urban services, most are in 
bad condition, but 90 per cent of households have access to street light-
ing; 57 per cent of the houses are consolidated buildings and 28 per cent 
semi- consolidated, while only 15 per cent of the total houses located in 
the area are precarious constructions. About 70 per cent of the homes 
have some degree of overcrowding and only 1.94 per cent have drainage, 
which means that much of the wastewater is directly discharged to the 
land on which the dwellings are located (SEDUMA- SEDATU- AXIS 2015, 
30– 55).
The intervention proposal
With the interest of reducing poverty and the environmental impact that 
the occupation of these lands causes, the state government, through 
SEDUMA, began an evaluation process in order to undertake the even-
tual relocation of this population to safer lands, the sanitation of the area, 
and its active reinsertion in the RCBR. Using federal funds available from 
the Ministry of Agrarian, Territorial and Urban Development (SEDATU), 
SEDUMA commissioned a feasibility study (SEDUMA- SEDATU- AXIS 
2015). This provides a diagnosis of the general situation of the area and 
resettlement options are evaluated.
The results of the study suggested that the resettlement of the pop-
ulation was the only real option. Three alternatives were offered for the 
new settlement:
1. Infill and protect one of the ponds inside the existing risk zone and 
relocate the whole population to that area.
2. Resettle the population outside the urban area, in a sector located 
approximately 30 km east of Celestún, near the town of Kinchil. 
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and associated vegetation as well as the floodplain, which must be 
preserved.
3. Relocate the population to an area north of the existing population 
nucleus, within the existing urban area, on a single piece of land with 
the appropriate dimensions and characteristics to support the neces-
sary housing.
Beyond the dubious technical quality of the feasibility study, it is between 
these three options that the authorities are deciding the resettlement 
issue, and the population will only be informed of the final decision when 
this is taken. More relevant here, however, are the economic, social and 
political realities of the area, which are not even considered in the feasi-
bility study.
resettlement as the only solution and under a unique model
The authorities have considered the resettlement of more than seven hun-
dred families living in Las Charcas using a conventional model of single 
resettlement as the only option. Alternative and differentiated interven-
tion options according to individual risk exposure and habitation condi-
tions have not been offered. As in many other cases, the target population 
is seen as a monolithic block that can be uprooted and placed elsewhere, 
even if this is 30 km away from its source of employment and livelihood. 
But not all the families settled in Las Charcas respond to the same pat-
tern or live in the same conditions of risk exposure, nor are all homes 
the same. Usually, the more recently settled families have built using 
precarious materials, while the longer- rooted families have built more 
consolidated houses that have involved significant investment. Among 
the latter, greater resistance to change can be seen. On the other hand, 
property status is also not the same for all families. Some of them have a 
legal estate granted by the municipality or have a written authorisation 
to settle there, even though the land has been urbanised on a landfill or in 
federal areas over which the municipality has no legal jurisdiction.
Proposing ‘mono- solutions’ to such diverse situations can only hin-
der the process and does not guarantee that the intervention meets its 
proposed objectives. It fuels conflict and opposition from the population 
and completely cancels out any possibility of transforming this process 
into a true development option. This is especially true when the project is 
based on an incomplete and insufficient diagnosis and a narrow- minded 
intervention proposal. The solution to these problems is not always tech-
nical and requires imagination and the art of negotiation. The inhabitants 
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of Las Charcas are well aware of the risks and the conditions under which 
they live and, like any family, would like to have legal certainty about 
their tenure. That is why a significant number of them are willing to be 
resettled under negotiated conditions that positively affect their employ-
ment opportunities. From interviews with the population it would seem 
they have access to secure plots within the municipal area that could be 
used for resettlement. This would be based on the option of not being 
resettled in one place but rather being relocated to different areas of the 
same town, according to opportunity and need.
Another aspect that should be considered is that at minimum, hous-
ing similar to the original housing should be provided. Among those con-
sulted, the average house has an area of 60 m2. There is no additional 
land given that houses are raised on a cluster of garbage and stones. Even 
when there are cases that differ from those described above, the inves-
tigation shows that resettlement is viable and that the requests by the 
population are reasonable, although everything will depend on how the 
authorities decide to carry out the process.
Up until now, the authorities have not consulted the families that 
will eventually be resettled, and although the resettlement process is 
forthcoming, it has not been officially announced. It is, however, already 
an open secret that runs throughout the village. Would it not be better, in 
this case, to start from an objective diagnosis and more imaginative and 
better- informed intervention proposals? Is it possible that with appro-
priate intervention this resettlement project could become an authen-
tic development opportunity for the families of Las Charcas? Knowing 
that a good number of the families would agree in principle to resettle-
ment, would it not be more appropriate to report truthfully, to consult 
the affected population and to involve them in the process from the 
beginning, so that negotiations flow better and the proposed objectives 
are achieved? The reasons for the secretive, unilateral approach are not 
overly clear.
the conflict of authority and the right to the land
Although there are families in Las Charcas that have migrated from 
other states of the country, most of them are Celestunians. In general, 
they are young families, second- or third- generation descendants of the 
original population. With the intention of owning their own dwellings, 
they invaded the area after not being able to find land in better and more 
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accessible conditions. Neither did they have the option of being included 
in state or federal housing programmes.
The housing crisis in the municipality involves not only the inhabit-
ants of Las Charcas, but also a large part of the total population. This is 
manifested in a severe housing deficit that has led to 55 per cent of exist-
ing housing being overcrowded in different degrees, according to the 
Municipal Development Plan for 2015– 18 (Ayuntamiento de Celestún 
2015, 18). There is little land suitable for urbanisation, given the physi-
cal conditions of the area, and because suitable land is monopolised by 
private individuals, who use it for holiday homes, hotels or shops, or sim-
ply keep it as vacant lots.
According to the RCBR Management Programme, land tenure is as 
follows: 89 per cent of the area covered by the reserve is under federal 
jurisdiction, 7.5 per cent is ejido (collective lands without the possibility 
of being sold or divided), 1.7 per cent is private property, and 1.8 per 
cent has unknown property status (SEMARNAT 2002, 29– 30).8 On the 
other hand, the city has no territorial reserves to meet the demands of 
urban growth. In fact, urban growth is being promoted by the municipal 
authorities on land to the north- west of the town, which is under federal 
jurisdiction and has not been disassociated: therefore, there is no author-
isation for its use. However, at least one access road has been opened 
in the area and the relocation of a school that is constantly flooded in 
its present location has been contemplated. The mayor has granted legal 
estate or written authorisation to some residents to occupy lots. For sev-
eral years they have demanded a home. They have been recommended 
to delimit ‘their land’ with bushes and plants as a means of continuing 
the process of urbanisation while the disassociation of the land by the 
federation is achieved.
This clearly constitutes an illegal act and promotes the informal-
ity of urban growth. It is, in general terms, a formal authorisation to 
invade land. The question is, however, what options remain for both 
local authorities and the population, when the vast majority of the land 
has been devoted to environmental conservation, less than 8 per cent is 
under productive use and less than 2 per cent has potential for building 
but is in the hands of private hoarders?
It is within this framework that a debate should occur on the rights 
of native populations to occupy the lands they have inhabited for cen-
turies and the undeniable need to conserve the natural wealth of the 
area. Celestún already existed as a settlement long before the biosphere 
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established without considering that a population already existed there, 
has needs and will eventually grow in number and territorial exten-
sion. The current management programme has not been updated since 
2002, the year in which it was created, and although it acknowledges the 
problem of urban growth, it offers no solutions. Nor is it known whether 
the reserve authority has undertaken any economic or social develop-
ment initiatives to prevent the problems of disordered urban growth and 
increases in the population’s poor living conditions, resulting in even 
more severe environmental impacts.
Based on the former arguments, the key question would then 
be: does a human presence automatically imply environmental degrada-
tion or are there options for resource conservation through controlled 
exploitation? Should populations living in NPAs benefit from the natural 
wealth of their environment in order to achieve better living conditions 
or should natural resources be untouchable? Is it possible to improve the 
living conditions of the population and at the same time conserve natural 
resources? A research report published by various academic institutions 
shows that under appropriate conditions, communities can maintain for-
est coverage and conserve the biodiversity of the forests they manage, 
even better than what can and has been achieved with the NPAs. An 
example of this are the community forests in the centre of the state of 
Quintana Roo, where the lowest deforestation rate in all of south- east 
Mexico has been registered, including regions where NPAs occupy most 
of the territory (Bray et al. 2007, 36). In addition, the use of commu-
nity forests contributes to poverty reduction. Would not it be better to 
base new initiatives on the search to resolve problems instead of ignor-
ing them?
the different visions of development
The lack of communication between different levels of government and 
between the government and the population, the vision of ‘conserva-
tion by decree’ and the lack of institutional coordination have led to the 
improvisation of public policies. Each of the authorities involved has its 
own vision of what development should be. On the one hand, the fed-
eral authorities, through the National Commission of Natural Protected 
Areas, maintain a bureaucratic vision of conservation, ignoring any other 
problems that fall outside this domain. On the other hand, the vision of 
the municipal authorities is mediated by the pragmatism required when 
a government lasts for three years, with no opportunity for the re- election 
of mayors. And finally, there is the vision of the intermediate level of 
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government (state government), which has no jurisdiction over the area 
and whose intervention in any conservation or development project can 
only be implemented in agreement with the local authority, but mainly 
with the federal level.
Thus, at the governmental level, three different development ideas 
prevail for the area and these are not necessarily complementary. At the 
national level, the federal authority expresses its interest in the pres-
ervation of natural resources, both flora and fauna, while in terms of 
management practice social and urban problems are ignored, communi-
cation with the mayor is very limited and with the population it is simply 
non- existent.
At the opposite extreme is the vision of development at the munici-
pal level, based on the promotion of tourism: the only activity that suc-
cessive mayors suppose can be profitable. Parallel to the promotion of 
tourism, the construction of a coastal boardwalk throughout the reserve 
for the enjoyment of visitors is planned (Ayuntamiento de Celestún 2015, 
38). This is, of course, planned without considering the environmental 
impact of construction or the large- scale arrival of tourists on a natural 
area that is intended to be conserved and that does not even have the 
basic infrastructure necessary for its inhabitants.
Finally, for its part, the state government, through SEDUMA, has a 
vision that is closer to that of the federal government, based on resource 
conservation. In fact, although the resettlement project of Las Charcas is 
apparently motivated by the need to reduce flooding and improve sani-
tary conditions, it may in fact be explained by the interest in recovering 
the wetlands and restoring them to the reserve. The problem with this 
initiative, however, is that the resettlement project is not being seen as an 
opportunity to redirect urban growth in the area and to foster real devel-
opment for Celestunians by preventing poor families from continuing to 
cause harmful effects on the environment due to the lack of other options. 
Nor does it contemplate, for example, actions to avoid the vacated and 
restored areas in the reserve being occupied again, or to develop differ-
ent productive options for those affected in the case of resettlement some 
30 km distant – much less the environmental impact that a new settle-
ment of more than seven hundred houses in a protected area could have.
But to these three visions a fourth must be added: that of the 
population itself. For generations, Celestunians have lived from fishing 
and salt extraction from ponds that are close to where they currently 
live. And although a good proportion of them also provide services, 
mainly in the flamingo observation tours, income from tourism is mar-
ginal because it is seasonal and the offer of service providers surpasses 
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demand by far. That is why all the settlers, at least those who were con-
sulted during the investigation, continue to bet on fishing as the main 
source of income in spite of the restrictions that the reserve authority 
imposes on them. But they are also eager to receive proposals on dif-
ferent productive options that complement their incomes and enable 
them to improve their living conditions. They are well aware of the fact 
that it is necessary to conserve natural resources because their income 
depends on them and, ultimately, they do not wish to live on a garbage 
dump, nor for their children to be exposed to attack by crocodiles when 
the tide rises. The problem is that they have no options. For them, the 
federal authority only signifies prohibition on developing their activity, 
the local authority acts for personal benefit and for the good of rela-
tives, and the state government, which could eventually act as inter-
locutor and mediator, ignores them. Proof of this is the census that 
was taken as a basis for the feasibility study. The population was never 
informed as to why the census was being taken.
Conclusions: is the resettlement an opportunity 
for development?
In this context, it is questionable whether this resettlement project can 
represent a real opportunity for the development of the area. It is pos-
sible that a positive result could be achieved, but there are a number of 
obstacles that must be overcome.
A starting point is to move from a conventional vision of resettle-
ment9 to a more imaginative idea of development, based on a compre-
hensive management of the environmental, social and urban challenges 
prevailing in the area. The conservation of natural resources is undoubt-
edly important, but it is also a fact that those who live there are not going 
to leave. On the contrary, the town will continue to grow and it will 
become increasingly difficult to control growth if the relevant measures 
are not taken now. For that reason, the first thing is to plan the use of the 
territory with a vision that includes not only wild flora and fauna but also 
the human urban area. It is essential to start from a serious and careful 
study that determines the lands that can be objectively urbanised – obvi-
ously with acceptable levels of security – and to initiate a legal and orderly 
process of dissociation so that they can be incorporated as urban lots. At 
the same time, options should be explored for the creation of ‘develop-
ment poles’ outside the reserve, so new generations of Celestunians are 
attracted by profitable economic activities different from those currently 
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offered by the town. This would help avoid further invasions of land in 
already recovered areas, so pressure from the reserve can be removed.
On the other hand, distrust between different government authori-
ties and between these and the population must be overcome. It is unde-
niable that among the settlers there is a sense of having been stripped of 
their territory when the biosphere reserve was created. To some extent 
they are right, since there are few productive options left, in the name of 
‘natural resources conservation’. Hence poverty in the municipality con-
tinues to increase. In addition, the reserve authority must recognise that 
it does not have the capacity to monitor compliance with all the prohi-
bitions established in the regulations – including non- invasion of lands 
under federal jurisdiction. Human and financial resources are limited.
A different situation would exist if the reserve’s authority estab-
lished direct and permanent contact with the population in the search 
for and implementation of productive activities that benefit the citizens 
of Celestún and at the same time allow for resource conservation. This 
would not only create a link between them but would also help prevent 
municipal authorities from acting at a discrete level, while the same 
population would be the main proponent of conserving resources.10 Most 
of the population is fully aware of the great environmental value of the 
land, but people also have daily needs to solve for themselves and their 
families. A balance between the two would be ideal to ensure a good 
future for the area and the fulfilment of the objectives of any intervention 
project. In this, SEDUMA could play an important role as mediator within 
the contemplated relocation project framework. SEDUMA could still take 
advantage of local capacities and avoid a project decided and executed 
from above, unplanned and with little consideration for those affected. It 
would also avoid another failed project.
Celestún is at a point where it is still possible to solve problems, 
because the magnitude of its difficulties is very small compared to what 
happens in other NPAs. Such is the case of the Montes Azules Biosphere 
Reserve in Chiapas, for example, where there are more than five hun-
dred dispersed human settlements with more than half a million people 
demanding a solution to their land tenure problems. Agrarian conflicts 
have prevailed there for more than 40 years, and plundering of land, 
forced resettlements, and violent and prolonged social conflicts have 
occurred. All this has been aggravated by the arrival of Guatemalan ref-
ugees since 1981, conflicts between communities and the emergence 
of the armed conflict in Chiapas since 1994 in the Reserve (Secretariat 
of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries [SEMARNAP] 
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small, concentrated in a single urban centre, quite friendly and well dis-
posed to resettlement, so it is unnecessary to start a process of remov-
ing distrust.
In short, the project that the state government has commenced 
can become a real opportunity for development by ordering urban 
growth in the area and encouraging sustainable productive activities 
that do not go against resource management. This is a resettlement 
initiative for a third of an urban centre. This may be small in absolute 
terms, but its impact could be significant and it could establish a prec-
edent of good practice. In an area like the RCBR, everyone loses with 
the destruction of the environment, and everyone gains from its conser-
vation. However, the key to the success of an initiative of this kind is to 
recognise that in Natural Protected Areas where human settlements are 
present, more than anywhere else, there is an indissoluble link between 
society and nature.
Notes
 1. It is worth noting the scarcity of updated demographic and social information on the NPAs in 
Mexico since the last demographic study was carried out by the National Population Council 
(CONAPO) in 2010. Other relevant studies on the problem of human settlements in these 
areas date from 2009, although they use demographic information from 2005 (Bezaury- Creel 
and Gutiérrez- Carbonell 2009).
 2. I use the term ‘relocation’ to refer to population movements to sites close to the original loca-
tion and where substantial changes in terms of employment, access to services, etc. are not 
implied. ‘Resettlement’ refers to more complex processes of population movement involving 
greater distances from original sites, changes in livelihoods (source of employment, access to 
services, longer- distance transport, etc.). For greater precision on both terms, see Chapter 1 in 
this book on the concept of resettlement. For more details on the area of study and the method 
of research, consult the research reports at https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ bartlett/ development/ 
reducing- relocation- risk- urban- areas.
 3. Diario Oficial de la Federación, 27 November 2000.
 4. According to the testimony of Celestún settlers and several journalistic articles (in La Jornada, 
Milenio and Unión Yucatán, 15 November 2016).
 5. For further details on resettlement experiences in the state of Yucatán see Lavell 2016 and 
Lavell et al. 2016.
 6. According to the Glossary of Legal- Agrarian Terms of the Agrarian Attorney’s Office 
(Procuraduria Agraria 2009), the ‘legal estate’ is a portion of land destined for the founda-
tion and construction of a village. At the moment it is regulated by agricultural regulations, 
as well as by federal or state provisions related to human settlements.
 7. See Mexico’s Agrarian Law (Cámara de Diputados n.d.), in particular articles 63, 64 and 65 
relating to human settlements on ejidal lands. The last reform of this law was published in the 
Diario Oficial de la Federación on 9 April 2012.
 8. These figures refer only to the land area of the reserve; although I have no figures for the cur-
rent status of land tenure, I assume that it has not changed significantly.
 9. The most widely applied conventional model consists of moving the target population as a 
whole to a new site, usually far from the place of origin, as a single settlement that is built for 
this purpose. This does not involve wider intervention to solve problems in the community that 
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poor populations with alternative productive options, housing improvements, urban reorgani-
sation, etc.
 10. In 2017, residents of Celestún tried to lynch the mayor, Leonel Rosado Meda, for the alleged 
sale to a private consortium of a 5 hectare beach that is part of the reserve. The mayor had to 
flee the municipality for several days and the intervention of the state police was necessary. It 
is not the first conflict between settlers and municipal authorities over repeated attempts by 
the current mayor to cede land from the reserve improperly, to be commercially exploited by 
his relatives. With this it is clear that if anyone in Celestún is interested in conservation and can 
take care of the monitoring and protection of natural resources, it is the population itself and 
not necessarily the authorities.
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(Re)creating disasters: a case of  
post- disaster resettlements 
in Chennai
Garima Jain, Chandni singh and teja malladi
Damaged houses are among the most visible outcomes of hazard event 
impacts and attract immediate attention from various state and non- 
state humanitarian actors to showcase responsiveness (Arvind and Ranjit 
2020; Few et al. 2021). This was the case in Chennai, a metropolitan city 
in South India, where the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 and the devas-
tating floods of 2015 caused widespread loss of life and damage to infra-
structure. Following these events, pre- existing housing stock was used to 
resettle disaster- affected people in the name of providing humanitarian 
relief and reducing hazard exposure. In this chapter, we examine the long- 
term implications of these state- mandated resettlements, demonstrating 
how interventions to reduce hazard exposure (i.e. resettlement away 
from coasts and riverbanks) can aggravate risks if the resettlement loca-
tions are also exposed to hazards. Apart from the direct socio- economic 
implications of first the disaster and then the process of resettlement, the 
degraded conditions of living in these risk- exposed resettlements further 
exacerbate vulnerabilities. In effect, new socio- economic and ecological 
risks are created for the people as well as the city at large as a conse-
quence of poorly planned interventions (Jain et al. 2017).
Housing that is built for social development purposes on the one 
hand and that built post- disaster, on the other, may seem fundamen-
tally similar, but they are operationally distinct. Normatively, all hous-
ing should help achieve people’s overall wellbeing and improve their 
long- term resilience. Development literature defines adequate housing 
as a combination of a shelter as a physical space along with tenure secu-
rity, availability of basic services, affordability, habitability, accessibility 
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and cultural adequacy (Bhan, Anand and Harish 2014, 36; UN- Habitat 
2014). It can have multi- scalar economic, environmental and social 
functions, such as being an economic asset, providing safety, promot-
ing asset- based welfare at the household level and contributing to the 
mitigation of climatic impacts or enabling labour movement at the urban 
and regional level (Arku 2006; Deo Bardhan and Barua 2015; Doling and 
Ronald 2010).
However, housing built for developmental purposes often disre-
gards risk reduction requirements, for example, the need to reduce haz-
ard exposure with the use of adequate building techniques or safe site 
locations, while post- disaster rehabilitation focuses primarily on reduc-
ing hazard exposure and tends to ignore underlying socio- economic 
vulnerabilities and the additional functions of housing beyond a shelter. 
Effectively, these investments lead to partial or skewed development out-
comes, continuing pre- existing risks or creating new ones.
State housing provision involves multiple, cross- scalar agencies, 
including those providing funding (e.g. federal government housing 
schemes), allocating land (e.g. provincial governments), building the 
physical structure (e.g. provincial- level housing boards), and providing 
services such as water, electricity and sanitation (e.g. municipal govern-
ments). But due to a lack of jurisdiction, wider technical knowledge, and 
sufficient attention being paid to the environmental and socio- economic 
implications of building large- scale infrastructure, housing interventions 
fail to deliver holistic and sustainable outcomes (Wamsler 2004). This 
in turn embeds negative risks pertaining to the socio- economic needs or 
environmental dependencies of people and cities.
Importantly, housing provided as an immediate post- disaster 
response lacks detailed socio- economic and environmental risk assess-
ments and relevant, flexible monitoring and evaluation frameworks. 
Poorly planned housing thus tends to inadequately address underlying 
entrenched inequalities or vulnerabilities that are often the foundational 
reasons for disaster losses in the first place (Pahwa- Gajjar et al. 2019; 
Lavell and Maskrey 2014). As we will demonstrate in this chapter, such 
quick- fix responses, articulated in post- disaster ‘crisis’ situations, can 
have poor developmental outcomes that ricochet over decades.
This chapter discusses the mass post- disaster resettlement of peo-
ple affected by the tsunami in 2004 and floods in 2015 undertaken in 
Chennai, where state and local authorities have systematically built 
tenements on ‘under- utilised’ environmentally sensitive marsh areas 
under centrally sponsored schemes for affordable housing. We exam-
ine the medium- and long- term environmental and socio- economic 
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implications of resettlement interventions for the people and the city at 
large. In particular, we explore whether the resettlement interventions 
(1) take into account socio- economic and environmental considerations 
at the new sites, and (2) ensure that the overall risks are reduced and 
development outcomes are improved for the resettled populations. The 
research examines trends and actions taken in Chennai as a whole, with a 
specific focus on the resettlement sites of Kannaginagar, Semmencherry 
and Perumbakkam, all three of which are located within the wetland of 
Pallikaranai marsh.
Overall, post- disaster resettlements in Chennai have been used 
as a quick fix and showcased as an effective and necessary response to 
reduce risk (Narayan 2018; Jain et al. 2017). However, we argue that 
these resettlements have exacerbated exposure to hazards such as sea-
sonal flooding and increased socio- economic and environmental risks, 
without addressing the affected communities’ underlying needs and vul-
nerabilities. Furthermore, these actions have potentially increased flood 
risk across the Chennai Metropolitan Area (Arabindoo 2016; Jayaraman 
2016a; Vencatesan et al. 2014), creating long- term risks for the people 
and the city at large.
Chennai: a site of rapid development and witness 
to many disasters
Chennai, erstwhile Madras, saw a rapid influx of people starting in the 
early 1920s– 1930s, followed by a deep agrarian crisis in its hinterland. 
This was accompanied by a widespread growth of slums across the city. 
To respond to these, a City Improvement Trust (CIT) was established in 
the 1940s, with the mandate to ‘clear’ the slums and move the people 
to what were then the outskirts of the city. This approach was revised in 
the 1950s, to ‘improvement’ by providing basic services and upgrading 
existing slum layouts. Meanwhile, the CIT acquired large tracts of land 
around the city, to build tenements in order to meet the still growing 
need for housing (Venkat and Subadevan 2015). The CIT was absorbed 
by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board (TNHB) after its establishment in 
1961. This came with an expanded mandate of building housing for 
all income groups. Meanwhile, the slums kept growing, and TNHB fell 
significantly short in fulfilling its promise to supply sufficient affordable 
housing units (Vijayabaskar et al. 2011).
As the population of slum dwellers grew, their political strength 
also increased, especially within the new winning regional party Dravida 
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Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). This period witnessed a significant shift in 
the state’s perspective when the Tamil Nadu Slum Areas (Improvement 
and Clearance) Act 1970 came into force. This provided security of ten-
ure, promoted improvements in living conditions, and offered protection 
against arbitrary evictions (Coelho et al. 2015).
This led to a decade of major in situ tenement construction. But 
due to its higher costs, and inherent difficulties in implementation, only 
a fraction of the targets were met. The 1980s saw another shift towards 
in situ slum upgrading, supported by the World Bank, on the premise 
that giving tenure security would promote self- investment by the resi-
dents. But by the 1990s, growing pressures on urban land, and forces 
for city beautification, brought back the approach of shifting people to 
tenements outside the city. Large- scale funding for building affordable 
housing at the beginning of this century, for example through centrally 
sponsored schemes like the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal 
Mission (JnNURM) or state programmes like the Tamil Nadu Urban 
Development Project, gave it further impetus (Jain et al. 2017).
The first two decades of the twenty- first century have seen unprec-
edented urbanisation in Chennai, owing to the growing IT industry 
and automobile manufacturing, increasing public and private invest-
ment to fuel the Smart City, and associated large- scale labour migration 
(Krishnamurthy and Desouza 2015). With the Bay of Bengal in the east 
and state administrative limits in the north, Chennai’s rapid built- up 
area expansion over the last two decades is concentrated in the western 
and the southern regions, along the Chennai– Bengaluru and Chennai– 
Puducherry industrial corridors. See Figure 14.1 for Chennai’s spatial 
growth patterns over the decades.
The city needed space to accommodate this growth, and con-
scious planning efforts to protect its environmentally sensitive areas. 
Unfortunately, the lack of planning and enforcement and the rapid 
expansion of built- up areas have led to encroachment on some of its 
important ecological zones. This includes the catchment areas of its three 
rivers, lakes and water tanks that supplement its drinking water supply, 
and the low- lying wetlands that act as sinks for excess rainwater and 
groundwater recharge.
Other engineered infrastructure close to the coast, including hous-
ing schemes, ports and thermal power plants, are increasing coastal 
erosion, groundwater salinity and industrial/ human waste effluent- 
based pollution (Elangovan, Lavanya and Arunthathi 2017; Jayaraman 
2016b; Kudale 2010; Kumar and Kunte 2012; Coastal Resource Centre 
2016a, 2016b). According to a citizen- led social audit report, only 
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427 million litres per day (MLD) of sewage are currently pumped and 
treated, whereas almost 1,073 MLD are left to flow untreated directly 
into water bodies (Arappor Iyakkam n.d.). Such pollution poses a serious 
threat to human and environmental health, and to economic outcomes 
for the entire city in the long term.
Meanwhile, Chennai has also witnessed many disasters in the 
past, some associated with natural hazards, others as a consequence of 
urbanisation stress (Jayaraman 2015). In 2003– 4, the city suffered from 
a severe drought stemming from poor monsoonal rains. This led to a drop 
of groundwater by up to 8 m, the shutting down of the city’s piped water 
supply and the complete drying out of local reservoirs (Srinivasan 2008; 
Thomas 2010). In 2004, a tsunami that hit Tamil Nadu killed nearly eight 
thousand people and affected more than a million. In 2015, Chennai was 
among the most affected regions after the heavy rains that led to severe 
floods across Tamil Nadu. Many lives were lost, more than six million 
people were affected and 1.5 million houses were damaged. The city has 
also been affected by several cyclonic storms, such as Cyclone Vardha in 
Figure 14.1 Map of land- cover changes in the Chennai region:  
1997, 2006 and 2016. © Authors, based on data from Jain, Singh and 
Malladi 2017; CGIAR- CSI SRTM 2009; CMDA 2008; OpenStreetMap 
Contributors 2017.
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2016 and Cyclone Gaja in 2018, that have left its people and infrastruc-
tural systems stranded.
While there is an inclination to see these events as a ‘force of 
nature’ (Few et al. 2021), it has been observed that many of the losses 
are driven by poor planning, inadequate operational management and 
growing inequities in the city (Bremner 2019). Contrary to popular opin-
ion, recurring floods in the city are not so much due to an increase in 
precipitation, which has largely remained unchanged over the last cen-
tury (Drescher et al. 2007), as they are due to wetland fragmentation, 
a compromised natural drainage system (Vencatesan et al. 2014) and 
ecologically insensitive infrastructure development (Arabindoo 2016; 
Jayaraman 2016a). At the same time, recurring water supply shortages 
(Government of Tamil Nadu 2014; Janakarajan et al. 2007; Srinivasan 
2008) across the city have often led to rioting in informal settlements 
(Srinivasan 2008; Thomas 2010), as well as increasing dependence on 
groundwater borewells. This growing groundwater dependence is nega-
tively affecting the balance and driving coastal saline water intrusion, 
making it a vicious cycle with a water supply shortage. Marginalised 
communities are affected disproportionately, leaving them at the mercy 
of private tanker companies (Srinivasan et al. 2013).
Climate variability has and climate change will aggravate haz-
ards across Tamil Nadu. Regional climate studies indicate an average 
temperature increase of 1– 3.1°C between the 2020s and the 2080s 
(Anushiya and Ramachandran 2015; Bal et al. 2016). Annual rainfall 
projections indicate a general decrease in rainfall of 2– 9 per cent over 
the same period (with some regional exceptions where rainfall might 
increase) and decreasing water availability in the Chennai basin. Sea 
levels along the Chennai coast are projected to increase by 0.37 mm per 
year (Government of Tamil Nadu 2014), directly affecting the area from 
the Ennore Creek in the north, all along the Buckingham Canal on the 
coast, to the Pallikaranai marsh area in the south (Indian Space Research 
Organisation 2012). Cyclone frequency is projected to decrease, although 
their intensity (measured through wind speed) may increase (Ministry 
of Environment and Forests 2010). Despite this increasing hazard expo-
sure, major investments are being made along the coast, in the form of 
affordable housing, thermal power plants, ports, coal and petroleum ter-
minals and railways, which would have significant social and economic 
implications in the future.
Disaster risk management in Chennai has been two- 
pronged: individual- led interventions (e.g. raising floor heights; under-




projects for widening and desilting existing stormwater and natural 
canals; resettlement of affected poor communities). A close study of these 
varied responses shows that they either focus on a specific water resource 
(e.g. cleaning the Buckingham Canal, restoring the Adyar river), or a sin-
gular aspect of water management (e.g. desilting for increasing the depth 
of the stormwater drains, relocating people to reduce sewage discharge 
into the canal), instead of a comprehensive understanding of risks and 
associated actions for reducing them. Besides, these responses are taken 
by multiple agencies and institutions, with limited participation from the 
affected vulnerable communities (Viswanathan 2018).
Overall, the Tamil Nadu government has a State Disaster 
Management Authority (SDMA) in place with the Chennai Metropolitan 
Development Authority (CMDA) as the policy and advisory agency for 
disaster management at the city level. Their approach for ‘disaster man-
agement’ (and not ‘disaster risk management’) has tended to be reactive 
and infrastructure- focused, with less emphasis on addressing structural 
vulnerabilities and proactive risk management (Jain, Singh and Malladi 
2017). However, in 2018, the Tamil Nadu State Disaster Management 
Policy was amended to align it with the Sendai Framework as well as to 
move towards a less reactive and more systemic approach to risk man-
agement (Tamil Nadu State Disaster Management Authority 2018).
The 2015 floods saw fragmented, delayed and reactive humani-
tarian action from the state, with individual government officials, con-
cerned private- sector actors and informal civic groups stepping in to fill 
relief gaps. As the relief phase waned, the state used the post- disaster 
momentum to justify resettlement of marginalised communities, and 
often to allocate land resources to more lucrative enterprises. Coelho 
(2016, 9) calls this ‘a highly selective notion of encroachment’:
The five- star hotels and the high- rise office and apartment build-
ings of MRC Nagar on the Adyar estuary complex, the Phoenix 
mall on the Velachery lake-bed, the elevated expressway on the 
Cooum River and the Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) rail line 
on the Buckingham Canal, are only a few instances of mammoth 
structures that have been permitted to be built on waterways and 
waterbodies. It is only the Dhideer Nagars, the Alamelu Nagars, 
the Ambedkar Nagars that are removed, because they are slums, 
because they are considered eyesores. This is [a] discriminatory 
action in the name of [the] environment (Coelho 2016, 9).
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Just as the 2004 tsunami enabled the removal of coastal fishing villages 
to build a coastal highway and a subsequent move to resettlement colo-
nies in Kannaginagar and Semmencherry (see Figure 14.2), the floods 
were leveraged to evict informal settlements along the Adyar and Cooum 
rivers to pre- existing and vacant housing colonies in Perumbakkam, all 
several tens of miles away from the original habitations.
Between the bottom- up resistance to moving and top- down focus 
on resettlement, civil society played a strong role in relief, with a lesser 
emphasis on recovery. Local development- focused NGOs coordinated 
and implemented relief during the 2015 floods and some continued to 
work through community volunteers to provide assistance and livelihood 
support over the medium to long term. However, widespread environ-
mental risks generated through these processes have remained outside 
the purview of both state and non- state actors.
Figure 14.2 Ground elevation, water bodies and drainage networks 
along with disaster- affected sites and resettlement sites. Note here 
that the extent of the Pallikaranai Marsh is indicated by the existing 
surface water, excluding the encroachments. While that does not show 
the actual extant of the low- lying marsh, it is indicated here using the 
digital elevation. © Author’s elaboration based on data from CGIAR- CSI 





This study uses primary and secondary information. Secondary research 
included a literature review of government policies and documents, 
newspaper articles, NGO reports and peer- reviewed publications; and 
spatial analysis to map land use, land cover changes, groundwater aqui-
fer recharge zones and proposed locations for housing projects (extracted 
from the CMDA Master Plan 2026). Primary research included: 20 key 
informant interviews with government officials, academics, activists, 
NGOs and select humanitarian agencies; 55 semi- structured house-
hold interviews (SSIs) across the three research sites; and two multi- 
stakeholder consultations before and after primary data collection.
Findings
Long- term ecological implications on the city
Owing to increasing urbanisation pressures, poor land governance 
and planning, many ecologically sensitive areas of the city have been 
encroached upon. The Pallikaranai marshland is one such area that pro-
vides critical ecosystem services to the city of Chennai and its environs, 
but over the years it has been severely degraded.
The Pallikaranai marsh is a contiguous low- lying area, located to 
the south of Chennai, that receives run- off from a catchment area of 235 
km2 and discharges into the Bay of Bengal (CMDA 2008). It is natural and 
unique in its hydrology. It is the sole home for a large number of flora and 
fauna species and provides natural drainage into the Bay of Bengal (via 
Okkiyam Madavu, Buckingham Canal and Kovalam Creek). It is a criti-
cal wetland for the city as well as the state of Tamil Nadu, but after the 
1980s it saw systematic degradation at the hands of public and private 
agencies alike.
Between 1992 and 2012, the marshland provided an opportunity 
for housing development in the rapidly urbanising city. The state built 
large- scale resettlement colonies on the marshland, largely using funds 
from the central government- sponsored Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Urban Renewal Mission’s (JnNURM’s) Basic Services for the Urban Poor 
programme (BSUP). A total of 26,376 units were built on the marsh, cost-
ing nearly 70,000 crore rupees (approximately US$10.4 billion). These 
are in addition to the ones built by the state government: 15,656 houses 
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Table 14.1 Housing schemes built on the Pallikaranai Marshland area. 
© Author’s elaboration based on information from Tamil Nadu Clearance  
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(Tamil Nadu Slums Clearance Board n.d.; Housing and Land Rights 
Network 2014; Jain et al. 2017). The marsh was further fragmented by 
the construction of supporting infrastructures such as roads, the metro, 
public and private institutions and the Perungudi municipal landfill and 
sewage treatment plant, as well as IT corridors and residential complexes 
(Vencatesan et al. 2014).
Affordable housing construction projects were followed by a 
series of government- led resettlements. In 1996, 1,600 families were 
moved to Velachery (in the northern part of the marsh) from differ-
ent development- induced land acquisition sites across the city. After 
the 2004 tsunami, affected fishing communities and slum dwellers 
from coastal locations, such as Santhome Church area, and affected 
floodplains of the Cooum were moved to Okkiyam Thoraipakkam, 
Semmencherry, and Kannaginagar under the Tsunami Rehabilitation 
Programme. Yet until late 2015, many of these housing units remained 
vacant, awaiting slum dwellers to agree to move from the city. This 
forms the backdrop for the resettlement drives that took place after 
the 2015 floods (Jain et al. 2017). Many affected families, now with 
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as Surya Teja Nagar and Saidapet to these housing sites over 25 km 
away from their original residences (see Figure 14.2 for the original 
and resettlement site locations). With people forcefully moved to the 
marsh area, pressures on that land increased further.
A government- funded assessment of Pallikaranai marsh (Vencatesan 
et al. 2014) found that the marshland has critically been degraded by 
urbanisation, high groundwater extraction, waste dumping, increasing 
imperviousness and building upon its recharge areas (Jain, Singh and 
Malladi 2017). Although 317 hectares of its southern portion have now 
been declared a reserve forest and it was recognised among the 94 critical 
wetlands in the country that needed protection under the 2016 National 
Wetland Conservation and Management Programme of the Government 
of India, due to the rapidly changing urban landscape surrounding it, the 
marsh’s area was already reduced to a tenth of its former size between the 
1960s and 2007 (Drescher et al. 2007). The marsh’s area decreased from 
6,000 hectares in 1906 to 593 hectares by 2007. Much of the water from 
the wetland has been pushed southwards onto what used to be ‘low- and 
high- density vegetation’ and is now replaced by ‘moderate to dense built- 
up’ areas (Vencatesan et al. 2014). There has been significant land- use 
conversion into residential and industrial uses (63 per cent and 850 per 
cent increases respectively), while wetland and water bodies have been 
drastically reduced in size (63 per cent decrease). This land- use change 
is a crucial factor that exacerbates flood risk in the city (Arabindoo 2016; 
Jayaraman 2016a).
But what enabled the conversion of these environmentally sensitive 
areas to urban land uses in the first place? There is an underlying land gov-
ernance regime that may provide some reasons. Poromboke – a vernacular 
term derived from puram meaning outside and pokku referring to books 
of (governance) accounts (Gopalakrishnan 2017) – in Tamil Nadu were 
once public commons and consisted of wetlands, riverbanks, eris (water 
reservoirs) and pasturelands that did not generate taxes. However, since 
they had no purpose in the colonial context, which focused on revenue 
generation from productive agricultural lands, the British changed their 
classification (Baden- Powell 1892), to what came to be known in offi-
cial parlance as ‘wastelands’– a designation that remains in place to this 
day. Following Indian independence, these lands were transferred to the 
state, rather than reverting to their original common ownership. With 
increasing urbanisation pressures, the state began using these ‘waste-
lands’ (Jayaraman 2016b) instead of otherwise expensive urban land 
for purposes including affordable housing, sewage treatment plants, and 
a landfill. Over the last decade, tsunami- and flood- affected families in 
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Chennai have been moved to state- sponsored resettlement colonies built 
on these very environmentally sensitive poromboke marshlands. These 
‘wastelands’ continue to be converted for more lucrative commercial uses 
such as for industry, public transport and private- sector institutions.
Overall, the evidence alludes to new risks being created by building 
affordable housing in environmentally sensitive locations, exacerbated 
further by poor service delivery. Ironically, people affected by disasters, 
including those caused by tampering with the environment, are moved to 
the same housing locations that created the risks in the first place.
Continuing environmental and socio- economic  
risks for the people
Our research shows that disaster- affected people are ‘affected’ not just by 
the disasters, but also subsequently by risk reduction interventions in the 
form of resettlements, and then continuing environmental hazard expo-
sure alongside newly created socio- economic vulnerabilities in these new 
sites. The 2004 tsunami affected Chennai’s coastal communities severely. 
Fishing settlements from Ennore in north Chennai to Neelankarai in the 
south were directly affected, with the loss of lives and fishing equipment, 
and damage to fishing harbours and personal property. The state’s main 
recovery intervention was rebuilding infrastructure and relocating fish-
ers from so- called ‘hazard- prone’ coastal areas to resettlement colonies 
across Chennai, often far from the sea and hence their livelihoods. The 
successive waves of resettlement, which spanned several years, were 
divisive and exclusionary (Housing and Land Rights Network 2014; 
Information and Resource Centre for the Deprived Urban Communities 
and Housing and Land Rights Network 2017), impacted fishers deeply 
through long- term impacts on livelihoods and mental trauma, and 
eroded social and political capital.
The 2015 floods were used to continue and expand resettlement, 
focusing on informal settlements along the Adyar and Cooum rivers. This 
resettlement has been heavily criticised for ghettoising communities into 
high- rise enclaves far from places of work, exacerbating risk by build-
ing on environmentally fragile marshlands, and causing issues with mul-
tigenerational repercussions such as inadequate public services, safety 
concerns, and overall marginalisation.
Of the 55 households surveyed, 20 reported losing their liveli-
hoods after moving. The three resettlement sites studied (Kannaginagar, 
Semmencherry, and Perumbakkam) were at least 20 km away from their 
previous place of residences: on riverbanks of the Adyar in Saidapet and 
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Surya Teja Nagar for the flood- affected, and in coastal areas of Santhome 
for the tsunami- affected. Hence, following resettlement, people spent 
a lot of time and money travelling to work (38 per cent of households 
reported travelling more than 5 km to reach their workplace, which added 
to their costs). Several others, notably women, lost their jobs as domestic 
workers and could not travel long distances for other jobs, demonstrating 
how the resettlement exacerbated socio- economic vulnerability.
Second- order impacts of resettlement were varied (see Figure 14.3). 
Importantly, 43 per cent of respondents indicated that the incidence 
of flooding was bad when they arrived, and over time 30 per cent said 
that it worsened, while 40 per cent perceived that their exposure to 
flooding remained the same. This is in sharp contrast to top- down, pub-
lic authority- led narratives of resettlement reducing flood exposure. 
Similarly, 38 per cent said that house quality was poor when they arrived, 
and it worsened over time for the majority. 66 per cent of respondents 
reported having difficulty paying rent when they arrived, and almost all 
of the respondents felt that it either worsened or remained just as bad 
over time. About 50 per cent of them complained of increased disease 
incidence after they moved.
Some conditions were bad when relocated residents arrived, and 
remained unchanged over time, such as drinking water, which was 
reported to be bad by 40 per cent of people on arrival. Similarly, for elec-
tricity 51 per cent said that conditions were bad and there were a lot of 
power cuts. About 43 per cent said their ability to repay loans worsened 























































































































































































Figure 14.3 Change in access to services and living conditions in 





Some parameters seemed to improve over time in some areas. While 
78 per cent of the respondents said the availability of jobs was bad when 
they arrived, 39 per cent said it improved over time. Similarly, 65 per cent 
said that access to markets was poor when they arrived, and 63 per cent 
said it improved over the years; 65 per cent had found health facilities poor, 
and 62 per cent reported education facilities as poor when they arrived at 
these resettlement sites, but a majority said they had improved over time.
An unintended consequence of the resettlement was the disrup-
tion of social ties and the creation of artificial communities in reset-
tlement colonies. While most respondents in the survey reported that 
political and community networks remained the same over years, the 
in- depth interviews demonstrated that people reported decreased well-
being in resettled areas because of issues of safety, regular incidents of 
conflict and increased alcoholism and drug use. Together, these factors 
have led to resettlement colonies being perceived as unsafe and unhy-
gienic, with residents thus marginalised twice over. The repercussions 
of these marginalisations are very direct and long term: as one respond-
ent, referring to the stigma associated with living in Kannaginagar 
since the tsunami, elaborated, ‘You say you are from Kannaginagar, 
and [a] post [i.e. job] is closed for you’ (interview with a resident of 
Kannaginagar, 2016).
A more intangible yet long- lasting impact of resettlement was the 
fraying of political ties and avenues to exercise one’s agency. As a reset-
tled household head noted, ‘We knew our MLAs [local elected members 
to the legislative assembly] and other party leaders and we used to get 
help from there. But here we are new and we do not know anyone yet’ 
(interview with a resident of Perumbakkam, 2016). This severing of 
communities from their carefully cultivated informal and formal socio- 
political capital meant that after moving, their bargaining power and 
grievance redressal platforms narrowed considerably.
The most telling statistic from the survey was that when asked if 
they preferred to stay in resettlement colonies or to return to their origi-
nal housing, 75 per cent (n=41) of respondents chose going back. Among 
these, common reasons for wanting to return were a better quality of life 
and access to services (24 per cent); better job opportunities in previ-
ous locations (24 per cent); feelings of safety and sense of community 
(15 per cent); and remaining close to the city (10 per cent). Eventually, 
these communities, who were resettled in low- lying areas, continue to 
face local flooding and other health implications that come with water-
logging (such as water- and vector- borne diseases and skin allergies). 
This implies that while they were moved from hazard- prone areas with 
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the stated objective of reducing their risks, they continue to live with haz-
ard exposure, despite the economic, financial and social costs borne for 
the resettlement.
Overall, through first- order impacts of the hazard event itself 
and second- order impacts of top- down resettlement, we conclude that 
Chennai saw a concentration of risk for disaster- affected communities. 
This played out through the move into poor- quality housing in flood- 
prone areas; cascading disaster impacts such as loss of livelihood and 
issues of safety and community conflict; and eroded dignity, peripherali-
sation and a narrowing of avenues to exercise agency or demand rights.
risk- blind urban development: a cause of future risk
The majority of the resettlement sites described above, as well as the 
areas identified for future housing schemes, were flooded in 2015 (see 
Figure 14.4). Building on these low- lying flood- prone regions puts the 
people who will inhabit these resettlement sites at the risk of floods 
again. This will disproportionately affect the poor and those who cannot 
Figure 14.4 Affordable housing sites identified in the Second Master 
Plan overlaid on 2015 flood map. © Authors, based on data from CMDA 





afford to live elsewhere in the city. Many of them moved with the aim of 
reducing risk, only to find that they are still at risk in their new homes. 
Such building activity on the low- lying areas also reduces the available 
surfaces for rainwater percolation, thereby increasing stormwater run- 
off and possibly exacerbating the existing flood conditions. This, in turn, 
could also lead to a decrease in groundwater recharge, which could be a 
significant threat to the city’s water supply in the future.
Planning instruments, which are often reactive in their approach, 
also seem to be contradicting each other. Areas covered by former salt 
pans, mangroves and water bodies and marked as ecologically sensi-
tive in the Coastal Zone Management Plan have been earmarked for 
‘hazardous and special industries’ in the Second Chennai Master Plan 
(CMDA 2008; Coastal Resource Centre 2016b; Tamil Nadu Coastal Zone 
Management Authority 2011). Many of these ecologically sensitive areas 
are already built upon by public and private agencies (for example, as 
affordable housing), including the area adjacent to the Buckingham 
Canal otherwise marked as an aquifer recharge area under the Second 
Chennai Master Plan (CMDA 2008; Jain et al. 2017). Refer to Figure 14.2 
for more details.
The IT corridor is planned between the two environmentally sensi-
tive areas, Pallikaranai marsh on the west and the aquifer recharge zone on 
the east, leading to rapid construction and development in the catchment 
areas over the last two decades, driving planned and unplanned building 
activities on the aquifer recharge zone (see Figure 14.2). Similarly, the 
outlet from the Pallikaranai marsh, Okkiyam Maduvu, which drains the 
excess water from the marsh into the Buckingham Canal, passes through 
the IT corridor zone. Real estate development in the IT corridor and 
resettlement colonies in Ezhil Nagar and Kannaginagar have also nar-
rowed the outlet canal, reducing its capacity to carry stormwater into the 
sea. This was similar to the case in Semmencherry and Perumbakkam, 
where the government built resettlement colonies over a drainage chan-
nel in the catchment of the Pallikaranai marsh.
The Chennai Second Master Plan identifies the low- lying areas 
along the rivers and channels as prone to flooding. The master plan 
highlights that development in these low- lying areas can be allowed 
with the clearance from the public works department if the new devel-
opment is designed to make it free from inundation (CMDA 2008). 
However, due to increased paving and construction activities in the 
catchment and low- lying areas, increased surface run- off is leading to 
flooding and reduced groundwater recharge, and these issues continue 
to remain unaddressed.
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Conclusion
Chennai is prone to certain environmental hazards owing to its geograph-
ical location. Urban pressures, similar to those experienced by all major 
growing South Asian cities, strain the limited land and environmental 
resources. But it is the governance regime, driven by a unidimensional 
and static understanding of ‘risk’ and with a particular approach for risk 
reduction through resettlement, that is leading to long- term risk creation 
at the watershed, city, settlement and household levels.
Despite large investments, hazard exposure and experiences 
of losses continue to increase. Focus on housing and resettlement as 
a means for reducing exposure and recovery is predominantly exclu-
sionary and exacerbates vulnerability. It is based on a narrow under-
standing of risk only as hazard exposure, and ignores the increasing 
vulnerabilities and exposure, especially owing to climate change. 
In this case, people are forced to move from one exposed location to 
another, with worse social and economic conditions than their previ-
ous lifestyles. Poor people are affected disproportionately – impacted 
first by hazard events, then by post- disaster intervention processes and 
thereafter by continued hazard exposure as well as worsened socio- 
economic conditions.
This case strengthens the already well- known premise that dis-
asters are a consequence of poor development practices, but also high-
lights how this link is not yet made or, if made, has not been acted on 
by planning agencies. In Chennai, a lucrative economic outlook for land 
development drives planning decisions, with persistent apathy for the 
environment and marginalised sections of society. This is locking the 
city’s growth into an unsustainable and inequitable pathway.
There is an urgent need for leadership to build capacities, institu-
tional systems and procedures to recognise the environmental and social 
implications of large- scale interventions, such as resettlement and relo-
cation, on the city’s future. It will take a concerted effort from policy-
makers, planners and funding and implementing agencies to arrive at 
creative solutions for addressing growth needs without causing harm to 
the socio- ecological system. It will also require an effective civil society 
and concerned citizen groups to hold the state accountable, to build a 
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Flood risk- induced relocation  
in urban areas: case studies  
of Bwaise and Natete, Kampala
teddy kisembo
Global climate and land- use changes are expected to induce significant 
alterations in climate and hydrological regimes in urban areas, produc-
ing flash floods with significant impacts in terms of damage to property 
and loss of human life. This will force people to relocate in search of a 
lower risk location (Minninger and Wirsching 2015). Climate change is 
accentuating decisions for relocation partly due to the shortened recov-
ery period between flash flood events, which are becoming more fre-
quent. Climate- induced extreme events lead to damage to infrastructure, 
houses and livelihoods, causing households and other actors to reach the 
tipping points1 for deciding on relocation and resettlement.
Though the impact of climate change on localised extreme rainfall 
events is still not well understood because of limitations of modelling and 
data, it is already evident that flash floods are affecting local urban areas 
more frequently and intensely (Bicknell, Dodman and Satterthwaite 
2009). The implication of the increased frequency and severity of flash 
floods is that resettlement2 and relocation3 will become key needs in 
policy- and decision- making at multiple scales. Relocation and resettle-
ment are often the result of a variety of layered causes – economic, social 
and political – which are accentuated by the changing environment as 
well as development and demographic conditions.
Kampala experiences extreme events, with rainfall exceeding 
300 mm per month in the city region (Lwasa 2010). The hilly terrain with 
valleys that have suffered spontaneous housing and infrastructure devel-
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city transportation, have knock- on health effects, and damage infrastruc-
ture, causing cumulative damages and losses to the city and its residents. 
Further, environmental degradation in Kampala is largely characterised 
by the reclaiming of wetlands, clearance of vegetation and dumping of 
rubbish in water channels, all of which interfere with water flow and 
make neighbouring communities vulnerable to both flash flooding and 
waterlogging. Each year there are climatic events that present risks to 
city residents and urban systems (Douglas et al. 2008). Though floods in 
Kampala do not generally have a very long duration – normally lasting 
from several hours to at most two days – they do cause major disrup-
tion to the lives of Kampala’s citizens and they entail high economic and 
social costs (Barrow et al. 2016). Generally, the relatively poorer citizens 
of Kampala experience more of the burden of flooding, as many of them 
live in the relatively low- lying valleys and wetlands (Sliuzas et al. 2013). 
The urban poor live in slums that are at high risk from the impacts of 
climate and natural hazards. Their choice of where to live is driven by 
a series of trade- offs between what is affordable, proximity to income- 
earning opportunities, and where individuals may have social networks 
and kinship ties. Areas that are affordable to the poor are typically on 
hazard- prone lands deemed undesirable to others, which are usually 
informal settlements with insecure tenure (Baker 2012).
This chapter analyses households’ decisions to relocate or not relo-
cate based on the study of two neighbourhoods in Kampala. The objec-
tives of this chapter are threefold: to analyse the drivers and the tipping 
points at which people decide to move or not; to identify the reasons why 
people tolerate risks; and to discuss the household process of implement-
ing decisions regarding voluntary and involuntary relocation.
Framing the analysis of risk- induced relocation
The decision to move from a hazard- prone area, or to remain, is influenced 
by many factors. People’s perception of risk is always a critical point in a 
process that may eventually lead to relocation, whether voluntarily or 
involuntarily (see Chapter 4 by Johnson et al. in this book). When there 
is a perceived threat to the lives, livelihood or assets of a household, the 
interplay of each factor weighs in the decision to relocate or not. External 
threats in the context of this chapter are related to climate- induced flash 
floods as part of the broader environmental hazards. Poverty, failing 
ecosystems, vulnerability to natural hazards and gradual climate- driven 
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environmental changes are all linked to the need for relocation (Bunce, 
Rosendo and Brown 2009).
This chapter employs a framework that understands the macro fac-
tors shaping hazards as spatial, temporal and variable (Douglas et al. 
2008; Kithiia 2011). These factors may occur gradually or suddenly, and 
governance and city management policies also interact with the factors 
that lead to perceived or actual threat to the households. Once a hazard 
event occurs, the decision- making process starts and different factors 
including economic, social, health- related, household characteristics, 
costs of reducing risk and costs of moving are weighed differently by dif-
ferent households before making a decision (Lwasa et al. 2009; McBean 
2012). This framing recognises that drivers and conditioning factors 
do not necessarily mean that relocation will occur. Whether relocation 
occurs or not depends on a series of intervening factors and personal and 
household characteristics. Moreover, substantial social, economic and 
human capital may be required to enable people to relocate.
In this chapter, the cumulative effects of frequent flash floods are 
used to explain how and when households get to the point of deciding to 
relocate or not. Likewise, governance and institutional factors, though 
inherent at the household level in shaping the decisions, may have an 
independent influence on the decision around involuntary relocation. 
Involuntary relocation is usually project- based and will involve market- 
based valuation of the household assets exposed to floods such that a 
decision is made for the affected households to relocate. There are cases 
where the valuation prolongs the negotiations before relocation occurs, 
exposing the household to more frequent flash floods. The people who 
tend to stay may be poor, but they may also be households with assets 
worth protecting or costly to move.
Materials and methods
research study area
Kampala has grown to be the largest urban centre and the only city in 
Uganda. It is Uganda’s political seat and the country’s economic hub, 
accounting for 80 per cent of industrial and commercial activities and 
generating 65 per cent of national GDP (KCCA 2014). The city has an 
estimated 1.75 million residents and is a working environment for an 
estimated daily workforce of 4.5 million, with an annual demographic 
growth rate of 3.9 per cent (KCCA 2014). Its growing population, high 
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level of informality and service delivery problems are typical of many 
African cities (Chereni et al. 2020). Kampala experiences flash floods 
virtually every year, leaving little room for recovery by households or 
institutions. Flood- related losses and damage to people’s property are 
escalating, while the cost of maintaining roads and drainage chan-
nels is also on the rise. One of the key outcomes of flood- related risk 
is a downturn in public health. The incidence of water- borne diseases 
such as cholera, typhoid, dysentery and malaria, which are linked to 
flood and precipitation events characterised by variable climate, is 
increasing.
The research was carried out in Kampala with a focus on two neigh-
bourhoods, Bwaise III and Natete, both of which are highly prone to flash 
floods (see Figure 15.1). These two neighbourhoods were chosen as they 
enabled us to understand the relocation decisions of households affected 
by flash floods, including those that had relocated within the neighbour-
hood. The majority of the residents in these settlements are low- income 
earners, involved in small- scale businesses within the area, such that a 
large number of people, infrastructure, livelihoods and social services 
are exposed to severe destruction, damage, dampness and health chal-
lenges when it floods. For some, their vulnerability further increases 
with the rising costs of individual anti- flood interventions. For others, 
Figure 15.1 Location of research areas within greater Kampala. 
© Teddy Kisembo.
 
rEthinkinG urbAn risk And rEsEttLEmEnt in thE GLobAL south294
  
the choice to relocate from the area engenders additional costs and loss 
of social networks.
Bwaise III Parish
Bwaise III Parish is located in the Kawempe division, 5 km from the city 
centre. It is located along the downstream area of a primary drain, the 
Lubigi. The neighbourhood is a busy commercial centre traversed by 
the Kampala– Gulu highway linking the north of the country to the capi-
tal. The parish has five villages or zones – St Francis, Kalimali, Bukasa, 
Katoogo and Bugalani – with most of the area located in the swamp, mak-
ing it significantly prone to flooding. Bwaise III is a densely populated 
area with approximately thirty- five thousand people and an estimated 
seven thousand households with an average size of five people each 
(Actogether Uganda 2017). The majority of the residents are low- income 
earners, involved in small- scale activities within the area. The parish is 
also largely unplanned and highly built up, with a mixture of housing, 
shops, schools, religious buildings, markets and health centres concen-
trated in the same area (Ajambo 2013).
Natete Parish
Natete Parish is located in Lubaga division, on the south- western edge 
of the city of Kampala along Nsooba drainage channel. Natete has an 
estimated population of forty- five thousand people living in nine thou-
sand households with an average household size of five people each 
(Actogether Uganda 2017). Natete Parish is a high- density settlement 
comprising residential areas and light industry. Despite inadequate infra-
structure, it is an economically vibrant area, steadily increasing its contri-
bution to Kampala’s economy (Dodman et al. 2015).
data collection
The study is based on an exploratory and diagnostic type of research in 
which data was collected through interviews. These captured informa-
tion relevant to determining the different form of relocations associated 
with flooding, understanding tipping points that make people relocate, 
the perceived tolerable risk that makes people stay and the process of 
relocation.
Qualitative data was used to offer more in- depth explanations of 
the temporal dimension of relocations. Sixteen interviews were con-
ducted with policymakers to gain more insight into the environment and 
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A total of 54 respondents were interviewed through a snowball sampling 
process to target households that had relocated, while 26 respondents 
were interviewed through random sampling for people living in flood- 
prone areas. We also interviewed households who had relocated within 
the same neighbourhood, after identifying them with the help of field 
guides.
data analysis
To understand the hazard events, impacts and relocation decisions, the 
study employed thematic content analysis using the in- depth interviews 
from open- ended questionnaires to describe the motivation for reloca-
tion, what makes people tolerate the risk and the strategies for coping 
with flooding. Some supportive quantitative data is used, but this study 
mainly relies on views and experiences expressed during the interviews. 
This helps the nuanced understanding of tipping points for relocation 
decisions.
Findings
different forms of relocations induced by flooding
The forms of relocation found across the settlements were temporary 
relocation (this is largely voluntary, within and outside the settlements) 
and permanent relocation (both voluntary and involuntary, within and 
outside the settlement).
Temporary relocations
Across both sites, 40 per cent of respondents relocate temporarily and 
then come back to their homes after the waters have receded. This tem-
porary relocation can be seen as a coping response to the emergency 
since people often return to their homes immediately after the waters 
recede. Since floods occur frequently, populations have become used to 
tackling the consequence by seeking temporary shelter in various places. 
Ten per cent of respondents across the two sites relocated temporarily 
during flood events within their settlements, either to a friend or relative 
whose place is less prone to flooding or where the water doesn’t enter the 
house. Ten per cent relocated to friends or relatives outside the sites, in 
areas such as Kawempe, Nabweru, Ndeeba and Kyengera. The remain-
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roads where they can sleep, cook or just stay there until the waters recede 
and they can return to their homes.
Permanent relocation
Permanent relocation is considered by the affected people to be a normal 
or near- normal adaptation strategy for flooding. Populations that have 
relocated permanently also view it as a coping mechanism and survival 
strategy. However, permanent relocation is a choice not open to everyone 
as it depends on resources, information and other social and personal 
factors.
The study shows that permanent relocations covered 21.4 per 
cent of all cases, with 14.3 per cent relocated voluntarily and 7.1 per 
cent involuntarily. The involuntary relocation was from Bwaise dur-
ing the widening of the Lubigi drainage channel. Therefore, these were 
people that were affected by the Second Kampala Institutional and 
Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP2).4 Most of the permanent 
relocations were from areas that are highly prone to flooding to areas 
that are less prone or not prone at all. However, some relocated to areas 
outside of their settlements. Of the 21.4 per cent of respondents who 
have relocated permanently across the two sites, 11.4 per cent relocated 
within their neighbourhood in Bwaise, 4.3 per cent relocated within 
their neighbourhood in Natete, and 5.7 per cent relocated outside the 
neighbourhoods of Bwaise and Natete to places like Ntinda, Kinaawa, 
Kawempe and Kyengera.
There is a direct link between relocation and displacement.5 Before 
populations can relocate either temporarily or permanently, voluntarily 
or involuntarily, there has to be some form of displacement due to flood-
ing of their houses, damage to housing and assets etc., necessitating relo-
cation. However, the displacement for those who relocate is temporary, 
because after the waters recede they return to their homes.
tipping points that make people relocate
Tipping points are conditions or thresholds at which a series of flood 
events or incidents become significant enough to cause households or 
individuals to relocate permanently. These households do not seem to 
have a strong buffer for recovery from the frequent high impacts of flash 
floods to housing, livelihoods and health. These households were some-
how displaced because their livelihoods were being threatened by the 
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for themselves (see Figure 15.2). Across both sites, there were several 
different reasons for households reaching the tipping points, and many 
households indicated more than one reason:
• when the floodwaters inundate the houses frequently during rainy 
seasons
• constant loss and damage of property
• frequent health risk during rainy seasons (with diseases such as chol-
era, foot diseases and diarrhoea)
• destruction of livelihoods
• the high cost of managing floods, which in the long run puts a strain 
on their income
• children at risk of drowning and illness
• children skipping school for fear of drowning
• general frustration with the situation.
When flooding events coincide with economic or social stress-
ors, the potential for relocation becomes more and more significant. As 
Figure 15.3 shows, the point where the flood episodes and possibility of 
relocation cross is the tipping point. Below it, the risk is tolerable.
Assets are reduced as flood episodes increase, and the possibility 
for permanent relocation also increases. To a great extent, the asset port-
folios of individuals, households and communities determine their adap-
tive capacity about avoiding risk – meaning that when an individual’s 
Figure 15.2 Property damaged and abandoned due to flooding in 
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or household’s assets reduce, their versatile limit is undermined, which 
increases the likelihood of them moving. Assets are means of construct-
ing, reconstructing and diversifying an individual’s, household’s or 
community’s livelihood base, increasing their capabilities to invest and 
contribute to individual, household and community wellbeing (Bazaz 
et al. 2016).
reasons why people tolerate risk
The present section explains why people live with the associated chal-
lenges of flood- prone areas. This covers those who able and willing to 
tolerate the risk and those who do not wish to relocate at all or those who 
wish to relocate but are unable to do so. Several reasons seem to influ-
ence the level and length of tolerance of flood risk by people living and 
working in Bwaise and Natete (see Figure 15.4). It is advantageous for 
some households to stay and others to relocate.
Twenty per cent of the respondents can tolerate the flood risk by 
coping with impacts because they have lived in their settlements for a 
long time, have become used to the flood and have nowhere else to go. 
One of the respondents from Bwaise said: ‘Floods come and go and life 
goes on. It isn’t like the waters stay for a week, only for a few hours. We 
are kind of used to that’ (interview with resident of Bwaise III Parish, 
Kalimali zone by Teddy Kisembo, 13 June 2016). Their lives revolve 
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around their neighbourhoods, which makes them tolerate the risk. They 
are immobile because they are not willing to relocate at any cost.
Other reasons why people do not want to relocate from their resi-
dences are social ties and a sense of belonging that comes with that. 
Having lived with their neighbours for so long, social relations have grown 
strong as years go by. With such attachment comes a sense of belonging, 
which in turn makes it difficult for some households to relocate.
People across the two sites are tolerant of the risk because of the 
location of their places of work or business. Although they are affected by 
the floods in terms of loss of customers and machinery and at times dam-
age to stock, the benefits of doing business in these communities seem to 
outweigh the impacts caused by the frequent floods.
Affordable or cheap accommodation is also one of the reasons why 
some households tolerate flood risk. The only reason they are tolerant of 
flood risk is that their communities offer cheap housing and they cannot 
afford to move to places where the rent is too high for them. In both set-
tlements, rent may be as low as 10,000 Ugandan shillings (approximately 
US$2.70) per month, which means these communities are affordable for 
Figure 15.4 People going on with their lives amid flooding in Natete, 
Nafuka zone. © Teddy Kisembo.
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them. Thus, it is the low incomes of these individuals which make them 
have to tolerate the risk.
Livelihoods formed around their neighbourhoods are another rea-
son some residents of Bwaise and Natete tolerate flood hazard. This is 
coupled with social ties: they may have a history of living in these settle-
ments for a long time and of doing business or trade within the communi-
ties. These settlements are not only places of residence but also a place of 
doing business, ranging from food vending and retail shops to laundry, 
carpentry and vehicle repairs. Relocating would mean recreating this 
livelihood, and this is so expensive for them that they would rather toler-
ate the impacts of flooding.
Contentment is another reason that was mentioned why people 
tolerate risk in Bwaise and Natete. The respondents said they are con-
tent where they are. This can be attributed to the fact they own land in 
these settlements and are not willing to relocate somewhere else where 
they would have to begin renting. Contentment can also be attributed 
to social identity or ties, livelihoods and having lived in a place for so 
long. Residents may be content with a neighbourhood that is affordable 
in terms of the housing and services it offers, and close to the city centre.
The study also revealed that people who have lived somewhere for 
less than a year and those who have lived there for one to five years are 
willing to tolerate risk. This can be attributed to the fact that they have 
just moved into the settlement and they are not in a position to take on 
the cost of moving again so soon. Living in a flood- prone area is due to 
their limited budget and the need to access employment services, which 
in turn, exposes them to flood hazard.
decisions about relocation by residents
Relocation is based on a decision made by individuals or households that 
is influenced by many interconnected factors. These decisions attempt 
to ensure survival and the ability to live in dignity. People often decide 
to leave their homes when changes in several factors coincide. If flood-
ing in Bwaise and Natete continues to advance, worsening or destroy-
ing livelihoods and the properties of more and more people, relocation 
will become unavoidable. Individuals make decisions on their location 
and movements based on their quality of life and the livelihoods of them-
selves and their families.
Households that relocate are motivated by aspirations to improve 
their lives and livelihoods. Some leave the previous home out of choice 
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and others are obliged to do so, like those evicted by the drainage chan-
nel enlargement projects. Relocation, particularly permanent relocation, 
involves both choice and constraints. Most of the households or individ-
uals have the choice to relocate but they are constrained financially to 
move. The choice of deciding to relocate and do something different or 
interesting is the privilege of people with enough resources and money 
to do so. One of the respondents’ answers as to why she has not yet relo-
cated although she would love to move was ‘Poverty … no person likes to 
live in a flooded area’ (interview with resident of Natete Parish, Nafuka 
zone by Teddy Kisembo, 19 January 2016). Another respondent said: ‘I 
have not yet got the money to pay for advance rent … you know that 
landlord wants you to pay for an advance of 3– 4 months’ (interview with 
resident of Bwaise III Parish, Kalimali zone by Teddy Kisembo, 13 June 
2016). Individuals and families make decisions to relocate based on ana-
lysing the possibilities of settling elsewhere and the available resources 
for making the move.
There is a clear sense of resignation and submission to the con-
sequences of living in an area that floods regularly (see Figure 15.5). 
This suggests that, for the most part, the respondents are tolerating the 
flood risk. Any decision to relocate does not, therefore, appear to be 
primarily determined by flood risk and indicates that there are other 
Figure 15.5 Flooded area in Natete Parish, Nafuka zone. © Teddy 
Kisembo.
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more fundamental factors at play that influence decisions about when 
to move. The data suggests that their decision- making might be influ-
enced by other factors, such as constant failure to manage the floods, 
the high cost of managing floods by households and the reduction of 
household assets.
There are overlapping issues where people tolerate risk because 
they are unable to relocate due to poverty. For example, some of the 
respondents had entertained the thought of moving from their neigh-
bourhood. Issues preventing them from moving included not finding 
another suitable place, not finding a buyer for the current place or not 
having enough money to buy a place in another location. Thus, the issues 
of access to land, affordability, relocation costs and social ties seem 
more influential on decisions around relocation than just flood risk (see 
Chapter 9 by Marx in this book).
Vulnerability to extreme events such as floods and the ability to 
move are related to social, economic and political capital. People with 
low to medium asset levels often become trapped and unable to move 
permanently, despite frequent flooding events. Low involvement in social 
networks beyond their settlements also increases people’s possibility of 
being trapped. Trapped populations are those people who aspire to relo-
cate for their protection but cannot do so. Our research found that 41 per 
cent of the respondents who stay are trapped populations because they 
have the desire to leave their settlements – or are in desperate need to 
leave – but they do not see a way to move to new places that are not prone 
to flooding because they do not have the financial ability to relocate.
The population that stays can be categorised into two 
groups: trapped populations and immobile populations (that is, people 
who choose to stay). The immobile are immobile out of choice, while 
the trapped are unable to relocate. Therefore, it is important to con-
sider aspiration and ability as key concepts in analysing relocation. The 
trapped population always has a wish to relocate, though they face a 
challenge in the realisation of that wish; therefore it is important to 
understand why these people want to relocate but are unable to do 
so. When trapped in a fluctuating process which can be amplified by 
flooding events, there is a need to distinguish between not wanting to 
relocate and not being able to relocate and the possibility of voluntary 
immobility. Distinguishing those who wish to move (or need to do so in 
times of crisis) but remain in situ from those who do not wish to move 
is likely to be extremely difficult, not least because people’s judgement 
about whether it is necessary to relocate is likely to change over even 
quite short periods (Ulla 2016).
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City- level strategies for managing flood impacts on relocation
This section presents the discussions from interviews with the city 
authorities about the relationship between encroachment on wetlands 
and floods and the implication of these interacting factors for Kampala.
Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) is trying to scale up the 
greening of all open spaces to deter unnecessary drain- or stormwa-
ter run- off. Unfortunately, there is little space for KCCA to bank on 
because property developers are slowly converting originally low- 
density  development into high- density development. The KCCA Physical 
Planning Department is trying to encourage developers to both pave and 
commit some space on their sites for greening. KCCA also hope soon to 
pass a policy where developers adopt on- site water harvesting to reduce 
the water run- off.
KCCA is trying as much as possible to incorporate flood manage-
ment within the design by specifying how to use septic systems and how 
to discharge waste on site, although some developers decide not to go to 
KCCA for development approval. This indicates that KCCA understands 
the role wetlands play in reducing flooding compared to the technical 
solutions of the construction of drainage channels, though there seems 
to be little evidence to enable the conservation and preservation of the 
wetlands.
Complexity seems to typify the process of controlling development 
and protecting the wetlands from encroachment. The Ministry of Lands, 
Housing and Urban Development has a stake in registering land, while 
KCCA only approves the development. KCCA faces a challenge whereby 
people who are supposed to be implementing the recommendations put 
forward do not do so because these recommendations affect the imple-
menters, and they are required to give up some of the lands that have 
been encroached on. The Directorate of Public Health and Environment 
in KCCA reviews environmental impact assessments and gives com-
ments to NEMA (the National Environmental Management Authority). 
However, their comments are not binding: NEMA can consider KCCA’s 
comments or disregard them. This leaves KCCA with the role of exam-
ining building plans and monitoring developments in wetlands while 
NEMA examines environmental impacts on development.
The government is embarking on the process of deregistration or 
cancellation of land titles in wetlands as a way of trying to save the wet-
lands from perishing. The logic behind the cancellation of titles is not 
for ‘flood risk reduction’ directly, but rather for the protection of ecologi-
cally important areas of the city by stopping the degradation of wetlands. 
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However, this maintenance of wetlands performs several ecological func-
tions, such as reducing flooding. Deregistration of people means that 
people will have to relocate after being compensated.
Conclusion
Flood- induced relocation in Kampala seems to be a response that is 
taken at the household level to diversify income streams and secure live-
lihoods in the face of deteriorating environmental and living conditions. 
Evidence from the study suggests that flooding destroys and damages 
property, and affects incomes and health, hence affecting access to live-
lihood assets at household level, which then directly causes relocation.
Evidence from the research also suggests that flood- induced relo-
cation is a coping strategy for households who are affected by flooding 
and can afford to relocate. The survey revealed that the households used 
relocation as a coping strategy for flooding events either temporarily or 
permanently. Relocation can help reduce risk to lives, livelihoods and 
ecosystems. It can also contribute to income diversification and enhance 
the overall capacity of households and communities to cope with flood-
ing events. However, relocation is a coping strategy not available to 
everyone as it depends on resources, information and other social and 
personal privileges.
Those who are unable to move away from potential danger have 
inevitably lost a lot more, too. There are reasons to be concerned for the 
populations that are unable to relocate: their inability to relocate magni-
fies their vulnerability to flooding. To be ‘trapped’, individuals must not 
only lack the ability to move but also either want or need to move.
The people living and continuing to stay in flood- prone areas can 
use flood risk as an opportunity whereby living with the risk provides 
an opportunity to establish or maintain an income flow that would oth-
erwise not be possible. From a poor household or small enterprise per-
spective, living with flood risks on encroached land is likely to play an 
important role in making livelihoods possible or sustaining them. That is, 
the ‘risk’ will create an opportunity to start something, however meagre 
or slim the margins, and risk can be an opportunity to transform society 
into a higher level of sustainability.
KCCA’s focus on the flood measures prevents them from discussing 
relocation as an adaptive strategy. There is a need for officials in KCCA to 
shift the understanding of flooding and its impact on people’s mobility 
from technological to social, and from narrow- sighted to open- minded 
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problem- solving. Rather than seeing flooding as a sudden- onset short- 
term crisis, policymakers should adopt a holistic perspective to challenge 
the norm of relocation and address relocation as an adaptation strategy. 
Adaptation strategies can take the form of a portfolio of solutions for 
implementing the rights of people to move, among other measures.
Notes
 1. A tipping point is the threshold that, when exceeded, will enable or drive people or households 
to move or relocate.
 2. Resettlement is a major integrated, comprehensive movement of people and families which 
normally involves significant distances between the origin and the new location.
 3. Relocation refers to short- distance, non- systematic movements of families or individuals from 
hazard- prone locations to nearby areas.
 4. The Second Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP2) seeks 
to enhance the infrastructure and institutional capacity of Kampala Capital City Authority 
(KCCA) and improve urban mobility for inclusive economic growth. This five- year project is 
worth US$183.7 million and its implementation started in May 2015. The project is funded by 
the World Bank and the government of Uganda, and is implemented by KCCA.
 5. Displacement is a process related to a disruption of the functioning of a household at any scale 
due to flood events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, thereby 
putting them out of place.
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Garima Jain, Allan Lavell and Cassidy Johnson
At the outset of the research presented in this volume, we hypothesised 
a distinction between the different forms of resettlement and relocation. 
Through the research, this typology was developed further, as explored 
by Allan Lavell in Chapter 1, and it became evident that the characteris-
tics of the people, their relationship with the original and relocation sites, 
and the decision- making and implementation processes have a strong 
bearing on the eventual outcomes of intervention on the people and the 
city. The significant repetition of similar ‘errors’ in different contexts and 
cases suggests that the problem is more structural than contextual, and 
that it relates more to the ways resettlement is constructed as a problem 
and the associated sectoral mindsets than to specific, individual causes. 
The latter are, rather, a product of the former.
Several of the contributions to this book illustrate how decision- 
making processes arrive at resettlement and relocation as a ‘solution’ for 
reducing exposure to hazards in a particular location, without sufficient 
consensus within the communities or assessment of alternative interven-
tions. This was especially pronounced in the contributions by Garima 
Jain et al. (Chapters 3 and 14), Cassidy Johnson et al. (Chapter 4), 
Shuaib Lwasa et al. (Chapter 5), and Elizabeth Mansilla (Chapter 13). 
Resettlement and relocation are often immersed in and confused by 
other circumstances and used as an excuse for achieving other goals 
such as urban redevelopment, infrastructure works or the modernisation 
of space. In the process, they create significant tangible and intangible 
costs borne disproportionately by the marginalised communities who are 
moved, and in the long term this also impacts on the functioning of the 
city, for example by increasing urban sprawl.
Lack of adequate land in urban areas is found among the key driv-
ers for such decisions. As Colin Marx explains in Chapter 9, land tenure 
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arrangements impact on whether people are able to settle in environ-
mentally sensitive areas, and this affects the power structures that enable 
them to stay there. In some cases, such as those explored in the contribu-
tions by Yves Cabannes (Chapter 10), Giovanna Astolfo (Chapter 11) and 
Garima Jain et al. (Chapter 14), it is evident that in a context where the 
power is skewed between the people and the state, people are evicted 
from high- value land to far- off areas that push the poor further into dep-
rivation. Some of these practices, being devoid of risk- sensitive planning 
approaches, locate the affordable housing sites on less valued lands that 
are environmentally sensitive, such as marshlands, not just creating haz-
ard risk for the resettled people, but also exacerbating or creating new 
environmental risks for the city.
This is also partly caused by the siloed approach to disaster risk 
reduction and development- centric policies and practices, as illustrated 
by Allan Lavell (Chapter 1) and Garima Jain et al. (Chapters 3 and 14). 
The chapters in this book also indicate how preventative risk reduction 
practices often fall under the purview of development agencies, who 
have limited knowledge of ‘risk’, and take the traditional route of hazard 
exposure reduction as the means for risk reduction. At the same time, 
post- disaster housing, which is undertaken by disaster management 
agencies, does not see the long- term development aspects associated 
with housing as a priority, creating new socio- economic challenges for 
the resettled communities.
On this subject, Anne-Catherine Chardon (Chapter 2) and Garima 
Jain et al. (Chapter 14) argue that housing provision needs to be looked 
at as the building of a habitat, that is, more than just the provision of 
shelter but also addressing the needs of safety, access to livelihoods and 
social  services, and secure tenure, with least disruption to the socio- 
economic systems of communities. Elizabeth Mansilla (Chapter 13) and 
Shuaib Lwasa et al. (Chapter 5) further support this argument by sug-
gesting looking at relocation and resettlement interventions as a means 
to address the overall development objectives at the city scale, while 
reducing existing risks and avoiding risk creation, to take advantage of 
the opportunity of the investments being made.
Meanwhile, it has also become evident through the contributions 
from Cassidy Johnson et al. (Chapter 4), Shuaib Lwasa et al. (Chapter 5), 
Emily Wilkinson (Chapter 6) and Teddy Kisembo (Chapter 15) that along 
with place attachment, people’s own abilities to reduce risk have a direct 
bearing on their decision- making: whether they are willing to move from 
or stay in hazard- exposed areas. This has at least equal impact on these 
decisions to the mere knowledge of hazard exposure.
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Garima Jain (Chapter 3), Cassidy Johnson et al. (Chapter 4), 
Shuaib Lwasa et al. (Chapter 5) and Emily Wilkinson (Chapter 6) also 
provide further insights into the backdrop of the decision- making pro-
cesses: both from the institutional and from communities’ perspectives. 
These chapters indicate that different actors value risk differently and 
these values eventually inform their respective priorities and risk- 
reducing actions. Institutional approaches, often in the form of legal and 
policy frameworks, are largely technocratic and look at the risk through 
its single dimension of hazard exposure. While they are devoid of any 
understanding of everyday risks and the coping systems of the com-
munities, people themselves see disasters primarily as an exaggeration 
of their everyday risks. People inherently pursue a means to maximise 
their asset accumulation (which includes both tangible and intangible 
assets), and any action that would harm this balance or pathway is not 
acceptable to them. It is for this asset accumulation strategy that many 
even choose to live in hazard- exposed areas, if it maximises their overall 
benefits from being located in a certain place. Relocation, therefore, is 
not a solution to address their developmental needs. These are some of 
the reasons why building consensus, although critical, is almost always 
impossible.
Anthony Oliver- Smith (Chapter 7) and Angel Wilson Chávez Eslava 
(Chapter 8) exemplify this through cases of resistance in urban settings 
exposed to climate risks. They bring out the power relations between 
multiple actors and stakeholders, and how the fight for rights within 
skewed governance regimes impacts the eventual resilience outcomes. 
At the same time, Cassidy Johnson et al. (Chapter 4) and Teddy Kisembo 
(Chapter 15) describe, both with theoretical and empirical evidence, 
that at extreme sudden moments, or tipping points, when their risk 
values change, people may even decide to move. Cases like Chennai, as 
described in Chapter 14 by Garima Jain et al., also highlight how states 
are often seen taking advantage of such moments when people are vul-
nerable and have fewer choices of adaptation, to resettle them, a process 
they have otherwise resisted.
Ultimately, it became evident across the many cases that resettle-
ment continues to be unsuccessful in general, barring very few exceptions 
where people’s agency was dominant in the decision- making process and 
the disruption between new and old ways of living was minimised by in 
situ housing, infrastructure upgrading or moving people not too far from 
their previous locations. It was in these latter approaches that people’s 
ownership was maximised, and other social, economic and environmen-
tal costs were minimised.
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Bill Flinn and Holly Schofield, in Chapter 12, shed some light on 
ways of self- recovery, by supporting people’s agency, maximising choices 
of where to rebuild and incentivising the movement through secure 
land tenure policies. This is in line with what Shuaib Lwasa et al. sug-
gest (Chapter 5), that states’ role in providing people with the opportu-
nity to accumulate assets could eventually help people self- insure and 
build further monetary and non- monetary assets. This can improve their 
adaptation choices, resilience and overall wellbeing in the long term. 
In a similar vein, Elizabeth Mansilla (Chapter 13) also draws attention 
to alternative approaches to risk reduction, including a more compre-
hensive management that takes into account environmental, social and 
urban challenges. Finally, Cassidy Johnson et al. call for consensus- 
building platforms, where people and institutional actors could share 
their respective perspectives and knowledge of risk values, arrive at a 
common understanding of acceptable risk, set future resilience targets, 
and devise appropriate and mutually acceptable ways to get there.
Recommendations
At the conclusion of the ‘Reducing Relocation Risk in Urban Areas’ pro-
ject, the research teams prepared a policy brief for each regional study, 
one for Latin America, one for India and one for Uganda. These are 
included as Appendices C, D and E, and they detail a number of recom-
mendations that came out of the study. The research project team also 
prepared a cross- regional policy to generalise the recommendations in an 
international context; this is included as Appendix B.
Emerging areas of research
We also found several new areas that require more research in the future:
• Literature exists that indicates a mediating role of place attachment in 
risk reduction and adaptation responses, but these relationships have 
not been studied in the context of the global South, where the lim-
ited ability to act may further affect the choices available for coping or 
adaptation.
• Disasters are largely an indicator of poor development. Much has been 
said about ‘mainstreaming’ risk reduction in development practices, 







reduction practices is equally important, especially when looking at 
rehabilitation as a means for long- term recovery, and its contribu-
tion to overall development outcomes for the people and the region. 
Therefore, further research is needed to look at what it means to 
mainstream development in disaster risk reduction, and how it can 
be done.
• Urban areas in the global South are extremely dynamic and the vul-
nerabilities and exposure are constantly changing, especially due to 
the changing climate and growing populations. They also face unique 
challenges such as those owing to land pressures, stated difficulties in 
participatory processes in heterogeneous communities, the politics of 
a larger variety of stakeholders, poor planning capabilities, etc., such 
that they need to be studied further to arrive at reasonable alterna-
tives and processes for resettlement and relocation.
• Land markets and land tenure are a key issue that we have only man-
aged to begin to delve into in this research. How land markets and land 
tenure in cities of the global South impact on resettlement decision- 
making and how resettlement can lock in risk geographically need 
further research.
• There is also a need identified for longitudinal studies of the long- term 
implications of actions such as resettlement and relocation.
• It is evident that the practice of resettlement and relocation as a means 
to reduce risk is rampant across the global South as well as the North 
(in the form of ‘managed retreats’); however, there is no clear esti-
mate of the actual scale or numbers of people affected. This lack of 
data obscures the scale of impacts and prevents a cohesive advocacy at 
regional and global levels in search of alternative approaches for risk 
reduction and climate adaptation. A comprehensive documentation of 
such cases from across different regions is highly encouraged.
• More action- research is needed: that is, work with governments and 
communities that are facing risk situations to examine the issues, to 
assist in the implementation of collective decision- making, and espe-
cially to take forward the ideas outlined in the project’s cross- regional 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Risk- related resettlement and 
relocation in urban areas1
Key findings
1. Resettlement and relocation can reduce people’s exposure to haz-
ards – but experience shows that in most cases, it leaves people worse 
off overall in social and economic terms than they were before.
2. Planning needs to guarantee safer locations for new green- site settle-
ments, in order to avoid future needs for resettlement due to undue 
location in hazard- prone areas.
3. Resettlement should always be considered a last resort after all 
options for on- site mitigation or upgrading have been exhausted. 
Decision- making authorities may, and often do, understand risks 
differently from the communities living in environments that they 
know and understand, and alternative actions to resettlement may be 
possible.
4. Policies and procedures must ensure people’s rights are protected; 
legal frameworks may need to be strengthened; and international 
covenants on resettlement must be honoured.
Out of harm’s way?
In cities worldwide, inequalities are high. Low- income populations suf-
fer disproportionately the impacts of climatic and other types of hazard 
events, as well as being exposed to everyday health and human security 
risks. Within these populations, women, the elderly, disabled people and 








As one way of addressing disaster risk, national and local govern-
ments, often supported by international funding agencies, engage in 
resettlement and relocation. While this reduces people’s exposure to 
hazard, it can lead to numerous other problems, which can leave people 
more vulnerable or worse off than they were before. We need to under-
stand better the challenges and associated outcomes of such interven-
tions on people and cities.
To reduce disaster risk, the systemic drivers of environmental deg-
radation and inadequate location of human settlements, contributing to 
multi- dimensional poverty and inequality and site insecurity, need urgent 
attention. Resettlement needs to be understood as part of long- term sus-
tainable development, not just as a means for disaster risk reduction.
Definitions2
Resettlement: major integrated, comprehensive movement of people, 
which normally involves significant distance between the original and 
new locations. It involves not only new housing and services, but also 
new social and economic relations, and new challenges such as access to 
work and social cohesion.
Relocation: non- systematic movement of people from hazard- prone loca-
tions to nearby areas. It involves less upheaval in terms of access to work 
and social networks.
Eviction or displacement: expulsion of people from possession of their 
land or house, usually by a process of law. Households are moved forcibly 
without an alternative location being planned for the move.
Recommendations
• Avoiding any need to consider resettlement. Land use planning lead-
ing to safer locations for populations is of paramount importance in 
order to eliminate or reduce the need for resettlement and relocation 
in the future. Urbanisation, poverty conditions, degradation of local 
and regional natural environments and climate change increase the 
number of people living in highly hazard- prone areas. Therefore, the 
priority is making safe land available for low- income populations, 
minimising new development on hazard- prone land, and the integra-
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• Protect against forced evictions. Hazard exposure is often used as a pre-
text to move people out and destroy their property. National safety- net 
policies and procedures need to be enforced and monitored to protect 
people’s rights and ensure due and just processes are followed.
• Strengthen legal frameworks. Policies may have the stated objective 
of protecting people’s welfare, but be used as a pretext for evictions 
and resettlement, like those applied to ‘untenable’ slums in India and 
‘unmitigable’ risks in some Latin American countries. Selection based 
on these conditions may be subjective and based on archaic data, 
offering a limited view of the risk and the risk reduction options avail-
able. Laws are often rigid, and place too much power in the hands of 
the few.
• Where hazard- prone communities exist, resettlement should be an option 
of last resort and all options for risk reduction should be fully discussed 
and understood. Communities, government and other stakeholders 
need to be fully informed about the issues – including the values of dif-
ferent people, current and future hazards, and potential uses for the 
land to be vacated. Discussion is needed on the alternatives to reset-
tlement and relocation, including potential options for risk reduction 
and on- site upgrading/ rebuilding. People have always lived in hazard- 
prone locations, and may be willing to accept certain risks based on 
the opportunities offered by the location and the value they place on 
it. Decision- making authorities may understand risk differently, often 
equating it with exposure to extreme events. The gap in understand-
ing between communities and authorities is a potential cause of con-
tention, and a platform for dialogue and informed debate is needed to 
overcome these differences.
• Enabling consensus- building processes for all stakeholders. For both 
preventive and post- disaster resettlement and relocation, where a 
decision is made to enact these options, decisions must be built in con-
sultation with – and with consensus between – those living in exposed 
areas or those affected by the disaster. The affected community and 
local authorities are lead stakeholders, and they can identify others 
who should be brought into this deliberative process. Information 
sharing, education and communication between stakeholders are 
needed to ensure decisions are made with complete ownership of the 
issues and knowledge of potential outcomes. Transparency of infor-
mation and intentions is of paramount importance in this process.
• Honour international covenants on resettlement. If a multi- stakeholder 
consultation identifies resettlement or relocation as being the most 








of rights, maintenance and diversification of livelihood opportunities, 
sustainable development, and adherence to principles of international 
covenants on resettlement must prevail.
• Share good practices. Sharing across local and state governments, 
between national governments and with civil society through 
exchanges, workshops and technical assistance will improve the 
practices and outcomes of risk- induced resettlement. Platforms for 
national and international discussions between policymakers and 
practitioners can heighten awareness of the issues.
Notes
 1. This is a cross- regional policy brief written after a two- day multi- stakeholder workshop held 
in Quito, Ecuador, 14– 15 October 2016 for the ‘Reducing Relocation Risk in Urban Areas’ pro-
ject. Available as Jain, G., C. Johnson, A. Lavell, S. Lwasa, A. Oliver-Smith and E. Wilkinson, 
2017. Risk-related Resettlement and Relocation in Urban Areas: Policy brief for the global south. 
London: Climate and Development Knowledge Network. https://cdkn.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/07/Risk-related-resettlement-CDKN.pdf.
 2. See Ferris, Elizabeth. 2014. Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating 
good practices and preparing for the future. Background document. Sanremo consultation, 12– 14 









Disaster- and hazard- induced urban 
resettlement in Latin America1
Introduction
Rapid urban growth, much of it fuelled by the migration of rural poor 
to the city, accompanied by a lack of sufficient access to safe land, poor 
urban land use planning and high levels of informality, marginality and 
exclusion, have led to large, unaccounted numbers of people living in 
hazard- prone areas in the cities of Latin America. Many of them live in 
areas subject to hydro- meteorological threats such as flooding, subsid-
ence and landslides. Climate change will probably increase the number 
and extent of such hazards, according to many observers.
Relocation and resettlement have been increasingly enacted to 
reduce disaster risk for hazard- prone populations. This has mostly been 
employed in post- impact circumstances, after a disaster. Relatively few 
preventative schemes can be found where a population is resettled prior 
to major impacts, damage and loss. Difficulties in adequately evaluating 
the real risk faced by populations, lack of finance, bureaucratic ineffi-
ciency and resistance to resettlement from the population are important 
factors in explaining the lack of preventative schemes.
Many resettlements fail, a lot of them miserably. This is particularly 
true with post- impact resettlement. The findings of the research project 
‘Reducing Relocation Risk in Urban Areas’ support prior conclusions as to 
the influence on such failures of the lack of beneficiary participation; lack 
of adequate finance; development at inadequate sites distant from work 
opportunities; over- concentration on physical infrastructure; and service 
provision as opposed to livelihood sustenance options. However, the sig-
nificant repetition of similar ‘errors’ in different contexts and cases sug-






which focused on decision- making and implementation at multiple sites 
in three Latin American countries, suggests the problem relates more to 
the ways resettlement is constructed as a problem and the associated sec-
tor mindsets than to specific, individual causes. The latter are, rather, a 
product of the former.
Recommendations
Avoiding the need for resettlement
1. Resettlement of populations should be the last possible management 
option and solely contemplated for extreme cases. Before deciding 
on resettlement of already exposed populations, all other possible 
options for reducing risk should be closely considered and costed. 
Participation of affected populations in such analysis is fundamental, 
and analysis should consider both disaster and everyday risk reduc-
tion needs, many of which are associated with poverty.
2. Avoidance of the need for post- event resettlement requires a vast 
improvement in land use planning, investment decision- making and 
urban governance. Availability of safe land through an increase in pub-
licly owned urban land is imperative if safe location is to be ensured.
3. Environmental degradation through such processes as deforestation, 
mining of urban slopes for building materials and filtering of waste-
water into surface strata must be controlled in order to prevent origi-
nally safe sites being converted into hazard- prone locations.
decision- making and implementation of resettlement
Baselines and legality
1. Resettlement, where deemed indispensable, does not have to be gov-
erned by a specific law, although this option may be contemplated 
under determined national and local conditions. Laws or norms that 
directly or indirectly impinge on resettlement should clearly establish 
the holistic and integral nature of this process, and the roles, types 
and levels of coordination and collaboration that must exist among 
relevant national and local government agencies that deal with disas-
ter and everyday risk concerns and urban planning stipulations.
2. Typologies of resettlement, according to type and size of urban area 
and type and size of resettlement, should be established and proce-
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On participation
1. Participation of the population must stop being seen by policymakers 
as demagogic and unnecessary. Decision- makers often view the par-
ticipation of society as a mechanism that hinders or delays processes 
due to the large number of interest groups that have to be taken into 
account. However, participation is the only way of ensuring appropri-
ation and rationalisation of costs and benefits among different inter-
est groups.
On the scientific and information basis for resettlement
1. A rigorous and objective scientific assessment of the actual risk condi-
tions of the population and the need for relocation must be available. 
This should be comprehensive and participatory. It must include not 
only a consideration of physical hazards (magnitude, intensity, recur-
rence, etc.) and the levels and types of exposure and vulnerability to 
these, but also the social needs of the population, the range of risk con-
texts they face and their overall attitudes and perceptions of risk and its 
different manifestations.
2. The national and local government institutions responsible for dis-
aster risk management must monitor areas of high unmitigable risk 
in order to avoid further urban occupation and densification and 
increased progression of risk in such areas.
On the siting of resettled communities and the use given  
to abandoned land
1. Location is fundamental for the success of resettlement. Location is 
often a surrogate or indicator of employment and income opportuni-
ties, costs of transport services to and from work or for recreational 
purposes, and access to service provision, as well as certain health- 
related and other social concerns. Maximum attention must be given 
to siting in light of these factors and circumstances.
2. Relocation or resettlement of urban populations is closely related to 
urban land use and planning issues and the spatial development of 
urban areas. The review and updating of existing legal frameworks relat-
ing to urban development planning and land use is urgently required in 
many countries, and should explicitly consider resettlement and its 
role in urban development.
3. Although it is normally considered that a community should be moved 
as a whole, this idea should not always dominate. Consideration 






segregation of an existing community with its relocation to different 
parts of a city. This may more adequately serve the interests and needs 
of the population in terms of work, income, social relations and costs.
4. Abandoned land should never be used for new housing or made 
available to other population groups through invasion or illegal 
occupation.
On settlement patterns and housing for relocated populations
1. Resettlement in urban areas should include all those services nec-
essary for a new generation of safe and healthy urban spaces. This 
requires participation and coordination of sector and territorial devel-
opment institutions in order to achieve the goal of safeguarding the 
physical and livelihood integrity of the population at risk.
2. Cultural diversity is the basis of numerous lifestyles in cities. These 
merit close consideration in the design of resettlement schemes 
in order to avoid traumatic changes in the target population. New 
houses should be functional and appropriate to the geographical condi-
tions and needs of the population, as well as being consistent with their 
customs.
3. Given the diversity of climates and customs that can prevail in a coun-
try, standardisation in the style, size and layout of housing for relocated 
populations should be avoided. The use of local materials and tech-
niques and the ‘local’ design of houses have a clear rationale, and 
knowledge is required about autochthonous or local styles in order 
to achieve improved results. Socially and culturally sensitive architects 
and builders must be employed, many from the areas where relocation 
is enacted.
4. The practice of granting free housing is not sustainable in general and 
must be avoided.
On financing of resettlement
1. Finance and technical expertise must be ensured and legislated 
beyond particular periods of government. Full financing for an inte-
grated approach to resettlement must be guaranteed from the outset.
2. The economic benefits generated by activities on abandoned land 
(income, employment, production etc.) can or should be shared with 
the relocated population, thus respecting and maintaining past ties to 
land, ensuring an additional incentive for accepting relocation and 
guaranteeing employment and income for the resettled population, 
or a part of it.
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Note
 1. This is an excerpt from a project policy brief from 2016 composed by Allan Lavell, Omar Darío 
Cardona, Ángel Chávez, Elizabeth Mansilla, Anthony Oliver- Smith and Pilar Pérez.
Further reading
Cernea, Michael M., ed. 1999. The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and chal-
lenges. Washington, DC: World Bank. http:// documents1.worldbank.org/ curated/ en/ 
790851468773055283/ pdf/ multi- page.pdf.
Correa, Elena. 2011. Populations at Risk of Disaster: A resettlement guide. With Fernando Ramírez 
and Haris Sanauja. Washington, DC: World Bank and GFDRR. https:// www.gfdrr.org/ sites/ 
gfdrr/ files/ publication/ resettlement_ guide_ 150.pdf.
Ferris, Elizabeth. 2014. Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating good 
practices and preparing for the future. Background document. Sanremo consultation, 12– 14 












Reimagining resettlement for risk 
reduction in urban India1
In India, people are relocated both after a disaster and in anticipation 
of one. In both cases, the outcomes are often detrimental. Land is often 
acquired for ‘resettlement and rehabilitation’ to move people out of dan-
gerous places, but there are no legal frameworks or safety net policies 
for those moved post- disaster. Specific policies are needed to support 
these people and ensure resettlement and relocation is good for cities at 
large. India has a weak national policy and legal institutional framework 
to deal with internally displaced populations. The current institutional 
mechanisms and authorities view the entire process of resettlement and 
rehabilitation as a means of sponsored welfare and relief rather than as 
people’s right to resettle. Compensation for disaster- affected people is 
always ex gratia (under moral obligation) by the state or national govern-
ment. There are limited market- based insurance instruments available 
for different types or combinations of hazards that often occur together. 
The penetration of these is further limited by restricted access by the 
poor and vulnerable people who need it most, which means that they are 
reliant on the state or national government for support.
Recommendations
summary of recommendations
• Relocation should be a last resort for risk reduction. Resettlement and 
relocation should only be done when sufficient assessments for all 
alternative options for risk reduction and development have been 
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equitable or effective or less socially and economically ‘costly’. If 
and when conducted, relocation and resettlement should always be 
accompanied by safety nets for those being resettled.
• For some settlements, relocation must be avoided at all costs, if (1) the 
settlement in an ‘untenable’ location is older than 10 years; and (2) 
there is no safe and viable location available within a minimum dis-
tance from the existing settlement (less than 2 km in rural and 5 km in 
urban areas) such that continuity of the life and services that they are 
accustomed to can be maintained. Once relocated, households must 
be protected against any future forced relocation, by offering tenure 
security.
• Disaster management authorities need to work in close partnership with 
housing and development authorities in order to conduct regular risk 
assessments pre- emptively, and have plans for resettlement for all 
exposed populations in a way that adds developmental gains and is 
not detrimental to the environment.
Gaps in decision- making processes
Triggers and alternatives to relocation
1. Most often, the decision to take action post- disaster is based on the 
urgency of the situation, where many people have lost all forms of 
shelter. It is important to understand the long- term implications of 
resettlement, particularly when there is not enough information to 
conduct any detailed environmental or socio- economic assessments.
2. In some cases, the intervention is a political move and the moments 
of disaster are being used as an opportunity to build housing stock for 
the future in line with the overall growth vision of the city, and not 
necessarily for the benefit of those for whom the aid money may 
have been received. The result is that the housing provided is not 
useful for the allotted beneficiaries and risks remaining vacant, or 
worse, can amount to increased aggregated socio-economic risks for 
the city.
3. The urban context of such interventions is different from the rural. 
This is particularly due to the contested and limited land resource 
in the former, and often, alternate uses of the vacated land drive the 
decisions for relocation. If the vacated land is put to an alternate use, 
other than environmental, the costs of relocation and upgradation for 








4. In most cases, alternatives to relocation are not assessed fully. Once 
resettled, it is assumed that the communities’ needs are met even for 
the future – whereas people’s experiences suggest that their regular 
costs seem to increase post- relocation, while their ability to deal with 
future shocks decreases. So there needs to be an understanding of 
long- term implications on people’s lives and livelihoods at the time of 
relocation decisions.
Institutional design
1. There is a lack of multi- scalar institutional design of these interven-
tions, where community participation is enabled within the project 
design phases.
2. Participation is being left for the last stages of the project – if at all – 
instead of including people from the early design and planning stage. 
Participation and sense of ownership, once enabled, can have longer- 
term benefits for development. Urban settlements are also more het-
erogeneous than rural settlements, which can pose challenges for 
enabling participation.
Incentive structures
1. Inclusion and exclusion of some households within larger settlements 
is known to tamper with the existing social and economic inequali-
ties, and may not be equitable owing to the current beneficiary selec-
tion criteria and processes. Yet universal housing allocation is neither 
a solution nor implementable.
2. Although there is a culture of using public transport in cities, relo-
cating people by more than 5 km is still leading to economic stresses 
faced by the communities, and thereby resistance to relocating. It is 
clear that proximity of public transport is not the same as people being 
able to affordably access it.
3. Where there are many housing schemes ongoing, different cost struc-
tures and provisions in each present themselves as disincentives to 
participate in one over the other. Even within one housing scheme, 
one size doesn’t fit all, as the family needs and requirements vary, and 
often the site discrepancies also require different pricing structures 
within each scheme.
4. People perceive risks differently from the state, and each acts based on 
their knowledge and perception of these risks as well as their abilities 
to respond to them.
 
 




1. On the one hand, housing undertaken in a purely developmental 
context often ignores hazard risk reduction as part of the mandate. 
On the other hand, while post- disaster housing developments may 
address hazard exposure, they are often seen as creating other socio- 
economic risks. These two kinds of housing interventions are con-
ducted by multiple agencies with no cross- learning opportunities.
2. Beneficiary identification based on select, objective criteria could be 
misleading. Reasons for the lack of identity cards could further lead 
to exclusion from entitlements, and beneficiary identification needs 
to be substantiated with alternative conditions of selection.
3. Provision of temporary transit housing needs to be made part of hous-
ing schemes, including those that involve in situ housing, for greater 
success of the intervention.
4. Emergency shelters, particularly in urban areas, are not sufficiently 
equipped for the needs during disaster evacuations.
Lack of flexibility
1. There is still a lack of sensitivity to caste and disability at the time of 
beneficiary identification. Mixing of castes occurs at the time of relo-
cation, and this is leading to high risks for particularly vulnerable 
groups. Community mobilisers must have sufficient autonomy for 
working closely with the target settlements to be able to identify and 
address these as they come up on a case- by- case basis.
2. A multi- stage grievance redress system that is accessible to one and all 
needs to be in place in urban areas, to correct for any excluded house-
holds that have been disadvantaged because of their lack of political 
powers.
3. Transferring money to existing beneficiary bank accounts may not be 
possible as they have lower transfer limits.
Innovations
Innovative interventions such as the mason training programme could 
reduce the challenges of skills scarcity during large- scale interventions, 
but their impacts on long- term economic diversification and other social 







Policies and programme design
Research shows that relocation almost always disturbs the balance of the 
existing neighbourhood, yet there are situations where relocation is the 
only means to reduce exposure. While it is not recommended to have a 
blanket policy of relocation for reducing risk, as this could be used as a 
pretext for evictions and development, it is still advisable to have some 
safety recommendations in terms of what these relocation interventions 
must consider, and what the ‘no- go’ conditions for relocation are.
for in situ reconstruction and upgrading
This should be the status quo decision, unless it is documented in detail 
that despite structural interventions, relocation is the only means of 
reducing risk exposure, as well as providing improved overall develop-
ment outcomes for the people.
for relocation
1. Relocation is recommended only as long as in situ upgrading or early 
warning- based risk reduction options are not viable.
2. The distance between old and new sites must be minimal (less than 
2 km in rural and 5 km in urban areas) such that continuity of life 
and services that people are accustomed to can be maintained, even if 
provision of new services is not planned.
3. Rather than the size of the settlement, it is seen that the levels of homo-
geneity must direct the design of the relocation and resettlement.
for all interventions aimed at risk reduction
1. It is recommended to conduct detailed assessments for the most 
vulnerable settlements prior to actual extreme events, and invest-
ing in early warning systems (particularly for climatic and hydro- 
meteorological hazards) to avoid disruptions.
2. Making people aware on a regular basis and keeping them involved in 
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3. Suitable models and simulations of climate change must be devised 
to inform design and policy actions for long- term risk reduction. For 
instance, moving people so that they continue to stay on the coast 
could be re- evaluated with future scenarios of sea- level rise, etc., along 
with the implications of costs and benefits in various timeframes.
4. It is often advocated to have the beneficiaries contribute financially 
for some ‘skin in the game’, thereby encouraging participation and 
involvement. However, it is also seen that these financial require-
ments often become additional burdens, and can exclude those who 
cannot afford such investments. In such cases, participation can also 
be enabled by involving people in other ways, such as construction, 
thereby ensuring quality and ownership.
5. The project design should include appropriate methods to rehabili-
tate or restore livelihoods and economic patterns. If the same liveli-
hoods cannot be restored, alternative livelihood options need to be 
identified, based on their existing skills.
6. All risk reduction interventions must include a long-term monitoring 
and evaluation component, to ensure that the objectives are met, and 
no new risks are created in the process or over time. Lessons from 
different interventions should be documented comprehensively, and 
used to inform and improve future interventions.
Characteristics of settlements where relocation must  
be avoided at all costs
1. If the age of the original settlement living in ‘untenable’ locations is 
older than 10 years, relocation is not recommended as a means for 
risk reduction. Tenability assessments can be no older than five years, 
since adaptation strategies come into play after that and people learn 
to cope with their risks.
2. Once relocated, households must be protected against any future 
forced relocations. This could also enable tenure security.
Definitions used in this brief
• Untenable slums: According to Rajiv Awas Yojna’s Guidelines 
for Slum Free City Plan of Action 2013– 22, an untenable slum is 
defined as slum pockets in the following locations: 1. Major storm 





alignment areas; 5. Banks of rivers or water bodies; 6. Beds of rivers 
or water bodies; 7. Others (hazardous or objectionable) including 
high- tension lines.
• Pre- emptive vs. post- disaster risk management: Disaster risk manage-
ment is seen by some as comprising three distinct yet complementary 
types – corrective or post- disaster, whereby existing risk is the centre 
of attention and reduction the goal; pre- emptive, where the avoid-
ance or prevention (within bounded limits) of future risk is the goal; 
and compensatory, where residual risk is dealt with through different 
social and economic mechanisms.
Note
 1. This is an excerpt from a project policy brief composed in 2016 available as Jain, G. (2017). 
Re-imagining Resettlement for Risk Reduction in Urban India. London: Climate and Development 
Knowledge Network. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/development/sites/bartlett/files/ 
policy_briefs_regional_india_-_final_final.pdf.
Further reading
Cernea, Michael M., ed. 1999. The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and chal-
lenges. Washington, DC: World Bank. http:// documents1.worldbank.org/ curated/ en/ 
790851468773055283/ pdf/ multi- page.pdf.
Ferris, Elizabeth. 2014. Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating good 
practices and preparing for the future. Background document. Sanremo consultation, 12– 14 
March, 2014. UNHCR, Brookings- LSE and Georgetown University. https:// www.unhcr.org/ 
53c4d6f99.pdf.
Jha, Abhas Kumar and Jennifer E. Duyne. 2010. Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: A handbook for 
reconstructing after natural disasters. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development/ World Bank.
Lama, Mahendra P. 2000. ‘Internal displacement in India: Causes, protection and dilemmas’. Forced 
Migration Review 8: 24– 26. https:// www.fmreview.org/ sites/ fmr/ files/ FMRdownloads/ en/ 
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Building better to build back 
better: understanding value, cost 
and risk in Kampala, Uganda1
In Kampala, Uganda, where the topography is a series of hills and low- 
lying wetland areas, the most serious climate- induced disasters are local-
ised or large- scale flooding, which often leads to cascading impacts on 
health, loss of income, disruption of livelihoods and destruction of prop-
erty and infrastructure. Flooding- related events are likely to increase 
with climate change. People living in informal settlements in low- lying 
wetland areas are the most frequently and heavily impacted. The urban 
poor and many who are not poor are forced to make settlement decisions 
that expose them to these risks, because of the options of minimising 
costs by living in these areas as well as the opportunities accrued from 
the locations, such as access to food, livelihoods and schools.
Urban expansion in the Kampala region is driven by the coupling of 
demographic shifts and private- sector developments, fuelled by the land 
market and the opening up of land for development. The city is described 
as a ‘runaway’ city and most development is informal. The nature by which 
the city has developed over the decades makes it difficult and impracti-
cal to deconstruct existing developments, so government- driven resettle-
ment is not common, although people do try to move themselves out of 
the worst- flooded areas if they have the means. Current approaches to 
reducing flood risk in Kampala are based solely on infrastructural devel-
opment, such as waste management and the improvement and mainte-
nance of drainage systems. These alleviate the risk in the immediate area 
of the intervention, but exacerbate the problem downstream in other 
wetlands, including polluting Lake Victoria.
This briefing presents an alternative approach to reducing risk with 





existing settlements are exposed, reduction of risk can benefit from a 
wide range of non- grey infrastructure.
Recommendations
on risk- embedded urban development
1. Urban development can be ‘built better’ to take disaster events and 
climate change impacts on future urban growth into consideration. 
Current and future risks need to be embedded into all development 
decisions, including decisions around where and how to build infra-
structure and industry.
2. Where existing settlements are already exposed, reduction of risk 
can benefit from a combination of grey- green- blue infrastructure 
for a holistic stormwater management system that is robust and eco-
logically friendly. This can include sustainable urban drainage design 
principles (SUDs), such as leaving more green areas on properties for 
stormwater absorption.
3. Prioritising green infrastructure, by protecting existing wetlands and 
natural areas from further encroachment through stronger implemen-
tation of the National Policy for the Conservation and Management 
of Wetland Resources in urban areas. This could include initiatives 
such as physically delineating wetland boundaries, and enhanced 
public communication about the importance of protecting wetlands 
in urban areas.
4. Revision of the building codes and standards so that they are flexible 
enough to enable more space for water absorption on plots, and tech-
nologies for affordable, decent housing.
5. Consideration for incentives for communities who have long contrib-
uted financially and technologically to risk reduction through scalable 
solutions from the household to citywide scales, such as those who 
are maintaining and improving drainage in their areas, community- 
driven waste management practices, and greening of properties.
on decision- making processes for resettlement
1. Understanding the options for disaster risk management requires 
looking at the exposure of people now and in the future, the costs of 
the impacts, both to the city and to the households, and the values that 
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to stay in the areas that are regularly flooded, despite the negative 
economic and health impacts from the flooding, because there are 
economic opportunities in these areas, such as access to affordable 
food and transport, and business prospects. Options for disaster risk 
management need to address the opportunities that people have or 
the values they place on living in these areas, otherwise people will 
continue to occupy these places.
2. Resettlement in Kampala is impractical. Over 60 per cent of Kampala’s 
built- up area is informal settlements. Land tenure systems have had 
considerable influence on the way the city has grown; tenure is com-
plicated and there can be multiple claims to a plot. Informal settle-
ments are predominantly on private mailo lands, or where customary 
tenants have freehold or leasehold rights. In practice, this means that 
the governing body, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), has 
less power over how the land is used. While the constitution affords the 
state the right to acquire land for the common good of all citizens, in 
practice, it is expensive and impractical for the state to enact compul-
sory land acquisition at scale.
3. Existing informal settlements should stay where they are, and people 
should be allowed to stay in places that they already occupy if they 
wish to. Rather than resettlement, reducing the impacts of flooding 
through grey- green- blue infrastructure is a better option in these set-
tlements. This is currently the predominant position of the Kampala 
Capital City Authority, through its designation of heavily built- up 
areas as ‘vanquished wetlands’ and its investments in better drain-
age for these areas. The infrastructure deficit increases the risks in 
informal settlements. But it is important to highlight that the urban 
poor have demonstrated individual and group ingenuity in creating 
diverse, risk- minimising socio- technical infrastructure solutions. 
Flooding in informal settlements, such as in Bwaise and Natete, 
results in high economic costs for households, incurring an average 
US$13.6 per month on costs associated with flooding, which is a 
high proportion of the average income of US$62.8. At the neighbour-
hood scale, estimated household expenditure on flood- related costs is 
$17.4 million annually.2
4. Many people who are living in the worst flooding areas have indicated 
they are willing or wanting to move if they can secure land and hous-
ing elsewhere. Identifying these people and developing programmes 
to enable them to move to other areas, including accompanying land 
tenure, would enable greening of wetland areas. However, freed- up 




on implementation of resettlement
1. Resettlement and forced evictions as a result of urban development or 
urban infrastructure projects, including those intended to reduce risk, 
should stop. There is a need for a comprehensive, all- encompassing 
resettlement framework with a socially just valuation system that 
can reduce the disruption of life and social systems of affected peo-
ple. Where resettlement is the only option, compensation for people’s 
property rights and the disruption of social and economic systems 
should be based on just, market- informed valuation.
2. Where risk has been identified and strategies for its reduction imple-
mented, resettlement has been undertaken but in a way that is largely 
programme- or project- specific, unfair and disfavours the urban poor. 
For example, urban infrastructure projects, such as drainage chan-
nel widening in Kampala (KIIDP I and II), are designed to reduce 
urban flooding and improve road infrastructure. Both of the projects 
have prepared a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) in line with 
national and local legal frameworks that regulate land relations in 
Uganda. Depending on their property rights, people to be resettled 
are compensated for their loss (of land, property or access) either 
in kind or cash. However, the compensation is not applied consist-
ently, fairly or evenly by local and/ or state authorities. Those receiv-
ing compensation do not receive enough money to replace what has 
been lost. There is no comprehensive ‘resettlement’ where new land, 
housing and services are offered. Renters and other forms of tenancy 
are left out of compensation and are often not included in communi-
cations about impending evictions. While there is a need for effective 
resettlement policies, in practice, this is constrained by larger land 
market dynamics and the impacts of uncontrolled urbanisation.
Notes
 1. This is an excerpt from a project policy brief from 2016 composed by Shuaib Lwasa, Cassidy 
Johnson, Colin Marx, Teddy Kisembo and Charlotte Barrow.
 2. Benoit Laplante et al. 2008. Assessment of Economic Costs and Benefits of Flooding in Kampala. 
Kampala: Focus Cities Kampala.
Further reading
Lwasa, Shuaib. 2010. ‘Adapting urban areas in Africa to climate change: The case of Kampala’. 
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